"Presents, and in part develops, a systematic philosophy as the universal science, or the theorization of the unrestricted universe of discourse, explicitly including being as such and as a whole. Argues that complete exploration of the theoretical domain requires such a science"--Provided by publisher.

Ch. 1: Inadequate approaches to the question of God -- 1.1. Initial clarifications -- 1.2 Wholly unsystematic direct approaches -- 1.3. Semi-systematic indirect approaches -- 1.4. A wholly anti-systematic, anti-theoretical, and direct approach: Ludwig Wittgenstein -- 1.5. A characteristic example of a failed critique: Thomas Nagel's objections to God as "last point" -- Ch. 2. Heidegger's thinking of Being: the flawed development of a significant approach -- 2.1. Heidegger's failed and distorting interpretation and critique of the Christian metaphysics of Being (...) -- 2.2. Heidegger's four approaches to "retrieving" the "question of being" -- 2.3. What is unthought in Heidegger's thinking of Being I: Being-as-Ereignis -- 2.4. What is unthought in Heidegger's "thinking of Being" II: Being and being(s)- Ereignis and Ereignete(s) -- 2.5. The "overcoming [Überwinding] of metaphysics" as "transformational recovering [Verwindung]" of metaphysics and "the end of the history of Being" -- 2.6. The status of Heideggerian thinking I: thinking of Being as thinking within Ereignis, thinking that reaches its destination with Ereignis (Denken, das in das Ereignis einkehrt) -- 2.7. The status of Heideggerian thinking II: absolute claim, provisionality, the poverty of language, the language of thinking, the finitude of thinking -- 2.8. Heidegger's thinking and the topic "God" -- 2.9. Heidegger's "thinking": a fundamentally deficient and confused form of thinking -- Ch. 3:The structural-systematic approach to a theory of Being and God -- 3.1. The systematic context: the theoretical framework of the structural-systematic philosophy -- 3.2. The unrestricted universe of discourse as the universal dimension of primordial Being -- 3.3. Explication of the dimension of Being I: theory of Being as such -- 3.4. Explication of the dimension of Being II: theory of Being as a whole -- 3.5. Explication of the relation between absolutely necessary Being and the contingent dimension of Being as key to a conception of absolutely necessary Being as minded (as personal) -- 3.6. Absolutely necessary minded (personal) Being as creator of the world (as absolute creating) -- 3.7. The clarified relation between Being and God and the task of developing an integral theory about God -- Ch. 4: Critical examination of two counterpositions: Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion -- 4.1. Levinas's misguided conception of transcendence "beyond B/being" -- 4.2. Jean-Luc Marion's failed conception of "radical and non-metaphysical transcendence" and of "God without Being". (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Preliminaries 1 The Highly Problematic Status of the Category of Substance 2 A New Approach: Prime State of Affairs (“Pristate”) as the Only Ontological Category at the Fundamental Level 3 Concluding Remarks.

I have frequently mentioned objective problems and topics in the preceding sections. But what exactly is the force of ‘objective’ here? As my remarks should have made clear I have been using ‘objective’ to contrast with ‘purely historical’. A ‘purely historical’ approach never gets beyond reproduction, commentary, and interpretation. I call an approach ‘objective’ when it involves a philosopher who advances his own theses and claims. This minimal understanding of ‘objectivity’ (in the context of my remarks in this paper) by (...) no means implies that there are problems and topics, systems of concepts, methods, and similar factors that are ‘eternal’, completely independent of the contingencies of history (of philosophy, of the sciences), that are not relative to a language, to a logic, to a model, etc. Indeed whether there are problems, etc., in just this absolute, atemporal sense is itself a question for systematic philosophy. It seems clear that the formulation of a problem can only take place against a cognitive background of some sort and within some ‘conceptual scheme’. 34 Such an assumption is made by most if not all analytic philosophers. But the fact that a philosophical tradition recognizes ‘conceptual schemes’ does not make it a ‘purely historical’, non-objective philosophy, in the sense already introduced and described. A philosopher who explicitly accepts a certain ‘conceptual scheme’ proceeds in an entirely objective and systematic (and not purely historical) manner when, within this framework, he formulates his own theses. (shrink)

The paper attempts to clarify some fundamental aspects of an explanationof the concept of truth which is neither “deflationary” nor “substantive”.The main aspect examined in detail concerns the ontological dimension of truth, the mind/language-world connection traditionally associated with the concept of truth. It is claimed that it does not make sense to defend or reject a relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension so long as the kind of presupposed or envisaged ontology is not made explicit and critically examined. In (...) particular, it is shown that generally an “objectual” ontology is – often only implicitly – presupposed, i.e., an ontology admitting “objects” (substances), properties, relations, sometimes also facts, events, and the like. The paper demonstrates that such an ontology derives from the Principle of Semantic Sentential Compositionality and that this principle should be rejected. It introduces instead the Principle of Semantic Sentential Contextuality (or Context Principle) as the semantic basis of a new ontology, an ontology of “primary states of affairs”. After sketching such an ontology, it is shown that the relatedness of truth to the ontological dimension becomes intelligible. (shrink)

Mit dem vorliegenden Werk schliesst Lorenz B. Puntel seine Seinstrilogie ab; die beiden vorherigen Bande sind unter dem Titel Struktur und Sein (2006) und Sein und Gott (2010) erschienen. Der neue Band fuhrt das in den anderen Banden nur inchoativ formulierte gesamtsystematische philosophische Programm aus. Lorenz B. Puntel betrachtet das Thema Sein und Nichts als das ursprungliche Thema der Philosophie und stellt daruber eine umfassende Theorie auf. Diese Theorie nennt er Seinstheorie; sie besteht aus den beiden Subtheorien: Ontologie (...) als Theorie (des Seins) der Seienden und Einailogie als Theorie des Seins selbst oder als solchen. Ausgangspunkt ist die von Heidegger eingefuhrte ontologische Differenz, die Unterscheidung von Sein und Seienden. In eingehenden, auf den einschlagigen Originaltexten der wichtigsten Philosophen basierenden Ausfuhrungen wird der Nachweis gefuhrt, dass der in der Philosophiegeschichte feststellbare Grundmangel in der haufigen totalen und in sehr wenigen Fallen partiellen Ignorierung der grossen Seinsfrage besteht; nirgends wird diese in adaquater Weise thematisiert. In Teil II arbeitet der Autor die Grundzuge sowohl der allgemeinen Ontologie als auch der Einailogie heraus. Zwei grundlegende Thesen werden bewiesen: die Moglichkeit des relativen Nichts, d. h. des Verschwindens aller Seienden auf der Basis ihrer Kontingenz, und die Unmoglichkeit des absoluten Nichts, d. h. des Verschwindens des Seins selbst auf der Basis seines notwendigen Status. Gezeigt wird schliesslich, dass dem Sein selbst eine geistige Verfasstheit innewohnt, die aus Intelligenz/Denken, Wille und Freiheit besteht, womit die Moglichkeit eroffnet wird, dass das notwendige geistig verfasste und damit freie Sein sich weiter offenbaren kann. Dem nachzugehen, setzt aber eine grundlegende methodische und thematische Zasur voraus. (shrink)

The necessary task for philosophy is the development of a metaphysical ontology, i.e., a philosophical theory of everything. The urgency of this task is apparentin, for example, the weakness of proofs for the existence of God. When such “proofs” are not rooted in a comprehensive metaphysical ontology, the principlesapplied, as well as the “God” whose existence has supposedly been proven, are unintelligible. Thus, the explication of Being, from within an adequately articulated framework, should be the central focus of philosophy. The (...) basic conceptual structures required for this task are the three fundamental modalities: necessity, possibility, and contingency. With these tools, we can refute the thesis that everything is contingent and nothing is necessary or absolute. The all-is-contingent thesis has as an implication the assumption of the possibility of absolute nothingness. But this concept both is itself contradictory and has an impossible consequence. Finally, the relation between the absolute dimension of being and persons like us (contingent beings) can be understood by conceiving of the absolute dimension as a personal absolute. From here, we can attempt to interpret the history of the free acts of the personal absolute by studying the history of revealed religions. (shrink)

Propósito deste ensaio é apresentar uma nova abordagem ao velho problema que é o acesso filosófico ao Deus cristão. Isto acontece dentro do esquema de uma nova metafísica cujo ponto de partida é a capacidade que a mente tem de percepcionar a totalidade do ser, facto este que o artigo apresenta como sendo justamente uma estrutura central do intelecto. Dado que as distinções entre intelecto e mundo, conceitos e realidade, sujeito e objecto, etc., já pressupõem a totalidade do ser dada (...) perceptivamente e nela está baseada, esta totalidade, assim concebida, torna-se mais fundamental que todas aquelas famosas distinções. A tarefa dessa nova metafísica aqui em questão consiste em explicitar uma explicação desta totalidade. No presente artigo, esta explicação é desenvolvida apenas numa direcção, a saber, a explicação no sentido de como proceder da totalidade do ser para o Deus cristão. Neste sentido, uma distinção fundamental é feita entre "o Absoluto" e "Deus ". A filosofia tradicional acreditou frequentemente que a filosofia só poderia explicitar a "determinação" do absoluto como criador do universo finito. O autor do artigo visa justamente demonstrar que outras determinações do Absoluto podem ser filosoficamente alcançadas; mas isto pressupõe que a história da liberdade do Absoluto seja radicalmente tomada em consideração. Ora isto, por sua vez, significa que a história e interpretação da religião - especialmente da religião segundo a tradição judaico-cristã - tem de ser vista como um tópico filosófico verdadeiramente central. Assim compreendido, o Absoluto é apropriadamente designado por "Deus ". Segue-se que uma das consequências desta abordagem é a de que uma vincada distinção entre filosofia tradicional e teologia tradicional cristã deve ser abandonada. /// The purpose of this essay is to present a new approach to the old problem of philosophical access to the Christian God. This is done within the frame of a new metaphysics whose starting point is the mind's perception of the totality of being which is shown to be a central structural feature of the mind as such. Since the distinctions between mind and world, concepts and reality, subject and object, and the like, already presuppose the perceptually given totality of being and are based on it, this totality, so concei-ved, is more fundamental than all those famous distinctions. The task of the envisaged new metaphysics consists in working out an explication of this totality. In this paper this explication is developed only in one direction: the explication in the sense of how to proceed from the totality of being to the Christian God. To this effect, a fundamental distinction is made between "the Absolute" and " God". Traditional philosophy had constantly believed that philosophy could only work out the "determination "of the Absolute as the creator of the finite universe. The paper endeavours to demonstrate that further determinations of the Absolute can be philosophically reached; but this presupposes that the history of the freedom of the Absolute is radically taken into account. And this, in turn, amounts to the claim that the history and interpretation of religion - most especially according to the Judaic-Christian tradition -must be seen as a central philosophical topic. Thus understood, the Absolute is appropriately called " God". One of the consequences of this approach is that the sharp distinction between traditional philosophy and traditional Christian theology should be abandoned. (shrink)

1. Philosophiegeschichtlichkritischer Versuch über das Grundproblem der Metaphysik.

Dialectics and Formalization. In an appendix to his article Can the concept of dialectic be made clear? (JGPS 27: 131–165) the author critically examined an attempt by D. Wandschneider of reconstructing Hegelian dialectical logic by displaying antinomic structures. The main steps of this reconstruction were formalized within the framework of second order predicate logic. In his reply (JGPS 27: 347–352) Wandschneider argues that formalization is the wrong way of interpreting and judging his reconstruction project on the ground that the understanding (...) of predication is already presupposed by predicate logic and, therefore, cannot be formalized. In the present contribution it is shown that Wandschneider's criticism is based on a fundamentally mistaken conception of formalization and formal logic and that the problems posed by his project remain completely unresolved. (shrink)

The necessary task for philosophy is the development of a metaphysical ontology, i.e., a philosophical theory of everything. The urgency of this task is apparentin, for example, the weakness of proofs for the existence of God. When such “proofs” are not rooted in a comprehensive metaphysical ontology, the principlesapplied, as well as the “God” whose existence has supposedly been proven, are unintelligible. Thus, the explication of Being, from within an adequately articulated framework, should be the central focus of philosophy. The (...) basic conceptual structures required for this task are the three fundamental modalities: necessity, possibility, and contingency. With these tools, we can refute the thesis that everything is contingent and nothing is necessary or absolute. The all-is-contingent thesis has as an implication the assumption of the possibility of absolute nothingness. But this concept both is itself contradictory and has an impossible consequence. Finally, the relation between the absolute dimension of being and persons like us (contingent beings) can be understood by conceiving of the absolute dimension as a personal absolute. From here, we can attempt to interpret the history of the free acts of the personal absolute by studying the history of revealed religions. (shrink)

The article aims to show that current understandings and developments of “metaphysics,” in both analytic and continental philosophy, fail to do justice both to the metaphysical tradition as a whole and to the potentialities inherent in that tradition’s mode and aim of thinking. The root failure is the failure to recognize that Thomas Aquinas, by distinguishing between ens and esse, reveals that metaphysics must thematize Being (esse) as well as being(s) (ens/entia). To be sure, Aquinas’s understanding of Being solely as (...) actus essendi is fundamentally inadequate, but Being is not even a topic for analytic philosophy, for which metaphysical questions concern only being(s). The article takes seriously Heidegger’s (only partially correct) charge that an “oblivion of Being” pervades metaphysics and, against Heidegger, shows how to conceive of and develop an adequate theory of Being. (shrink)

The first section states two general theses: the claim that semeantic features are not expressible in language is indefensible; and, the role semantic expressions play in language consists in making language fully determinate. The second section elaborates on the main thesis of the paper; that is, ‘... is true’ expresses neither a predicate nor a PROsentence-forming operator (R. Brandom), but a PERsentence- (and PERproposition-) forming operator (‘PER’ from ‘PERfect’ or ‘PERform’). Contrary to the ‘anaphoric’ conception, it is argued that the (...) truth operator functions ‘cataphorically’ in the following sense: it applies to semantically indeterminate (or underdetermined) sentences (and propositions) and yields fully determinate sentences (and propositions), i.e., PERsentences (and PERpropositions). This leads to a surprisingly new understanding of (Tarski’s) Tbiconditionals. The final section shows how to conceive of the fully determinate semantical and ontological status of sentences and propositions. (shrink)

The present article purports to show that the protocol sentence debate, pursued by some leading members of the Vienna Circle in the mid-1930s, was essentially a controversy over the explanation and the real significance of the concept of truth. It is further shown that the fundamental issue underlying the discussions about the concept of truth was the relationship between form and content, as well as between logic/language and the world. R. Carnap was the philosopher who most explicitly and systematically attempted (...) to come to grips with this problem. It is shown that the form-content distinction pervades the three most important phases of Carnap's philosophical development: the structuralist (in Der logische Aufbau der Welt), the syntactical and the semantical. His final semantical stance is essentially determined by the concept of linguistic frameworks. The article purports to demonstrate that this concept cannot be dispensed with in philosophy, but that Carnap failed to work out its ontological implications. Finally, the concept of an internal ontology is briefly delineated. (shrink)

The present article purports to answer the old question of whether the concept (and the method) of Hegelian dialectic can be clarified. Three arguments are advanced in defence of the claim that Hegel's conception is not in fact intelligible. The first argument shows that dialectical negation leads to an infinite regress. The second argument analyses Hegel's claim that the dialectical method yields a positive result and demonstrates that this claim remains completely unsubstantiated and unsubstantiable. The third argument comes to the (...) conclusion that Hegelian dialectic cannot pretend to be an acceptable explication of the “intuitive” understanding of negation. An APPENDIX examines critically a new attempt by D. Wandschneider of reconstructing the first steps of Hegelian dialectical logic by displaying “antinomic structures” and by employing (at least to a limited extent) the techniques of formal logic. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider certain cardinals in ZF (set theory without AC, the axiom of choice). In ZFC (set theory with AC), given any cardinals C and D, either C ≤ D or D ≤ C. However, in ZF this is no longer so. For a given infinite set A consider $\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)$ , the set of all sequences of A without repetition. We compare $|\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)|$ , the cardinality of this set, to |P(A)|, the cardinality of (...) the power set of A. What is provable about these two cardinals in ZF? The main result of this paper is that $ZF \vdash \forall A(|\operatorname{seq}^{1 - 1}(A)| \neq|\mathscr{P}(\mathscr{A})|)$ , and we show that this is the best possible result. Furthermore, it is provable in ZF that if B is an infinite set, then $|\operatorname{fin}(B)| <|\mathscr{P}(B)|$ even though the existence for some infinite set B* of a function f from $\operatorname{fin}(B^\ast)$ onto P(B*) is consistent with ZF. (shrink)

For a ⊆ b ⊆ ω with b\ a infinite, the set D = {x ∈ [ω]ω : a ⊆ x ⊆ b} is called a doughnut. A set S ⊆ [ω]ω has the doughnut property [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL D] if it contains or is disjoint from a doughnut. It is known that not every set S ⊆ [ω]ω has the doughnut property, but S has the doughnut property if it has the Baire property ℬ or the Ramsey property ℛ. (...) In this paper it is shown that a finite support iteration of length ω1 of Cohen forcing, starting from L, yields a model for CH + equation image + equation image + equation image. (shrink)

Die "Gottesfrage" ist anerkanntermaßen eine äußerst komplexe, vieldeutige und obskure Frage. In ausführlicher Auseinandersetzung mit Heidegger, in dessen Schriften eine sehr einflussreiche einseitige und entstellende Interpretation und Kritik der großen metaphysischen Tradition immer wieder präsentiert wird, zeigt Lorenz B. Puntel, dass die Gottesfrage klar, rational und argumentativ, kurz: mit theoretischer Rigorosität, behandelt werden kann. Dies aber setzt einen umfassenden philosophischen Theorierahmen voraus, der die Entfaltung einer systematischen Konzeption des Seins als solchen und im Ganzen ermöglicht und in nuce enthält. (...) Anschließend wird eine solche Konzeption im Grundriss zur Darstellung gebracht. In einem ausführlichen Kapitel werden die Positionen von É. Lévinas und J.-L. Marion, den zwei wohl radikalsten postmodernen Kritikern und Gegnern jeder Form eines positiven Verhältnisses zwischen dem "Sein(sdenken)" und (dem Thema) "Gott", eingehend analysiert und deren radikale Unhaltbarkeit demonstriert. (shrink)

Die "Gottesfrage" ist anerkanntermaßen eine äußerst komplexe, vieldeutige und obskure Frage. In ausführlicher Auseinandersetzung mit Heidegger, in dessen Schriften eine sehr einflussreiche einseitige und entstellende Interpretation und Kritik der großen metaphysischen Tradition immer wieder präsentiert wird, zeigt Lorenz B. Puntel, dass die Gottesfrage klar, rational und argumentativ, kurz: mit theoretischer Rigorosität, behandelt werden kann. Dies aber setzt einen umfassenden philosophischen Theorierahmen voraus, der die Entfaltung einer systematischen Konzeption des Seins als solchen und im Ganzen ermöglicht und in nuce enthält. (...) Anschließend wird eine solche Konzeption im Grundriss zur Darstellung gebracht. In einem ausführlichen Kapitel werden die Positionen von É. Lévinas und J.-L. Marion, den zwei wohl radikalsten postmodernen Kritikern und Gegnern jeder Form eines positiven Verhältnisses zwischen dem "Sein" und "Gott", eingehend analysiert und deren radikale Unhaltbarkeit demonstriert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 122-123 [Access article in PDF] Andreas Kamp. Philosophiehistorie als Rezeptionsgeschichte. Die Reaktion auf Aristoteles' De Anima-Noetik. Der frühe Hellenismus. Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner, 2001. Pp. viii + 315. Cloth, $82.00. This book is the first installment of an extraordinarily ambitious project. The plan is to investigate the reception of Aristotle's conception of the intellect, set out in De Anima 3.4-5, in (...) the subsequent history of philosophy, from Theophrastus to the present.The current volume deals with the natural starting-point for this project, philosophy in the early Hellenistic period, centering on Theophrastus and his tenure as head of the Peripatos, the school that Aristotle founded.Kamp begins with an engaging, somewhat lengthy introduction, which remains curiously remote from what one might expect it to concentrate on, namely Aristotle's conception of the intellect. Apart from presenting an outline of the reception of Aristotle's philosophical work in general from Theophrastus to Sigmund Freud, the introduction includes only one short paragraph specifically on the topic of the intellect (12). This paragraph, which comes closest to revealing Kamp's reason for focusing, of all things, on Aristotle's discussion of the intellect in De Anima3.4-5, simply makes two unsubstantiated claims. First, Kamp claims that the conception of the intellect, as presented in those chapters, is at the center of the Aristotelian system; and secondly, that this is, of all Aristotelian and perhaps all philosophical theories, the one that received the highest level of attention in the subsequent history of philosophy. The reader might be content to wait and let the second claim be borne out, in the present volume and beyond; but the first claim—concerning the centrality of the intellect, and of De Anima3.4-5, to Aristotle's thought—should at least have received some specification and illustration.The central part of the book, and philosophically by far the most interesting, concerns Theophrastus. Kamp begins with an extensive discussion of the political, social, and economic circumstances of Theophrastus's biography and of the history of the Peripatos. He then offers a reconstruction of Theophrastus's remarks on the nature of the intellect in the fifth book of his Physics. This reconstructive effort is based on a number of fragments [End Page 122] preserved in Themistius's De Anima paraphrase (written at about 350ad) and in Priscianus Lydus's Metaphrasis in Theophrastum (about 530ad). Kamp's discussion of these fragments is well informed, judicious, and illuminating throughout.It may be in order, though, to indicate one misgiving. One of the problems that Theophrastus addresses is that it might appear as if thinking were a matter of the intellect being changed by intelligibles, much as perceiving is, or may appear to be, a matter of sense being changed by sensibles. (If so, the question arises as to what the principle of thought is, the intellect itself or the intelligibles.) Kamp reconstructs the train of thought as follows (124-5).(1) The intellect stands to intelligibles the way sense stands to sensibles (intellect-sense analogy).(2) Sense is changed by sensibles.Therefore, the intellect is changed by intelligibles.Kamp proceeds to suggest (126) that Theophrastus attempted to avoid the conclusion by denying the first premise. According to Kamp, Theophrastus rejected the intellect-sense analogy by drawing attention to significant differences between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception, one of these being that the intellect (in thinking) is changed only in a special sense, namely inasmuch as it undergoes a transition to activity, energeia. Kamp is right that the notion of a special kind of change that consists in a transition to activity is Aristotelian; it is presented in considerable detail in De Anima2.5 (417b2-16). But it would surely be puzzling if Theophrastus thought that one significant difference between (the activity of) the intellect and sense perception was that the intellect (in thinking) was changed in a special sense (whereas sense perception, to complete the... (shrink)

Schlicks Erkenntnistheore ist semiotisch: Erkennen heißt wissen, daß zwei Begriffe (d.s. Bezeichnungsfunktionen von etwas Wirklichem, z.B. von Lauten) denselben Gegenstand bezeichnen. Dazu muß ein Gegenstand als ein Inbegriff seiner eriebten und von Konstatierungen (d.s. Ausdrücke von Erlebnissen) begleiteten Merkmale verstanden werden. Die Inbegriffbüdung (konvers zu Reichenbachs *-Operation einer Umwandlung von Ausdrücken der Dingsprache in solche der Ereignissprache) läßt sich mereologisch rekonstruieren; dabei zeigt sich eine enge methodologische Verwandtschaft mit der Analyse des Erkenntnisprozesses in Peirce' Pragmatismus.

Schlicks Erkenntnistheore ist semiotisch: Erkennen heißt wissen, daß zwei Begriffe (d.s. Bezeichnungsfunktionen von etwas Wirklichem, z.B. von Lauten) denselben Gegenstand bezeichnen. Dazu muß ein Gegenstand als ein Inbegriff seiner eriebten und von Konstatierungen (d.s. Ausdrücke von Erlebnissen) begleiteten Merkmale verstanden werden. Die Inbegriffbüdung (konvers zu Reichenbachs *-Operation einer Umwandlung von Ausdrücken der Dingsprache in solche der Ereignissprache) läßt sich mereologisch rekonstruieren; dabei zeigt sich eine enge methodologische Verwandtschaft mit der Analyse des Erkenntnisprozesses in Peirce' Pragmatismus.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden Grundlagenreflexionen in (...) den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht. Der Herausgeber Jürgen Mittelstraß, Professor em. für Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie an der Universität Konstanz, ist einer der international renommiertesten deutschen Philosophen. 1989 erhielt er den Leibniz-Preis der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) und seitdem zahlreiche weitere Wissenschaftspreise sowie Ehrendoktorwürden. Er ist Direktor des Konstanzer Wissenschaftsforums, war Präsident der Academia Europaea (2002-2008) und Vorsitzender des Österreichischen Wissenschaftsrates (2005-2015). Band 1: A-B | Band 2: C-F | Band 3: G-Inn | Band 4: Ins-Loc | Band 5: Log-N | Band 6: O-Ra | Band 7: Re-Te | Band 8: Th-Z. (shrink)

Using covariant derivatives and the operator definitions of quantum mechanics, gauge invariant Proca and Lehnert equations are derived and the Lorenz condition is eliminated in U(1) invariant electrodynamics. It is shown that the structure of the gauge invariant Lehnert equation is the same in an O(3) invariant theory of electrodynamics.

This paper is unusual for this journal because most readers do not deal professionally with animals. Information from primatology, however, is relevant to consideration of violence between people. I will focus mainly on aggression and peacemaking among nonhuman primates, but will address related topics as well. I do not use the term “aggression” to refer only to violent behavior, but to any overt conflict between individuals. Although I am a professor of psychology, I am a biologist by training. When I (...) was a student many years ago, the major scholarly work on this topic was Konrad Lorenz’s On Aggression. It set into motion contemporary research on aggression from a biological perspective by making the controversial claim that aggression is an instinct not only in animals, but also in human beings. My own research and that of others suggests a slightly different view, namely, that aggression between individuals is a last resort when conflict resolution fails. (shrink)

In September 2008, 10 years after the untimely death of Pere Alberch (1954–1998), the 20th Altenberg Workshop in Theoretical Biology gathered a group of Pere’s students, col- laborators, and colleagues (Figure 1) to celebrate his contribu- tions to the origins of EvoDevo. Hosted by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research (KLI) outside Vienna, the group met for two days of discussion. The meeting was organized in tandem with a congress held in May 2008 at the Cavanilles (...) Institute for Biodiversity and Evolutionary Biology (ICBiBE) in Valencia, Spain. The talks at the KLI were equal parts: nostalgic remembrance, excitement over new ways of thinking about old problems, and an unrepressed vitriol against the resurgence of reductionist thinking in EvoDevo. Here we highlight some of the key aspects of Pere’s life and work that informed and infused the talks. (shrink)