In Chapter 12 of the General Theory, on “The State of Long-Term Expectation,” Keynes writes: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain”. In a footnote to this sentence, Keynes points out that by “very uncertain” he does not mean the same as “very improbable” and refers to the chapter on “The Weight of Arguments” in his earlier Treatise on Probability. The purpose of this article, in the first place, is (...) to provide an account of, and to sort out the relations between, Keynes's views on probability, uncertainty, and the weight of arguments. (shrink)

Ramsey's critique of Keynes's ‘logical’ approach to probability is widely regarded as decisive, and his own ‘subjective’ approach and SEU framework are now familiar tools in economics. This paper challenges the standard view of Ramsey's critique and assesses the SEU model from a Keynesian viewpoint on probability. It consists of a summary of the two theories and an evaluation of Ramsey's criticisms and alternative. The two main conclusions are that although Keynes yields to Ramsey on the question of the existence (...) of logical probability relations, the formal structure of his theory is compatible with non-objectivist interpretations of probability; and that Ramsey makes far heavier demands on the capacities of the ‘rational agent’ than does Keynes. (shrink)

Paul Davidson's critique of O'Driscoll and Rizzo is based on an “official” philosophical position that turns on an opposition between knowledge and ignorance and a corresponding opposition between ergodic and nonergodic processes. But Davidson's substantive analysis reveals a very different “unofficial” position, based on “sensible expectations” and a realist ontology of enduring social structures. While O'Driscoll and Rizzo have the edge on Davidson in terms of their characterization of agents’ beliefs, their ontology of event regularities is ultimately the same, and (...) suffers from the same drawbacks, as Davidson's official ontology. The solution to some of these problems may lie in adopting an ontology similar to the one Davidson invokes in his unofficial capacity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What constitutes a Black Swan? And under what conditions may a Black Swan be expected to arise? As Nassim Taleb describes it, a Black Swan is an event that displays three key properties, the two most important of which are that: (1) it is not even imagined as a possibility prior to its occurrence; and (2) it is in some way significant in its impact. It follows that whether or not an event counts as a Black Swan depends on (...) the subjective imaginings of contemporaneous observers and their (usually implicit) criteria regarding what counts as a “significant impact.” Since there is nothing in determinism that precludes (1) and (2), Black Swans may occur even in a perfectly deterministic world. Nevertheless, if the world is indeed characterised by randomness, free will, emergence, and the like, then it is arguably more likely to throw forth events that display the above‐mentioned properties. The same goes for various specific features of an increasingly interconnected global economy, which allowed Taleb (paradoxically) to forecast what was, for most of us at least, the great Black Swan of 2008. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What constitutes a Black Swan? And under what conditions may a Black Swan be expected to arise? As Nassim Taleb describes it, a Black Swan is an event that displays three key properties, the two most important of which are that: (1) it is not even imagined as a possibility prior to its occurrence; and (2) it is in some way significant in its impact. It follows that whether or not an event counts as a Black Swan depends on (...) the subjective imaginings of contemporaneous observers and their (usually implicit) criteria regarding what counts as a “significant impact.” Since there is nothing in determinism that precludes (1) and (2), Black Swans may occur even in a perfectly deterministic world. Nevertheless, if the world is indeed characterised by randomness, free will, emergence, and the like, then it is arguably more likely to throw forth events that display the above‐mentioned properties. The same goes for various specific features of an increasingly interconnected global economy, which allowed Taleb (paradoxically) to forecast what was, for most of us at least, the great Black Swan of 2008. (shrink)

A recurring theme in discussions about the uncertainties of belief is their connection with the uncertainties of chance. Economists, broadly speaking, fall into two groups on this issue. One holds that beliefs can only be taken to correspond to point probabilities in situations that approximate games of chance. The other holds that beliefs should be treated as point probabilities, entering economics via decision theory and emerging as the parameters of consistent choice. I shall call these the traditional view and the (...) Bayesian view respectively. (shrink)

Examines ontological presuppositions that inform traditional and Bayesian positions on the uncertainties of belief in economic theory. D. Knight and J.M. Keynes’ views on the risks and uncertainties in economics; Reasons for the popularity of the Bayesian view in modern economic theory.

In the insurance literature, it is often argued that private markets can provide insurance against ‘risks’ but not against ‘uncertainties’ in the sense of Knight ([1921]) or Keynes ([1921]). This claim is at odds with the standard economic model of risk exchange which, in assuming that decision-makers are always guided by point-valued subjective probabilities, predicts that all uncertainties can, in theory, be insured. Supporters of the standard model argue that the insuring of highly idiosyncratic risks by Lloyd's of London proves (...) that this is so even in practice. The purpose of this article is to show that Bruno de Finetti, famous as one of the three founding fathers of the subjective approach to probability assumed by the standard model, actually made a theoretical case for uncertainty within the subjectivist approach. We draw on empirical evidence from the practice of underwriters to show how this case may help explain the reluctance of insurers to cover highly uncertain contingencies. (shrink)

In the present research, we examine the relation between leader mindfulness and employee performance through the lenses of organizational justice and leader-member relations. We hypothesize that employees of more mindful leaders view their relations as being of higher leader-member exchange quality. We further hypothesize two mediating mechanisms of this relation: increased interpersonal justice and reduced employee stress. In other words, we posit that employees of more mindful leaders feel treated with greater respect and experience less stress. Finally, we predict that (...) LMX quality serves as a mediator linking leader mindfulness to employee performance—defined in terms of both in-role and extra-role performance. Across two field studies of triadic leader-employee-peer data and dyadic leader–employee data, we find support for this sequential mediation model. We discuss implications for theorizing on leadership, organizational justice, business ethics, LMX, and mindfulness, as well as practical implications. (shrink)

An outline topography of musical accessibility. What is musical accessibility? ; Society, atonality, psychology -- Accessibility discourse in rock, and cultural change. Case study 1 : 'Prog' rock/punk rock : sophistication, directness and shock ; Zeitgeist : accessibility in flux -- A valiant failure? : new art music and the people. Case study 2 : Vaughan Williams' national music in context ; Art music, vernacular music and accessibility -- Accessibility, identity and social action. Case study 3a : Accessibility in action (...) : Bahia, Brazil ; 3b : Samba in Wales : how is adopted music accessible? -- Part five. Themes. Some key concepts. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology is concerned with assumptions about human nature, differential psychology with the empirical investigation of such belief systems. A questionnaire composed of 64 questions concerning brain and consciousness, free will, evolution, meaning of life, belief in God, and theodicy problem was used to gather data from 563 students of psychology at seven universities and from 233 students enrolled in philosophy or the natural sciences. Essential concepts were monism–dualism–complementarity, atheism–agnosticism–deism–theism, attitude toward transcendence–immanence, and self-ratings of religiosity and interest in meaning (...) of life. The response profiles (Menschenbild) of women and men, and of psychology students in the first and midterm of study were very similar. The method of statistical twins indicated a number of differences between students of psychology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. The majority of respondents were convinced that philosophical preconceptions on mind–body and free will have important practical implications for the way in which psychotherapists, physicians, or and judges exercise their professions. (shrink)

With this special issue, we would like to promote research on changes in the funding of the sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Since funding secures the livelihood of researchers and the means to do research, it is an indispensable condition for almost all research; as funding arrangements are undergoing dramatic changes, we think it timely to renew the science studies community’s efforts to understand the funding of research. Changes in the governance of science have garnered considerable attention from science studies (...) and higher education research; however, the impact of these changes on the conduct and content of research has not received sufficient attention, and theoretical insights into the connections between funding practices and research practices are few and far between. The aim of this special issue is to contribute to our theoretical understanding of the changing nature of research funding and its impact on the production of scientific knowledge. More specifically, we are interested in the interplay between funding and research practices: What is the impact of institutionalised funding arrangements on the production of scientific knowledge? (shrink)

Sentences containing predicates of personal taste (for example, ‘tasty’, ‘funny’) and aesthetic predicates (for example, ‘beautiful’) give rise to an acquaintance inference: They convey the information that speakers have first-hand experience with the object of predication and they can only be uttered appropriately if that is the case. This is surprisingly hard to explain. I will concentrate on aesthetic predicates, and firstly criticize previous attempts to explain the acquaintance phenomena. Second, I will suggest an explanation that rests on a speech (...) act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, according to which, in uttering ‘X is beautiful’ speakers perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously: an expressive and an assertive one. I will spell out this suggestion in detail and defend it against objections. Considering puzzles related to the acquaintance inference will lead to a new argument for a promising version of hybrid expressivism in meta-aesthetics. (shrink)

Although the computational properties of the Region Connection Calculus RCC-8 are well studied, reasoning with RCC-8 entails several representational problems. This includes the problem of representing arbitrary spatial regions in a computational framework, leading to the problem of generating a realization of a consistent set of RCC-8 constraints. A further problem is that RCC-8 performs reasoning about topological space, which does not have a particular dimension. Most applications of spatial reasoning, however, deal with two- or three-dimensional space. Therefore, a consistent (...) set of RCC-8 constraints might not be realizable within the desired dimension. In this paper we address these problems and develop a canonical model of RCC-8 which allows a simple representation of regions with respect to a set of RCC-8 constraints, and, further, enables us to generate realizations in any dimension d = 1. For three-and higher-dimensional space this can also be done for internally connected regions. (shrink)

Competitive athletes act within cultures of risk in sports and often decide to return to sport despite having acute health problems. The outcomes of such risky return-to-play decisions can not only negatively affect their future health, but also limit their sports performance or even upset their career paths. Following risk-management-decision theory with its focus on active risk defusing, we developed a model for understanding the process of return-to-play decision making from an athlete’s perspective. Based on the method of active information (...) search, a quasi-naturalistic return-to-play decision scenario was created in order to assess amateur team sport athletes’ decision making strategies. The main goals were to identify different information acquisition patterns and to analyze the influence of social pressure to play hurt on decision making. A total of 72 competitive team sport athletes (36 females, 36 males, m= 25.7 years of age, 3rd to 6th league level) out of three disciplines (volleyball, basketball, and handball) participated in the experimental study. Facing the same medical scenario (a partial tear of the supraspinatus tendon), athletes show different approaches to return-to-play decision making. The main focus is on potential sporting consequences of withdrawal from competition due to injury, while only few players favoring well-informed decisions based on thorough risk analysis. The athletes who chose the medically risky alternative to play hurt mostly employed strategies of active risk defusing, which got activated when severe sporting consequences were perceived. Those who chose to withdraw from competition primarily referred to maximin heuristic, particularly when social pressure to play was reduced. The findings can be used to improve rehabilitation. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena with patterns in data (...) sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive empiricism. (shrink)

Comics are complex multimodal documents that make for intriguing materials to analyze with computer vision and computational linguistics. This review summarizes the growing developments in computational modeling which have been progressing to analyze visual narratives across their various substructures.

Today, avatars often represent users in digital worlds such as in video games or workplace applications. Avatars embody the user and perform their actions in these artificial environments. As a result, users sometimes develop the feeling that their self merges with their avatar. The user realizes that they are the avatar, but the avatar is also the user—meaning that avatar’s appearance, character, and actions also affect their self. In the present paper, we first introduce the event-coding approach of the self (...) and then argue based on the reviewed literature on human-avatar interaction that a self-controlled avatar can lead to avatar-self merging: the user sets their own goals in the virtual environment, plans and executes the avatar’s actions, and compares the predicted with the actual motion outcomes of the avatar. This makes the user feel body ownership and agency over the avatar’s action. Following the event-coding account, avatar-self merging should not be seen as an all-or-nothing process, but rather as a continuous process to which various factors contribute, including successfully taking the perspective of the avatar. Against this background, we discuss affective, cognitive, and visuo-spatial perspective taking of the avatar. As evidence for avatar-self merging, we present findings showing that when users take the avatar’s perspective, they can show spontaneous behavioral tendencies that run counter to their own. (shrink)

Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue that semantic approaches as well as these pragmatic ones cannot satisfactorily explain the evaluativity of aesthetic statements. Second, I offer a positive proposal based on a speech-act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, which states that, with the (...) literal utterance of ‘X is beautiful’, we perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously, an assertive and an expressive one. I will specify this theory in detail and argue that it can satisfactorily account for the evaluative content of aesthetic statements. I will also discuss the advantages of the theory over other variants of expressivism in meta-aesthetics. (shrink)

An analysis of this allusive prologue demonstrates the poet’s acquaintance with all of Greek literature. The tone of his choliambic verses is softer and more urbane than that of his iambic predecessors, his message is less obtrusive, ambiguous and can only be grasped by an active interpretative effort. The linguistic and stylistic forming of the fables, which are consciously referring back to the prosaic and more polemic Aesop, is the core of the poet’s interest. With regard to content the poet (...) places himself within the tradition of divine revealed truth when he calls for justice and peaceful coexistence. But, through subtle hints he continues to make evident that a return to the Golden Age of the early days is neither possible nor actually desirable. (shrink)

This paper gives a simple method for providing categorial brands of feature-based unification grammars with a model-theoretic semantics. The key idea is to apply the paradigm of fibred semantics (or layered logics, see Gabbay (1990)) in order to combine the two components of a feature-based grammar logic. We demonstrate the method for the augmentation of Lambek categorial grammar with Kasper/Rounds-style feature logic. These are combined by replacing (or annotating) atomic formulas of the first logic, i.e. the basic syntactic types, by (...) formulas of the second. Modelling such a combined logic is less trivial than one might expect. The direct application of the fibred semantics method where a combined atomic formula like np (num: sg & pers: 3rd) denotes those strings which have the indicated property and the categorial operators denote the usual left- and right-residuals of these string sets, does not match the intuitive, unification-based proof theory. Unification implements a global bookkeeping with respect to a proof whereas the direct fibring method restricts its view to the atoms of the grammar logic. The solution is to interpret the (embedded) feature terms as global feature constraints while maintaining the same kind of fibred structures. For this adjusted semantics, the anticipated proof system is sound and complete. (shrink)

In this paper we show that Audi’s fallibilist foundationalism is beset by three unclarities. First, there is a conceptual unclarity in that Audi leaves open if and how to distinguish clearly between the concepts of fallibility and defeasibility. Second, there is a general unclarity: it is not always clear which fallibility/defeasibility-theses Audi accepts or denies. Finally, there is an unclarity of self-application because Audi does not specify his own claim that fallibilist foundationalism is an inductivist, and therefore itself fallible, thesis. (...) The critical part of our paper is supplemented by a constructive part, in which we present a space of possible distinctions between different fallibility and defeasibility theses. These distinctions can be used by Audi as a toolkit to improve the clarity of fallibilist foundationalism and thus provide means to strengthen his position. (shrink)

I show that quantum theory is the only probabilistic framework that permits arbitrary processes to be emulated by sequences of local measurements. This supports the view that, contrary to conventional wisdom, measurement should not be regarded as a complex phenomenon in need of a dynamical explanation but rather as a primitive—and perhaps the only primitive—operation of the theory.

How can work be a genuine good in life? I argue that this requires overcoming a problem akin to that studied by Marx scholars as the problem of work, freedom and necessity: how can work be something we genuinely want to do, given that its content is not up to us, but is determined by necessity? I argue that the answer involves valuing contributing to the good of others, typically as valuing active pro-sociality – that is, valuing actively doing something (...) good for others. This makes work better in one way, and may even make work something we are genuinely glad to have in our lives. Contemporary philosophical thinking about good work tends to focus on how work can be good for the person doing it, by providing, for example, self-realization or social relationships, while underappreciating the special importance of valuing social contribution. People will typically only really want work if they want a part of their lives to be about the good of others. This also means that work may be a part of the best life, something we should take into account when discussing work-related policies and the desirability of a ‘post-work’ future. (shrink)

Was sind naturwissenschaftliche Phanomene und inwiefern kann die Beantwortung dieser Frage zu einer besseren philosophischen Einschatzung der wissenschaftlichen Praxis beitragen? Dieses Buch untersucht die wissenschaftstheoretische Unterscheidung zwischen Daten und Phanomenen, um ihre Bedeutung fur die Debatte um den Wissenschaftlichen Realismus zu klaren. Ausgehend von einer Analyse des Phanomenbegriffs werden sowohl realistische als auch antirealistische Anwendungen der Unterscheidung auf ihre Uberzeugungskraft gepruft. Auf Grundlage der Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung wird fur ein realistisches Phanomenverstandnis pladiert und erortert, wie exakt Wissenschaftstheoretiker die wissenschaftliche Praxis (...) beschreiben mussen, um zutreffende philosophische Schlussfolgerungen ziehen zu konnen.". (shrink)