Three ways of relating the structures of human existence to the world are offered by ecological holism, moral extensionism, and biotic communitarianism. Leopold’s attempt to reconcile these three is examined in the light of Peirce’s categories, in order to ascertain how far Leopold’s final position is anthropocentric, ecocentric, neither, or both.

An account of what Michael Krausz refers to as “a three tiered structure” within the interpretative process is defended. Starting with the employment of Peircian nomenclature, as employed by Joseph Margolis, artworks and persons - cultural entities - are distinguished from physical entities as tokens of types. But even if culturally emergent entities con be attributed to certain physical atributes in relation to their materiality at the first level of interpretation - the elucidatory - in which such culturally emergent properties (...) are embodied, cultural entities possess certain distinctive Intentional attributes, at a second level of interpretation - thc intentional - not assignable to purely physical properties nor, in the case of artworks such as Van Gogh’s The Potato Eaters, their creator’s intentions. But in order to make sense of Krausz’s notion of “aspectual reverberation” for an individual appreciator, a third level of interpretation is required - the elaborative - in order to make sense of Peirce’s notion not only of the type and token status of a work of art, but its tone, This third elaborative sense of interpretation is then considered in two ways: experientially in terms of what the spectator can bring to an appreciation of an artwork and performatively with respect to an artist’s interpretation of the work in performance, as in dance for example. Possible attacks on this position are then considered. (shrink)

James offers ways for escaping pessimism: i) leaving "the bare facts by themselves" - in construing the scientific order of nature - or permitting ii) a "religious reading to go on" by postulating "supplementary facts which may be discovered" or iii) "believed in". Adopting ii), we can trust the idea that "a still wider world may be there" as a "maybe" and then act as if the invisible world thereby suggested was real, enabling us "to live in the light of (...) " our "religious demands". One way of approaching Bloch's philosophy is to see him as dealing with James's three ways. A case can be made for Bloch's naturalism, phenomenologically understood, akin to James's second way. Yet, Bloch could also be regarded as adopting something like James's third way in terms of a teleologism messianically understood needed to ground the idea of Hope. But can Bloch's reconcile these two conceptions successfully? (shrink)

Whether science can be regarded as value-neutral remains a contestable issue. Much of that debate is confused because it is not made clear exactly what the term science is meant to include. Three conceptions can be delineated: the iconic, the indexical, and the interpretative. The iconic employs a wide usage of the term science to include any process of inquiry. The indexical refers to the way the outcomes of inquiry can be made subject to testing and criticism. The interpretative conception, (...) growing out of the iconic, emphasizes the methodology of science, marking it off from other forms of inquiry. These three conceptions of science—delineated in the writings of Charles Peirce—have haunted debates in the philosophy of science during the twentieth century. But whichever conception is adopted, none of these three can offer a satisfactory account of the way in which socio-ethical judgments come to be formed for their application in everyday life. (shrink)

Three paradigms for making sense of the aesthetic experience of nature---Specularism, Scientific Exemplarism and Perspectivalism---are found in the literature on the aesthetics of nature. The first focuses on seeing nature as a picture, the second on grasping aesthetic experience through the categories of scientific enquiry and the third emphasizes a more phenomenological relation between the experienced and the experiencer. After the historical development which fashioned Specularism’s approach to aestheticshas been indicated and the ahistorical nature of Scientific Exemplarism has been explained, (...) the relative strengths of these three paradigms are explored before the implications of the third are related to a possible spiritual view of nature. (shrink)

Three ways of relating the structures of human existence to the world are offered by ecological holism, moral extensionism, and biotic communitarianism. Leopold’s attempt to reconcile these three is examined in the light of Peirce’s categories, in order to ascertain how far Leopold’s final position is anthropocentric, ecocentric, neither, or both.

An account of what Michael Krausz refers to as “a three tiered structure” within the interpretative process is defended. Starting with the employment of Peircian nomenclature, as employed by Joseph Margolis, artworks and persons - cultural entities - are distinguished from physical entities as tokens of types. But even if culturally emergent entities con be attributed to certain physical atributes in relation to their materiality at the first level of interpretation - the elucidatory - in which such culturally emergent properties (...) are embodied, cultural entities possess certain distinctive Intentional attributes, at a second level of interpretation - thc intentional - not assignable to purely physical properties nor, in the case of artworks such as Van Gogh’s The Potato Eaters, their creator’s intentions. But in order to make sense of Krausz’s notion of “aspectual reverberation” for an individual appreciator, a third level of interpretation is required - the elaborative - in order to make sense of Peirce’s notion not only of the type and token status of a work of art, but its tone, This third elaborative sense of interpretation is then considered in two ways: experientially in terms of what the spectator can bring to an appreciation of an artwork and performatively with respect to an artist’s interpretation of the work in performance, as in dance for example. Possible attacks on this position are then considered. (shrink)

James offers ways for escaping pessimism: i) leaving "the bare facts by themselves" - in construing the scientific order of nature - or permitting ii) a "religious reading to go on" by postulating "supplementary facts which may be discovered" or iii) "believed in". Adopting ii), we can trust the idea that "a still wider world may be there" as a "maybe" and then act as if the invisible world thereby suggested was real, enabling us "to live in the light of (...) " our "religious demands". One way of approaching Bloch's philosophy is to see him as dealing with James's three ways. A case can be made for Bloch's naturalism, phenomenologically understood, akin to James's second way. Yet, Bloch could also be regarded as adopting something like James's third way in terms of a teleologism messianically understood needed to ground the idea of Hope. But can Bloch's reconcile these two conceptions successfully? (shrink)

Three paradigms for making sense of the aesthetic experience of nature---Specularism, Scientific Exemplarism and Perspectivalism---are found in the literature on the aesthetics of nature. The first focuses on seeing nature as a picture, the second on grasping aesthetic experience through the categories of scientific enquiry and the third emphasizes a more phenomenological relation between the experienced and the experiencer. After the historical development which fashioned Specularism’s approach to aestheticshas been indicated and the ahistorical nature of Scientific Exemplarism has been explained, (...) the relative strengths of these three paradigms are explored before the implications of the third are related to a possible spiritual view of nature. (shrink)

This article is prompted by some ideas from Robert S. Brumbaugh and Alfred North Whitehead, in particular. Four different views of experienced time are considered as well as four different conceptions of the practice of life that are the implications of these views of time. Further, four different famous works of literature are considered in the effort to understand these views of time and their implications for the practice of life.

The Iconic, Indexical and Intellective are conceptions derived from Charles Sanders Peirce's use of his sign theory. In characterizing different kinds of interpretative activity, they can be used to address certain problems in science, technology and the arts.

Language can be cast through words and images where truth claims are thought to lie. They may be either embodied within language or indicate what transcends it. Yet expression is formed through the spoken, written words or images. But what about the imagistic: words doing the work of an image without employing the visual? To grasp how the latter has emerged, the shift in authority from the spoken to the written word will be undertaken. The importance of the shift from (...) the written word to the image can be illustrated in the case of the Renaissance, for example, where the image in the book legitimated, the word. Today the word merely amplifies or justifies the image, located on a screen! From that development the imagistic has evolved raising the problem of its authority and thereby the issue of a concern for truth. (shrink)

Sartre’s Degrees of Consciousness Theory is developed in order to ascertain what this existential conception implies for an account of human intersubjectivity. Once active involvement in instrumental concerns---first degree consciousness---and reflection, whether of an impure kind characterizing second degree consciousness or a pure consciousness---that of a third degree---are distinguished, attention is focused upon the kinds of social relations typifying each kind of consciousness. A model for social relations is suggested to distinguish it from either the conflict model, with which it (...) is often confused, or the ‘we-subject’ model necessary for world exploitation so as to offer a way of grounding a morality as promised at the end of Being and Nothingness. (shrink)

By employing Peirce’s semiotics, Totalitarianism is distinguished indexically from forms of Dictatorship and Authoritarianism. The former can be cast, as Arendt argued, to initiate a project for world domination dispensing with any sense of Authoritarianism in forwarding some purely fictitious conception where violence is manifested in terror. Alternatively, distortion of intellectual activity may issue within Populism so that the rule of Demagogy emerges initiating Despotism or a form of Dictatorship – either Commissarial or Sovereign form – where lawless violence is (...) sustained by secret police inducing fear but not terror. In the case of Authoritarianism induced iconically in a populace, violence may be tolerated accompanying either lawmaking or lawpreserving, both to be separated from Benjamin’s sense of pure violence. The latter – whether humanistically or spiritually understood – transcends both utilitarianism and sheer arbitrariness. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between three elements—personality, character, and script—to interpret the idea of someone's identity. A common way to deal with this relationship is in terms of a duality, but a tripartite analysis works better. The article relies heavily on the thought of Charles Hartshorne, with the aid of Simone Weil and Charles Sanders Peirce.

Several lines of evidence suggest that children born via Cesarean section are at greater risk for adverse health outcomes including allergies, asthma and obesity. Vaginal seeding is a medical procedure in which infants born by C-section are swabbed immediately after birth with vaginal secretions from the mother. This procedure has been proposed as a way to transfer the mother's vaginal microbiome to the child, thereby restoring the natural exposure that occurs during vaginal birth that is interrupted in the case of (...) babies born via C-section. Preliminary evidence indicates partial restoration of microbes. However, there is insufficient evidence to determine the health benefits of the procedure. Several studies, including trial, are currently underway. At the same time, in the clinic setting, doctors are increasingly being asked to by expectant mothers to have their babies seeded. This article reports on the current research on this procedure and the issues it raises for regulators, researchers, physicians, and patients. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

A growing body of research suggests that students achieve learning outcomes at higher rates when instructors use active-learning methods rather than standard modes of instruction. To investigate how one such method might be used to teach philosophy, we observed two classes that employed Reacting to the Past, an educational role-immersion game. We chose to investigate Reacting because role-immersion games are considered a particularly effective active-learning strategy. Professors who have used Reacting to teach history, interdisciplinary humanities, and political theory agree that (...) it engages students and teaches general skills like collaboration and communication. We investigated whether it can be effective for teaching philosophical content and skills like analyzing, evaluating, crafting, and communicating arguments in addition to bringing the more general benefits of active learning to philosophy classrooms. Overall, we find Reacting to be a useful tool for achieving these ends. While we do not argue that Reacting is uniquely useful for teaching philosophy, we conclude that it is worthy of consideration by philosophers interested in creative active-learning strategies, especially given that it offers a prepackaged set of flexible, user-friendly tools for motivating and engaging students. (shrink)

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people (...) spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general. (shrink)

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended (...) to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions. (shrink)

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

Prescriptive rules guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law, morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty years, theorists in the philosophy of law have offered a useful framework with which to consider this question. Some, following H. L. A. Hart, argue that a rule’s text at least sometimes suffices to determine whether the rule itself covers a case. (...) Others, in the spirit of Lon Fuller, believe that there is no way to understand a rule without invoking its purpose — the benevolent ends which it is meant to advance. In this paper we ask whether people associate rules with their textual formulation or their underlying purpose. We find that both text and purpose guide people’s reasoning about the scope of a rule. Overall, a rule’s text more strongly contributed to rule infraction decisions than did its purpose. The balance of these considerations, however, varied across experimental conditions: In conditions favoring a spontaneous judgment, rule interpretation was affected by moral purposes, whereas analytic conditions resulted in a greater adherence to textual interpretations. In sum, our findings suggest that the philosophical debate between textualism and purposivism partly reflects two broader approaches to normative reasoning that vary within and across individuals. Keywords: , the concept of law, rules, legal psychology, Hart, Fuller. (shrink)

The signing of the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by over a hundred states is a realization of the importance of the quest of indigenous peoples to direct their present and future existence, together with the knowledge and heritage they have acquired from their ancestors which they constantly mould to survive and thrive in a contemporary world made up of competing interests that are often at odds with their physical, cultural, and spiritual survival. The paper examines (...) some of the interconnected philosophical and legal issues concerning indigenous knowledge and the indigenes' quest to safeguard their knowledge, with indigenous philosophical views given the necessary focus in analyzing these issues. It also traces how these philosophical views inform and are reflected in international documents, including the 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. (shrink)

In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this is not possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we (...) need a view about the relationship between agents’ capacities to accord with normative requirements and the conditions under which those normative requirements obtain. I offer an account of the epistemic dimension of this relationship. The goal is to provide enough of a story about the natural reaction to make accounting for it look like an important desideratum for any theory of the nature of normative requirements—whether these are moral or epistemic. To focus the discussion, I use Timothy Williamson’s knowledge-first view of evidence as an example of a view in epistemology that generates the natural reaction. One upshot of the discussion, then, is a detailed account of what is troubling about Williamson’s influential but controversial view of evidence. (shrink)