This study described the relationships between academic class and student moral sensitivity and reasoning and between curriculum design components for ethics education and student moral sensitivity and reasoning. The data were collected from freshman (n = 506) and senior students (n = 440) in eight baccalaureate nursing programs in South Korea by survey; the survey consisted of the Korean Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and the Korean Defining Issues Test. The results showed that moral sensitivity scores in patient-oriented care and conflict were (...) higher in senior students than in freshman students. Furthermore, more hours of ethics content were associated with higher principled thinking scores of senior students. Nursing education in South Korea may have an impact on developing student moral sensitivity. Planned ethics content in nursing curricula is necessary to improve moral sensitivity and moral reasoning of students. (shrink)

This volume provides analyses of the logic-reality relationship from different approaches and perspectives. The point of convergence lies in the exploration of the connections between reality – social, natural or ideal – and logical structures employed in describing or discovering it. Moreover, the book connects logical theory with more concrete issues of rationality, normativity and understanding, thus pointing to a wide range of potential applications. -/- -/- The papers collected in this volume address cutting-edge topics in contemporary discussions amongst specialists. (...) Some essays focus on the role of indispensability considerations in the justification of logical competence, and the wide range of challenges within the philosophy of mathematics. Others present advances in dynamic logical analysis such as extension of game semantics to non-logical part of vocabulary and development of models of contractive speech act. -/- Table of Contents: Introduction: Majda Trobok, Nenad Miščević and Berislav Žarnić.- I. Logical and Mathematical Structures.- Life on the Ship of Neurath: Mathematics in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Stewart Shapiro.- Applied Mathemathics in the Sciences: Dale Jacquette.- The Philosophical Impact of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem: Miloš Arsenijević.- Debating (Neo)logicism: Frege and the neo-Fregeans: Majda Trobok.- II. Epistemology and Logic.- Informal Logic and Informal Consequence: Danilo Šuster.- Logical Consequence and Rationality: Nenad Smokrović.- Logic, Indispensability and Aposteriority: Nenad Miščević.- III . Dynamic Logical Models of Meaning.- Extended Game-Theoretical Semantics: Manuel Rebuschi.- Dynamic Logic of Propositional Commitments: Tomoyuki Yamada.- Is Unsaying Polite?: Berislav Žarnić.- IV Logical Methods in Ontological and Linguistic Analyses.- Towards a Formal Account of Identity Criteria: Massimiliano Carrara and Silvia Gaio.- A Mereology for the Change of Parts: Pierdaniele Giaretta and Giuseppe Spolaore.- Russell versus Frege: Imre Rusza.- Goodman’s OnlyWorld: Vladan Djordjević.-. (shrink)

The lynch-pin of the structuralist account of logic endorsed by Koslow is the definition of logical and modal operators with respect to implication relations, i.e. relative to implication structures. Logical operators are depicted independently of any possible semantic of syntactic limitations. It turns out that it is possible to define conjunction as well as other logical operators much more generally than it has usually been, and items on which the logical operators may be applied need not be syntactic objects and (...) need not have truth values.In this paper I analyse Koslow’s structuralist theory and point out certain objectionable aspects to as well as reasons why such a theory does not fulfil the (possibly unjustified) expectation of getting defined a universal logical structure. (shrink)

In this paper I concentrate on three issues concerning Williamson’s book The Philosophy of Philosophy: the problem of analytic statements being first-order propositions, the issue concerning aposteriority and the concerns related to the semantic vs. metasemantic distinction.

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 4, Page 413-417, December 2011.

The aim of this paper is to point to the analogy between mathematical and physical thought experiments, and even more widely between the epistemic paths in both domains. Having accepted platonism as the underlying ontology as long as the platonistic path in asserting the possibility of gaining knowledge of abstract, mind-independent and causally inert objects, my widely taken goal is to show that there is no need to insist on the uniformity of picture and monopoly of certain epistemic paths in (...) the epistemic descriptive context. And secondly, to show the analogy with the ways we come to know the truths of (natural) sciences. (shrink)

This paper is an update of the documents we have concerning the Acts of the Christian martyrs, focused on three main aspects: 1) the kind of acts we know of and their classification from the point of view of their historic value; 2) the versions or editions of the texts that are most accepted by scholars; 3) the relevance of the different parts that make up these documents in order to discern the original text from passages that were rewritten or (...) underwent later variations. In this way, the article offers an exhaustive list of the documents for use in researching Christian martyrs in the Roman period. (shrink)

Motivated by the analogy which holds within the context of discovery between mathematics and physics, we aim to show that there is a connection between two fields within the context of justification too. Based on the careful analysis of examples from science (especially within the domain of physics) we suggest that the logic of scientific research, which might appear as enumerative induction, is deduction, and we propose it to be universal generalization inference rule. Our main argument closely follows the analysis (...) of the structure of physical theory proposed by theoretical physicist Eugene P. Wigner. (shrink)

In this paper we shall concentrate on the issue of those ways of knowing in mathematics that have traditionally been taken to support apriorism. We shall do it by critizing pragmatic naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics, and in particular its historical approach in denying any role to apriority in mathematical epistemology. The version of pragmatic naturalism we shall be analyzing is Kitcher’s. In the paper we shall first set out a brief survey of the relevant features of Kitcher’s pragmatic (...) naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics and then indicate the points that provoke our disagreement.U ovome radu ćemo se koncentrirati na pitanje onih načina spoznaje u matematici za koje se tradicionalno smatralo da podržavaju apriorizam. To ćemo učiniti kritizirajući pragmatički naturalizam u filozofiji matematike, posebice njegov povijesni pristup u negiranju ikakve uloge apriorizma u matematičkoj epistemologiji. Verzija pragmatičkog naturalizma koju ćemo razmatrati je Kitcherova. U radu ćemo prvo iznijeti sažeti pregled relevantnih obilježja Kitcherovog pragmatičkog naturalizma u filozofiji matematike te potom naznačiti točke koje izazivaju naše neslaganje.Dans cet article, nous nous concentrerons sur la question des modes de la connaissance en mathématiques qui ont traditionnellement été considérés comme soutenant l’apriorisme. Nous le ferons en critiquant le naturalisme pragmatique dans la philosophie des mathématiques, notamment son approche historique de la négation de tout rôle de l’apriorité dans l’épistémologie mathématique. La version du naturalisme pragmatique que nous analyserons est celle de Philip Kitcher. Dans l’article, nous présenterons d’abord un court examen des aspects pertinents du naturalisme pragmatique de Philip Kitcher dans la philosophie des mathématiques, puis indiquerons les points qui suscitent notre désaccord.Im vorliegenden Paper konzentrieren wir uns auf die Problematik jener Wege der Erkenntnis innerhalb der Mathematik, denen traditionell Unterstützung des Apriorismus beigemessen wird. Wir verwirklichen dies, indem wir den pragmatischen Naturalismus in der Philosophie der Mathematik kritisieren, namentlich dessen historische Herangehensweise bei der Verneinung jeglicher Rolle der Apriorität in der mathematischen Epistemologie. Die Version des pragmatischen Naturalismus, der wir auf den Grund gehen, ist die von Kitcher. In der Abhandlung machen wir erstens einen Streifzug durch die relevanten Wesenszüge von Kitchers pragmatischem Naturalismus in der Philosophie der Mathematik und geben anschließend Anhaltspunkte an, die unseren Dissens hervorrufen. (shrink)

In recent literature, panpsychism has been defended by appeal to two main arguments: first, an argument from philosophy of mind, according to which panpsychism is the only view which successfully integrates consciousness into the physical world (Strawson 2006; Chalmers 2013); second, an argument from categorical properties, according to which panpsychism offers the only positive account of the categorical or intrinsic nature of physical reality (Seager 2006; Adams 2007; Alter and Nagasawa 2012). Historically, however, panpsychism has also been defended by appeal (...) to a third argument based on considerations about the nature and observability of causation. This argument has not been much discussed in recent times. Here is a concise version from William James: "… the concrete perceptual flux, taken just as it comes, offers in our own activity-situations perfectly comprehensible instances of causal agency … If we took these experiences as the type of what actual causation is, we should have to ascribe to cases of causation outside of our life, to physical cases also, an inwardly experiential nature. In other words, we should have to espouse a so-called “pan-psychic” philosophy" (James 1911: 218). James here suggests that we have direct experience of causation in our own agency. He thereby directly contradicts David Hume, who famously denied that we have any experience of causation. James goes on to claim that if this experience is representative of causation in general, it follows that all causation is mental, and that panpsychism is true. This kind of argument for panpsychism can be called the argument from (experience of) causation. This chapter offers, first, a history of this argument and arguments closely related to it, and second, an analysis of the argument – is it valid, are its premises in any way defensible, and how does it relate to the other, more popular arguments for panpsychism from philosophy of mind and categorical properties? (shrink)

Even though mathematics and physics have been related for centuries and this relation appears to be unproblematic, there are many questions still open: Is mathematics really necessary for physics, or could physics exist without mathematics? Should we think physically and then add the mathematics apt to formalise our physical intuition, or should we think mathematically and then interpret physically the obtained results? Do we get mathematical objects by abstraction from real objects, or vice versa? Why is mathematics effective into physics? (...) These are all relevant questions, whose answers are necessary to fully understand the status of physics, particularly of contemporary physics. The aim of this book is to offer plausible answers to such questions through both historical analyses of relevant cases, and philosophical analyses of the relations between mathematics and physics. (shrink)

Ibn al-ʻArabī, 1165-1240; views on freedom; Sufism; Islamic philosophy.

This collection of articles is a tribute to Nenad Smokrović, our friend and colleague from the Philosophy Department. He has been working on human rationality for over 25 years. Consequently, articles in this collection are either directly or indirectly related to this subject matter. In this volume, 19 authors from Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Italy, Israel, USA, and GB write about human rationality. What human rationality consists in? What is the relationship between its normative aspect (logic) and its descriptive aspect (psychology)? (...) Do people in fact reason according to the laws of logic? What is the nature and the function of reasoning, argumentation, and inference? ... We are publishing this volume in the hope that it will provide further contribution to the research in the field. (shrink)

Greek text, english translation and commentary on the surviving fragments of Empedocles (fragments as known in 1981, does not include more recent finds).

Contrary to Vaesen's argument that humans are unique with respect to nine cognitive capacities essential for tool use, we suggest that although such cognitive processes contribute to variation in tool use, it does not follow that these capacities arenecessaryfor tool use, nor that tool use shaped cognition per se, given the available data in cognitive neuroscience and behavioral biology.

Kurt Godel, the greatest logician of our time, startled the world of mathematics in 1931 with his Theorem of Undecidability, which showed that some statements in mathematics are inherently "undecidable." His work on the completeness of logic, the incompleteness of number theory, and the consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum theory brought him further worldwide fame. In this introductory volume, Raymond Smullyan, himself a well-known logician, guides the reader through the fascinating world of Godel's incompleteness theorems. The (...) level of presentation is suitable for anyone with a basic acquaintance with mathematical logic. As a clear, concise introduction to a difficult but essential subject, the book will appeal to mathematicians, philosophers, and computer scientists. (shrink)

The concept of the receptive field, first articulated by Hartline, is central to visual neuroscience. The receptive field of a neuron encompasses the spatial and temporal properties of stimuli that activate the neuron, and, as Hubel and Wiesel conceived of it, a neuron’s receptive field is static. This makes it possible to build models of neural circuits and to build up more complex receptive fields out of simpler ones. Recent work in visual neurophysiology is providing evidence that the classical receptive (...) field is an inaccurate picture. The receptive field seems to be a dynamic feature of the neuron. In particular, the receptive field of neurons in V1 seems to be dependent on the properties of the stimulus. In this paper, we review the history of the concept of the receptive field and the problematic data. We then consider a number of possible theoretical responses to these data. (shrink)

There are obvious benefits to be gained from the study of logic: heightened ability to express ideas clearly and concisely, increased skill in defining one's terms, enlarged capacity to formulate arguments rigorously and to analyze them critically. But the greatest benefit, in my judgment, is the recognition that reason can be applied in every aspect of human affairs.

What are conspiracy theories? And what, if anything, is epistemically wrong with them? I offer an account on which conspiracy theories are a unique way of holding a belief in a conspiracy. Specifically, I take conspiracy theories to be self-insulating beliefs in conspiracies. On this view, conspiracy theorists have their conspiratorial beliefs in a way that is immune to revision by counter-evidence. I argue that conspiracy theories are always irrational. Although conspiracy theories involve an expectation to encounter some seemingly disconfirming (...) evidence (allegedly planted by the conspirators), resistance to all counter- evidence cannot be justified on these grounds. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the study of some subvarieties of the variety Qof Q-Heyting algebras, that is, Heyting algebras with a quantifier. In particular, a deeper investigation is carried out in the variety Q 3 of three-valued Q-Heyting algebras to show that the structure of the lattice of subvarieties of Qis far more complicated that the lattice of subvarieties of Heyting algebras. We determine the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras in Q 3 and we construct the lattice of subvarieties (...) (Q 3 ) of the variety Q 3. (shrink)

I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to (...) the question, "Can machines think?" is to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B. We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original, "Can machines think?". (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

Traditional Chinese commentators rightly see that understanding Zhuangzi's way with words is the presupposition for understanding Zhuangzi at all. They are not sure, however, if Zhuangzi's words are super-effective or pure nonsense. I consider Zhuangzi's experience with language, and then turn to Heidegger's word of being to see if it may throw light on Zhuangzi's way of saying. I argue that a conversation between Heidegger and Zhuangzi on language is possible, but only by expanding Heidegger's notion of Gestell and through (...) a destruction of the dominant Confucian discourse that obscures Zhuangzi's way of saying. (shrink)

Several variants of Lewis's Best System Account of Lawhood have been proposed that avoid its commitment to perfectly natural properties. There has been little discussion of the relative merits of these proposals, and little discussion of how one might extend this strategy to provide natural property-free variants of Lewis's other accounts, such as his accounts of duplication, intrinsicality, causation, counterfactuals, and reference. We undertake these projects in this paper. We begin by providing a framework for classifying and assessing the variants (...) of the Best System Account. We then evaluate these proposals, and identify the most promising candidates. We go on to develop a proposal for systematically modifying Lewis's other accounts so that they, too, avoid commitment to perfectly natural properties. We conclude by briefly considering a different route one might take to developing natural property-free versions of Lewis's other accounts, drawing on recent work by Williams. (shrink)

For the theorists of crisis, the revolutionary state comes into existence through violence, and due to its inability to provide an authoritative katechon (restrainer) against internal and external violence, it perpetuates violence until it self-destructs. Writing during extreme economic depression and growing social and political violence, the crisis theorists––Joseph de Maistre, Juan Donoso Cortés, and Carl Schmitt––each sought to blame the chaos of their time upon the Janus-faced postrevolutionary ideals of liberalism and socialism by urging a return to pre-revolutionary moral (...) and religious values. They are united by three counterrevolutionary principles, all of which are purported to remedy revolutionary violence: traditional constitutional fidelity, the philosophy of the decision, and opposition to bourgeois liberalism. This essay is followed by the first complete English translation and publication of Donoso’s letter of October 24, 1851, which contains Donoso’s only reference to the “discussing class,” a political entity later popularized by Schmitt in his 1922 work Political Theology. (shrink)

This article examines three candidate cases of non-causal explanation in computational neuroscience. I argue that there are instances of efficient coding explanation that are strongly analogous to examples of non-causal explanation in physics and biology, as presented by Batterman, Woodward, and Lange. By integrating Lange’s and Woodward’s accounts, I offer a new way to elucidate the distinction between causal and non-causal explanation, and to address concerns about the explanatory sufficiency of non-mechanistic models in neuroscience. I also use this framework to (...) shed light on the dispute over the interpretation of dynamical models of the brain. _1_ Introduction _1.1_ Efficient coding explanation in computational neuroscience _1.2_ Defining non-causal explanation _2_ Case I: Hybrid Computation _3_ Case II: The Gabor Model Revisited _4_ Case III: A Dynamical Model of Prefrontal Cortex _4.1_ A new explanation of context-dependent computation _4.2_ Causal or non-causal? _5_ Causal and Non-causal: Does the Difference Matter? (shrink)

Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...) the HOT theory. A crucial feature of homomorphism theory is that it individuates and taxonomizes mental qualities independently of the way we're conscious of them, and indeed independently of our being conscious of them at all. So the theory accommodates the qualitative character not only of conscious sensations and perceptions, but also of those which fall outside our stream of consciousness. Rosenthal argues that, because this account of mental qualities makes no appeal to consciousness, it enables us to dispel such traditional quandaries as the alleged conceivability of undetectable quality inversion, and to disarm various apparent obstacles to explaining qualitative consciousness and understanding its nature. Six further essays build on the HOT theory to explain various important features of consciousness, among them the complex connections that hold in humans between consciousness and speech, the self-interpretative aspect of consciousness, and the compelling sense we have that consciousness is unified. Two of the essays, one an extended treatment of homomorphism theory, appear here for the first time. There is also a substantive introduction, which draws out the connections between the essays and highlights their implications. (shrink)