The purpose of the article is to present the outlines of the reception and the influence of Heidegger’s philosophy on the territory of former Yugoslavia. This reception and influence were in their essence co-conditioned by specific political, social and cultural circumstances in the region, which were throughout accompanied by “the syndrome of dehumanization”. The confrontation with Heidegger’s philosophy is therefore co-defined by the profoundly experienced crisis of European humanity. During both world wars the attempt of an overcoming of this crisis (...) of humanity by the means of phenomenological and existentialist philosophy was the main focus of attention. The period after the Second World War is denoted by the linking of Marxism with Heidegger’s attempt to surpass philosophy as metaphysics through the perspective of the history of being; in this context we specifically discuss the Praxis philosophical school and the original philosophical thought of Vanja Sutlić. During the disintegration of Yugoslavia and in the period thereafter, besides the intensive appropriation of Heidegger’s thought through translations and interpretations, which also led to the thorough study of Slavic philosophical terminologies, post-Heideggerian ways of thinking came to the fore, together with the possibility for a new humanization within the wider European and global social framework. (shrink)

The philosophical translation should be considered as a special usage of language. The author reflects upon the spiritual, historical and intercultural roles of translation and its significance for the philosophical experience of Slovenian language, a very important one in the case of translating Being and Time. The problem is how to turn this hermeneutic experience into a concrete translation.

Bivanja -- Začrtanost -- Obznak -- Jezikovna torba -- Kritična humanost -- Integral -- Osvobojeni lik -- Seminar -- Pogovor.

The underlying premise of this essay is that the essential contribution of the hermeneutic turn in contemporary philosophy is the acknowledgment of a historical criterion of thinking, whereby the philosophical tradition is claimed by the question of its own truth. Philosophy, historically established by founding experience in truth, thus finds itself facing the open experience of truth, i.e. the truth as the coming about of the openness. Philosophical hermeneutics, as differing from hermeneutic philosophy, cannot limit itself solely to interpretative criticism. (...) Rather, it must follow the opening of truth primarily happening in transit from thinking to language. And the moment of this transit is the question of ourselves. (shrink)

Focuses on the understanding of meaning as a way of thinking in parallels.

Kada se raspravlja o filozofskoj hermeneutici, riječ »filozofska« nije tek običan atribut. Prije svega, ona označava zbiljsku djelatnost filozofije same, koja u sebi razotkriva hermeneutičko pitanje o mogućnosti istine. Razvoj filozofske hermeneutike u 20. st. ovisi dakle o povijesnom suočavanju filozofije s pitanjem o mogućnosti njene imanentne istine. Ova »povijesna« dimenzija nije nešto izvanjsko filozofiji, već njena unutarnja sposobnost mogućnosti samog filozofskog mišljenja koje implicira temeljnu pretpostavku filozofske hermeneutike na koju ovdje pokušavamo ukazati i razraditi. Stoga unaprijed prihvaćamo povijesni kriterij (...) filozofskog mišljenja.When discussing philosophical hermeneutics, the word »philosophical« is not just an ordinary attribute. Above all, it denotes the very activity of philosophy itself, which in itself discloses the hermeneutic question of the possibility of truth. The development of the 20th century philosophical hermeneutics thus depends on the philosophy’s historical facing the question of the possibility of its immanent truth. This »historical« dimension is not something extrinsic to philosophy, but rather an intrinsic quality of the possibility of philosophical thinking itself, which implies the basic presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics we’re here trying to indicate and develop. We therefore accept in advance the historical criterion of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

When discussing philosophical hermeneutics, the word »philosophical« is not just an ordinary attribute. Above all, it denotes the very activity of philosophy itself, which in itself discloses the hermeneutic question of the possibility of truth. The development of the 20th century philosophical hermeneutics thus depends on the philosophy’s historical facing the question of the possibility of its immanent truth. This »historical« dimension is not something extrinsic to philosophy, but rather an intrinsic quality of the possibility of philosophical thinking itself, which (...) implies the basic presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics we’re here trying to indicate and develop. We therefore accept in advance the historical criterion of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

Rolf KÜHN, Innere Gewißheit und lebendiges Selbst. Grundzüge der Lebens-phänomenologie ; John Wrae STANLEY, Die gebrochene Tradition. Zur Genese der philosophischen Hermeneutik Hans-Georg Gadamers ; Gisbert HOFFMANN, Heideggers Phänomenologie. Bewusstsein — Reflexion — Selbst und Zeit im Früh werk ; Dean KOMEL, Kunst und Sein. Beiträge zur Phänomenologischen Ästhetik und Aletheiologie.

‘Molinism’, in contemporary usage, is the name for a theory about the workings of divine providence. Its defenders include some of the most prominent contemporary Protestant and Catholic philosophical theologians.¹ Molinism is often said to be the only way to steer a middle..

William Petty's work has usually been regarded as an epistemic break in the history of statistical and politico-economic thought. In this paper, I argue that Petty's statistical notions stemmed from the natural-historical techniques he originally implemented to manage the Down Survey. Following Bacon, who viewed the description of trades as a paramount branch of natural history, Petty approached the art of surveying itself as an object of natural-historical analysis. He partitioned the surveying work into individual tasks and implemented a meticulous (...) division of labour, employing hundreds of disbanded soldiers as surveyors and using questionnaires to calibrate the responses of his ‘instruments’, as he called his specialized workers. By borrowing these methods from natural history to organize surveying work, Petty was able to conceptualize Ireland as a political body defined by tables of aggregate data. I then compare the Down Survey with John Graunt's observations on the bills of mortality to show that both are representative of a particular style of natural history, aimed at describing the natural and political state of a circumscribed territory. I close by considering other manifestations of ‘territorial natural history’, indicating a continuity between this research tradition and the appearance of statistics in the British Isles. (shrink)

Predictive processing accounts of neural function view the brain as a kind of prediction machine that forms models of its environment in order to anticipate the upcoming stream of sensory stimulation. These models are then continuously updated in light of incoming error signals. Predictive processing has offered a powerful new perspective on cognition, action, and perception. In this chapter we apply the insights from predictive processing to the study of emotions. The upshot is a picture of emotion as inseparable from (...) perception and cognition, and a key feature of the embodied mind. (shrink)

Property dualism is enjoying a slight resurgence in popularity, these days; substance dualism, not so much. But it is not as easy as one might think to be a property dualist and a substance materialist. The reasons for being a property dualist support the idea that some phenomenal properties (or qualia) are as fundamental as the most basic physical properties; but what material objects could be the bearers of the qualia? If even some qualia require an adverbial construal (if they (...) are modifications of the thing that is conscious because of them, not properties of something else to which the subject of consciousness is related), then the property dualist can be driven to speculative forms of materialism none of which, at this point, looks more likely to be true than the more modest versions of emergent dualism defended by contemporary substance dualists. (shrink)

Shows that the very same asymmetries that arise for intentionally also arise from deciding, desiring, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. It seems that the phenomenon is not due to anything about the concept of intentional action in particular. Rather, the effects observed for the concept of intentional action should be regarded as just one manifestation of the pervasive impact of moral judgment.

In this classic analysis of travel and sightseeing, author Dean MacCannell brings social scientific understandings to bear on tourism in the postindustrial age, during which the middle class has acquired leisure time for international travel. In _The Tourist_—now with a new introduction framing it as part of a broader contemporary social and cultural analysis—the author examines notions of authenticity, high and low culture, and the construction of social reality around tourism.

Selective scientific realists disagree on which theoretical posits should be regarded as essential to the empirical success of a scientific theory. A satisfactory account of essentialness will show that the (approximate) truth of the selected posits adequately explains the success of the theory. Therefore, (a) the essential elements must be discernible prospectively; (b) there cannot be a priori criteria regarding which type of posit is essential; and (c) the overall success of a theory, or ‘cluster’ of propositions, not only individual (...) derivations, should be explicable. Given these desiderata, I propose a “unification criterion” for identifying essential elements. (shrink)

The translation of Being and time is in different ways connected with the understanding of Heidegger’s hermeneutical destruction of the basic philosophic concepts. The translator of Being and Time is further faced with complex theoretical questions, such as the relation between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology. The article aims to recognize the importance of Husserl’s phenomenological investigations for the genesis of several central concepts in Being in Time.

This study provides an evaluation of ethical business perception of busIness students from three countries: Australia, Taiwan and the United States. Although statistically significant differences do exist there is significant agreement with the way students perceive ethical/unethical practices in business. The findings of this paper indicate a universality of business ethical perceptions.

It is a natural thought that understanding language consists in possessing knowledge—to understand a word is to know what it means. It is also natural to suppose that this knowledge is propositional knowledge—to know what a word means is to know that it means such-and-such. Thus it is prima facie plausible to suppose that understanding a bit of language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of its meaning. I refer to this as the epistemic view of understanding language. The theoretical appeal (...) of this view for the philosophy of language is that it provides for an attractive account of the project of the theory of meaning. If understanding language consists in possessing propositional knowledge of the meanings of expressions, then a meaning theory amounts to a theory of what speakers know in virtue of understanding language. In this paper I argue that, despite its intuitive and theoretical appeal, the epistemic view is false. Propositional knowledge is not necessary for understanding language, not even tacit knowledge. Unlike knowledge, I argue, linguistic understanding does not fail in Gettier cases, does not require epistemic warrant and does not even require belief. The intuitions about knowledge that have been central to epistemology do not seem to hold for linguistic understanding. So unless epistemologists have been radically mistaken about what knowledge requires, knowledge is unnecessary for understanding language. (shrink)

It seems that, for Husserl, the fact of human freedom is more fundamental than the transcendental subjectivist constitution of the world, or in other words, this constitution has to be seen in this light and further critically elucidated on the ground of the movement of phenomenological epoch as methodical freedom. This, however, also implies a certain practical doctrine and self-trial of Europe. After all, Europe is but this freedom of individuality and responsible personality, which is the only way it can (...) come to an agreement on the interpersonal, intercultural and international level. If this proves to be the authentic meaning of Husserl's disclosure of Lebenswelt, then this immediately paves the way for the philosophical investigation of the present condition of Europe, affirming us in the sense of responsible individuality and mutual discussion. (edited). (shrink)

The translation of Being and time is in different ways connected with the understanding of Heidegger’s hermeneutical destruction of the basic philosophic concepts. The translator of Being and Time is further faced with complex theoretical questions, such as the relation between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology. The article aims to recognize the importance of Husserl’s phenomenological investigations for the genesis of several central concepts in Being in Time.

Interpretative horizons, which determine the position of a concept within a given philosophical context open up a broader issue of linguistic expression and culture. Begriffsgeschichte therefore cannot be limited to a special philosophical discipline, since its relevance comes to the front primarily on the interdisciplinary level of humanities, in general. (edited).

Plato’s definition of philosophy as a mania in the first place distances philosophy from prudence of the so called common sense and places it between the enthusiastic madness of poets and clairvoyants on the one hand, and ironic concealment on the other, which in this very madness prove to be parts of the same question: How can that which is unhidden be revealed in the hidden? Erotic enthusiasm of philosophy is a special sort of madness. It is the paradoxical closeness (...) that is rendered possible by distance. Approaching the distant is recollection. Recollection is by no means a reproduction of anything, but a thought of that which is always preconceived in previous intelligibility, so that it is always being concealed in it. Out of this, the wondering and amazement brings back the unforgettable in Plato’s philosophy, the unusual measures of poetry and of our own oblivion. (shrink)

Plato's definition of philosophy as a mania (in Phaedrus) in the first place distances philosophy from prudence of the so-called common sense and places it between the enthusiastic madness of poets and clairvoyants on the one hand, and ironic concealment on the other, which in this very madness prove to be parts of the same question: How can that which is unhidden be revealed in the hidden? Erotic enthusiasm of philosophy is a special sort of madness. It is the paradoxical (...) closeness that is rendered possible by distance. Approaching the distant is recollection. Recollection is by no means a reproduction of anything, but a (loving) thought of that which is always preconceived in previous intelligibility (disclosure of everything), so that it is always being concealed in it. (edited). (shrink)

"Justice as the Living Good offers a comprehensive reading of Hegel's social and political philosophy. Two hundred years after the publication of his Philosophy of Right, Hegel's theory of justice remains a viable alternative to the social contract tradition in modern political theory. Hegel's Value shows that underlying Hegel's claims about freedom and history is a theory of value grounded in our dual nature as living and self-conscious beings. While Hegel follows the modern tradition in basing his theory on the (...) free will, he departs from the tradition in emphasizing the expression of the will in valuable action. Hegel's Value argues for the expressive validity of practical inferences as the key to understanding the connection between value and a system of right. Through a close reading of key episodes in the Phenomenology of Spirit and of the entire Philosophy of Right, this study show how Hegel develops his account of justice through an inferentialist conception of reason. Hegel's Value traces the development of right from the basic conception of property rights to an inclusive conception that he calls simply the Good, and finally to a system of just institutions structured by "living" inferential relations. The result is an institutional system governed by a moral ideal but realized through concrete economic and political processes"--. (shrink)

We argue that companion friendship is not importantly marked by self-disclosure as understood in either of these two ways. One's close friends need not be markedly similar to oneself, as is claimed by the mirror account, nor is the role of private information in establishing and maintaining intimacy important in the way claimed by the secrets view. Our claim will be that the mirror and secrets views not only fail to identify features that are in part constitutive of close or (...) companion friendship, but that they miss the mark quite broadly and fail to capture anything significant and distinctive about the ways in which friendship has an impact on the self. The article will proceed as follows. In the first section we outline our account of the self in friendship. In the next two sections we examine the mirror and secrets views and develop our own view in counterpoint to these. In the final section we defend our own account by showing how it provides the governing conditions which do distinguish friendship from other kinds of relations between persons. (shrink)

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Uncorrected Proof; please cite published version.

The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called ‘tensed theories of time’). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: (...) growing-block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; presentists, to future and past entities. Others think of themselves as A-theorists but exclude no past or future things from their ontology. The metaphysical skeptic suspects that their attempt to articulate an ‘eternalist’ version of the A-theory collapses into merely ‘taking tense seriously’– a thesis that does not imply the A-theory. The second half of the paper is the search for a stable eternalist A-theory. It includes discussion of temporary intrinsics, temporal parts, and truth. (shrink)

Recent publications by several leading philosophers of chemistry have focused on the definition, scope, utility, and nomenclature of issues dealing with acidity and basicity. In this paper, molecular orbital theory is used to explain all acid–base reactions, concluding that the interaction of the highest occupied molecular orbital (HOMO) of one substrate, “the base,” with the lowest unoccupied molecular orbital (LUMO) of a second substrate, “the acid,” determines the reactivity of such systems. This paradigm provides an understanding of all acid–base reactions (...) as well as other reactions which, on the surface, may not seem like acid–base reactions but which have fundamental underpinnings of that kind of chemistry. Rather than being unable to determine a unified understanding of acidity and basicity as suggested in the philosophy of chemistry literature, we propose that acidity and basicity fit securely in a classification of many other reactions that, using classical chemistry knowledge, pre-quantum chemistry, would not be possible. We strongly support the use of all scientific knowledge and experience in the development of the ideas in the philosophy science. We further suggest increased interactions between philosophers of science and scientists, so that all scholars benefit from the values, knowledge, and perspectives of other disciplines. (shrink)