Michael Polanyi’s work has often been conflated with that of Thomas Kuhn. This article shows that although Polanyi and Kuhn both conceded the similarities in some aspects of their accounts of science, both were critical of the other’s position. The key to a correct understanding of the tensions between the authors and their views is to recognize the clash of worldviews within which their philosophies of science were constructed.

Michael Polanyi’s work has often been conflated with that of Thomas Kuhn. This article shows that although Polanyi and Kuhn both conceded the similarities in some aspects of their accounts of science, both were critical of the other’s position. The key to a correct understanding of the tensions between the authors and their views is to recognize the clash of worldviews within which their philosophies of science were constructed.

Michael Polanyi was one of the great figures of European intellectual life in the 20th century. A highly acclaimed physical chemist in the first period of his career who became a celebrated philosopher after World War II, Polanyi taught in Germany, England, and the United States and associated with many of the leading intellects of his time. His biography has remained unwritten partly because his many and scattered interests in a wide variety of fields, including six subfields of physical chemistry, (...) epistemology, economics, patent law, social and political theory, aesthetics, and theology. This long-awaited volume will be the definitive resource on Polanyi and his work. (shrink)

Orr and Dentith argue that a recurrent problem in much of the wider academic literature on conspiracy theories is either conceptual confusion or a refusal to put theory before practice. Orr and Dentith show that a naive empiricism pervades much of the social science literature when it comes to these things called ‘conspiracy theories’ which not only runs at odds with the philosophical literature but also the general tenor of the social sciences over the latter part of the 20th Century (...) and beyond. Orr and Dentith argue that central to these confusions or refusals is not just a lack of philosophical rigour when it comes to defining and presenting views, but an active disinterest in such conceptual work. (shrink)

In the literature on conspiracy theories, the least contentious part of the academic discourse would appear to be what we mean by a “conspiracy”: a secretive plot between two or more people toward some end. Yet what, exactly, is the connection between something being a conspiracy and it being secret? Is it possible to conspire without also engaging in secretive behavior? To dissect the role of secrecy in con- spiracies – and thus contribute to the larger debate on the epistemology (...) of conspir- acy theories – we dene the concepts of “conspiracy,” “conspirator,” and “secret,” and argue that while conspirators might typically be thought to commit to keeping secrets once their conspiracy is underway, the idea that conspiracies are necessarily secretive to start with is not as obvious as previously thought. (shrink)

Ever since Clifford Geertz urged the “blurring of genres” in the social sciences, many scholars have considered the crossing of disciplinary boundaries a healthy alternative to rigidly maintaining them. But what precisely does the metaphor of “blurring” imply? By unpacking the varieties of visual experiences that are normally grouped under this rubric, this essay seeks to provide some precision to our understanding of the implications of fuzziness. It extrapolates from the blurring caused by differential focal distances, velocities of objects in (...) the visual field, and competing perspectival vantage points to comparable effects in the intersection of different scholarly disciplines. Arguing against the holistic implications of Geertz's metaphor, as well as the even more totalizing concept of “consilience” introduced by E. O. Wilson, it suggests that blurring implies new types of complexity between or among those disciplines. (shrink)

Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695–705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase “conspiracy theory” has no negative effect upon people’s willingness to endorse a claim. We revisit Wood’s findings and its (re)uptake in the recent (...) literature. Is the label “conspiracy theory” a pejorative? If so, does it sway or affect people’s belief in specific claims of conspiracy (i.e. particular conspiracy theories), or is the effect one that concerns claims of conspiracy more generally (i.e. all conspiracy theories)? Through an examination of the conceptual and methodological scope of Wood’s work and the results of our similar quasi-experimental design, we argue that it is premature to suggest the label “conspiracy theory” has no impact on the believability of a claim, or that it has no rhetorical power. (shrink)

A reply to Gérald Bronner, Véronique Campion-Vincent, Sylvain Delouvée, Sebastian Dieguez, Nicolas Gauvrit, Anthony Lantian, and Pascal Wagner-Egger's piece, '“They” Respond: Comments on Basham et al.’s “Social Science’s Conspiracy-Theory Panic: Now They Want to Cure Everyone”.

This article investigates the paradoxical nature of cameraless photography. Born after the invention of early photography, the camera apparatus is clearly a precondition of the idea and practice of cameraless photography (photography made without a camera). Yet, at the same time, cameraless photography is situated as a form of pure photography, giving rise to the idea that the spirit of photography lies somewhere beyond the mediation of the camera. This article approaches the paradoxical nature of cameraless photography in an indirect (...) manner by considering the spectrality of photography: from conceptions of early photography as itself spectral, to the manifestation of spectres in spirit photography, to the decomposition of the spectres by X-rays and radioactivity. Cameraless photography plays a twofold role in this genealogy of photographic spectres: first, it goes against a certain understanding of the spirit of photography as conditioned by the manipulating force of the camera apparatus; second, it proves the existence of spectres by uncovering the ontological convulsions of the world. (shrink)

Anosognosia is literally ‘unawareness of or failure to acknowledge one’s hemi- plegia or other disability’ (OED). Etymology would suggest the meaning ‘lack of knowledge of disease’ so that anosognosia would include any denial of impairment, such as denial of blindness (Anton’s syndrome). But Babinski, who introduced the term in 1914, applied it only to patients with hemiplegia who fail to acknowledge their paralysis. Most commonly, this is failure to acknowledge paralysis of the left side of the body following damage to (...) the right hemisphere of the brain. In this paper, we shall mainly be concerned with anosognosia for hemiplegia. But we shall also use the term ‘anosognosia’ in an inclusive way to encompass lack of knowledge or acknowledgement of any impairment. Indeed, in the construction ‘anosognosia for X’, X might even be anosognosia for some Y. (shrink)

Martin Bell; X*—The De Dicto/De Re Distinction in Relation to Actions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 159–174.

Since its introduction, Hubert Dreyfus’ account of expertise has been a topic of debate and continues to be. This article focuses on one particular critique: Selinger and Crease :245–279, 2002) argument that Dreyfus wrongfully denies expertise to those whose expertise is a matter of propositional knowledge, which they call an ‘expert in x’. This article sets out to defend Dreyfus against the ‘expert in x’ by showing that Selinger and Crease’s use of Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between know-how and know-that as (...) the foundation of their argument is vulnerable to Ryle’s regress argument and arguments from Radical Anti-Intellectualism. (shrink)

A is for Alice and astronomers arguing about acceleration -- B is for Bernard's body-exchange machine -- C is for the Catholic cannibal -- D is for Maxwell's demon -- E is for evolution (and an embarrassing problem with it) -- F is for the forms lost forever to the prisoners of the cave -- G is for Galileo's gravitational balls -- H is for Hume's shades -- I is for the identity of indiscernibles -- J is for Henri Poincaré (...) and alternative geometries -- K is for the Kritik and Kant's kind of thought experiments -- L is for Lucretius' spear -- M is for Mach's motionless chain -- N is for Newton's bucket -- O is for Olbers' paradox -- P is for Parfit's person -- Q is for the questions raised by thought experiments quotidiennes -- R is for the rule-ruled room -- S is for Salvatius' ship, sailing along its own space-time line -- T is for the time-travelling twins -- U is for the universe, and Einstein's attempts to understand it -- V is for the vexed case of the violinist -- W is for Wittgenstein's beetle -- X is for xenophanes and thinking by examples -- Y is for counterfactuals and a backwards approach to history -- Z is for Zeno and the mysteries of infinity. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Discussion.

Martin Bell; X*—The De Dicto/De Re Distinction in Relation to Actions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 159–174.

The task of computing a function F with the help of an oracle X can be viewed as a search problem where the cost measure is the number of queries to X. We ask for the minimal number that can be achieved by a suitable choice of X and call this quantity the query complexity of F. This concept is suggested by earlier work of Beigel, Gasarch, Gill, and Owings on “Bounded query classes”. We introduce a fault tolerant version and (...) relate it with Ulam's game. For many natural classes of functions F we obtain tight upper and lower bounds on the query complexity of F. Previous results like the Nonspeedup Theorem and the Cardinality Theorem appear in a wider perspective. (shrink)

Why 1 = presence and 0 = absence and the digital world formula is x = xn: an exploration of meaning in a universe of infinite replication. In the beginning was the Zero, and the Zero was with God, and God was the One. —All and Nothing In 1854, the British mathematician George Boole presented the idea of a universe the elements of which could be understood in terms of the logic of absence and presence: 0 and 1, all and (...) nothing—the foundation of binary code. The Boolean digits 0 and 1 do not designate a quantity. In the Boolean world, x times x always equals x; all and nothing meet in the formula x = xn. As everything becomes digitized, God the clockmaker is replaced by God the programmer. This book–described by its authors as “a theology for the digital world”—explores meaning in a digital age of infinite replication, in a world that has dissolved into information and achieved immortality by turning into a pure sign. All and Nothing compares information that spreads without restraint to a hydra—the mythological monster that grew two heads for every one that was cut off. Information is thousand-headed and thousand-eyed because Hydra's tracks cannot be deleted. It shows that when we sit in front of a screen, we are actually on the other side, looking at the world as an uncanny reminder of the nondigitized. It compares our personal data to our shadows and our souls, envisioning the subconscious laid out on a digital bier like a corpse. The digital world, the authors explain, summons forth fantasies of a chiliastic or apocalyptic nature. The goal of removing the representative from mathematics has now been achieved on a greater scale than Boole could have imagined. (shrink)

Biologists rely heavily on the language of information, coding, and transmission that is commonplace in the field of information theory developed by Claude Shannon, but there is open debate about whether such language is anything more than facile metaphor. Philosophers of biology have argued that when biologists talk about information in genes and in evolution, they are not talking about the sort of information that Shannon’s theory addresses. First, philosophers have suggested that Shannon’s theory is only useful for developing a (...) shallow notion of correlation, the so-called causal sense of information. Second, they typically argue that in genetics and evolutionary biology, information language is used in a semantic sense, whereas semantics are deliberately omitted from Shannon’s theory. Neither critique is well-founded. Here we propose an alternative to the causal and semantic senses of information: a transmission sense of information, in which an object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X. The transmission sense not only captures much of what biologists intend when they talk about information in genes, but also brings Shannon’s theory back to the fore. By taking the viewpoint of a communications engineer and focusing on the decision problem of how information is to be packaged for transport, this approach resolves several problems that have plagued the information concept in biology, and highlights a number of important features of the way that information is encoded, stored, and transmitted as genetic sequence. (shrink)

If ZFC is consistent, then each of the following is consistent with ZFC + 2ℵ0 = ℵ2: (1) $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is of strong measure zero iff |X| ≤ ℵ1 + there is a generalized Sierpinski set. (2) The union of ℵ1 many strong measure zero sets is a strong measure zero set + there is a strong measure zero set of size ℵ2 + there is no Cohen real over L.

Drawing from the lives of Ossie Davis, Frantz Fanon, Malcolm X, and W. E. B. Du Bois, as well as his own experience, and fully updated to account for what has transpired since the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, Yancy provides an invaluable resource for students and teachers of courses in African American Studies, African American History, Philosophy of Race, and anyone else who wishes to examine what it means to be Black in America.

Ian Hacking, Hacking and Latour on science studies and metaphysics: The Social Construction of What?Harvard University Press, ISBN 0-674-81200-X Bruno Latour, Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science StudiesHarvard University Press, ISBN0-67-465336-X.

In this article, I aim at problematizing the implied idea of causality in cognitive evaluations of horizontal justice events. I will draw on theories about retrospective sensemaking and its cognitive foundation in counterfactual belief formation. Issues related to horizontal or intraunit unfairness emerge in situations in which the actions of one employee influence the outcome of another due to relational interdependence. The authors of theories about horizontal unfairness have continued the traditional distinction between the three facets of justice, procedural, distributive, (...) and interactional. However, might employee A blame employee B because she (B) obtained qualitative (e.g., non-monetary appraisal) or quantitative (e.g., monetary compensation) recognition even though the latter did not, directly at least, bring about the event. The problem here is one of causality which asks the question, Can A be blamed by B for bringing about the event of outcome difference? While blame in evaluations of vertical justice certainly presumes causal agency, it might be questioned whether the same goes for horizontal unfairness. Counterfactual belief formation enables a step into the cognitive and retrospective nature of evaluations of horizontal justice events centered on the counterfactual belief “had the unfavorable event X not occurred, another and more favorable event X1 would have occurred.” This is related to the distance between the actual X and the potential event state X), in the sense that the closer the two appear, the more convincing becomes A’s belief to himself. The underlying causality of rewarding processes, however, states that some third party introduces the recognition, for example, a manager, and, therefore, B did not bring about the reward event, the third party did. It seems, then, that to understand this, we should take into consideration: 1) the formation of counterfactual beliefs and 2) the causality of blame. The article concludes that, due to the underlying causality of rewarding processes, one might solely consider one facet of horizontal justice, interactional horizontal justice. However, tapping into the phenomenological dimension of morality might allow one also to address the moral nature of distributive and procedural facets of horizontal justice as the experience of the psychosocial fabric of social reality related with feeling either “as if” one is being treated unfairly or “as if” one is treating others unfairly. (shrink)

Because the main difference between combinatory weak equality and λβ-equality is that the rule \begin{equation*}\tag{\xi} X = Y \vdash \lambda x.X = \lambda x.Y\end{equation*} is valid for the latter but not the former, it is easy to assume that another way of defining combinatory β-equality is to add rule (ξ) to the postulates for weak equality. However, to make this true, one must choose the definition of combinatory abstraction in (ξ) very carefully. If one tries to use one of the (...) more common abstraction algorithms, the result will be an equality, = ξ , that is either equivalent to βη-equality (and so strictly stronger than β-equality) or else strictly weaker than β-equality. This paper will study the relations = ξ for several commonly used abstraction algorithms, distinguish between them, and axiomatize them. (shrink)

Although Maxwell theory is O(3,1)-covariant, electrodynamics only transforms invariantly between Lorentz frames for special forms of the field, and the generator of Lorentz transformations is not generally conserved. Bérard, Grandati, Lages, and Mohrbach have studied the O(3) subgroup, for which they found an extension of the rotation generator that satisfies the canonical angular momentum algebra in the presence of certain Maxwell fields, and is conserved by the classical motion. The extended generator depends on the field strength, but not the potential, (...) and so is manifestly gauge invariant. The conditions imposed on the Maxwell field by the algebra lead to a Dirac monopole solution.In this paper, we study the generalization of the Bérard, Grandati, Lages and Mohrbach construction to the full Lorentz group in N dimensions. The requirements can be maximally satisfied in a three-dimensional subspace of the full Minkowski space; this subspace can be chosen to describe either an O(3)-invariant space sector, or an O(2,1)-invariant restriction of spacetime. The field solution reduces to the Dirac monopole found in the nonrelativistic case when the O(3)-invariant subspace is selected. When an O(2,1)-invariant subspace is chosen, the field strength can be associated with a Coulomb-like potential of the type A μ(x) = n μ/ρ, where ρ = (x μ x μ)1/2, similar to that used by Horwitz and Arshansky to obtain a covariant generalization of the hydrogen-like bound state. In the presence of these fields, which are determined entirely by symmetry considerations, without reference to a source equation, the extended generator is conserved under classical relativistic system evolution. (shrink)

Se habla de las traducciones de Aristóteles y Pseudo-Aristóteles en tierras gallegas o realizados por gallegos en la Edad Media; así como los problemas inherentes a toda operación de traducción en cualquier época y circunstancia. Nos centramos en Pedro Gallego, representante de la 3º generación de los traductores de la corte toledana de Alfonso X el Sabio, de quien fue amigo y confesor, aunque afincado en Murcia y obispo titular de la recién recuperada sede de Cartagena. Y pormenorizamos las distintas (...) secuencias en el traslado de una de las obras capitales de Aristóteles, que tanto interesó a los árabes, del árabe al latín, el Liber de animalibus, compendio de diversos trabajos naturalistas y de biología, que traduce nuestro autor natural de Ortigueira (mariña lucense). (shrink)

Dogmatic Metaphysics and Tschirnhaus's M ethodology MARTIN SCHONFELD ACCORDING TO STANDARD COMMENTARIES, Tschirnhaus's main work, Medicina mentis, ~ supposedly furnished the methodological basis for the Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics. ~ Christian Wolff and his disciples, at any rate, preferred to think so. Wolff taught classes on Tschirnhaus and claimed that he had developed his own tenets on the basis of Tschirnhaus's ideas; Johann Christoph Gottsched praised the Medicina mentis as the basic methodology of the Wolffian enlightenment.3 Mirroring these views, W. Wundt (...) and H. J. de Vleeschauwer saw in Tschirnhaus the inventor of the "geometric method" adopted by the School Philosophers.4 According to M. ' Medicina Mentis, sive Tentamen genuinae Logicae, in qua disseritur de Methodo detegendi incoKaitas veritates, Amsterdam, 1687. Second and revised edition, Medicina Mentis, sive Artis inveniendi Praecepta generalia, Leipzig, 1695. ~For example, cf. Wilhelm Windelband, Geschichte der Philosophie, 3~o-33 and 356; Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, III: ~95-97, 3 x~ 34o-43; A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philosophy (Notre Dame/London: University of Notre Dame.. (shrink)