In this paper, I defend the view that we can literally perceive the morally right and wrong, or something near enough. In defending this claim, I will try to meet three primary objectives: to clarify how an investigation into moral phenomenology should proceed, to respond to a number of misconceptions and objections that are most frequently raised against the very idea of moral perception, and to provide a model for how some moral perception can be seen as literal perception. Because (...) I take “moral perception” to pick out a family of different experiences, I will limit myself to a discussion of the moral relevance of the emotions. (shrink)

Understanding Torture surveys the massive literature surrounding torture, arguing that, once properly understood, there can be no defence of torture in any circumstances.

My aim in this article is programmatic. I argue that understanding perceptual experience on the model of perceptual affordances allows us to acknowledge the centrality of embodiment to moral phenomenology, on the one hand, and to see more transparently the place of the emotions in the moral life, on the other. I suggest some means by which moral perception, construed as the perception of moral affordances, might be cultivated.

abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to (...) the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions. (shrink)

abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to (...) the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions. (shrink)

In recent literature on moral perception, much attention has been paid to questions about the relationship between metaethical commitments and moral experience. Far less attention has been paid to the nature of moral perception, its context-sensitivity, and the role it might play in carrying out everyday tasks with decency and care. I would like to reflect on just these features of moral perception in the context of healthcare. I will argue that healthcare providers do in fact have at least an (...) imperfect duty to develop their capacities to perceive with sympathy. I will further suggest, for some familiar reasons, that this development is not best accomplished through the model of adherence to ‘ethics codes.’. (shrink)

X-Men is one of the most popular comic book franchises ever, with successful spin-offs that include several feature films, cartoon series, bestselling video games, and merchandise. This is the first look at the deeper issues of the X-Men universe and the choices facing its powerful "mutants," such as identity, human ethics versus mutant morality, and self-sacrifice. J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Oneonta, NY) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Hartwick College and the editor of Family Guy and Philosophy (978-1-4051-6316-3) and (...) The Office and Philosophy (978-1-4051-7555-5). Rebecca Housel (Rochester, NY) is a professor at Rochester Institute of Technology, where she teaches about writing and pop culture. For William Irwin's biography, please see below. (shrink)

The first student-friendly introduction to the philosophical issues surrounding torture. It is a timely and useful contribution to a highly topical and on-going debate.

Ethics and Phenomenology examines the relevance of major phenomenologists and phenomenological concepts to ethical inquiry in general, as well as to a broad range of contemporary ethical issues.

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the recent anti-Ticking Bomb argument offered by Bufacchi and Arrigo is unsuccessful. To adequately refute the Ticking Bomb strategy, I claim, requires carefully addressing both policy questions and questions involving exceptional conduct.

Argues that Wittgenstein, though himself often silent on particular ethical matters, gives us immense resources for understanding the aims appropriate to any philosophical ethics. This work re-examines some of the landmarks in the history of moral philosophy in order to cast contemporary ethical philosophy in a fresh light.

Reeently, a man in Germany was put on trial for killing and consuming another German man. Disgust at this incident was exacerbated when the accused explained that he had placed an advertisement on the internet for someone to be slaughtered and eaten-and that his ‘vietim’ had answered this advertisement. In this paper, I will argue that this disturbing ease should not be seen as morally problematic. I will defend this view by arguing that (1) the so-called ‘vietim’ of this cannibalization (...) is not in fact a victim of murder, and that (2) there is nothing wrong with cannibalism. (shrink)

Reeently, a man in Germany was put on trial for killing and consuming another German man. Disgust at this incident was exacerbated when the accused explained that he had placed an advertisement on the internet for someone to be slaughtered and eaten-and that his ‘vietim’ had answered this advertisement. In this paper, I will argue that this disturbing ease should not be seen as morally problematic. I will defend this view by arguing that (1) the so-called ‘vietim’ of this cannibalization (...) is not in fact a victim of murder, and that (2) there is nothing wrong with cannibalism. (shrink)

Wisnewski provides a concise introduction to Heidegger’s work through the lens of his best-known book, Being and Time. This insightful, new text guides students through Heidegger’s challenging ideas to help them understand his writings as a whole and his influence on modern thought.

The most common argument in favor of torture in the current literature is the ticking bomb argument. It asks us to imagine a case where only torture can prevent the detonation of a bomb that will kill millions. In this paper, I argue that the seeming effectiveness of this argument rests on two things: 1) the underdetermined semantic content of the term ‘torture,’ and 2) a philosophical attitude that regards the empirical facts about torture as irrelevant. Once we pay attention (...) to the facts about torture, and particularly about the role time plays in actual torture, the ticking bomb argument becomes incoherent, and hence cannot provide a basis for accepting torture. (shrink)

This paper explores the tension between two views attributed to Plato: 1) that every person in a just society must fulfil his function, and 2) justice requires philosophical wisdom. It is argued that is not Plato's view in Republic, and that this can be seen as early as Book II.

This paper explores the tension between two views attributed to Plato: 1) that every person in a just society must fulfil his function, and 2) justice requires philosophical wisdom. It is argued that is not Plato’s view in Republic, and that this can be seen as early as Book II.

In this paper I argue that the social constructionist view found in Foucault''s work does not condemn one to a deterministic portrait of the ''self.'' Attention to the early and late writings allows one to articulate a weak notion of autonomy even under the heavy-handed descriptions found in Foucault''s early work. By recognizing autonomy as a public task, and not as a notion of freedom relegated to particular individuals, one is entitled to view autonomy as present in Foucault''s work - (...) and not merely in those writings dedicated to the ''techniques of the self.'' Far from emphasizing practices of freedom, I demonstrate that we need not always think of autonomy as contained in necessary 0resistance. It is this that permits reading autonomy as a product of social construction, and not an objection to it. (shrink)

_Family Guy and Philosophy_ brings together low-brow, potty-mouthed, cartoon humor and high-brow philosophical reflection to deliver an outrageously hilarious and clever exploration of one of TV’s most unrelenting families. Ok, it’s not that high-brow. A sharp, witty and absurd exploration of one of television’s most unrelenting families, the stars of one of the biggest-selling TV series ever on DVD, now in its fourth season Tackles the perennial positions of _Family Guy_ at the same time as contemplating poignant philosophical issues Takes (...) an introspective look at what this show can teach us about ethics, ego, religion, death, and of course, time-travel Considers whether _Family Guy_ is really a vehicle for conservative politics, and whether we should be offended by the show, as well as diving into the philosophy of the cast. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to offer some critical remarks about the possibility of honestly confronting finitude through the experience of tbe value of the other. I suggest that there is reason to think that an honest confrontation with finitude cannot be so accomplished, and that, moreover, there can be no ‘compensation’ for the fact of finitude. Finally, I suggest that the rhetoric of ‘authenticity’ might not be the most fruitful way of talking about confronting our death.

In the following reply to Joe Frank Jones, Ill's "Analysis, Phenomenology and the Travails of Ontology," I argue that skepticism about method plays an important critical role in philosophical thinking. I further suggest that it may be time for philosophy to rehabilitate metaphysics rather than simply ceding it to the natural sciences.

These remarks consider Andrew Fiala’s Tyranny from Trump to Plato in the context of political apathy and climate pessimism. First, I raise the issue of whether or not some form of tyranny might be necessary in dealing with the crisis of climate change. Second, I express some skepticism about Fiala’s dual remedies of moral education (Ch 8) and constitutional wisdom (Ch 9) to face our present political challenges.

Through humorous and revealing essays by professional philosophers, The Office and Philosophy illustrates broad philosophical concepts by exploring the characters and scenes of their unexamined lives in both the British and American versions of the acclaimed television series, The Office.

This book argues that the traditional emphasis on the accuracy of a given theory of human agency has systematically obscured the normative dimension in these theories and that recognizing this normative dimension allows us to see that a ...

The aim of this article is to argue for a conception of critical social science based on the model of constitutive rules. The author argues that this model is pragmatically superior to those models that employ notions like "illusion" and " ideology," as it does not demand a specification of the "real (but hidden) interests" of social actors. Key Words: constitutive rules • critical theory • ideology • recommendations • social facts.

Saturday Night Live's comedy and philosophy have something fundamental in common: both re‐tune attention by challenging assumptions about the world and each other. Comedy reveals assumptions by exploiting them in exaggerated form – and boy do we have a lot of assumptions, particularly about race and racial identity. “Black Jeopardy” reminds people that many things affect identities, not just the putative race to which we belong. The “neighborhood” we're exposed to is one of pure fancy: a comedic rendering of all (...) the stereotypes and biases that are carried by notion of “black.” In “Mr. Robinson's Neighborhood,” which appeared multiple times from Season 6 to Season 10, Eddie Murphy plays the ghetto version of Fred Rogers, from the PBS show Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood. The sketches usually end with Mr. Robinson leaving his apartment by fire escape, typically to avoid violence or arrest. (shrink)