The purpose of this book is to clarify the concept of definition and improve defining activities.

Following strict rules of interpretation, this book focuses on the ideas in Plato's early and middle dialogues that lie within the fields now called logic and methodology, specifically elenchus and dialectic and the method of hypothesis.

A nexus of imperfect duty, defined as positive commitments that have practical limits, describes business behavior toward building affable and virtuous relations, maintaining reasoned social discourse, and performing the due diligence necessary for making knowledgeable business decisions. A theory of the development and extent of the limits of these imperfect managerial duties is presented here, a theory that in part explains the activities and personnel included under the firm’s umbrella. As a result, the nexus of imperfect duty is shown to (...) complement the perfect-duty-based nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm. The existence of flexible trade-offs involving these duties, trade-offs limited by contractual arrangements whether explicit or implicit, is shown to be one of the advantages of imperfect duty for developing business relations. (shrink)

The word ought is often used to express moral judgments. It is used to express moral laws, as in “We ought to honour our parents”; and it is used to express singular moral judgments, as in “You ought not to have spoken to your mother like that”". Some singular moral judgments are clearly deductions from some moral law, as is “You ought not to have spoken to your mother like that”. Others, however, are not clearly so, e.g. “You ought not (...) to have done that”. Where both the agent and the action are indicated merely by a contextual reference, no underlying moral law is suggested by the words alone. Even when the singular judgment characterizes both the agent and the action, as “You, being a strong man, ought to have gone to his aid”, it may still be quite obscure what, if any, moral law implies this judgment. Clearly there is no moral law that “Every strong man ought always to go to everybody's aid”. (shrink)

He does not consider the suggestions that the occurrence of complex things entails only the occurrence of less complex things, and that analysis might theoretically go on for ever. His argument here seems to me no better than arguing that, if we keep on taking points nearer and nearer to each other, we shall eventually come to two points that are next each other. There must be unanalysed concepts, but there need not be unanalysable concepts. Just so, there must be (...) integers that have never been thought of, but there is no integer that cannot be thought of. Possibly this is concealed from Dr. Ewing by his assuming that, if we analyse x into yz, y and z must have been familiar to us before. Whereas it seems possible that our first analysing x into yz should also be our first conceiving of y or of z or of both. (shrink)

The societal benefits derived from competitive markets certainly depend upon participants conforming to generally accepted notions of moral duty. These notions include negative duties such as those against fraud, deception, and coercion and also positive duties such as those that favor beneficence but with limits. This investigation examines the extent that product, capital, and internal-labor markets are capable of imposing conformance to society’s expectations of duty through both formally and informally organized boycotts. A categorization of classic and recent boycotts into (...) those motivated by (i) establishing new norms, or (ii) enforcing existing generally accepted norms is provided. This categorization helps to explain why some boycotts are successful, and others not. Through this exploration, a contribution to the resolution of the so called “Adam Smith problem” concerning the morality-enforcing capability of the invisible hand is offered. (shrink)

3. The third proposition seems to imply that outside metaphysical analogy there are only different degrees of "univocity." This would mean that things expressed according to the Aristotelian πρὸς ἕν relations, or in Scholastic terminology "analogy of attribution," should be classed as basically "univocal." This seems to be against the traditional usage [[sic-corrected duplicate line/portion of sentence missing]] organism are healthy in a way that is basically univocal, just because the reference in all cases is to one and the same (...) nature, would be to miss the import of this type of metaphysical procedure, as well as to cause confusion in the traditional terminology. Would not the interests of clarity be better served by retaining the basic opposition between the Aristotelian μοναχῶς and πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα? For the latter type I would suggest retaining "equivocal," which goes back to Boethius, who has given the fixed and definite meanings to so much of the traditional terminology. Basically opposed to the "univocal" will be the "equivocal," and under this latter class will come its three main divisions: equivocal by chance, equivocal by proportion, and equivocal by reference. Analogy, then, will be equivocity by proportion, and will be opposed immediately to the other types of equivocity, all of which as a class are opposed to the univocal. (shrink)