The article argues that there are different ways of justifying suspension of judgement. We suspend judgement not only privatively, that is, because we lack evidence, but also positively, that is, because there is evidence that provides reasons for suspending judgement: suspension is more than the rational fallback position in cases of insufficient evidence. The article applies the distinction to recent discussions about the role of suspension for inquiry, Turri's puzzle about withholding, and formal representations of suspension.

The paper develops an inductive extension of AGM-style belief base revision theory with the aim of formally implementing Freitag’s :254–267, 2015, Dialectica 70:185–200, 2016) solution to Goodman’s paradox. It shows that the paradox dissolves once belief revision takes place on inductively closed belief bases, rather than on belief sets.

The book discusses the central notion of logic: the concept of logical consequence. It shows that the classical definition of consequence as truth preservation in all models must be restricted to all admissible models. The challenge for the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the definition with a criterion for admissible models. -/- The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current debate, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the (...) various dimensions of the problem of admissible models and argues that standard responses are unwarranted. As a result, it develops a new vision of logic, suggesting in particular that logic is deeply imbued with metaphysics. (shrink)

The book discusses the central notion of logic, the concept of logical consequence, and its model-theoretic definition as truth-preservation in all models. Whether the model-theoretic definition captures the modal and epistemological features of our pre-theoretic notion depends on what models model. The book argues that, given a non-formal understanding of models, the universal quantifier used in the definition of consequence must be restricted: if literally all models had to be considered, no argument would ever be logically valid. A central challenge (...) of the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the model-theoretic definition by a criterion for admissible models. The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current literature on logical consequence, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the various dimensions of the problem of admissible interpretations and proposes that the standard views are unjustified or even unjustifiable. As a consequence, it develops a new vision of logic and suggests in particular that our notion of logical consequence is deeply imbued with metaphysics. (shrink)

According to the classical invariance criterion, a term is logical if and only if its extension is isomorphism-invariant. However, a number of authors have devised examples that challenge the sufficiency of this condition: accepting these examples as logical constants would introduce objectionable contingent elements into logic. Recently, Gil Sagi has responded that these objections are based on a fallacious inference from the modal status of a sentence to the modal status of the proposition expressed by that sentence. The present paper (...) demonstrates that Sagi’s response, though successful, is futile. There is another objection, based on the same type of example, that is not susceptible to Sagi’s criticism: accepting the examples as logical terms would have the fatal consequence that any contingent metalanguage sentence is entailed by the truth of some logically true object-language sentence. I conclude with a sketch of an alternative to the classical invariance criterion. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that some cases of naked statistical evidence license a high credence, but not an outright belief. If this is correct, there cannot be an unconditional bridge principle from credence to outright belief. We show that at least one prominent putative counterexample to such a bridge principle is based on a mistake, by demonstrating that the statistical evidence falls short not only of licensing rational belief, but also of justifying a high credence.

We can distinguish two non-equivalent ways in which a natural language argument can be valid: it can be interpretationally or representationally valid. However, there is just one notion of classical first-order validity for formal languages: truth-preservation in all classical first-order models. To ease the tension, Baumgartner suggests that we should understand interpretational and representational validity as imposing different adequacy conditions on formalizations of natural language arguments. I argue against this proposal. To that end, I first show that Baumgartner’s definition of (...) representational validity is extensionally inadequate. I present a number of natural language arguments that we pre-theoretically hold to be representationally valid, but are not representationally valid according to Baumgartner’s definition. I then point to two further untenable features of Baumgartner’s definitions: according to Baumgartner’s definition of a representationally correct formalization, we cannot arrive at formalizations in a recursive way, and Baumgartner’s definition of representational validity is non-monotonic. I conclude that interpretational and representational validity cannot be understood as merely imposing different adequacy conditions on formalizations. If we want to capture our interpretational and representational intuitions, we need two different formal definitions of validity. (shrink)

The paper provides a new argument against the classical invariance criterion for logical terms: if all terms with a permutation invariant extension qualify as logical, then for any arbitrary true contingent sentence K of the meta-language, there would be a logically true object-language sentence 'φ' such that K follows from the sentence 'φ is true'. Thus, many logically true sentences would be a posteriori. To prevent this fatal consequence, we propose to alter the invariance criterion: not only the term's extension, (...) but also its semantic clause must satisfy certain invariance conditions. The paper ends with the observation that the new criterion makes explicit the dependency of the classification of terms into logical and non-logical ones at the different levels of the Tarskian hierarchy of languages. (shrink)

We investigate a construction schema for first-order logical systems, called “form logic”. Form logic allows us to overcome the dualistic commitment of predicate logic to individual constants and predicates. Dualism is replaced by a pluralism of terms of different “logical forms”. Individual form-logical systems are generated by the determination of a range of logical forms and of the formbased syntax rules for combining terms into formulas. We develop a generic syntax and semantics for such systems and provide a completeness proof (...) for them. To illustrate the idea of form logic, and the possibilities it facilitates, we discuss three particular systems, one of which is the form-logical reconstruction of standard first-order predicate logic. (shrink)

The paper investigates the prospects of Spohn’s ranking theory with respect to Goodman’s New Riddle of Induction. Based on a novel analysis of the riddle (Freitag [manuscript]), we show it to be an inductive extension of Hansson’s puzzle (Hansson 1992, 1999). As a consequence, a solution needs to take into account the dependence relations between evidential beliefs: “grue” is unprojectible because it depends on evidence whose projection is defeated. It will be suggested that this solution can be implemented into Spohn’s (...) ranking theory, but that ranking theory is unable to provide a proper explanation of the required conditional ranks. (shrink)

This collection includes twenty original philosophical essays in honour of Wolfgang Spohn. The contributions mirror the scope of Wolfgang Spohn’s work. They address topics from epistemology (e.g., the theory of ranking functions, belief revision, and the nature of knowledge and belief), philosophy of science (e.g., causation, induction, and laws of nature), the philosophy of language (e.g., the theory of meaning and the semantics of counterfactuals), and the philosophy of mind (e.g., intentionality and free will), as well as problems of ontology, (...) logic, the theory of practical rationality, and meta-philosophy. ― Contributors: Ansgar Beckermann, Wolfgang Benkewitz, Bernd Buldt, Ralf Busse, Christoph Fehige, Wolfgang Freitag, Gordian Haas, Volker Halbach, Franz Huber, Andreas Kemmerling, Manfred Kupffer, Hannes Leitgeb, Godehard Link, Arthur Merin, Thomas Müller, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Hans Rott, Holger Sturm, Thomas Ede Zimmermann, Alexandra Zinke. (shrink)

Admiration and adoration have been considered as emotions with the power to change people, yet our knowledge of the specific nature and function of these emotions is quite limited. From an interdisciplinary perspective, we present a prototype approach to admiration and what has variously been labelled adoration, worship, or reverence. Both admiration and adoration contribute to the formation of personal and collective ideals, values, and identities, but their workings differ. We offer a detailed theoretical account of commonalities and differences in (...) the appraisal patterns and action tendencies associated with the two emotions. This analysis reveals that admiration motivates the internalisation and emulation of ideals embodied by an outstanding role model. Adoration motivates adherence to the teachings and expectations of a meaning maker and benefactor perceived as superhuman or sacred. Thus, the primary function of admiration is to promote individual learning and change, whereas adoration primarily serves to bind communities together. (shrink)

As of this writing, twenty‐one states have passed laws barring transgender youth‐athletes from competing on public‐school sports teams in accordance with their gender identity. Proponents of these regulations claim that transgender females in particular have inherent physiological advantages that threaten a “level playing field” for their cisgender competitors. Existing evidence is limited but does not support these restrictions. Gathering more robust data will require allowing transgender youth to compete (rather than preemptively barring them), but even if trans females are shown (...) to retain some advantage, this would not have greater moral significance than the many other “fair” physical and economic advantages found across sports. These regulations deprive transgender youth, an exceptionally vulnerable population, from the vast physical, mental, and social benefits of sports. While we advocate for transgender inclusion under our current, gender‐segregated model of sport, we propose changes to the overarching structure that would promote a more inclusive and fairer athletic environment. (shrink)

The article investigates Dostoevsky 's juridical discourse and demonstrates that the apologist of the Russian soul had a genuinely European mind. In his novel The Idiot in particular, in which the death penalty and imprisonment are explored, Dostoevsky unmasks— more radically even than Victor Hugo— the supposedly civilised and lenient forms of modern criminal justice. Dostoevsky 's criticism is ahead of its time; his arguments resemble those subsequently put forward by Foucault. A comparison with Anatoly Pristavkin's report on post-Communist crime (...) and jurisdiction underscores the topicality of these reflections. (shrink)

Every language has a way of talking about seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. This can be done through lexical means, and through grammatical evidentials. The studies presented here focus on the experssions of perception and cognition in languages of Africa, Oceania, and South America.

Voluntary sustainability standards that establish global rules for firms’ environmental and/or social conduct and allow for verification of firm compliance via third-party certification hold the promise to govern firms’ sustainability conduct in a globalizing world economy. However, the recent proliferation of competing and overlapping global sustainability standards that have been developed by various stakeholders with different agendas, creates uncertainties for firms that likely reduce their propensity to adopt any standard. Without widespread adoption these standards cannot effectively govern firm conduct and (...) in contrast create barriers for firms’ access to export markets. We suggest that the uncertainties associated with competing standards and the effect of these uncertainties on standard certification decisions are especially large for firms in emerging economies because these firms lack access to information about current and future standards and the resources to obtain certifications to multiple standards. We theoretically propose and empirically identify three distinct sources of sustainability standard uncertainty: diversity of customer requirements, dynamism of customer requirements, and the unpredictability of the future evolution of standard and propose that each of these sources reduces firms’ propensity to obtain certification to any standard. Our empirical results based on certifications to food safety standards by a sample of 97 Mexican food exporting firms confirm that three distinct sources of sustainability standard uncertainty exist and that all of them negatively impact certification. We discuss ethical implications and offer recommendations for both suppliers as well as standard setting organizations. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...) all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an account of the wrong that is done to women when everyday people fail to believe allegations of sexual assault made by women. I argue that an everyday person wrongs both the accuser and women causally distant from the accuser when they fail to believe the accuser’s allegation. First, I argue that there are responses that we, as everyday members of society, owe to victims of sexual assault. A condition enabling everyday people to respond in (...) the way owed to victims is that they have an outright belief that the accuser was assaulted. Actively suspending judgement about whether a crime occurred is in tension with the ability to respond to the victim in a way that supports and validates them. When an everyday person fails to have an outright belief in the truth of an allegation, they wrong the accuser because they risk failing to satisfy the conditions enabling them to fulfill their obligation to her. Second, I argue that everyday people wrong women who are causally distant from the accuser because in our social context, women are often treated in particular ways – especially in the sexual domain – because they are women. As a result, when women hear that an everyday person fails to believe a particular allegation, they easily project themselves into the accuser’s position and reasonably worry that if they were to be assaulted, they too would be met with doubt and disbelief by the people in their community. (shrink)

Is there anything wrong with publishing philosophical work which one does not believe (publishing without belief, henceforth referred to as ‘PWB’)? I argue that there is not: the practice isn’t intrinsically wrong, nor is there a compelling consequentialist argument against it. Therefore, the philosophical community should neither proscribe nor sanction it. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I’ll clarify and motivate the problem, using both hypothetical examples and a recent real-world case. Next, I’ll look at arguments that there is something (...) wrong with PWB, and show that none is sound. Then, I’ll give some reasons for thinking a norm against PWB is detrimental to the profession. Do I believe these arguments? If I’m right, it shouldn’t matter. (shrink)

Previous research suggested a role of gaze in preference formation, not merely as an expression of preference, but also as a causal influence. According to the gaze cascade hypothesis, the longer subjects look at an item, the more likely they are to develop a preference for it. However, to date the connection between viewing and liking has been investigated predominately with self-paced viewing conditions in which the subjects were required to select certain items from simultaneously presented stimuli on the basis (...) of perceived visual attractiveness. Such conditions might promote a default, but non-mandatory connection between viewing and liking. To explore whether the connection is separable, we examined the evaluative processing of single naturalistic food images in a 2 x 2 design, conducted completely within subjects, in which we varied both the type of exposure (self-paced versus time-controlled) and the type of evaluation (non-exclusive versus exclusive). In the self-paced exclusive evaluation, longer viewing was associated with a higher likelihood of a positive evaluation. However, in the self-paced non-exclusive evaluation, the trend reversed such that longer viewing durations were associated with lesser ratings. Furthermore, in the time-controlled tasks, both with non-exclusive and exclusive evaluation, there was no significant relationship between the viewing duration and the evaluation. The overall pattern of results was consistent for viewing times measured in terms of exposure duration (i.e., the duration of stimulus presentation on the screen) and in terms of actual gaze duration (i.e., the amount of time the subject effectively gazed at the stimulus on the screen). The data indicated that viewing does not intrinsically lead to a higher evaluation when evaluating single food images; instead, the relationship between viewing duration and evaluation depends on the type of task. We suggest that self-determination of exposure duration may be a prerequisite for any influence from viewing time on evaluative processing, regardless of whether the influence is facilitative. Moreover, the purported facilitative link between viewing and liking appears to be limited to exclusive evaluation, when only a restricted number of items can be included in a chosen set. (shrink)

Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and (...) pollution, so moral disgust tracks social contamination. I begin by examining the arguments for skepticism about disgust and show that these arguments threaten to overgeneralize and lead to a widespread skepticism about the justifiability of our moral judgments. I then look at the positive arguments for according disgust a role in moral judgment, and suggest that disgust tracks invisible social contagions in much the same way as it tracks invisible physical contagions, thereby serving as a defense against the threat of socio-moral contamination. (shrink)

Regulatory agencies vary widely in their classification of FMT, with significant impact on patient access. This article conducts a global survey of national regulations and collates existing FMT classification statuses, ultimately suggesting that the human cell and tissue product designation best fits FMT's characteristics and that definitional objectives to that classification may be overcome.

BackgroundKnowledge and attitude towards organ donation are critical factors influencing organ donation rate. We aimed to assess the knowledge and attitude towards organ donation in adolescents in Austria and Switzerland.MethodsA paper-based survey was performed in two secondary schools (age range 11–20 years) in Austria and Switzerland. 354/400 surveys were sufficiently answered and analyzed.ResultsOur study found that knowledge on organ donation is scarce in adolescents. Less than 60% of those surveyed thinks that a person is dead when declared brain dead. 84.6% (...) would authorize organ donation after brain death for themselves, but only 69% would authorize organ donation after brain death for a close relative. 93.7% would accept a donor organ if they needed one. Family discussions, rather than school discussions, influenced knowledge on organ donation, the percentage of respondents who have a firm opinion on organ donation and the rate of declaration of this opinion. Age, gender, nationality and religion also influenced knowledge and attitude towards organ donation. Nearly one third of adolescents are of the opinion that selling non-vital organs should be legalized.ConclusionSince having had family discussions, a potentially modifiable factor, was positively associated with knowledge and attitude towards organ donation, we postulate that educational programs stimulating family discussions on organ donation may be a promising strategy to increase knowledge. (shrink)

Empowerment, an already central concept in public health, has gained additional relevance through the expansion of mobile health (mHealth). Especially direct-to-consumer self-testing app companies mobilise the term to advertise their products, which allow users to self-test for various medical conditions independent of healthcare professionals. This article first demonstrates the absence of empowerment conceptualisations in the context of self-testing apps by engaging with empowerment literature. It then contrasts the service these apps provide with two widely cited empowerment definitions by the WHO, (...) which describe the term as a process that, broadly, leads to knowledge and control of health decisions. We conclude that self-testing apps can only partly empower their users, as they, we argue, do not provide the type of knowledge and control the WHO definitions describe. More importantly, we observe that this shortcoming stems from the fact that in the literature on mHealth and in self-testing marketing, empowerment is understood as a goal rather than a process. This characterises a shift in the meaning of empowerment in the context of self-testing and mHealth, one that reveals a lack of awareness for relational and contextual factors that contribute to empowerment. We argue that returning to a process-understanding of empowerment helps to identify these apps’ deficits, and we conclude the article by briefly suggesting several strategies to increase self-testing apps’ empowerment function. (shrink)

The development of empathy is central to positive social adjustment. However, issues remain with integrating empathy research conducted with children, adolescents, and adults. The current article (...

Empathy is an extensively studied construct, but operationalization of effective empathy is routinely debated in popular culture, theory, and empirical research. This article offers a process-focused approach emphasizing the relational functions of empathy in interpersonal contexts. We argue that this perspective offers advantages over more traditional conceptualizations that focus on primarily intrapsychic features. Our aim is to enrich current conceptualizations and empirical approaches to the study of empathy by drawing on psychological, philosophical, medical, linguistic, and anthropological perspectives. In doing so, (...) we highlight the various functions of empathy in social interaction, underscore some underemphasized components in empirical studies of empathy, and make recommendations for future research on this important area in the study of emotion. (shrink)

Democracy and the Divine articulates a democracy that is based on the principle of giving oneself to another. For this project, the author highlights two traditions that rarely have been read side by side or considered seminal to the philosophical idea of democracy: nineteenth-century German romanticism and French postmodernism.

_ Source: _Volume 25, Issue 2, pp 232 - 255 In Book III of _The Star of Redemption_, Franz Rosenzweig contrasts Judaism and Christianity: Judaism consists in the eternal passage of a people from creation to revelation; it suspends the divide between God’s presence and his worldly manifestation. For Rosenzweig, being Jewish means to be with God in the world. Christianity, however, defers salvation. While Judaism is with God in the world, Christianity retreats from God and the world. Christianity therefore (...) has no “immediacy.” How can both Judaism and Christianity then live in immediacy with God in the world? Seeking to overcome Rosenzweig’s dichotomy, I endeavor to think an immediate relationship with God in the world by turning to one of Rosenzweig’s “biggest names”: Hermann Cohen. Following Cohen, I take it that Judeo-Christian continuity begins before both religions. I wish to explore the passage from the origin to the prophetic that constitutes the idea of a “pure monotheism” in Cohen’s philosophy. (shrink)

This book focuses on how gender in its many guises - Linguistic, Natural, Social - is reflected in human languages, how it features in myths and metaphors, and the role it plays in human cognition. Examples are drawn from all over the world, with a special focus on Aikhenvald's extensive fieldwork in Amazonia and New Guinea.

Contrary to the contemporary view that negation is a logical operation that modifies the mere content of a thought or judgment, but not the act of thinking or judging it, Kant maintains that negation is an act of logical apperception through which I exclude a thought or judgment from what ‘I think.’ In this paper, I argue against two interpretations of Kant’s account of logical negation. According to the first, negation is a subjective psychological act of excluding an erroneous judgment. (...) Against this, I will show that for Kant, negation is an operation of logical, not empirical apperception. The second interpretation views logical negation as an objective representation either of a relation of opposition or of non-being. I argue that, on the contrary, the logical function of negation is merely formal, not material, and therefore does not have semantic content. The paper’s final section develops a positive conception of logical negation as a formal function of judging. (shrink)

ABSTRACTResearch on bilingualism and emotions has shown stronger emotional responses in the native language compared to a foreign language. We investigated the potential of purposeful second language use as a means of decreasing the experience of psychological distress. Native Swedish speakers read and answered questions about negative and neutral texts in their L1 and their L2 and were asked to rate their level of distress before or after the questions. The texts and associated questions were either written in the same, (...) or different languages. We found that within-language trials when the text was written in participants’ native language resulted in an increase of distress, whilst cross-language trials resulted in a decrease of distress. This implies that purposeful second language use can diminish levels of distress experienced following a negative event encoded in one's first language. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of ‘publishing without belief’ (PWB) – the view that authors are not required to believe what they publish. I address objections to the view ranging from outright denial and advocacy of a belief norm for publication, to a modified version that allows for some cases of PWB but not others. I reject these modifications. In doing so, I offer both an alternative story about the motivations for PWB and a diagnosis of the disagreement over its (...) permissibility. The original defense focused on consequentialist reasons for allowing PWB, offering mostly defensive arguments against potential criticisms. But I argue that once we shift our focus to the reasons why authors might be prone to PWB, we see a difference in two types of motivation: whereas I imagine PWB as arising from underconfident agents, critics point to cagey or nefarious authorial practices, or authors’ failure to clarify their own degrees of belief. Underlying the debate over norms of philosophical publishing, we find two different conceptions of philosophy itself. (shrink)

ObjectiveOur research aim is to enrich the conceptualization of high conflict post-divorce co-parenting by understanding the dynamic process involved.BackgroundThe studied phenomena were explored by linking previous scientific knowledge to practice.MethodWe cross-referenced the previous study results with the experiences reported by eight professionals and tried to answer the following research question: how professionals’ experience and previous scientific knowledge contribute to a better understanding of HC post-divorce co-parenting? Individual face to face interviews were conducted and analyzed regarding the qualitative theoretical reasoning of (...) thematic analysis.ResultsAnalysis allowed us to highlight how four main axes are related to HC post-divorce co-parenting: Parents for life, Acting in the child’s best interests, Managing disagreements, and Healing the separation.ConclusionOur findings capture high conflict post-divorce co-parenting as a multidimensional dynamic process. As such, dealing with co-parenting disagreements must be understood as a moment in a process that is influenced by, and influences, other dimensions.ImplicationsInterventions must consider the four dimensions and their reciprocal interactions. The essential elements underlying parents’ difficulties may reside at a multiplicity of levels: inter-relational, contextual, and intrapsychic. Each level contains key potential factors in understanding these families, and in formulating intervention guidelines. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study investigated the effect of conspiracy ideation, moral disengagement, and intolerance of uncertainty on compliance with the anti-SARS-COV-2 social distancing rules and two other facets of people’s reactions toward the coronavirus crisis. A convenience sample of 245 Romanians completed an online survey in March 2020. Results indicate that conspiracy ideation is associated with lower assessments of virus risk and lower compliance with the confinement measures. Moral disengagement had a parallel effect of undermining personal compliance to the social distancing (...) regulations, highlighting the need to define social distancing as morally relevant and prevent individual justifications for noncompliance. (shrink)

I strongly agree with the criticisms of the restrictive isomorphic matching definition of empathy made by Murphy, Lilienfeld, and Algoe, and largely agree with their conceptualization of empathy as a dynamic process best defined by its function. In this commentary, I extend this argument by emphasizing the relational, interpersonal aspects of empathy. It is my view that in order to understand the functions of empathy, we must take into account not only the internal experience of the individual empathizing, but also (...) the individual whose perspective the empathizer is attempting to take. I highlight how the emotional needs of others are dynamic and require flexible adaptation and underscore the role of context in appreciating the function of empathy. (shrink)

The philosophical debate over disgust and its role in moral discourse has focused on disgust’s epistemic status: can disgust justify judgments of moral wrongness? Or is it misplaced in the moral domain—irrelevant at best, positively distorting at worst? Correspondingly, empirical research into disgust has focused on its role as a cause or amplifier of moral judgment, seeking to establish how and when disgust either causes us to morally condemn actions, or strengthens our pre-existing tendencies to condemn certain actions. Both of (...) these approaches to disgust are based on a set of assumptions that I call, in what follows, the evidential model of disgust. This paper proposes an alternative model, which I call the response model. Instead of looking at disgust as a cause and justification of judgments of moral wrongness, I will argue that disgust is better understood as a response to wrongness. More precisely, I argue that disgust is a response to norm violations, and that it is a fitting response insofar as norm violations are potentially contagious and therefore pose a threat to the stability and maintenance of norms. (shrink)