Abstract

In this essay, I will try to answer two related questions. Adopting Nietzsche’s principle of the “enhancement of life” as a kind of basic value, would truth and truth-telling have high, medial, or no significance at all? In what sense does Nietzsche think that “the falsehood of a judgment is […] not necessarily an objection to it”?1 In order to give a satisfactory answer to these two questions, I will first illustrate how, from his essay entitled “On Truth and Lies in an Non Moral Sense” to the collection of aphorisms entitled Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche develops his analysis and critique of the conventional philosophical theory of truth into a full-fledged theory of multiperspectivism. Having reconstructed Nietzsche’s inquiry of the conventional concept of truth and his theory of perspectivism, I will be able to give a casuistic answer to the two abovementioned questions