Unprincipled Ethics

In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press (2000)
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David McNaughton
Florida State University
Piers Rawling
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Citations of this work

Moral Particularism.Jonathan Dancy - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
Normative strength and the balance of reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.
Thick Evaluation.Simon Kirchin - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Non-cognitivism and rule-following.John McDowell - 1981 - In Steven H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. pp. 141--62.
An unconnected Heap of duties?David McNaughton - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):433-447.
An Unconnected Heap of Duties?David McNaughton - 2002 - In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Clarendon Press.
Emeroses by other names.Donald Davidson - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (24):778-780.
A Defence of Intuitionism.J. O. Urmson - 1975 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:111 - 119.

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