Introduction: Loss of employment is an experience that is lived and interpreted differently depending on a series of individual variables, including the psychological resources available to the affected person, as well as their perception of their degree of employability. Losing one’s job can be one of the most painful and traumatic events a person has to withstand. Following a dismissal, the worker needs to overcome a period of emotional adaptation to the loss. But that period of grieving can also condition (...) the process of job search of the person, and be influenced by different variables, highlighting the age and work experience. The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between intensity and type of affliction due to the loss of employment in older workers and their level of employability. Method: We carried out a descriptive, analytical, cross-sectional study. The sample consisted of 140 unemployed participants, from 19 to 65 years of age, users of job Orientation in the Public Employment Service of Andalusia (España). Of the total participants, 66 were unemployed and over 45 years of age. They all took the Labour Insertion Potential Assessment Test, and the Texas Inventory revised adapted to job loss Results: Significant differences are shown in the grieving process due to loss of employment between both groups, with the older unemployed living the process more intensely. In relation to the employability potential, differences are found between both groups in terms of availability, perceived difficulties and fears. Interrelationships between total grieving intensity and the importance that older jobseekers give to work are also indicated. Conclusion:Loss of employment and the psychological and health consequences of this situation are identified with those that arise in the grieving process. Older workers present a series of features that determine that their job loss grieving process is more intense and lasts longer than that of other younger workers, regardless of whether the job loss was recent or not. On the other hand, it is shown that the intensity of grieving is related to the decrease of certain variables that are part of the concept of employability. (shrink)

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.

La noción de interpretación desarrollada en el racionalismo crítico de Karl R. Popper muestra atributos específicos que la distinguen de modo sustancial de la interpretación constitutiva de la experiencia que tanto N. R. Hanson como Th. Kuhn defienden en sus respectivas propuestas. Se muestra que la interpretación del modelo popperia-no queda atrapada en una epistemología de corte empirista que la separa de modo radical de toda hermenéutica filosófica.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Separating the Human from the Divine Cesáreo Bandera University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill Myths are hard to die. One such myth concerns what happened with poetry in general, that is to say, imaginative literature or literary fiction, in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance and beyond. Its basic outline was developed during the nineteenth century. J. E. Spingarn, for example, echoes such a myth in (...) his History of Literary Criticism in the Renaissance, first published in 1899, which has gone through many editions and reprintings since then. In it we read the following: The first problem of Renaissance criticism was the justification of imaginative literature. The existence and continuity of the aesthetic consciousness, and perhaps, in a less degree, of the critical faculty, throughout the Middle Ages, can hardly be denied; yet distrust of literature was keenest among the very class of men in whom the critical faculty might be presupposed, and it was as the handmaid of philosophy, and most of all as the vassal of theology, that poetry was chiefly valued.... The Renaissance was thus confronted with the necessity ofjustifying its appreciation of the vast body of literature which the Revival of Learning had recovered for the modern world. (3) Speaking of Savonarola's De Divisione ac Utilititate Omnium Scientiarum, written about 1492, he concludes as follows: In fine, as a reformer, he represents for us the religious reaction against the paganization of culture by the humanists. But the forces against him were too strong. Even the Christianization of culture effected during the next century by the Council of Trent was hardly more than temporary. Humanism, which represents 74Cesáreo Bandera the revival of ancient pagan culture, and rationalism, which represents the growth of the modem spirit in science and art, were currents too powerful to be impeded by any reformer, however great. (14) This general picture of the historical standing and the fate of literary fiction as we move from the Middle Ages into the modern era, is still very much with us, even though it is ill at ease with, or flatly contradicted by, undeniable historical facts. For example, the incredible notion of a "paganization of culture by the humanists" would have horrified somebody as profoundly Christian as Petrarch and, later on, Erasmus, who criticized the scholastics "in the name of a purer and simpler mode of piety and religious devotion" (Mazzeo 17). Or the mistaken idea that modern rationalism was much more hospitable to poetry than the old scholastic one. For from the seventeenth century on, as J. F. West has pointed out, the whole tide of [scientific] opinion was running strongly against poetry, metaphor, and poetic prose. The philosophers generally saw them as an obstacle to truth. Hobbes regarded metaphor as one of the hindrances to straight thinking. Rousseau thought that the philosophy of Descartes had 'cut the throat of poetry'; and John Locke, late in the century, openly regarded poetry as made up of 'pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy,' but basically misleading. (114) It is indeed true that in medieval scholasticism poetry occupies the lowest rank in the hierarchical structure of the arts and sciences. But it does have a place there. It would have never occurred to Thomas Aquinas, for example, to expel it from that position as something dangerous, something to be avoided. In fact, as he tells us at the beginning of the Summa Theologica, theology itself, the highest of the sciences, does not consider it below its dignity to make use of metaphor and other poetic devices propter utilitatem ac necessitatem. And yet it is precisely that kind of violent expulsion ofpoetic fiction that will be attempted during the Renaissance. In the words of Russell Fraser, "it is in the Renaissance, and not the Middle Ages that the artist is driven from the commonwealth" (39). It was then that the "war against poetry" intensified to fever pitch. It is, therefore, an error to imagine that those in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who bitterly attacked poetic fiction in general and the theater in particular as a very dangerous threat to religion and morality, were fanatic hold-overs from a medieval past... (shrink)

A sociologist who has to confront him/herself with social change cannot avoid running into subjectivity, which is seen as a clear indicator of the most recent tendencies that are going through contemporary society. The demand for subjectivity, generically considered as self-consciousness and the need for self-fulfilment, is undoubtedly a distinguishing feature of our age. The central role this concept has gained within recent sociological literature, however, coincides with the rise of a postmodern sociology, which tends to put forward a precise (...) image of subjectivity that I would call ?minimalist.? Through its call for subjectivity, postmodern sociology intends to celebrate indeed a radical freeing from the ethical, social, and relational constraints that would have oppressed human beings during modernity, which was characterized by a high degree of sociocentrism. Although I share all the contentions that aim at underlining the positive achievements of subjectivity over the constrictions and the de-personalizing forces that distressed the so-called homo sociologicus, I think we need nonetheless to distance ourselves from this new reductionism, which levels out subjectivity to its postmodern conception, and to underline instead the existence of a dual aspect in contemporary subjectivity. As a matter of fact, along with its minimalist and disengaged aspect, conceptualized in the homo psychologicus, another possible expression, called ?significant subjectivity? is emerging, which is a typical feature of the kind of human I propose to define civicus, a human who distinguishes him/herself because of the ability to become the bearer of an authentic form of responsible freedom. Consequently, we can identify two different aspects, at least, in contemporary subjectivity, notably a minimalist and a significant aspect. (shrink)

El ensayo explora los principios básicos y los supuestos teóricos del socialismo raizal propuesto por el sociólogo colombiano Orlando Fals Borda. Este socialismo es presentado como una propuesta enraizada en la Investigación Acción Participativa, haciendo énfasis en su origen en las experiencias históricas revolucionarias de los pueblos originarios y diversos sectores populares de América Latina. Igualmente, se resalta su contenido popular, humanista, democrático y epistémico. El ensayo también explora sus acercamientos y sus diferencias con el pensamiento de Marx.

In most domains of human life, we are willing to accept that there are experts with greater knowledge and competencies that distinguish them from non-experts or laypeople. Despite this fact, the very recognition of expertise curiously becomes more controversial in the case of “moral experts”. Do moral experts exist? And, if they indeed do, are there ethical reasons for us to follow their advice? Likewise, can emerging technological developments broaden our very concept of moral expertise? In this article, we begin (...) by arguing that the objections that have tried to deny the existence (and convenience) of moral expertise are unsatisfactory. After that, we show that people have ethical reasons to ask for a piece of moral advice in daily life situations. Then, we argue that some Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems can play an increasing role in human morality by becoming moral experts. Some AI-based moral assistants can qualify as artificial moral experts and we would have good ethical reasons to use them. (shrink)

The following conversation took place at the 2017 Colloquium on Violence and Religion in Madrid, Spain. Cesáreo Bandera and Adam Ericksen discuss Bandera's friendship with Girard, their disagreements about mimetic theory, and hope in these apocalyptic times. This is an edited version of the transcript of a recoded interview. You can watch the video recording at The Raven Review at ravenfoundation.org.We are in your home country.Yes. In my home country. I am from the south, from Malaga. Malaga is straight south (...) from Madrid on the coast, right across the Mediterranean from Africa. I was born there but grew up in other parts of southern Spain. Like Cordoba and Sevilla where I went to the law school, to get a law... (shrink)

En el marco de la reflexión sobre las relaciones entre ética y política como dimensiones de la experiencia humana y de la vida en común, se presenta una aproximación comparativa a la noción de democracia del filósofo estadounidense John Dewey y la del neozapatismo mexicano. Se señalan algunos puntos de encuentro entre estas nociones, principalmente, la consideración de la democracia como forma de vida comunitaria, como ethos, no sólo como forma de gobierno, y la afirmación de la coexistencia entre lo (...) diverso, en distintas escalas, como condición de la democracia —el pluralismo en Dewey y el pluriversalismo en el neozapatismo—. Se indican también importantes diferencias como el énfasis en el desarrollo de las potencialidades humanas individuales presente sólo en Dewey, y la historicidad y las relaciones de poder que contempla la noción de democracia de los neozapatistas, a diferencia de la de Dewey. El texto afirma la posible fecundidad del diálogo entre distintas tradiciones de pensamiento para la comprensión de la democracia en un sentido más radical, en el que se imbriquen ética y política. (shrink)

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener (...) en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM. (shrink)

In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...) the appropriate truth-value of the sentence. The second aim of this note is to explore how this may not be so. (shrink)

When travelling to a new city, we acquire knowledge about its physical terrain, directions, historical facts and aesthetic features. Engaging in tourism practices, such as guided walking tours, provides experiences of a city that are necessarily mediated and partial. This has led scholars in tourism studies, and more recently in philosophy, to question the epistemological value of city tours, critiquingthem as passive, lacking in autonomous agency, and providing misrepresentative experiences of the city. In response, we argue that the mediated and (...) partial knowledge of a city acquired through city tours is not epistemologically disvaluable. Although city tours involve the transmission of testimonial knowledge, this does not necessarily render tourists as passive and non-autonomous. Instead,tourists have the potential to participate in the generation of their knowledge actively. Moreover, we argue that city tours also provide a tourist with valuable ‘objectual’ knowledge of a city, whichhas the potential to be first-personal and active, and does not necessarily misrepresent the city’s identity. This type of knowledge is valuable both for tourists as credible epistemic agents, and for the city itself, as the knowledge generated by the tour can facilitate an accurate representation of the city and promote social transformation. We conclude by highlighting four further epistemic and ethical implications of our argument. (shrink)

This article presents the stance taken by José Ortega y Gasset in the debate that took place in early-twentieth-century Spain regarding the convenience of reading Don Quixote in schools. To this end, we start by describing, albeit briefly, the state of Ortega y Gasset’s thought in 1920, when he writes Biología y pedagogía, the essay with which we shall concern ourselves. According to Ortega y Gasset, Don Quixote must not be read in the classroom because it does not contribute to (...) the development of the students’ spontaneous life, or natura naturans. In order to foster this development, Ortega y Gasset suggests leaving Don Quixote aside and resort to myths such as Odysseus or Heracles because their exploits would excite the students’ vital pulse. However, we suggest several reasons why the aim stated by Ortega y Gasset —and several other highly valuable educational benefits— could be reached resorting to the reading of selected passages of Don Quixote instead of the feats of Odysseus and Heracles. (shrink)

Critical studies in higher education often embrace the ideas of the slowness movement to address time pressure. However, this desirable horizon presents some limitations. On the one hand, by emphasizing solutions at the individual level, boosting slowness may promote tactics incapable of producing changes to the underlying structural dynamics of time pressure. On the other hand, approaches based on slowness may also inadvertently foster a form of ethical paternalism within the context of ethical pluralism by prescribing substantive models of practice (...) ultimately based on ‘do this quickly or do it slowly.’ This theoretical research moves away from the temporal paradigm to that of the way of relating. Building upon the ethical concept of resonance, the approach focuses on a formal critique of the current socioeconomic and ethical dynamics of social acceleration, growth, and innovation that can contribute to projecting non-alienated relationships in higher education. (shrink)

Social Education implies a constant exposition to human experiences of vulnerability and suffering. In this paper, Levinas’s philosophy of alterity and, specifically, the notion of hospitality constitutes our ethical lens to explore educational encounters in non-formal contexts within the Spanish Social Sector. The study is developed from a hermeneutic phenomenological approach into the depth of lived experiences of eight social educators who currently work with different populations groups. The testimonies, explored through semi-structured interviews, are presented in a conversational, dialogic, poetic (...) format. First, Levinas’ philosophy is presented as our ethical position, focusing on subjectivity as hospitality. Secondly, methodological aspects regarding hermeneutics are addressed. Finally, the testimonies of social educators are presented in an evocative way, exploring uncertainty and three different tensions regarding human relations in their practices: physical spaces, affection, and embodiment. (shrink)

Most philosophers would agree that loving one’s romantic partner (i.e., being in love) is, in principle, a good thing. That is, romantic love can be valuable. It seems plausible that most would then think that the process leading to being in love—i.e. falling in love—can be valuable too. Surprisingly, that is not the case: among philosophers, falling in love has a bad reputation. Whereas philosophy of love has started to depart from traditional (and often unwarranted or false) tropes surrounding romantic (...) life, this tendency has not yet reached the analysis of falling in love. The phenomenon continues to be looked at mostly through a compendium of generalisations taken as metaphysical truths—the view of falling in love being akin to “losing one’s mind” or “not being able to think about anything else”. Here, I analyse some of these generalisations to show that although they may reflect some experiences of what falling in love feels like, they wrongly reduce falling in love to two related, but distinct, phenomena: limerence and infatuation. My aim is to refine the current terminology to lay the foundations for a neutral view of falling in love. (shrink)

This book tells the story of the Scientific Buddha, "born" in Europe in the 1800s but commonly confused with the Buddha born in India 2,500 years ago. The Scientific Buddha was sent into battle against Christian missionaries, who were proclaiming across Asia that Buddhism was a form of superstition. He proved the missionaries wrong, teaching a dharma that was in harmony with modern science. And so his influence continues. Today his teaching of "mindfulness" is heralded as the cure for all (...) manner of maladies, from depression to high blood pressure.In this potent critique, a well-known chronicler of the West's encounter with Buddhism demonstrates how the Scientific Buddha's teachings deviate in crucial ways from those of the far older Buddha of ancient India. Donald Lopez shows that the Western focus on the Scientific Buddha threatens to bleach Buddhism of its vibrancy, complexity, and power, even as the superficial focus on "mindfulness" turns Buddhism into merely the latest self-help movement. The Scientific Buddha has served his purpose, Lopez argues. It is now time for him to pass into nirvana. This is not to say, however, that the teachings of the ancient Buddha must be dismissed as mere cultural artifacts. They continue to present a meaningful challenge, even to our modern world. (shrink)

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

La humanidad evolucionó durante milenios para desarrollar unas características biológicas, culturales, cognitivas y simbólicas comunes, que han posibilitado la expansión de nuestra especie por toda la Tierra y el desarrollo cultural y tecnológico de nuestra era. En este artículo exploramos someramente las ideas del ser humano, proyecciones simbólicas de lo que hemos aspirado a ser, y nos concentramos en la idea moderna autopoiética o de autotransformación, que en nuestro tiempo está postulando la necesidad y posibilidad de una transmutación radical de (...) nuestra especie mediante las bio y neuro tecnologías, generando lo que se denomina «antropotecnologías». El transhumanismo o movimiento de automutación radical de la especie humana nos conducirá, probablemente, a un objetivo que alterará la historia de la humanidad y que, por tanto, debe ser revisado y evaluado desde una perspectiva filosófica y ética por sus profundas consecuencias. (shrink)

RESUMENLas nanotecnologías constituyen actualmente elsector másinnovador y desafiante en el desarrollo tecnocientífico-industrial. Dado que nuestrastecnociencias no son capaces de crearsistemas que sean tanto o más consistentes, más estables y autosustentables que los sistemas naturales, son necesarias e indispensables la supervisión y la regulación prudencial y precautoria de sus efectos y consecuencias, esperadas e inesperadas, mediante un debate público con amplia participación democrática. La nanoética es una forma de poner en acción una racionalidad colectiva prudencial que, en vistas del alcance omniabarcador (...) de las nanotecnologías, tiene que ser construida a partir de principios éticos de alcance global y debe tener un carácter prospectivo.PALABRAS CLAVENANOTECNOLOGÍA, REGULACIÓN, RIESGO TECNOLÓGICO, NANOÉTICAABSTRACTNowadays nanotechnologies constitute the most innovative and challenging sector in technoscientific-industrial development. Our technosciences aren’t capable of generating equally or more consistent stable and self-sufficient systems than natural systems. Therefore, supervision together with reasonable and precautionary regulation of their effects and consequences -being these expected or unexpected-, in the form of public debate with ample democratic participation proves to be necessary. Nanoethics is a way of starting a reasonable collective rationality movement which, in view of the all-containing span of nanotechnologies, must be constructed from ethic principles that have a global reach and must as well have a prospective character.KEYWORDSNANOTECHNOLOGY, REGULATION, TECHNOLOGICAL RISK, NANOETHICS. (shrink)

In Leibniz’s New Essays stands out, within many important topics, his doctrine of innate ideas, which supposes the division between sense knowledge and innate knowledge and implies the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. That doctrine is particularly relevant for Leibniz’s philosophy, but implicitly entails the epistemological difference between belief, on one hand, and certainty, on the other. In this paper I outline, according to my interpretation, how Leibniz explains that humans can have certainty about innate ideas. (...) This topic is important because if Leibniz demonstrates the possibility of having certainty of those ideas, then, it is feasible to believe in its existence. However, if his explanation is unsatisfactory his metaphysical doctrine would be seriously weakened and, at the same time, both skepticism and Locke’s empiricist doctrine would be reinforced. (shrink)

Hinge epistemology is a family of views that offers a novel approach to avoiding skeptical conclusions about the possibility of a posteriori justification of our empirical beliefs. They claim that at the basis of our empirical beliefs lie certain commitments whose rational status is not determined by our evidence. These are called hinge commitments. Prominent hinge epistemologists have claimed that hinge commitments are either rational or arational but yet not beliefs. I argue that such views are subject to decisive objections. (...) I then offer what I consider to be the best version of hinge epistemology. On this view, hinge commitments are best understood as arational beliefs that contingently inform our worldview. I call this view the Arational Beliefs View. (shrink)

Using a sample of 124 managers and 248 subordinates, this study examines the mediating effect of subordinates’ job satisfaction in the relationship between ethical leadership and subordinate organizational citizenship and counter-productive work behaviour in the Colombian context. We additionally analyse the effect of ethical leadership on subordinates’ perception of leaders’ performance. Factor analyses of the ethical leadership scale revealed two factors, ethical person and ethical guidance, which were differentially associated to the outcomes. We offer an explanation from three cultural dimensions (...) by which Colombian employees seem to be more willing to follow leaders’ ethical example as a way to strengthen their membership to the leader's group, than leaders ethical disciplining by which norms are imposed. These findings have a number of implications for organizations and managers who aim to improve their employees’ behaviour. Our advice to them is that leaders’ deeds have a greater impact than their ethical words. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

This paper’s main contention is that some basically methodological developments in science which are apparently distant and unrelated can be seen as part of a sequential story. Focusing on general inferential and epistemological matters, the paper links occurrences separated by both in time and space, by formal and representational issues rather than social or disciplinary links. It focuses on a few limited aspects of several cognitive practices in medical and biological contexts separated by geography, disciplines and decades, but connected by (...) long term transdisciplinary representational and inferential structures and constraints. The paper intends to show a given set of knowledge claims based on organizing statistically empirical data can be seen to have been underpinned by a previous, more familiar, and probably more natural, narrative handling of similar evidence. To achieve that this paper moves from medicine in France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to the second half of the nineteenth century in England among gentleman naturalists, following its subject: the shift from narrative depiction of hereditary transmission of physical peculiarities to posterior statistical articulations of the same phenomena. Some early defenders of heredity as an important causal presence in the understanding of life adopted singular narratives, in the form of case stories from medical and natural history traditions, to flesh out a special kind of causality peculiar to heredity. This work tries to reconstruct historically the rationale that drove the use of such narratives. It then shows that when this rationale was methodologically challenged, its basic narrative and probabilistic underpinings were transferred to the statistical quantificational tools that took their place. (shrink)