The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):517-541 (2017)
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Abstract

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.

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Author Profiles

Hyundeuk Cheon
Seoul National University
Vilius Dranseika
Jagiellonian University
Renatas Berniūnas
Vilnius University
25 more

Citations of this work

The Folk Concept of Law: Law Is Intrinsically Moral.Brian Flanagan & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):165-179.
Reflective Reasoning & Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12786.
Cross-Cultural Convergence of Knowledge Attribution in East Asia and the US.Yuan Yuan & Minsun Kim - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):267-294.
Knowledge and Assertion in Korean.John Turri & YeounJun Park - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (6):2060-2080.

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References found in this work

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.

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