What was the process by which an antiquity found on the streets of Rome became the subject of a Renaissance engraving? How did engraving preserve the memory of such antiquities as they vanished into the homes of private collectors, were plundered or destroyed? This article focuses on Marcantonio Raimondis Lion Hunt to explore the relationship between ancient sculpture and the medium of print in Raphaels Rome.

Any adequate account of the distinction between consequentialist and deontological moral systems must take account of the central place given to constraints in the latter. Constraints place limits on what each of us may do in the pursuit of any goal, including the maximisation of the good. There is some debate, however, both over how constraints are to be characterised, and over the rationale for their inclusion in a moral system. Some authors view constraints as agent-relative: a constraint supplies an (...) agent with an agent-relative reason to refrain from acting in the prohibited manner. A reason is agent-relative if it contains an ineliminable back-reference to the agent. On this characterisation, it is natural to suppose that constraints arise because of an agent’s concern with her own agency. There is perhaps, however, an alternative to this agent-focussed rationale: constraints, although characterised in terms of agent-relative reasons, might be best explained and defended via considerations of the potential victim of wrongdoing—yielding a victim- or patient-focussed rationale. Or, perhaps, constraints are not only best defended by a victim-focussed rationale; they are also best characterised by reference to the potential victim. In what follows, we advocate an agent-relative characterisation of, and an agent-focussed rationale for, constraints. We begin by developing a rigorous account of agent-focussed agent-relativity, before turning to consider patient-based approaches. (shrink)

The phenomenology of the creative process has been a neglected area of creativity research. The current study investigated the phenomenology of artistic creativity through semi-structured interviews with 11 artists. The findings consisted of 19 interlinked constituents, with 3 dynamics operating within these constituents: an intuition-analysis dynamic, a union-division dynamic, and a freedom-constraint dynamic. The findings are discussed in relation to the issues of creativity and spirituality, intuition and analysis, the creative synthesis, affective components, and flow. The findings display considerable overlap (...) with previous research into the phenomenology of the artistic creative process, yet place particular emphasis on the shift in sense of self associated with creative experience and the energising effect of a synthesis of disparate elements. (shrink)

The ethical problem of how to apportion limited resources amongst the needy has been forced on us by arbitrary limitation of health expenditure. Its solution would not be required if health expenditure were higher. Distribution of resources according to best value for money, assessed as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) per unit cost, has been suggested as a possible solution, but leads to absurd anomalies. In the calculation of QALYs the implied value of life is no more than the absence (...) of suffering. The use of QALYs for the comparison of treatments that are symptomatic or life-saving therefore leads to serious undervaluation of life and treatments that prolong it. Moreover, distribution of resources by best value for money, however assessed, is inequitable since for a given degree of suffering those whose illnesses happen to be cheaper to treat will be treated in preference to those whose treatments are more expensive. (shrink)

Donald Davidson is famous for, among other things, his theory of radical interpretation – an account of how it is that we can attribute meanings to people's words, and contents to their mental states, based on an apparent paucity of evidence. This account is infused with ideas from, and applications of, the general theory of measurement, as well as one specific instance of that theory – decision theory. In addition, however, Davidson also applies measurement theory – in the form of (...) his “measurement theoretic analogy” – from outside the theory of radical interpretation, to yield a novel account of one of its notable features: the indeterminacy of interpretation. I argue that the success of this application is limited, however, in dispelling a worry to which indeterminacy gives rise – namely that if Davidson's account of indeterminacy is correct, we have no mental states. (shrink)

1. We sometimes angrily confront, pointedly ostracize, castigate, or denounce those whom we think have committed moral offences. Conduct of this kind may be called blaming behaviour. When genuine,...

Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, S, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We advance a slightly qualified version of the following thesis: -/- (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for S to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing. -/- Leaving implicit the qualification concerning extent, we claim as well: -/- (Desert) S's having this reason suffices for S’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing. -/- We also advance a third (...) thesis connecting desert of feeling guilty with the fittingness of this response. -/- In light of our three theses, we address several claims that have been made regarding responsibility and desert. We take issue with the divorce of desert from responsibility. We find acceptable a claim regarding blameworthiness and reason to induce guilt, and we defend the idea that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is blameworthy be subject to a fitting feeling of guilt. We argue against a view on which desert of blame has a teleological dimension. (shrink)

The context-free weak ordering principle is viewed by many as a cornerstone of rational choice theory. McClennen, for example, claims that this principle is one of a pair on which '[t]he theory of rational choice and preference, as it has been developed in the past few decades by economists and decision theorists, rests', and Sen characterizes a version of context freedom as ‘a very basic requirement of rational choice’. But this principle is certainly not uncontroversial: there are examples of principle (...) is certainly not apper irrational. (shrink)

Insurance law in the eighteenth century is often seen as a perfect illustration of the way commercial law emerged from a relationship between the judges and the merchants, with Lord Mansfield at the centre, drawing on mercantile custom. This view tends to subordinate the role of both the merchants and Parliament. Yet, merchants were involved in shaping the law not just as witnesses and jurors in Mansfield’s court, but also through their promotion of, and opposition to, legislation, and through the (...) ways in which business was conducted and disputes were resolved. (shrink)

The increasing impact of humans on the earth might be expected to unite campaigners on behalf of animals and the environment. This is not always the case. There's more than a difference between animal welfare and conservation movements: identifying and understanding these differences will be an important factor in attempting to reconcile these two groups of people. Such reconciliation is worth aiming for, since the human threat is in many ways a real one, and animal and environmental campaigners would be (...) better off allied than divided. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern Rational Choice Theory Prescription and Description Ramsey's Theory Dutch Books and the Epistemic Objection Savage's Theory What is Preference and Why is it More Basic than Qualitative Probability? Context Freedom and the Transitivity of Preference The Causal Independence of Acts and Events The Constant Act Problem Allais's and Ellsberg's Examples Conclusion.

In recent years the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons has been taken by many to play a key role in distinguishing deontology from consequentialism. It is central to all universalist consequentialist theories that value is determined impersonally; the real value of any state of affairs does not depend on the point of view of the agent. No reference, therefore, to the agent or to his or her position in the world need enter into a consequentialist understanding of what makes (...) an action right or wrong or morally permissible. Consequentialism thus provides an agent-neutral account of both the right and the good. (shrink)

Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We (like perhaps Derek Parfit) hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions (...) of normativity, and we see reason to reject descriptivism generally. We also discuss the views of David Brink, Jonathan Dancy and Bernard Williams in this area. (shrink)

Innovation is fundamental to cumulative culture, allowing progressive modification of existing technology. The authors define innovation as an asocial process, uninfluenced by social information. We argue that innovation is inherently social – innovation is frequently the product of modifying others' outputs, and successful innovations are acquired by others. Research should target examination of the cognitive underpinnings of socially-mediated innovations.

The bitter, public contest for priority over the discovery of the virus that causes AIDS was officially closed in 1987 with equal credit being awarded to two parties from opposite sides of the Atlantic. One was led by Robert C. Gallo of the Laboratory of Tumor Cell Biology at the National Cancer Institute in the United States and the other was led by Luc Montagnier of the viral-oncology unit at the Pasteur Institute in France. Using citation counts from articles published (...) by the scientific community, a process of alloca tion of credit is examined and compared with this official settlement. A novel pattern emerges. It is found that the scientific community began to redistribute priority when the dispute became highly publicized and took little notice of the official settlement. This, along with the fact that Gallo has now officially been charged with misconduct by an investigative committee, may mean that Montagnier's team may eventually receive sole creditfor the discovery of the AIDS virus. The importance of examining priority disputes from many different angles and the potential for citation analysis in such cases are highlighted. (shrink)

Simon Blackburn can be seen as challenging those committed to sui generis moral facts to explain the supervenience of the moral on the descriptive. We hold that normative facts in general are sui generis. We also hold that the normative supervenes on the descriptive, and we here endeavour to answer the generalization of Blackburn's challenge. In the course of pursuing this answer, we suggest that Frank Jackson's descriptivism rests on a conception of properties inappropriate to discussions of normativity, and we (...) see reason to reject descriptivism generally. We also discuss the views of David Brink, Jonathan Dancy and Bernard Williams in this area. (shrink)

The two envelopes problem has generated a significant number of publications (I have benefitted from reading many of them, only some of which I cite; see the epilogue for a historical note). Part of my purpose here is to provide a review of previous results (with somewhat simpler demonstrations). In addition, I hope to clear up what I see as some misconceptions concerning the problem. Within a countably additive probability framework, the problem illustrates a breakdown of dominance with respect to (...) infinite partitions in circumstances of infinite expected utility. Within a probability framework that is only finitely additive, there are failures of dominance with respect to infinite partitions in circumstances of bounded utility with finitely many consequences (see the epilogue). (shrink)

The arguments used by Gavin Mooney in his scornful response to Castigating QALYs, are examined. In spite of the rhetoric there is a broad measure of agreement about the deficiencies of QALYs as a means of distributing scarce resources. The main area of conflict is that John Rawles favours compaigning for more resources while Gavin Mooney, constrained by his remit as a health economist, favours acceptance of the present level of funding and better methods of distributing resources.

This centenary volume of essays explores a number of related themes which differentiate and characterize the approach of the LSE. Central to this, is the assumption that law is one of the social sciences and that law should be studied "in context" as a social phenomenon. The contributors have been chosen both for their distinction and for their connection with the LSE, and include such eminent figures as Mrs Justice Arden, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Sir Stephen Sedley, and Roberto Mangabeira Unger. (...) The essays focus on three main subject areas: Law and Economy; Dimensions of Law; and Courts and Process which are discussed against the broader canvas of the School's approach to Law. Thus, Comaroff, Cohen, Unger and Teubner adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, stressing both legal and social theory, while the contributions of Cranston, Cornish and others stress an internationalist approach. A characteristic LSE focus on the dynamic nature of law runs through the work of Collins, Higgins and Lord Wedderburn, while a reformist tradition is explored alongside the introduction of new legal subjects into the curriculum. Fascinating and thought provoking, this volume is an accesible summary of current thought and debate presented by today's leading scholars and practioners. Law, Society and Economy will be of enduring interest to scholars and practioners worldwide, akin to Ginsberg's celebrated and widely cited volume of essays which marked the School's fiftieth anniversary. (shrink)

This centenary volume of essays explores a number of related themes which differentiate and characterize the approach of the LSE. Central to this, is the assumption that law is one of the social sciences and that law should be studied "in context" as a social phenomenon. The contributors have been chosen both for their distinction and for their connection with the LSE, and include such eminent figures as Mrs Justice Arden, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Sir Stephen Sedley, and Roberto Mangabeira Unger. (...) The essays focus on three main subject areas: Law and Economy; Dimensions of Law; and Courts and Process which are discussed against the broader canvas of the School's approach to Law. Thus, Comaroff, Cohen, Unger and Teubner adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the subject, stressing both legal and social theory, while the contributions of Cranston, Cornish and others stress an internationalist approach. A characteristic LSE focus on the dynamic nature of law runs through the work of Collins, Higgins and Lord Wedderburn, while a reformist tradition is explored alongside the introduction of new legal subjects into the curriculum. Fascinating and thought provoking, this volume is an accesible summary of current thought and debate presented by today's leading scholars and practioners. Law, Society and Economy will be of enduring interest to scholars and practioners worldwide, akin to Ginsberg's celebrated and widely cited volume of essays which marked the School's fiftieth anniversary. (shrink)

According to Newton, the goals of natural philosophy comprise quantitative generalizations and causal knowledge, the latter being paramount. Quantitative generalizations are sometimes explanatory, in psychology as elsewhere . However, in psychology, they are not explanatory when the human subject is considered qua bearer of psychological states , but only when she is considered qua physical system. In the former case quantitative generalizations are, rather, to be causally explained. In this sense, psychology may be closer to the Newtonian methodological mark than (...) contemporary physics. (shrink)

There is a substantial literature on the Bayesian approach, and the application of Bayes'' theorem, to legal matters. However, I have found no discussion that explores fully the issue of how a Bayesian juror might be led from an initial "presumption of innocence" to the judgment (required for conviction in criminal cases) that the suspect is "guilty beyond a reasonable doubt". I shall argue here that a Bayesian juror, if she acts in accord with what the law prescribes, will virtually (...) never reach such a judgment. In section I, I discuss Bayesianism, Bayes'' rule and the relation between them. Section II addresses the two legal notions key to my worries about Bayesian jurors: the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt criterion. Section III explores what a Bayesian is to make of these notions, and how the legal system requires her to reason in their light. If I am right, there emerges a conflict between current legal prescriptions and the Bayesian approach. Section IV explores the import of this conflict and how it might be resolved. (shrink)

I examine Quine’s and Davidson’s arguments to the effect that classical logic is the one and only correct logic. This conclusion is drawn from their views on radical translation and interpretation, respectively. I focus on the latter, but I first address, independently, Quine’s argument to the effect that the ‘deviant’ logician, who departs from classical logic, is merely changing the subject. Regarding logical pluralism, the question is whether there is more than one correct logic. I argue that bivalence may be (...) subject matter dependent, but that distribution and the law of excluded middle can probably not be dropped whilst maintaining the standard meanings of the connectives. In discussing the ramifications of the indeterminacy of interpretation, I ask whether it forces Davidsonian interpreters to adopt Dummett’s epistemic conception of truth vis-à-vis their interpretations. And, if so, does this cohere with their attributing a nonepistemic notion of truth to their interpretees? This would be a form of logical pluralism. In addition, I discuss Davidson’s arguments against conceptual schemes. Schemes incommensurable with our own could be construed as wholesale deviant logics, or so I argue. And, if so, their possibility would yield, in turn, the possibility of a radical logical pluralism. I also address Davidson’s application of Tarski’s definition of truth. (shrink)