The corporate glass ceiling continues to be a challenge for many organizations. However, women executives may be facing a second pane of obstruction – an expatriate glass ceiling – that prevents them from receiving the foreign management assignments and experience that is becoming increasing critical for promotion to upper management. The responsibility to break the expatriate glass ceiling lies with both female managers and the multinational corporations that utilize expatriates. In this paper, we propose pre-assignment, on-assignment, and post-assignment strategies for (...) breaking the expatriate glass ceiling. (shrink)

This article explores the plausibility of an argument against embryonic stem cell research based on what the regulations already say about research on pregnant women and fetuses. The center of the argument is the notion of vulnerability and whether such a concept is applicable to human embryos. It is argued that such an argument can be made plausible. The article concludes by responding to several important objections.

A widely accepted, perhaps prevailing view among Hobbes scholars is that his theory of political obligation is grounded in an egoistic and materialistic view of human nature. There are a number of difficulties with this view, not the least of which is that it seems to make a genuine theory of political obligation impossible. It is the object of the present paper to examine certain aspects of Hobbes's account of human nature, with the object of weaving them together into a (...) single doctrine which is coherent with what he has to say about political obligation. I will conclude by considering briefly how traditional interpretations could have come to prevail. (shrink)

Purpose ‐ The purpose of this paper is to explore the "resource curse" problem as a counter-example of creative performance and innovation by examining reliance on capital and physical resources, showing the gap between expectations and ex-post actual performance that became clearer under conditions of economic turmoil. Design/methodology/approach ‐ The analysis uses logistic regressions with dichotomous response and predictor variables on structured tables of count data, representing firm performance as an outcome of capital resources, physical resources and innovation where appropriate. (...) Findings ‐ Key findings relevant to economic and business practice follow. First, a typical characteristic of successful Vietnamese firms in the transition period is their reliance on either capital resources or physical asset endowments. Second, poor performers exhibit evidence of over-reliance on both capital and physical assets. Third, firms that relied on both types of resources tended to downplay creative performance. Some evidence suggests that firms face more acute problem caused by the law of diminishing returns in troubled times. Fourth, the "innovation factor" has not been tapped as a source of economic growth. Research limitations/implications ‐ This study has some limitations. The size of the survey sample is approximately 150 firms, while the potential sample of > 300 should be possible in the future. When the size increases, the research could be expanded to include further variables that will help investigate more deeply into the related issues and business implications. With regard to the implications of the study, the absence of innovations has made the notion of "resource curse" identical to "destructive creation" implemented by ex-ante resource-rich firms, and worsened the problem of resource misallocation in transition turmoil. The Vietnamese corporate sector's addiction to resources may contribute to economic deterioration, through a downward spiral of lower efficiency leading to consumption of more resources. Practical implications ‐ Insights obtained from this study could save transition economies' resources which have almost always been considered sine qua non before any critical major policymaking, while this is not necessarily true, and in many cases, even counterproductive. Originality/value ‐ Original data set on Vietnam stock market are collected, processed, prepared and used by the authors. Original design by the authors for regression equations with dichotomous predictor variables: dependence on endowed physical assets, reliance on capital resources and significant signs of creative performance/innovations. Original idea of viewing "resource curse" as absence of innovation and due to uncreative "destructive creation" of poor-performing commercial operations by resource-rich firms is used in the paper. We have searched the literature in business research and found that the empirical results have not been previously reported. (shrink)

The respect for one’s conscience is rooted in a broader respect for the human person. The conscience represents a person’s ability to identify the values and goods that inform her moral identity. Ignoring or overriding a person’s conscience can lead to significant moral and emotional distress. Refusals to respect a person’s conscientious objection to cases of killing are a source of incisive distress, since judgments that it is impermissible to kill so-and-so are typically held very strongly and serve as central (...) moral commitments in one’s moral identity. I think it is wrong for a college basketball coach to pay his players, but I think it is really wrong to kill people. This article argues that any and all arguments for not respecting a conscientious objection to abortion commit a deontic fallacy. Briefly, arguments for the permissibility of abortion are structurally such that abortion is at best permissible, not obligatory. Now, arguments to justify overriding or ignoring a person’s objection to performing action (α) must understand action (α) as being obligatory. Thus, arguments for ignoring conscientious objections to performing abortion are incongruent with the actual philosophical justifications for abortion. Such arguments, then, commit a deontic fallacy. (shrink)

Although leader role expectations appear to have become relatively more compatible with stereotypically feminine attributes like empathy, women continue to be highly underrepresented in leadership roles. We posit that one reason for this disparity is that, whereas stereotypically feminine traits are appreciated as nice “add-ons” for leaders, it is stereotypically masculine attributes that are valued as the defining qualities of the leader role, especially by men (who are often the gatekeepers to these roles). We assessed men’s and women’s idea of (...) a great leader with a focus on gendered attributes in two studies using different methodologies. In Study 1, we employed a novel paradigm in which participants were asked to design their “ideal leader” to examine the potential trade-off between leadership characteristics that were more stereotypically masculine (i.e., agency) and feminine (i.e., communality). Results showed that communality was valued in leaders only after meeting the more stereotypically masculine requirements of the role (i.e., competence and assertiveness), and that men in particular preferred leaders who were more competent (vs. communal), whereas women desired leaders who kept negative stereotypically masculine traits in check (e.g., arrogance). In Study 2, we conducted an experiment to examine men’s and women’s beliefs about the traits that would be important to help them personally succeed in a randomly assigned leader (vs. assistant) role, allowing us to draw a causal link between roles and trait importance. We found that both men and women viewed agentic traits as more important than communal traits to be a successful leader. Together, both studies make a valuable contribution to the social psychological literature on gender stereotyping and bias against female leaders and may illuminate the continued scarcity of women at the very top of organizations, broadly construed. (shrink)

The prevailing orthodoxy for competency assessment is to test for the presence of certain abilities. This article argues that the presence of certain abilities is not enough when a patient refuses a life-sustaining/lifesaving measure that promises to work and does not present obviously onerous burdens. In such cases, we need to know whether the patient has rendered a competent refusal of such measures. Whereas the former refers us to test for certain abilities, the latter refers us to assess the quality (...) of one’s judgment. Although such a thesis has been entertained previously (for example, Freedman), I reformulate the argument by applying two well-accepted epistemological criteria for justified belief. I argue that a competent refusal of such measures requires that the judgment be based on reasons. This basing condition turns on (or kicks in) in what I refer to as high-stakes contexts—contexts in which the patient’s life will end by respecting the refusal, and, by not respecting it, the patient undergoes a lifesaving and minimally burdensome treatment. (shrink)

The author reviews one of the more intriguing articles in the stem cell research issue of the journal Metaphilosophy (April 2007), “Killing Embryos for Stem Cell Research,” by Jeff McMahan. He begins by recapitulating McMahan’s argument against the proposition that we are essentially individual human organisms. He then turns to two main critiques of the argument. First, he shows that the term “essentially” is insufficiently defined by McMahan and, more important, if we take the typical explication of the concept by (...) modal metaphysicians, then the claim “we are essentially human beings” is true—contrary to McMahan’s argument. Second, the author offers a counterexample to McMahan’s implicit acceptance of the principle that only beings who have developed the capacity for self-consciousness are the proper subjects of moral worth. The author presents a regenerative therapy example to show that McMahan’s commitment on this point is counterintuitive. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 8.2 (Summer 2008): 255–264. (shrink)

The “disability paradox” is the idea that for those who become severely disabled, their own quality of life assessment remains at or slightly below the QoL assessments of normal controls. This is a source of skepticism regarding third-person QoL judgments of the disabled. I argue here that this skepticism applies as well to those who are in the minimally conscious state. For rather simple means of sustaining an MCS patient’s life, the cost of being wrong that the patient would not (...) want further support is high. Pair this cost with the reason to be skeptical of third-person judgments, and my argument suggests not withholding food and water from MCS patients. (shrink)

Recently, Verheijde and Potts (2011) have called into question the whole-brain death (WBD) criterion and, in particular, have taken issue with my admittedly limited defense of WBD. I would like to thank Verheijde and Potts for their comments and for identifying key points in the debate that need further clarification and defense. This article is an attempt to provide such clarification and to focus on Verheijde and Potts’s key argument against me and other proponents of WBD. The structure of this (...) reply is first to clear away some misunderstandings and to articulate further some of my original arguments. These clarifications are necessary to acuminate attention to what is, I believe, the fundamental locus of disagreement between proponents of WBD and its detractors. Detractors assert that patients who satisfy WBD can still evince integrated functioning. On the assumption that persons are not dead yet if they can manifest integrated functioning, WBD is not a reliable indicator of death. In the second section, I address this fundamental point of disagreement, arguing that with no (known) exceptions, patients satisfying WBD require external support (e.g., ventilator) in order to maintain integrated functioning. This fact is important because on the account of the person I endorse, one which I think is plausible, the soul confers on the body certain vital potencies. When the body itself has lost such potencies, we have evidence of the soul not being present. Emphasizing the aspect of self-integration that is characteristic of living human beings avoids the challenge that WBD persons are still alive. In the third section, however, I address what I take to be Verheijde and Potts’s strongest objection against WBD criterion, namely the objection from spontaneous circulation. The responses to this objection point to the fundamental and limited role the WBD criterion is meant to play in organ donation decisions. (shrink)

This paper addresses a certain lacuna in moral theological reflec­tion. An institutional review board (IRB) reviews research on human subjects and so represents the institution’s ethical review mechanism for research. The author argues that if an IRB approves a research project that is immoral, it thereby implicates the institution in formal cooperation. The author also argues that numerous ethical concerns are created by current research enterprises—concerns that extend beyond the “usual suspects” of embryonic stem cell research and research using cell (...) lines of illicit origin. The author describes these more subtle issues and shows how IRBs at Catholic hospitals can navigate them. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.2 (Summer 2011): 257–266. (shrink)

Research on human subjects aims to obtain knowledge of vital importance for human health and functioning. Neuroscientific research specifically is understood as oriented towards three goals: the maintenance of neurological health, the treatment of neurological diseases or syndromes, and the enhancement of neurological functioning. Most guidelines or regulations for pediatric research (whether in the U.S. or elsewhere) require that if a research intervention exposes subjects to more than minimal risk, a prospect of direct benefit is required—along with some other important (...) criteria. It is also required for any research project, that the methods and design will yield scientifically valid knowledge. This is typically met via placebo-controlled trials. This chapter presents an argument to the effect that more than minimal risk research on pediatric subjects cannot meet both ethical requirements. The basic idea is that either the subjects in the control or experimental arm will receive a prospect of direct benefit, but not both. This chapter also argues that the ethical weight or importance of this dilemma is very acute for neuroscientific research given the complexity of the brain’s functioning and the correlated difficulty of judging whether there is a “prospect” of direct benefit. The second half responds to this argument via a case study in neuroscientific research. The solution recapitulates a type of component analysis according to which different ethical principles apply to different activities of a research study. (shrink)

A widely accepted, perhaps prevailing view among Hobbes scholars is that his theory of political obligation is grounded in an egoistic and materialistic view of human nature. There are a number of difficulties with this view, not the least of which is that it seems to make a genuine theory of political obligation impossible. It is the object of the present paper to examine certain aspects of Hobbes's account of human nature, with the object of weaving them together into a (...) single doctrine which is coherent with what he has to say about political obligation. I will conclude by considering briefly how traditional interpretations could have come to prevail. (shrink)

There is debate among virtue epistemologists concerning what is the nature of an intellectual virtue. Linda Zagzebski in Virtues of the Mind , for instance, argues that an intellectual virtue has both a success and motivational component. Furthermore, Zagzebski defines knowledge with reference to acts of intellectual virtue. An agent S knows p iff S performs an act of intellectual virtue in forming the belief that p. This means that Zagzebski is committed to the counter-intuitive claim that low-grade knowledge requires (...) the agent to be epistemically motivated to form such low-grade beliefs. In this project I look at empirical research in cognitive psychology which suggests that epistemic motivations are involved in low-grade processing. Research on the role of attention in vision and memory suggests that attentional focus is necessary in order to have low-grade knowledge. And research on the relationship between motivation and attentional processing suggests that motivation informs attentional operations. The next step in the argument aims to show that such motivations are epistemic in that they are motivations to attain a cognitive state whose value is alethically related. Thus, one's epistemic motivations are necessary for low-grade knowledge. The second half of my project turns to higher-grade knowledge, i.e., testimony. It is here that I apply Zagzebski's account of knowledge to testimony. I do this to give a heretofore counterexample free definition of testimonial knowledge. Altogether, the project shows how Zagzebski's theory can account for the major modes by which we acquire empirical knowledge. (shrink)

It is common in bioethical discussion to present thought experiments or cases in order to construct an argument. Some thought experiments are quite illuminating, and ethical theorizing will often appeal at some point to one’s intuitions. But there are cases in which thought experiments are useless or do not contribute to the argument. This article considers cases presented in the context of stem cell research that are destructive of human embryos. I argue that certain popular cases that are meant to (...) motivate the view that such research is permissible either are dialectically useless or do not contribute to the argument. By dialectically useless, I mean that the cases analyzed here yield intuitions in people who are already committed to the permissibility of such research. I end with some reflections that challenge the reliability of our intuitions on applied ethics issues by suggesting that thought experiments in this field are dubious from the start. My argument should not be read to support moral skepticism but to urge that our inquiries on applied issues requires certain intellectual virtues. (shrink)

Every year, the Vietnamese people reportedly burned about 50,000 tons of joss papers, which took the form of not only bank notes, but iPhones, cars, clothes, even housekeepers, in hope of pleasing the dead. The practice was mistakenly attributed to traditional Buddhist teachings but originated in fact from China, which most Vietnamese were not aware of. In other aspects of life, there were many similar examples of Vietnamese so ready and comfortable with adding new norms, values, and beliefs, even contradictory (...) ones, to their culture. This phenomenon, dubbed “cultural additivity”, prompted us to study the co-existence, interaction, and influences among core values and norms of the Three Teachings –Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism–as shown through Vietnamese folktales. By applying Bayesian logistic regression, we evaluated the possibility of whether the key message of a story was dominated by a religion (dependent variables), as affected by the appearance of values and anti-values pertaining to the Three Teachings in the story (independent variables). Our main findings included the existence of the cultural additivity of Confucian and Taoist values. More specifically, empirical results showed that the interaction or addition of the values of Taoism and Confucianism in folktales together helped predict whether the key message of a story was about Confucianism, β{VT ⋅ VC} = 0.86. Meanwhile, there was no such statistical tendency for Buddhism. The results lead to a number of important implications. First, this showed the dominance of Confucianism because the fact that Confucian and Taoist values appeared together in a story led to the story’s key message dominated by Confucianism. Thus, it presented the evidence of Confucian dominance and against liberal interpretations of the concept of the Common Roots of Three Religions (“tam giáo đồng nguyên”) as religious unification or unicity. Second, the concept of “cultural additivity” could help explain many interesting socio-cultural phenomena, namely the absence of religious intolerance and extremism in the Vietnamese society, outrageous cases of sophistry in education, the low productivity in creative endeavors like science and technology, the misleading branding strategy in business. We are aware that our results are only preliminary and more studies, both theoretical and empirical, must be carried out to give a full account of the explanatory reach of “cultural additivity”. (shrink)

A Review of S. Napiers, book Virtue Epistemology. While concerned with the nature of knowledge, Napier also wants to claim that a key implication of responsibilist VE is “a shift away from analyzing epistemic concepts (knowledge, etc.) in terms of other epistemic concepts (e.g. justification) to analyzing epistemic concepts with reference to kinds of human activity…much of analytic epistemology centers on epistemic concepts, whereas the responsibilist focuses on epistemic activity” (144).Of the main points he claims responsibilism provides us with—(i) (...) rentention of the idea that a person who knows is personally justified in the sense of is rational, justified, or intellectually good, (ii) a sound account of the value of knowledge, and (iii) a Gettier-proof theory of knowledge —I pose some questions about the first and third. (shrink)

Along the way he interviewed professional resource managers and naturalists, biologists, interpreters, conservation agents, engineers, farmers, hunters, fishermen, writers, and many others in an effort to gain a perspective that only people who work with the land - for business or for pleasure - can have." "Shelton describes a range of land-management philosophies and techniques, from largely hands-off, as in state parks, to largely hands-on, as in farming. He also addresses the questions that surround some of the more controversial practices, (...) such as the use of fire for land management and the introduction of nonnative species."--Jacket. (shrink)

Who, over the age of 20, hasn’t experienced a serendipitous event: unexpected information that yields some unintended but potential value later on? Sitting next to a stranger on a plane who becomes a business partner? Stumbling onto an article in a journal or newspaper that helps tackle a nagging problem? Creating a new drug by accident?

In an increasingly global environment, managers face a dilemma when selecting and applying moral values to decisions in cross-cultural settings. While moral values may be similar across cultures (either in different countries or among people within a single country), their application (or ethics) to specific situations may vary. Ethics is the systematic application of moral principles to concrete problems.This paper addresses the cross-cultural ethical dilemma, proposes a tentative model for conceptualizing cross-cultural ethics, and suggests some ways in which the model (...) may be tested and operationalized. (shrink)

There is limited knowledge about cancer patients' experiences of uncertainty while waiting for genome sequencing results, and whether prolonged uncertainty contributes to psychological factors in this context. To investigate uncertainty in patients with a cancer of likely hereditary origin while waiting for genome sequencing results, we collected questionnaire and interview data at baseline, and at three and 12 months follow up. Participants had negative attitudes towards uncertainty at baseline, and low levels of uncertainty at three and 12 months. Uncertainty about (...) genome sequencing did not change significantly over time [t = 0.660, p = 0.510]. Greater perceived susceptibility for cancer [r = 0.14, p < 0.01], fear of cancer recurrence [r = 0.19, p < 0.01], perceived importance of genome sequencing [r = 0.24, p < 0.01], intention to change behavior if a gene variant indicating risk is found [r = 0.29, p < 0.01], perceived ability to cope with results [r = 0.36, p < 0.01], and satisfaction with decision to have genome sequencing [r = 0.52, p < 0.01] were significantly correlated with negative attitudes towards uncertainty at baseline. Multiple primary cancer diagnoses [B = −2.364 [−4.238, −0.491], p = 0.014], lower perceived ability to cope with results [B = −0.1.881 [−3.403, −0.359], p = 0.016] at baseline, greater anxiety about genome sequencing [B = 0.347 [0.148, 0.546], p = 0.0012] at 3 months, and greater perceived uncertainty about genome sequencing [B = 0.494 [0.267, 0.721] p = 0.000] at 3 months significantly predicted greater perceived uncertainty about genome sequencing at 12 months. Greater perceived uncertainty about genome sequencing at 3 months significantly predicted greater anxiety about genome sequencing at 12 months [B = 0.291 [0.072, 0.509], p = 0.009]. Semi-structured interviews revealed that while participants were motivated to pursue genome sequencing as a strategy to reduce their illness and risk uncertainty, genome sequencing generated additional practical, scientific and personal uncertainties. Some uncertainties were consistently discussed over the 12 months, while others emerged over time. Similarly, some uncertainty coping strategies were consistent over time, while others emerged while patients waited for their genome sequencing results. This study demonstrates the complexity of uncertainty generated by genome sequencing for cancer patients and provides further support for the inter-relationship between uncertainty and anxiety. Helping patients manage their uncertainty may ameliorate psychological morbidity. (shrink)

In this essay, we share our experience and learning about the value of, and the difficulty associated with, conducting and presenting scientific studies in ways that are both simple (understandable) and beautiful (appealing to the reader). We describe some “aha moments” of insight that led to changes in the way we approach and present research, some of the actions we took, and lessons we learned.

Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland (2023) argue that controlled donation after cardiac death (cDCD) protocols prescribe the extraction of organs that do not violate the dead donor rule. I argue here that e...

Ocherk 1. Voprosy ontologii -- Ocherk 2. Voprosy ėtiki i ėstetiki -- Ocherk 3. Voprosy gnoseologii i aksiologii.

In this fascinating and inventive work, A. David Napier argues that the central assumption of immunology—that we survive through the recognition and elimination of non-self—has become a defining concept of the modern age. Tracing this immunological understanding of self and other through an incredibly diverse array of venues, from medical research to legal and military strategies and the electronic revolution, Napier shows how this defensive way of looking at the world not only destroys diversity but also eliminates the (...) possibility of truly engaging difference, thereby impoverishing our culture and foreclosing tremendous opportunities for personal growth. To illustrate these destructive consequences, Napier likens the current craze for embracing diversity and the use of politically correct speech to a cultural potluck to which we each bring different dishes, but at which no one can eat unless they abide by the same rules. Similarly, loaning money to developing nations serves as a tool both to make the peoples in those nations more like us and to maintain them in the nonthreatening status of distant dependents. To break free of the resulting downward spiral of homogenization and self-focus, Napier suggests that we instead adopt a new defining concept based on embryology, in which development and self-growth take place through a process of incorporation and transformation. In this effort he suggests that we have much to learn from non-Western peoples, such as the Balinese, whose ritual practices require them to take on the considerable risk of injecting into their selves the potential dangers of otherness—and in so doing ultimately strengthen themselves as well as their society. _The Age of Immunology,_ with its combination of philosophy, history, and cultural inquiry, will be seen as a manifesto for a new age and a new way of thinking about the world and our place in it. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 60-61, August 2011.

Contemporary philosophical discussion on human embryonic stem cell research has focused primarily on the metaphysical and meta-ethical issues suchresearch raises. Though these discussions are interesting, largely ignored are arguments rooted in the secular research ethics tradition already informing humansubject research. This tradition countenances the notion of vulnerability and that vulnerable human subjects (of which human embryos are likely members)ought to be protected from research-related harms. This is the basic idea behind the argument from vulnerability, and it enjoys prima facie plausibility. (...) This articlepresents the vulnerability argument and then focuses critically on several lines of attack including: (1) twinning and totipotency arguments, (2) embryo-rescuearguments, and (3) natural loss arguments. The article concludes that there is no good defeater for the vulnerability argument, and, therefore, we have undefeated reasons for protecting human embryos from research related harms. (shrink)

Despite increasing public attention and media coverage of fraud, no solution to this problem has been designed specifically for the not-for-profit sector. This study focuses on charities in England and Wales and examines variables derived from a content analysis of 42 fraud and 42 no-fraud charities' annual reports and financial statements. We use logistic regression to explain and predict fraud in the charity sector. We examine whether a range of governance-type variables are significantly related to the likelihood of fraud in (...) charities. We find that smaller boards, which imply a small cosy environment for governance, are associated with a greater likelihood of fraud, suggesting that larger boards enhance monitoring in the not-for-profit sector. Also, a low or zero-level of grant funding is associated with a greater likelihood of fraud, implying that monitoring by long-term donors is also important in curbing fraud. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical discussion on human embryonic stem cell research has focused primarily on the metaphysical and meta-ethical issues suchresearch raises. Though these discussions are interesting, largely ignored are arguments rooted in the secular research ethics tradition already informing humansubject research. This tradition countenances the notion of vulnerability and that vulnerable human subjects (of which human embryos are likely members)ought to be protected from research-related harms. This is the basic idea behind the argument from vulnerability, and it enjoys prima facie plausibility. (...) This articlepresents the vulnerability argument and then focuses critically on several lines of attack including: (1) twinning and totipotency arguments, (2) embryo-rescuearguments, and (3) natural loss arguments. The article concludes that there is no good defeater for the vulnerability argument, and, therefore, we have undefeated reasons for protecting human embryos from research related harms. (shrink)

Debates on moral enhancement focus legitimate attention on the questions of whether it is possible and/or what could count as a moral enhancement given deep ethical disagreement. I argue here that moral enhancements might not even be rational to consider—from the perspective of the agent. At issue is the assessment of whether the enhancement is truly reliable. Since we assess reliable belief forming processes by their outputs, whether they are true, an agent who is entertaining a putative moral enhancement faces (...) a trilemma. If she already believes the promised outputs of the enhancement, the enhancement is obsolete. If she does not believe the promised outputs, it would be irrational from her current perspective to undertake the “enhancement.” If she is uncertain, she has no reason for thinking that the enhancement truly augments her moral beliefs. On any option, the agent has no reason for taking a putative moral enhancement. (shrink)

The theorisation of fraud has largely been developed in the for-profit sector, and the paper extends this to the not-for-profit sector. Motivated by social control theory, we adopt a qualitative approach to assess the views of key charity stakeholders (social control agents) of charities registered with the Charity Commission for England and Wales about fraud. We find that stakeholders, especially donors and beneficiaries, are often reluctant to label ‘fraud’ as a threat to the sector. This reflects ‘trusting indifference’, a value (...) embedded in the sector that brings more harm than good to the sector in terms of wrongdoing, by hampering effective social control. Adapting existing theories of fraud to charities, we propose a ‘fraud tower’ with three layers: the social layer (trusting indifference), organisational layer (opportunity), and individual layer (fraudsters-opportunity seekers). (shrink)

Bioethics is a field of inquiry and as such is fundamentally an epistemic discipline. Knowing how we make moral judgments can bring into relief why certain arguments on various bioethical issues appear plausible to one side and obviously false to the other. Uncertain Bioethicsmakes a significant and distinctive contribution to the bioethics literature by culling the insights from contemporary moral psychology to highlight the epistemic pitfalls and distorting influences on our apprehension of value. Stephen Napier also incorporates research from (...) epistemology addressing pragmatic encroachment and the significance of peer disagreement to justify what he refers to as epistemic diffidence when one is considering harming or killing human beings. Napier extends these developments to the traditional bioethical notion of dignity and argues that beliefs subject to epistemic diffidence should not be acted upon. He proceeds to apply this framework to traditional and developing issues in bioethics including abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia, decision-making for patients in a minimally conscious state, and risky research on competent human subjects. to traditional and developing issues in bioethics including abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia, decision-making for patients in a minimally conscious state, and risky research on competent human subjects. (shrink)

Ethical challenges to certain aspects of research on human subjects are not uncommon; examples include challenges to first-in-human trials (Chapman in J Clin Res Bioethics 2(4):1–8, 2011), certain placebo controlled trials (Anderson in J Med Philos 31:65–81, 2006; Anderson and Kimmelman in Kennedy Inst Ethics J 20(1):75–98, 2010) and “sham” surgery (Macklin in N Engl J Med 341:992–996, 1999). To date, however, there are few challenges to research when the subjects are competent and the research is more than minimal risk (...) with no promise of direct benefit. The principal reason given for allowing research that is more than minimal risk without benefit is that we should respect the autonomy of competent subjects. I argue that though the moral intuitions informing respect for autonomy are sound, there is another set of intuitions regarding what we take to be just treatment of another when one agent knowingly causes or allows suffering on another agent. I argue that concerns generated by commutative justice serve as limitations on permissible research. I highlight our intuitions informing this notion of justice by appealing to work done on theodicy; what counts as a morally sufficient reason for God to allow suffering in humans is applicable also to the researcher-subject relationship. I conclude that all human subjects who are exposed to more than minimal risk research should enjoy the same actual protections (e.g., subpart D) as those given subjects who cannot consent. (shrink)