The Rejection of Consequentializing

Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):79-96 (2021)
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Abstract

Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it is not for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.

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Daniel Muñoz
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Sources of transitivity.Daniel Muñoz - 2023 - Economics and Philosophy 39 (2):285-306.
Consequentialists Must Kill.Christopher Howard - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):727-753.
An Epistemic Version of Pascal's Wager.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.

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References found in this work

The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.
The Fundamentality of Fit.Christopher Howard - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14.
Actions.Jennifer Hornsby - 1980 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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