Keynesian Uncertainty and the Weight of Arguments

Economics and Philosophy 6 (2):275 (1990)


In Chapter 12 of the General Theory, on “The State of Long-Term Expectation,” Keynes writes: “It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain”. In a footnote to this sentence, Keynes points out that by “very uncertain” he does not mean the same as “very improbable” and refers to the chapter on “The Weight of Arguments” in his earlier Treatise on Probability. The purpose of this article, in the first place, is to provide an account of, and to sort out the relations between, Keynes's views on probability, uncertainty, and the weight of arguments

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References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - London, England: Routledge.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work

Keynes, Uncertainty and Interest Rates.Brian Weatherson - 2002 - Cambridge Journal of Economics 26 (1):47-62.
Keynes After Ramsey: In Defence of a Treatise on Probability.Jochen Runde - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):97-121.
Evidentialism, Inertia, and Imprecise Probability.William Peden - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-23.
Paul Davidson and the Austrians: Reply to Davidson.Jochen Runde - 1993 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 7 (2-3):381-397.

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