Propensities are presented as a generalization of classical determinism. They describe a physical reality intermediary between Laplacian determinism and pure randomness, such as in quantum mechanics. They are characterized by the fact that their values are determined by the collection of all actual properties. It is argued that they do not satisfy Kolmogorov axioms; other axioms are proposed.

A model of dissipative quantum dynamics (with a nonlinear friction term) is applied to systems periodic in time. The model is compared with the standard approaches based on the Floquet theorem. It is shown that for weak frictions the asymptotic states of the dynamics we propose are the periodic steady states which are usually postulated to be the states relevant for the statistical mechanics of time-periodic systems. A solution to the problem of nonuniqueness of the “quasienergies” is proposed. The implication (...) of a nonlinear evolution for Ludwig's axiomatization is briefly outlined. (shrink)

L'écologie cherche à connaître les conditions d'existence des organismes par rapport à leur milieu physique et biotique.D'une part elle étudie les exigences des organismes envers le milieu et leurs adaptations à celui-ci; d'autre part, elle recherche comment le milieu influe sur les organismes. Or, puisque chaque être vivant fait partie du milieu des autres et que sa présence et son activité modifient le milieu physique et biotique pour lui-même comme pour les autres, l'écologie est amenée à considérer en général les (...) interactions entre les facteurs constitués par les organismes ainsi que par les agents inorganiques.Toutefois, la complexité de ces interactions est telle qu'à leur analyse physico-chimique s'opposent des difficultés partiellement insurmontables. La raison en est que les multiples facteurs écologiques n'agissent pas isolément, mais en combinaison dans l'espace et dans le temps. Il en résulte des états d'équilibre relatif dont seule l'expérience multiséculaire de la nature nous révèle l'aboutissement avec certitude. Aussi bien l'écologiste qui veut en tenir compte commence-t-il ses recherches par le relevé qualitatif et quantitatif des groupements biologiques spontanés. Le chercheur les reconnaît à la constance relative de leur composition, dans les divers endroits où ils sont réalisés, constance résultant de l'équilibre relatif entre les facteurs. C'est exactement pour de tels groupements queMöbius à créé le terme de biocénose. Ainsi la biocénotique peut être considérée comme la propédeutique d'une écologie justement conçue; elle ne serait que préparatoire et provisoire si la Science pouvait un jour entièrement éclaircir le jeu des forces écologiques.Enfin en essayant de bien situer l'écologie dans le cadre des disciplines biologiques voisines, il est utile d'avoir présent à l'esprit l'ébauche suivante d'un nouveau système de la biologie:Dans mes „Analyses et synthèses biocénotiques” , j'ai discuté la conception d'Agrell, qui se base sur des stations-types préétablies. Depuis,Agrell a consacrédeux articles polémiques à soutenir que ses „Bestandestypen” s'identifient aux groupements écologiques tels que je le conçois.Il n'en est rien.Dans l'idée d'Agrell, tous les relevés provenant d'un même type de stations font a priori partie d'un même „Bestandestyp”. La conséquence en est que certaines espèces en réalité vicariantes, c'est-à-dire ne cohabitant jamais -Tetracanthella wahlgreni etFolsomia brevicauda, par exemple — se trouvent réunies, sur le papier, dans une même „communauté”. Au contraire, dans mon système, les relevés faits dans un certain type de stations sont classés tantôt dans un groupement , tantôt dans un autre , d'après leur composition faunistique servant d'indicateur. Cette différence explique amplement les discordances qu'Arell relève entre mes indices d'abondance-fréquence et les siens, discordance prouvant une fois de plus que les „Bestandestypen” et les groupements ne sont pas la même chose.Agrell qualifie de résidu l'un de mes groupements. Or, rien n'est plus résiduel queson Bestandestyp 2, qui représente l'ensemble de 7 stations sur 10, celles qui restent après avoir retranché les 3 stations de milieux extrêmes.Agrell reproche à ma méthode de laisser inclassables certains relevés dépourvusd'espèces vicariantes. Cela n'est-il pas préférable au classement de force de relevés, fragmentaires et aux calculs hasardeux basés sur des unités hétérogènes?Enfin,Agrell estime que le choix des espèces caractéristiques est subjectif. J'ai: montré qu'il ne l'est ni plus ni moins que celui des caractères spécifiques en taxonomie.Oekologie, Ethologie, Biogeographie und Biocoenotik werden noch häufig miteinander verwechselt. Diese Disziplinen lassen sich an Hand des Schemas unterscheiden, das in vorstehenden Schlussfolgerungen wiedergegeben ist. Dieses Schema ist zugleich ein Beitrag zu einem neuen, dreidimensionalen System der Biologie.Speziell wird auf den methodischen Unterschied zwischen Oekologie und Biocoenotik eingegangen. Die Biocoenotik kann als eine unentbehrliche Vorstufe der Oekologie angesehen werden, insofern sie die natürliche Vergemeinschaftung der Organismen als ein grossartiges, von der Natur selbst eingesetztes Experiment betrachtet. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, dass Ergebnis dieses Experiments zu beschreiben. Die Lebensgemeinschaften, die sie dabei unterscheidet, sind gekennzeichnet durch ihre häufig wiederkehrende, einigermassen konstante Zusammensetzung, entsprechend den relativen Faktoren-Gleichgewichten, welche sich im Laufe der Jahrhunderte einstellen. Die Lebensgemeinschaften sind aber viel leichter zu erfassen als die Faktoren-Gleichgewichte und deren biologische Bedeutung. Ihre Abgrenzung erfolgt, — wie in der Taxonomie diejenige der Arten — auf Grund objektiver Diskontinuitäten. Letztere gründen sich in der Biocoenotik auf die sich ökologisch ersetzenden Arten. Sie sind die Prüfsteine für die Grundeinheiten der Biocoenotik: die Biocoenosen.] Soweit die Organismen einer Biocoenose aufeinander einwirken, stellen sie gleichzeitig einen Konnex dar; und soweit sie in ihren Ansprüchen oder Anpassungen übereinstimmen, gehören sie auch zum gleichen Lebensformen-Typ. Es ist praktisch, drei Grössenordnungen von Biocoenosen zu unterscheiden: Synusien, Assoziationen und Biome. (shrink)

John Bell proposed an ontology for the GRW modification of quantum mechanics in terms of flashes occurring at space- time points. This article spells out the motivation for this ontology, inquires into the status of the wave function in it, critically examines the claim of its being Lorentz invariant, and considers whether it is a parsimonious but nevertheless physically adequate ontology.

Most physics theories are deterministic, with the notable exception of quantum mechanics which, however, comes plagued by the so-called measurement problem. This state of affairs might well be due to the inability of standard mathematics to “speak” of indeterminism, its inability to present us a worldview in which new information is created as time passes. In such a case, scientific determinism would only be an illusion due to the timeless mathematical language scientists use. To investigate this possibility it is necessary (...) to develop an alternative mathematical language that is both powerful enough to allow scientists to compute predictions and compatible with indeterminism and the passage of time. We suggest that intuitionistic mathematics provides such a language and we illustrate it in simple terms. (shrink)

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is (...) empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)

It is usual to identify initial conditions of classical dynamical systems with mathematical real numbers. However, almost all real numbers contain an infinite amount of information. I argue that a finite volume of space can’t contain more than a finite amount of information, hence that the mathematical real numbers are not physically relevant. Moreover, a better terminology for the so-called real numbers is “random numbers”, as their series of bits are truly random. I propose an alternative classical mechanics, which is (...) empirically equivalent to classical mechanics, but uses only finite-information numbers. This alternative classical mechanics is non-deterministic, despite the use of deterministic equations, in a way similar to quantum theory. Interestingly, both alternative classical mechanics and quantum theories can be supplemented by additional variables in such a way that the supplemented theory is deterministic. Most physicists straightforwardly supplement classical theory with real numbers to which they attribute physical existence, while most physicists reject Bohmian mechanics as supplemented quantum theory, arguing that Bohmian positions have no physical reality. (shrink)

Do scientific theories limit human knowledge? In other words, are there physical variables hidden by essence forever? We argue for negative answers and illustrate our point on chaotic classical dynamical systems. We emphasize parallels with quantum theory and conclude that the common real numbers are, de facto, the hidden variables of classical physics. Consequently, real numbers should not be considered as ``physically real" and classical mechanics, like quantum physics, is indeterministic.

The claim that the observation of a violation of a Bell inequality leads to an alleged alternative between nonlocality and non-realism is annoying because of the vagueness of the second term.

Discussions on indeterminism in physics focus on the possibility of an open future, i.e. the possibility of having potential alternative future events, the realisation of one of which is not fully determined by the present state of affairs. Yet, can indeterminism affect also the past, making it open as well? We show that by upholding principles of finiteness of information one can entail such a possibility. We provide a toy model that shows how the past could be fundamentally indeterminate, while (...) also explaining the intuitive (and observed) asymmetry between the past—which can be remembered, at least partially—and the future—which is impossible to fully predict. (shrink)

Quantum physics, which offers an explanation of the world on the smallest scale, has fundamental implications that pose a serious challenge to ordinary logic. Particularly counterintuitive is the notion of entanglement, which has been explored for the past 30 years and posits an ubiquitous randomness capable of manifesting itself simultaneously in more than one place. This amazing 'non-locality' is more than just an abstract curiosity or paradox: it has entirely down-to-earth applications in cryptography, serving for example to protect financial information; (...) it also has enabled the demonstration of 'quantum teleportation', whose infinite possibilities even science-fiction writers can scarcely imagine. This delightful and concise exposition does not avoid the deep logical difficulties of quantum physics, but gives the reader the insights needed to appreciate them. From 'Bell's Theorem' to experiments in quantum entanglement, the reader will gain a solid understanding of one of the most fascinating areas of contemporary physics. (shrink)

What can be more fascinating than experimental metaphysics, to quote one of Abner Shimony’s enlightening expressions? Bell inequalities are at the heart of the study of nonlocality. I present a list of open questions, organised in three categories: fundamental; linked to experiments; and exploring nonlocality as a resource. New families of inequalities for binary outcomes are presented.

We propose an interpretation of physics named potentiality realism. This view, which can be applied to classical as well as to quantum physics, regards potentialities (i.e. intrinsic, objective propensities for individual events to obtain) as elements of reality, thereby complementing the actual properties taken by physical variables. This allows one to naturally reconcile realism and fundamental indeterminism in any theoretical framework. We discuss our specific interpretation of propensities, that require them to depart from being probabilities at the formal level, though (...) allowing for statistics and the law of large numbers. This view helps reconcile classical and quantum physics by showing that most of the conceptual problems that are customarily taken to be unique issues of the latter -- such as the measurement problem -- are actually in common to all indeterministic physical theories. (shrink)

We propose a distinction between two different concepts of time that play a role in physics: geometric time and creative time. The former is the time of deterministic physics and merely parametrizes a given evolution. The latter is instead characterized by real change, i.e. novel information that gets created when a non-necessary event becomes determined in a fundamentally indeterministic physics. This allows us to give a naturalistic characterization of the present as the moment that separates the potential future from the (...) determined past. We discuss how these two concepts find natural applications in classical and intuitionistic mathematics, respectively, and in classical and multivalued tensed logic, as well as how they relate to the well-known A- and B-theories in the philosophy of time. (shrink)

Исследование посвящено философскому осознанию природы духовности человека. Автор рассматривает духовность внутреннего мира человека как единство высших чувств души и нравственного сознания. Для специалистов в области философии, методологии науки.

We argue that the appraisal of models in social epistemology requires conceiving of them as argumentative devices, taking into account the argumentative context and adopting a family-of-models perspective. We draw up such an account and show how it makes it easier to see the value and limits of the use of models in social epistemology. To illustrate our points, we document and explicate the argumentative role of epistemic landscape models in social epistemology and highlight their limitations. We also claim that (...) our account could be fruitfully used in appraising other models in philosophy and science. (shrink)

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...) value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with (...) others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience. (shrink)

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including (...) the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions. (shrink)

We discuss models that attempt to provide an explanation for the violation of Bell inequalities at a distance in terms of hidden influences. These models reproduce the quantum correlations in most situations, but are restricted to produce local correlations in some configurations. The argument presented in (Bancal et al. Nat Phys 8:867, 2012) applies to all of these models, which can thus be proved to allow for faster-than-light communication. In other words, the signalling character of these models cannot remain hidden.

CONTENIDO: Kant y la pedagogía - De la objetividad a la objetivación - De la tensión entre el investigador y el método - Interdisciplinariedad e investigación cualitativa en educación - Formación y subjetividad: epistemología, lenguaje y pedagogía - La pedagogía ante la tecnología como estructura del mundo de la vida - Alcances y limitaciones de la inteligencia artificial en pedagogía - A propósito de la informática en el mundo de la pedagogía y de la educación - La representación del conocimiento (...) y la inteligencia artificial - La lógica de las ciencias como didáctica: ¿un bastión de modernidad? - La educación del futuro como futuro de la educación - De la epistemología de la pedagogía a la filosofía de la educación. (shrink)

According to familiar accounts, Rousseau held that humans are actuated by two distinct kinds of self love: amour de soi, a benign concern for one's self-preservation and well-being; and amour-propre, a malign concern to stand above other people, delighting in their despite. I argue that although amour-propre can (and often does) assume this malign form, this is not intrinsic to its character. The first and best rank among men that amour-propre directs us to claim for ourselves is that of occupying (...) 'man's estate'. This does not require, indeed it precludes, subjection of others. Amour-propre does not need suppression or circumscription if we are to live good lives; it rather requires direction to its proper end, not a delusive one. (shrink)

Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice “see convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace model†(Dennett, p. 1). (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.) On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness. And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit.  Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of “consciousness†and (...) “awareness†in this volume can be taken to refer to the same phenomenon. More specifically, I think there are three different concepts of consciousness in play in this issue. The global workspace model makes much more sense on one of these than on the others. (shrink)

This paper responds to discussion and criticism contained in a mini-symposium on Just health: meeting health needs fairly. The replies clarify existing positions and modify or develop others, specifically in response to the following: Thomas Schramme criticises the claim that health is of special importance because of its impact on opportunity, and James Wilson argues that healthcare is not of special importance if social determinants of health have a major causal impact on population health. Annette Rid is concerned that the (...) relevance condition in accountability for reasonableness is unclear and does little work. Harald Schmidt aims to flesh out where an account of responsibility for health should go since one is under-developed in Just health. Michael Schefczyk and Susanne Brauer challenge aspects of the prudential lifespan account. Samia Hurst asks what impact a population view should have on clinician obligations. (shrink)