The badness of having conflicting emotions is a familiar theme in academic ethics, clinical psychology, and commercial self-help, where emotional harmony is often put forward as an ideal. Many philosophers give emotional harmony pride of place in their theories of practical reason.1 Here we offer a defense of a particular species of emotional conflict, namely, ambivalence. We articulate an conception of ambivalence, on which ambivalence is unresolved inconsistent desire (§1) and present a case of appropriate ambivalence (§2), before considering two (...) alternative defenses of emotional conflict (§3). We then argue that inconsistent desires can be fitting (§4) and that it can be reasonable not to resolve inconsistent desires (§5), before considering an objection (§6) and concluding the discussion (§7). (shrink)

David Balme's major critical edition of Aristotle's largest and perhaps least studied treatise is based on a collation of the 26 known extant manuscripts and a study of the early Latin translations. Begun in 1975, with his work towards the Loeb editio minor of books VII–X, this edition of all ten books, including a very full apparatus criticus, was largely complete by 1989 when Professor Balme died, but it needed extensive work to put it in publishable form. This work has (...) been carried out by Allan Gotthelf, Balme's friend and associate. Volume I of the edition contains the complete text of the Historia Animalium, the critical apparatus, and Balme's introduction to the manuscripts, expanded and updated with the assistance of Friederike Berger, and in consultation with the editors of forthcoming editions of the extant medieval translations. A substantial index to the text has been provided by Liliane Bodson in collaboration with Professor Gotthelf. (shrink)

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at (...) best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. (shrink)

D. J. Allan; XV—Aristotle's Criticism of Platonic Doctrine Concerning Goodness and The Good, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June.

This book of twelve essays applies the holistic theories of process philosophy to the educational challenges that teachers face in today’s complexly changing world. Topics range from staff development to spirituality, exploring issues of student and teacher motivation, developmental stages of learning, imaginative thinking and writing, nourishing relationships, moral and environmental education, and the development of hospitable learning environments.

Presumably it is common ground that this verb has in addition to the basic sense ‘recognize’ the derivative sense ‘oread’, and that one must judge from the context whether reading to one or more other people, or private reading, is meant. The reading of the text of a law to a jury at an orator's request is marked by the circumstances themselves as public reading; so is the reading of the Athenian decree to the Mitylenaeans in Thucydides. When Theaetetus answers (...) in the affirmative the question whether he has read the book of Protagoras which contains the statement that man is the measure of all things (); or when it is asked ‘Why is it that some people, if they begin to read, are overcome by sleep even against their will, whereas others wishing to be overcome by sleep are kept awake by taking up a book?’ Evidently what is intended is reading in the privacy of one's own room. When Socrates in the Phaedo says that he heard a person reading from Anaxagoras and eagerly took the book home to read , both senses are found within a few pages. (shrink)

Oxford Scholarly Classics brings together a number of great academic works from the archives of Oxford University Press. Reissued in a uniform series design, they will enable libraries, scholars, and students to gain fresh access to some of the finest scholarship of the last century.

Presumably it is common ground that this verb has in addition to the basic sense ‘recognize’ the derivative sense ‘oread’, and that one must judge from the context whether reading to one or more other people, or private reading, is meant. The reading of the text of a law to a jury at an orator's request is marked by the circumstances themselves as public reading; so is the reading of the Athenian decree to the Mitylenaeans in Thucydides. When Theaetetus answers (...) in the affirmative the question whether he has read the book of Protagoras which contains the statement that man is the measure of all things (); or when it is asked ‘Why is it that some people, if they begin to read, are overcome by sleep even against their will, whereas others wishing to be overcome by sleep are kept awake by taking up a book?’ Evidently what is intended is reading in the privacy of one's own room. When Socrates in the Phaedo says that he heard a person reading from Anaxagoras and eagerly took the book home to read, both senses are found within a few pages. (shrink)

Thetext of the de Caelo was the subject of an interesting article in the Rivista Storia Antica, N.S. IX, by Dr. R. Rubrichi; he showed that where the manuscriptsdiverge, we ought to bring in the evidence of Simplicius, and that when we look closely into the sense, the commentator's reading is in most cases decidedly preferable; he also established a fact which is familiar from editions of the othér physical treatises, namely that there is some specially close affinity between the (...) text of E and that used by Simplicius. (shrink)

Vahlen , 21–4) regards this as one of the most obscure passages in the treatise. But he himself has furnished the material for an understanding of it, and perhaps a little more can be done.