In his Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong argues for internal conception of political liberalism which goal is to show that a liberal well-ordered society is internally coherent ideal and that citizens who would be raised in such society could endorse and support their own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in particular way These institutions should be justified by particular conception of public reason which main feature is that overlapping consensus is the first stage of (...) its justificatory structure. So, public reasoning of citizens in well-ordered society should be based solely on values and ideas inherent to liberal conception of justice - freedom, equality, fair system of cooperation and burdens of judgment. Another important feature of Quong?s conception of public reason concerns its scope. Quong argues for a wide scope of public reason which demands that all coercive or binding laws or public policies should be justified on basis of these values alone. Thus, reasonable citizens in well-ordered society by definition accord deliberative priority to public reasons over their other comprehensive or nonpublic beliefs whenever they exercise their collective political power over one another. The problem I raise in this paper is that it is very likely that in well-ordered society there will be a group of citizens that will not accord full deliberative priority to political values, especially not at all levels of political deliberation. On certain issues they will like to see their particular values being realized through common political institutions. If our political theory excludes this group from justificatory constituency on this particular issue or categorize them as unreasonable it can easily undermine their general adherence to liberal conception of justice and endanger stability of well-ordered society. Thus, my point is that we need a further development of political liberalism to solve such problems not as a part of non-ideal theory but as a part of its ideal of well-ordered society. nema. (shrink)

Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus is crucial for the public justification of a political conception of justice in modern democratic societies. While overlapping consensus is mostly understood empirically, in the first part of this article we argue that a normative interpretation is more appropriate. Moreover, we try to show that Baccarini’s proposal of qualified consensus, in contrast to an assumed empirical reading, actually exploits the potentials of a normative reading. In the second part, we concern ourselves with the epistemological implications (...) of a normative understanding of overlapping consensus or, more precisely, with the issue of epistemic deontologism. If we claim that consensus should be understood as agreement about not already existing beliefs and reasons, but about beliefs and reasons that citizens should acquire, it can be argued that this implies a thesis about voluntary control over beliefs. We try to show that a normative reading can be compatible with strategies based both on doxastic voluntarism and doxastic involuntarism. (shrink)

U ovom radu raspravljamo odnos Rawlsovog političkog liberalizma i istine. Budući da je politički liberalizam teorija koja izbjegava sva kontroverzna epistemološka i metafizička pitanja, jednako tako izbjegava i pitanje svoje istinitosti i koncept istine uopće. Usredotočili smo se na tri autora koji tvrde da politički liberalizam ne može izbjeći pitanje istine. Prvi autor je perfekcionist, Joseph Raz, koji pokušava pokazati da je Rawlsova teorija nekoherentna ukoliko se ne bavi pitanjem istinitosti neke moralne doktrine na kojoj mora počivati. Drugi, David Estlund, (...) tvrdi da je teorija filozofski neodrživa ako se ne poziva na istinitost svog fundamentalnog načela. Treći, Joshua Cohen, pokazuje nemogućnost izbjegavanja nekog koncepta istine ako se u političkoj teoriji pozivamo na vjerovanja i opravdanje. Nastojimo dokazati tvrdnju o praktičko-političkoj i filozofskoj ograničenosti njihove kritike Rawlsove teorije. Temeljna intencija članka je opovrgnuti kritike koje se upućuju Rawlsu te time ojačati njegov prijedlog političkog liberalizma. Pri tome nastojimo i nadopuniti nedorečenosti u Rawlsovom prijedlogu te zbog toga nudimo preciznije određenu sliku političkog liberalizma u odnosu na njegovu izvornu.In this paper we discuss the relation between Rawls’ political liberalism and truth. Since political liberalism is a theory that avoids all controversial epistemological and metaphysical questions, it equally avoids the question of its truth and a concept of truth generally. We are focusing on three authors which claim that political liberalism can not avoid the question of truth. First, Joseph Raz, a perfectionist who claims that Rawls’ political theory is incoherent unless it is not concerned with the truth of some moral doctrine on which it must be derived. Second, David Estlund, who claims that Rawls’ theory is philosophically untenable unless it does not consider its fundamental principle as true one. Third, Joshua Cohen, indicates the impossibility of avoiding some concept of truth if political theory is invoking concepts such as beliefs and justification. We are pointing on theirs practical-political and philosophical limited range in criticizing Rawls’ theory. The basic intention of the article is to confute criticisms addressed to Rawls and, in this way, to strengthen his proposal of political liberalism. At the same time, we try to resolve issues deriving from indeterminacies in Rawls’ proposal. For this reason we offer a picture of political liberalism that is more determinate than his original proposal. (shrink)

One of the important questions in the interpretation of Rawls’s philosophy is the connection between the two problems he wrote about throughout his life – justice and legitimacy. In this paper, I take the difference principle as a special feature of Rawls’s theory of justice, while I take the idea of the public reason as a special aspect of his theory of legitimacy, and I try to show that both aspects are connected, that is, that we should not see them (...) as two separate projects. I am trying to show that we should formulate the justification of the difference principle as a justification of a particular socio-economic arrangement rather than as an abstract principle, one that is better than other legitimate arrangements. For Rawls, property-owning democracy and liberal socialism are socio-economic arrangements that realize the difference principle. The main difference between the two systems is that in the first one, private ownership of the means of production is allowed, but it is widely dispersed. In this paper, I try to show how such a system can be publicly justified. The justification that we need to use is precisely the one that Rawls formulates through the idea of the public mind, by referring to the political values contained in our public political culture. (shrink)

Rawlsian idea of public reason refers to the boundaries on political justification of coercive laws and public policies that have wide impact on lives of citizens. The boundaries of public reason means that political justification should be based on reasons we can expect every citizen can reasonably accept independently of any comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doctrine to which she adhere. In modern liberal democracies characterized by reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines it is unjustified for political argumentation to be based (...) on claims that many citizens can not accept. As I understand it, the point of idea of public reason is to strengthen the relationship of civic trust or civic friendship that can ensure inherent stability of just political regime. An important part of the idea of public reason is how it incorporates scientific claims in political argumentation. Rawls writes that citizens are to base their public justification on „presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when those are not controversial.“ If the idea of public reason is the source of political stability it is necessary to answer what it means that conclusions of science are controversial in political and social context? First, scientific controversy is different from controversy of comprehensive doctrines. Science stands outside of comprehensive doctrines so conclusions of science will not be controversial because they clash with comprehensive beliefs, but they will be controversial if they rely on comprehensive beliefs. Second, if conclusions of science are controversial within scientific community, if there are some expert witness disputing its validity, then maybe value-judgments can enter to set standards for certification of the scientific claim. If potential consequences of scientific claim are bad for welfare of some group in society than standards of evidence that will certify this claim must go up. Finally, even if some scientific claim has been certified it still can be controversial as a premise in political justification. The reason can be that certification has not been transparent and many citizens do not realize that this claim is part of scientific consensus. Again, the criterion for controversy of scientific conclusions in political context is connected to the notion of trust and not to the validity of scientific claim or supportive evidence by itself. (shrink)

This paper brings together the discussions on international resource trade and immigration. Following Wenar’s analysis of the resource curse, the aim is to challenge the conventional view on immigration that asserts the right of states to have discretionary control over these policies. The paper shows that more liberal immigration is required as an additional remedial policy to persons harmed in unjust trade. The right to self-determination and territorial rights, which are used as the basis for the exclusion of immigrants, are (...) in the context of this analysis constrained by both attentiveness to harm and the charge of inconsistency. Both rights, which are protected domestically, are violated by the unjust ‘might makes right’ trade rule in the international context, causing harm to people in resource exporting countries. This inconsistency presents a challenge to the moral plausibility of the conventional view in the context of the resource trade. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit wird Hegels Begr?ndung der?sthetik als Philosophie der sch?nen Kunst und die Bestimmung der kulturgeschichtlichen Funktion der Kunst behandelt. Der Aufsatz schlie?t sich an die Annemarie Geth?mann-Sieferts Interpretation von Hegels?sthetik. In dieser Interpretati?on wird Hegels Kunsttheorie ausdr?cklich im Hinblick auf die Frage nach der Rolle der Kunst in der Kultur und in der Geschichte er?rtert. Im Text wird zuerst Hegels Ausschlie?en das Nautursch?nen und die Bestimmung der?sthetik als Philosophie der Kunst untersucht. Dann folgt die Er?rterung von Hegels Widerlegung (...) der Einw?rfe gegen die Philosophie der Kunst. Hegel geht auf die Frage ein, ob die Kunst?berhaupt einer philosophischer Betrachtung f?hig und w?rdig sei, und diese Frage wird im Kontekst von Hegels systematischen Ansatzes positiv beantwortet. Am Ende wird Hegels Begr?ndung der?sthetik im Ausgang vom Einblick in der kulturgeschichtlichen Funktion der Kunst als Deutung der Welt behandelt. (shrink)

The paper examines the reasons for which Camap's and Fodor's theory are considered inadequate by Hilary Putnam in his book Representation and Reality, Putnam deconstmcts his earlier functionalist position and finds himself able to say many things about what language is not and very few about what it is, and, metaphorically speaking, puts human society in an Augustinian position regarding language. As well, this paper investigates whether Putnam's "internal realism" encourages the possible appearence of a new breed of analytic philosophers (...) who will be more sensitive to what was once called "continental metaphysics" and yet who still maintain the conceptual and methodological rigidness of the "old" analytic school. (shrink)

The paper examines the reasons for which Camap's and Fodor's theory are considered inadequate by Hilary Putnam in his book Representation and Reality, Putnam deconstmcts his earlier functionalist position and finds himself able to say many things about what language is not and very few about what it is, and, metaphorically speaking, puts human society in an Augustinian position regarding language. As well, this paper investigates whether Putnam's "internal realism" encourages the possible appearence of a new breed of analytic philosophers (...) who will be more sensitive to what was once called "continental metaphysics" and yet who still maintain the conceptual and methodological rigidness of the "old" analytic school. (shrink)

We argue that no sharp boundary can be drawn between the ``authentic'' human body and its instruments. In contrast to some other theorists of the continental canon--notably Heidegger and the Frankfurt school--Sartre and Merleau-Ponty can be read as asserting that the body (transitively) ``lives'' its instruments, weaving with them an intricate web of habitual actions and experiences. For Merleau-Ponty especially, the human body and its instruments are capable of complementing, supplementing, and melting into one another.

The main concern of this paper is to show that understanding mental variation may prove to be relevant to inquiry into thought experiments. First, I examine why Ernst Mach considered the ability to vary the contents of one's thoughts the principal requirement for thought experimentation. Second, I illustrate the wide applicability of mental variation in thought experiments. Third, I suggest, following Kathleen Wilkes, that variation is frequently employed in “realistic” thought experiments.

The article is addressing one of the central but maybe the most ambiguous and multilayered concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl’s insisting on a form of intentionality that implies not just conscious directedness towards objects, but also a constitutive function of mental acts, led to some serious accusations of his idealism and solipsism. Justification of such accusations depends exclusively on whether we understand constitution in an ontological sense, as a creative process which brings worldly entities into being, or in an epistemological (...) sense, as a process which enables us to identify and to interpret a particular givenness as something. In early stages of phenomenology, a so-called “hylomorphic” theory of constitution prevailed, which stated that object of our experience can be present for us only if some sense-data is formed in our intentional acts by a meaning-giving component. This theory proved to be unsatisfying when Husserl turned to a phenomenological description of temporal objects, discovering that not just objects, but also intentional acts have a distinct temporal structure. However, the analysis of temporal constitution reaches even further, because the idea of the “living present”, and its triadic structure of retention-primal impression-protention, holds the key to an explanation of horizon-intentionality, and offers the answer to an essential transcendental question: How is it possible for us to be aware of the world towards which all of our intentional life is directed, and from which all of the motivation for our actions originates? (shrink)

The first part of the text poses the question whether for Heidegger?s aesthetically relevant thought it is better to use older terms, such as?Heidegger?s Doctrine of Art? or?Heidegger?s Philosophy of Art?, or a more recent term?Heidegger aesthetics?? Does the term?Heidegger?s aesthetics? represent an?oxymoron? contrary to the intentions of Heidegger?s own philosophy, or does it signify a relevant aesthetic conception that has its own place in contemporary philosophical aesthetics? In order to answer these questions, the text considers Heidegger?s understanding of aesthetics (...) as a philosophical discipline and also the problems arising in connection with this designation. It argues that Heidegger?s concept of?overcoming aesthetics? represents the interpretation of his own philosophy of art developed in the essay The Origin of the Work of Art. The second part of the text follows the thesis that the Heidegger?s aesthetics contains the definitions of art and work of art, based on Heidegger?s analyses of freedom, basic moods, and emotions. This part of text follows a broader thesis, in which Heidegger?s philosophy as a whole can be understood as the phenomenology of freedom. Also, it discusses a special thesis that the concept of strife of Earth and world in The Origin of the Work of Art should be understood only on the background of the primordial struggle between concealment and unconcealment in the truth as the unconcealedness of beings. Further, the concept of strife is linked on a deeper level with the determination of finite human freedom and basic human moods. In light of that, Heidegger?s aesthetics is not only the heteronomous aesthetics of the work of art, but also the autonomous aesthetics of aesthetic experience articulated with respect to finite human freedom. The conclusion is that Heidegger?s aesthetics of truth understood as the philosophy of freedom, basic moods, and emotions, according to their inner intentions, is closer to the tradition of the aesthetics of sublime than the aesthetics of the beautiful. (shrink)

RésuméJ'examine dans cet article une notion assez spéciale de nécessité, celle de la nécessité matérielle, introduite explicitement pour la première fois par Adolf Reinach. Je soutiens que la variation libre joue un rôle important dans la découverte et la description de la nécessité matérielle et j'explore également quelques questions apparentées ayant trait à la présentation et à la signification, à la théorie des actes de discours, ainsi qu'à la qualité et à la matière de la présentation.

Dieser Essay versucht nicht nur die Vieldeutigkeiten zu entwirren, die sich um die phänomenologischen Begriffe ,Lebenswelt’ und ,Apriori der Lebenswelt’ ranken, sondern auch eine Phänomenologie der Lebenswelt in Beziehung zu vorwissenschaftlichem Alltagsleben und sinnlicher Wahrnehmung, den mathematischen und geometrischen Naturwissenschaften sowie der eidetischen und phänomenologischen Reduktion der reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie zu umreißen.

In diesem Essay werde ich versuchen, zwei miteinander verknüpfte Fragen zu beantworten. Nimmt man Nietzsches Prinzip der Lebenssteigerung als Grundwert an, würde Wahrheit und die Wahrheit zu sagen einen hohen, mittleren oder keinen Stellenwert haben? In welchem Sinne meint Nietzsche, dass „die Falschheit eines Urteils noch kein Einwand gegen ein Urteil“ ist? Um eine ausreichende Antwort auf diese beiden Fragen zu geben, werde ich darstellen, wie sich auf der Grundlage der Analyse und Kritik der herkömmlichen philosophischen Wahrheitstheorie in seinem Essay (...) unter dem Titel „Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne“ in der Aphorismensammlung Jenseits von Gut und Böse eine vollwertige Theorie des Multiperspektivismus entwickelt. Nachdem Nietzsches Untersuchung des herkömmlichen philosophischen Wahrheitsbegriffs rekonstruiert worden ist, werde ich imstande sein, eine kasuistische Antwort auf die oben erwähnten Fragen zu geben. (shrink)

In contrast to the discussion of theater in the tradition of Western philosophy from Plato and Aristotle through Rousseau and Diderot to Artaud and Brecht, who either devalued or valorized theatricality, Hegel adopts an intermediate point of view between these two extremes. He neither devalues nor valorizes theatricality, but rather maintains that it constitutes an essential dimension of poetic drama through which it presents its ideal and fictive reality to sense perception. While in pre-modernity dramatic poetry was able to represent (...) and reconcile the conflicts between ethical substantiality and individual subjectivity, it is a completely different matter in moder-nity. In the course of the progressing ethical de-substantialization of individual subjectivity, modern drama tends towards pure theatricality and loses its ability to reconcile ethical conflicts spiritually. (shrink)

Unter der Annahme, dass der Orientalismus und Balkanismus nicht einmal rudimentär die reichhaltigen interkulturellen Beziehungen zwischen Europa und dem Mittelmeer erfasst, argumentiert die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit, dass es nötig ist, einen weiteren Diskurs in Ermangelung einer besseren Bezeichnung unter dem Namen Mediterranismus einzubeziehen. Darunter sind kulturelle Imaginationen des Mittelmeeres als philosophische und poetische Denkfigur der europäischen Schriftkultur zu verstehen. Die Hauptaufgabe ist dabei auf der Grundlage der Begriffsgeschichte in Fragmenten und der Deduktion der heuristischen theoretischen Hypothesen eine Rekonstruktion und kontrastive und (...) komplementäre Komparation dieser drei Diskursformationen durchzuführen, unter der Einsicht, dass sie unter den Bedingungen der Moderne bei der europäischen Selbstbesinnung zugleich entgegengesetzt und miteinander verwoben sind. Daher enthalten sie eine ganze Reihe von perzeptiven, affektiven und kognitiven Gegensätzen und Widersprüchen, die gesondert in weiteren Forschungsarbeiten zu untersuchen sind. (shrink)

Ovaj članak pokušava ne samo pojasniti višeznačnosti vezane uz fenomenološke pojmove ‘životni svijet’ i ‘a priori svijeta života’ , nego isto ocrtati fenomenologiju svijeta života u odnosu prema predznanstvenom životu i svakdanje percepcije, matematičkim i geometrijskim prirodoslovnim znanostima te eidetičkoj i fenomenološkoj redukciji čiste fenomenologije i fenomenološke filozofije.

The paper explains Baumgarten?s foundation of modern aesthetics as the science of sensible cognition. The paper first examines mentalistic paradigm in modern philosophy as an intellectual background of Baumgarten?s philosophy and aesthetics. This is followed by consideration of Baumgarten?s definitions of aesthetics from Philosophical meditations of pertaining to some matters concerning poetry, Metaphysics and Aesthetics. Finally, it considers Baumgarten?s definition of aesthetics as the science of sensible cognition starting from Leibniz?s theory of different stages of knowledge.

Dans cette dissertation, nous tenterons de répondre à deux questions liées. Premièrement, si nous acceptons le principe de Nietzsche sur « l’agrandissement de la vie » comme valeur principale, la vérité et l’expression de la vérité auraient-elles une signification grande, moyenne ou nulle? Dans quel sens Nietzsche soutient-il que la « fausseté d’une estimation n’est pas nécessairement son reproche »? Dans le but de donner une réponse satisfaisante à ces deux questions, il faut d’abord montrer comment Nietzsche, à partir de (...) l’analyse et de la critique d’une théorie habituelle de la vérité , construit sa propre théorie du multiperspectivisme. Dans l’essai intitulé « Vérité et mensonge dans un sens extramoral », nous trouvons le germe de cette théorie que Nietzsche a encore développé dans le recueil d’aphorismes intitulé Par-delà le bien et le mal. Après que nous aurons reconstruit les recherches de Nietzsche sur la théorie habituelle de la vérité et sur sa propre théorie du multiperspectivisme, nous pourrons donner une réponse casuistique aux deux questions citées ci-avant. (shrink)

In this essay, I will try to answer two related questions. Adopting Nietzsche’s principle of the “enhancement of life” as a kind of basic value, would truth and truth-telling have high, medial, or no significance at all? In what sense does Nietzsche think that “the falsehood of a judgment is […] not necessarily an objection to it”?1 In order to give a satisfactory answer to these two questions, I will first illustrate how, from his essay entitled “On Truth and Lies (...) in an Non Moral Sense” to the collection of aphorisms entitled Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche develops his analysis and critique of the conventional philosophical theory of truth into a full-fledged theory of multiperspectivism. Having reconstructed Nietzsche’s inquiry of the conventional concept of truth and his theory of perspectivism, I will be able to give a casuistic answer to the two abovementioned questions. (shrink)

Although there are both common and specialised senses of the term variation, there seems to be no well defined use of this term in philosophy. The main task of my thesis is to demonstrate that variation can be defined as a cognitive technique. I suggest that variation has been frequently used by philosophers, although not always in an overt manner. Moreover, I attempt to show that it is reasonable to talk about the relative importance of variation by examining the role (...) of variation in Locke's Essay, Husserl's and Reinach's phenomenology, cognitive science, and thought experiments. (shrink)