El autor hace un repaso crítico de las teorías del conocimiento (naturalista, evolucionista, posmoderna…) que en las últimas décadas, recurriendo al “viraje pragmático” presuntamente protagonizado por Heidegger y el segundo Wittgenstein, se han centrado en la revisión crítica e implacable demolición de la “imagen cartesiana” y sus grandes supuestos: representacionismo, fundamentalismo, “egotismo”, etc.; apostando por la sustitución de la teoría del conocimiento como tal, y su lenguaje universalizante, por una suerte de filosofía de la cultura de inspiración hermenéutica.

El autor propone, una vez analizados algunos de los rasgos centrales del actual mundo globalizado, una nueva Ilustración, entendida como generalización de una cultura crítica cuyo objetivo último sea el de librarnos de la fatalidad biológica y social, de las constricciones de un entorno siempre irreflexivo y tiránico y de la compulsión a la inserción acrítica en lo dado, con la consiguiente reducción de la educación a mero aprendizaje de mecanismos de adaptación.

A partir de una lectura crítica de El marxismo como moral, obra clásica de José Luis López Aranguren, éste artículo trata de interrogarse acerca de los fundamentos normativos y morales del marxismo. A lo largo del texto se proponen diversas líneas temáticas para profundizar en la dimensión ética del pensamiento de Karl Marx y la tradición marxista, tratando de liberar, al mismo tiempo, su proyecto intelectual y político de diversos tópicos vinculados a su recepción tradicional. El ámbito ético aparecerá como (...) espacio de mediación entre el conocimiento y la realidad, revelándose como fundamental para el marxismo desde un punto de vista praxeológico. Al final del artículo se dialoga críticamente con algunas posiciones éticas en el marco del marxismo contemporáneo. (shrink)

The paper examines a recent proposal of substitution of classic (normative) philosophy of science by a post-positivist and pluralistic axiology governed by aesthetic or formal values. The author of the paper proposes a different set of values that can enconpass not only “internal” values, but is also open to the examination of the ethical limits of tecnoscience and the principles that can govern scientific development in oru “risk societies”, which depends heavily on the general evolution of science.

Muñoz, Jacobo (2022)Crítica i veritat: Assaigs, ressenyes, converses (1980-2015)València: Institució Alfons el Magnànim, 223 p.ISBN 978-84-7822-907-9.

The paper examines a recent proposal of substitution of classic (normative) philosophy of science by a post-positivist and pluralistic axiology governed by aesthetic or formal values. The author of the paper proposes a different set of values that can enconpass not only “internal” values, but is also open to the examination of the ethical limits of tecnoscience and the principles that can govern scientific development in oru “risk societies”, which depends heavily on the general evolution of science.

The paper examines a recent proposal of substitution of classic (normative) philosophy of science by a post-positivist and pluralistic axiology governed by aesthetic or formal values. The author of the paper proposes a different set of values that can enconpass not only “internal” values, but is also open to the examination of the ethical limits of tecnoscience and the principles that can govern scientific development in oru “risk societies”, which depends heavily on the general evolution of science.

Supererogatory acts are those that lie “beyond the call of duty.” There are two standard ways to define this idea more precisely. Although the definitions are often seen as equivalent, I argue that they can diverge when options are infinite, or when there are cycles of better options; moreover, each definition is acceptable in only one case. I consider two ways out of this dilemma.

Supererogatory acts—good deeds “beyond the call of duty”—are a part of moral common sense, but conceptually puzzling. I propose a unified solution to three of the most infamous puzzles: the classic Paradox of Supererogation (if it’s so good, why isn’t it just obligatory?), Horton’s All or Nothing Problem, and Kamm’s Intransitivity Paradox. I conclude that supererogation makes sense if, and only if, the grounds of rightness are multi-dimensional and comparative.

Businesses and governments in postcolonial countries frame investments in wind energy as efforts to address climate change and sustainable development. However, when wind energy projects encroach on indigenous peoples’ lives and land, there is often a lack of recognition and participation of these peoples and an unequal distribution of cost and benefits of such projects toward them, which leads to opposition against wind energy projects and often triggers conflicts for justice. Worryingly, such conditions have repeatedly resulted in the assassination of (...) human rights defenders, which further inflames the conflict. Herein, I discuss these concepts based on a longitudinal study centered on a wind energy project in Oaxaca, Mexico, with the aim of exploring and understanding the conditions under which wind energy investments fail to respect current laws and norms, as well as the consequences of such negligence. My in-depth analysis of the actions of the government, businesses, and indigenous peoples revealed a phenomenon that is less discussed in environmental justice research: the gradual and continuous transformation of indigenous peoples’ norms and behaviors away from their traditional economic and cultural livelihoods. This phenomenon helps to extend the conceptual understanding of environmental justice with regard to social turbulence, which is defined as the unpredictable behavior of political and social systems in contexts in which existing laws, regulations, and norms regarding environmental justice are not observed. The concept of social turbulence of environmental justice helps to explain how indigenous peoples sacrifice their territories, norms, and traditions to a technical solution to climate change and sustainable development. (shrink)

Moral philosophy is often said to be about what we owe to each other. Do we owe anything to ourselves?

Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it is not for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.

In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for (...) agents and advisors. (shrink)

Contingent negative existentials give rise to a notorious paradox. I formulate a version in terms of metaphysical grounding: nonexistence can't be fundamental, but nothing can ground it. I then argue for a new kind of solution, expanding on work by Kit Fine. The key idea is that negative existentials are contingently zero-grounded – that is to say, they are grounded, but not by anything, and only in the right conditions. If this is correct, it follows that grounding cannot be an (...) internal relation, and that no complete account of reality can be purely fundamental. (shrink)

Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...) mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account. (shrink)

Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind –particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the “selection problem” and the “endorsement problem” as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, (...) since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. (shrink)

En reacción al platonismo de Quine acerca de los objetos matemáticos han surgido las posiciones ficcionalistas, tanto las revisionistas como las hermenéuticas. En mi parecer las tres posiciones son defendibles. Cuál elige uno (si es que decidimos elegir una de ellas), depende de convicciones filosóf..

La caracterización de la ética postulada por Foucault en sus últimas investigaciones choca con la concepción del sujeto de sus primeros escritos, donde este se presenta como el paciente de las diversas presiones institucionales que le dan forma. El presente texto propone delimitar las tensiones que surgen al contrastar ambas concepciones. Para ello, se esbozarán las particularidades de la ética en Foucault para luego perfilar las oposiciones que esta encuentra en las regulaciones del campo de las relaciones de poder. A (...) través de esta indagación, se buscará dar respuesta a la pregunta de si es posible la vida ética en la filosofía foucaultiana. (shrink)

Some sacrifices—like giving a kidney or heroically dashing into a burning building—are supererogatory: they are good deeds beyond the call of duty. But if such deeds are really so good, philosophers ask, why shouldn’t morality just require them? The standard answer is that morality recognizes a special role for the pursuit of self-interest, so that everyone may treat themselves as if they were uniquely important. This idea, however, cannot be reconciled with the compelling picture of morality as impartial—the view that (...) we are each anyone’s equal. I propose an alternative Self-Other Symmetric account of our moral freedom: the limits on what morality may demand of us are set by the duties we owe to ourselves. I begin with a defense of the Self-Other Symmetry: the idea that we owe the same duties to ourselves—and have the same rights against ourselves—as any relevantly similar other. Because we are consenting parties to our own actions, I argue, our rights against ourselves do not function like the rights of unwilling others. Instead, they play a permissive function, allowing us to block the demand to give up what is ours. I conclude by uniting, aggravating, and trying to solve some paradoxes of supererogatory permissions, guided by the idea that morality cannot be reduced to a ranking of options from best-to-worst. Rights against oneself are an irreducible second dimension, one that we need if we are to unify rights and supererogation into an impartial moral vision. (shrink)

According to a familiar (alleged) requirement on practical reason, one must believe a proposition if one is to take it for granted in reasoning about what to do. This paper explores a related requirement, not on thinking but on acting—that one must accept a goal if one is to count as acting for its sake. This is the acceptance requirement. Although it is endorsed by writers as diverse as Christine Korsgaard, Donald Davidson, and Talbot Brewer, I argue that it is (...) vulnerable to counterexamples, in which agents act in light of ends that they do not accept but are still merely considering. For instance, a young professional may keep a job option open not because she definitely wants or intends to take it, but just because she is considering taking it. I try to show that such examples are not easily resisted; that they present challenges specifically for Brewer, Davidson, and especially Korsgaard; and that the examples also raise fresh, non-partisan questions in action theory. What is considering, exactly? How could it fall short of acceptance while still guiding behaviour? How can we act for an end before thinking it through? (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...) on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

El autor se propone demostrar en este ensayo que: (i) la cantidad de gente pobre en Chile es al menos el doble de la que se anuncia oficialmente; (ii) la brecha que separa a los más ricos de los más pobres es bastante mayor que la estimada; (iii) la estructura de poder determina que los beneficios del desarrollo se acumulen en los estratos más ricos, por lo cual altas tasas de crecimiento económico no redundan necesariamente en una disminución de la (...) pobreza; (iv) la inequidad se da también por actividades económicas específicas, por regiones y por género; (v) se produce constantemente un masivo traslado de riqueza desde los salarios y desde los recursos naturales a la masa de excedentes empresariales; (vi) se necesita una firme intervención del Estado para corregir esta situación. (shrink)

Por la encrucijada que la figura de Søren Kierkegaard supone en la historia del pensamiento, siendo comúnmente considerado como gozne entre el idealismo y las filosofías de la existencia, entre la creencia en un espíritu objetivo y la reivindicación subjetivista que halla acomodo en el agitado siglo XX, parecería obligado identificar y aislar la cuestión propiamente filosófica, en el seno de una producción tan peculiar como la suya. Una producción abundante en incógnitas, pistas falsas y autores ficticios, con preocupaciones que (...) pertenecen a ámbitos contrastados, de la estética a la teología. Por su problematicidad inherente, el concepto de ambigüedad -que él mismo tematizó- puede entenderse clave en la aproximación crítica a su obra, como verdadero “contra-concepto”. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso- phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions (...) to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by brie y describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4). (shrink)

Value pluralists believe in multiple dimensions of value. What does betterness along a dimension have to do with being better overall? Any systematic answer begins with the Strong Pareto principle: one thing is overall better than another if it is better along one dimension and at least as good along all others. We defend Strong Pareto from recent counterexamples and use our discussion to develop a novel view of dimensions of value, one which puts Strong Pareto on firmer footing. We (...) conclude by defending Dimensionalism, the hypothesis that overall value relations are determined solely by how things compare along value dimensions. These are first steps towards a more systematic value pluralism. (shrink)

Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one (...) of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels. (shrink)

Desde un enfoque estructural e interdisciplinario, el artículo ofrece un pano-rama de uno de los fenómenos filosóficos más relevantes en América Latina: la Filosofía de la Liberación, enfatizando especialmente los momentos emblemáticos de su génesis y la necesidad de revaluar su potencial crítico en la sociedad contemporánea. La estructura temática del texto expone: a) un acercamiento a la definición del término Filosofía de la Liberación; b) un perfil de las principales características de este filosofar con-cretamente en su etapa inicial; c) (...) una reflexión sobre el paradigma neoliberal predominante; d) y diversos aportes de este filosofar ante los desafíos contemporáneos, que le brindan la oportunidad de redimensionar sus posibilidades críticas, a favor de los pobres, grupos oprimi-dos, pueblos periféricos o excluidos de los beneficios del sistema socio-económico y político vigente. El artículo brinda un repertorio del tema sin pretender lógicamente agotarlo, con el fin de indagar sobre la composición de la Filosofía de la Liberación, la diversidad de su desarrollo y al mismo tiempo sobre su importancia o vigencia en la actualidad. (shrink)

How could it be wrong to exploit—say, by paying sweatshop wages—if the exploited party benefits? How could it be wrong to do something gratuitously bad—like giving to a wasteful charity—if that is better than permissibly doing nothing? Joe Horton argues that these puzzles, known as the Exploitation Problem and All or Nothing Problem, have no unified answer. I propose one and pose a challenge for Horton’s take on the Exploitation Problem.