An English eccentric and an agitated dean -- Mr. McGregor's garden -- I banish you -- Vultures and ostriches -- Post mortem.

How can Socrates maintain, as he appears to do, that both pleasure and virtue are the chief good? In the Gorgias, he declares that pleasure is not the good for human beings. Consistently with this, he argues in the Apology and Crito that this good is virtue. Yet in the Protagoras, he can claim after all that it is pleasure. How can these positions be other than mutually contradictory? A common strategy among interpreters is to take the Protagoras as making (...) concessions for the sake of argument, or merely experimenting with ideas. This cutting of the Gordian knot is repudiated by Professor Rudebusch. The answer he gives is that there are two possible accounts of pleasure; and the fact that Socrates argues against pleasure as conceived in one way, in the Gorgias, is perfectly compatible with his acceptance of it as envisaged in another, as illustrated by the Protagoras. If Socrates is commending the life of virtue as itself the most pleasurable, all inconsistency disappears. As Rudebusch says, this is not a matter of concern merely to scholars; if anyone were convinced by Socrates on the point, he or she might well be induced to make fundamental changes in his or her way of living. (shrink)

El presente libro se inicia con una breve reflexión sobre la actitud de los intelectuales en América Latina ante la coyuntura actual, señalando las aportaciones y confusiones de su dicurso teórico y tratando de rescatar las formas de expresión del pensamiento crítico; psra esto se considera la vigencia de la dialéctica como lenguaje. Además, se pretende incursionar sobre las relaciones entre individuos y colectivo, y sobre cuestiones metodológicas para el estudio de sujetos sociales; se incorporan el problema de análisis de (...) variables desde la perspectiva de las mediaciones, y una reflexión sobre la lógica del discurso económico para mostrar cómo implica el olvido del sujeto. Constituyen estos trabajos un esfuerzo de aplicación de la postura racional de nuevas posibilidades de reflexión teórica que contribuyan a enriquecer el discurso, aunque conscientes de su carácter todavía exploratorio. (shrink)

In a well-known text called ‘The Communist Hypothesis’, first published in 2007, the renowned philosopher Alain Badiou breathed fresh life into the idea of communism as an intellectual representation that provides a critical perspective on existing politics and offers a systemic alternative to capitalism. Now, in the course of this wide-ranging conversation with Peter Engelmann, Alain Badiou explains why he continues to value the idea of communism against the background of current social crises and despite negative historical experiences. From the (...) anticipation of a communism without a state to the problem of the concept of democracy and an analysis of capitalism as a system, the two thinkers discuss the key political issues of our time. Whilst explaining his political philosophy, Badiou also reflects on current socio-political developments such as the turmoil in the Middle East and the situation in China. This compelling dialogue is both a highly topical contribution to the question of how we might organize our societies differently and an accessible introduction to Badiou's philosophical thinking. (shrink)

Much evidence has accumulated in favor of such a dual view of reasoning. There is however some vagueness in the way the two systems are characterized. Instead of a principled distinction, we are presented with a bundle of contrasting features - slow/fast, automatic/controlled, explicit/implicit, associationist/rule based, modular/central - that, depending on the specific dual process theory, are attributed more or less exclusively to one of the two systems. As Evans states in a recent review, “it would then be helpful to (...) have some clear basis for this distinction”; he also suggests that “we might be better off talking about type 1 and type 2 processes” rather than systems. We share the intuitions that drove the development of dual system theories. Our goal here is to propose in the same spirit a principled distinction between two types of inferences: ‘intuitive inference’ and ‘reflective inference’. We ground this distinction in a massively modular view of the human mind where metarepresentational modules play an important role in explaining the peculiarities of human psychological evolution. We defend the hypothesis that the main function of reflective inference is to produce and evaluate arguments occurring in interpersonal communication. This function, we claim, helps explain important aspects of reasoning. We review some of the existing evidence and argue that it gives support to this approach. (shrink)

Having defended the usefulness of our definition of reasoning, we stress that reasoning is not only for convincing but also for evaluating arguments, and that as such it has an epistemic function. We defend the evidence supporting the theory against several challenges: People are good informal arguers, they reason better in groups, and they have a confirmation bias. Finally, we consider possible extensions, first in terms of process-level theories of reasoning, and second in the effects of reasoning outside the lab.

What can the manifestations of schizophrenia and other mental disorders reveal about classical notions of philosophy such as thought, perception, self, and rationality? Philosophers, psychiatrists, and clinical psychologists got together to compare notes at Harvard in October 1989, and presented these 16 papers. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.