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  1.  27
    Getting Warmer: Predictive Processing and the Nature of Emotion.Sam Wilkinson, George Deane, Kathryn Nave & Andy Clark - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 101-119.
    Predictive processing accounts of neural function view the brain as a kind of prediction machine that forms models of its environment in order to anticipate the upcoming stream of sensory stimulation. These models are then continuously updated in light of incoming error signals. Predictive processing has offered a powerful new perspective on cognition, action, and perception. In this chapter we apply the insights from predictive processing to the study of emotions. The upshot is a picture of emotion as inseparable from (...)
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    Visual experience in the predictive brain is univocal, but indeterminate.Kathryn Nave - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):395-419.
    Among the exciting prospects raised by advocates of predictive processing [PP] is the offer of a systematic description of our neural activity suitable for drawing explanatory bridges to the structure of conscious experience. Yet the gulf to cross seems wide. For, as critics of PP have argued, our visual experience certainly doesn’t seem probabilistic.While Clark proposes a means to make PP compatible with the experience of a determinate world, I argue that we should not rush to do so. Two notions (...)
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    Expecting some action: Predictive Processing and the construction of conscious experience.Kathryn Nave, George Deane, Mark Miller & Andy Clark - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Predictive processing has begun to offer new insights into the nature of conscious experience—but the link is not straightforward. A wide variety of systems may be described as predictive machines, raising the question: what differentiates those for which it makes sense to talk about conscious experience? One possible answer lies in the involvement of a higher-order form of prediction error, termed expected free energy. In this paper we explore under what conditions the minimization of this new quantity might underpin conscious (...)
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