This book explores the application of dynamical theory to cognitive science. Giunti shows how the dynamical approach can illuminate problems of cognition, information processing, consciousness, meaning, and the relation between body and mind.

During his celebrated 1922 debate with Bergson, Einstein famously proclaimed: “the time of the philosopher does not exist, there remains only a psychological time that differs from the physicist’s.” Einstein’s dictum, I maintain, has been metabolized by the natural sciences, which typically presuppose, more or less explicitly, the existence of a single, univocal, temporal substratum, ultimately determined by physics. This reductionistic assumption pervades much biological and biomedical practice. The chronological age allotted to individuals is conceived as an objective quantity, allowing (...) one to straightforwardly assign and compare the biological age of organisms. This essay argues that the standard practice of assessing the age and aging of organisms against the backdrop of a physical conception of time is problematic. This becomes especially evident in light of recent discoveries of various levels of senescence underlying the development of individual organisms—a phenomenon known as ‘age mosaicism.’ The bottom line is that the study of age and aging requires a biological conception of time, as opposed to a physical one. Einstein clearly wasn’t wrong about his operationalization of time in relativity theory. Still time may be less monolithic than he surmised. (shrink)

This article gives a practice-based overview of the implementation aspects of Corporate Responsibility. After discussing the success factors for implementing Corporate Responsibility, the article describes a model for implementing Corporate Responsibility. Special attention is given to the success factors in the subsequent phases of implementation (sensitivity to the organizational environment, awareness of core values and clear leadership), to ensure that the most optimal results attainable for the organization can be reached. The implementation-model is clarified by looking at experiences in implementing (...) Corporate Responsibility at Chiquita. (shrink)

Recent discussions on Fregean and neo-Fregean foundations for arithmetic and real analysis pay much attention to what is called either ‘Application Constraint’ ($AC$) or ‘Frege Constraint’ ($FC$), the requirement that a mathematical theory be so outlined that it immediately allows explaining for its applicability. We distinguish between two constraints, which we, respectively, denote by the latter of these two names, by showing how$AC$generalizes Frege’s views while$FC$comes closer to his original conceptions. Different authors diverge on the interpretation of$FC$and on whether it (...) applies to definitions of both natural and real numbers. Our aim is to trace the origins of$FC$and to explore how different understandings of it can be faithful to Frege’s views about such definitions and to his foundational program. After rehearsing the essential elements of the relevant debate (§1), we appropriately distinguish$AC$from$FC$(§2). We discuss six rationales which may motivate the adoption of different instances of$AC$and$FC$(§3). We turn to the possible interpretations of$FC$(§4), and advance a Semantic$FC$(§4.1), arguing that while it suits Frege’s definition of natural numbers (4.1.1), it cannot reasonably be imposed on definitions of real numbers (§4.1.2), for reasons only partly similar to those offered by Crispin Wright (§4.1.3). We then rehearse a recent exchange between Bob Hale and Vadim Batitzky to shed light on Frege’s conception of real numbers and magnitudes (§4.2). We argue that an Architectonic version of$FC$is indeed faithful to Frege’s definition of real numbers, and compatible with his views on natural ones. Finally, we consider how attributing different instances of$FC$to Frege and appreciating the role of the Architectonic$FC$can provide a more perspicuous understanding of his foundational program, by questioning common pictures of his logicism (§5). (shrink)

Dynamical systems are mathematical structures whose aim is to describe the evolution of an arbitrary deterministic system through time, which is typically modeled as (a subset of) the integers or the real numbers. We show that it is possible to generalize the standard notion of a dynamical system, so that its time dimension is only required to possess the algebraic structure of a monoid: first, we endow any dynamical system with an associated graph and, second, we prove that such a (...) graph is a category if and only if the time model of the dynamical system is a monoid. In addition, we show that the general notion of a dynamical system allows us not only to define a family of meaningful dynamical concepts, but also to distinguish among a cluster of otherwise tangled notions of reversibility, whose logical relationships are finally analyzed. (shrink)

Heterogeneity of Being goes beyond the standard interpretations of Octavio Paz as a thinker of national identity and proposes a radical rethinking of the relationship between literature and philosophy. Dorfsman analyzes how Paz’s “tradition of rupture” properly displays a continuity between self and other, identity and difference, time and space.

The paper argues that Frege’s primary foundational purpose concerning arithmetic was neither that of making natural numbers logical objects, nor that of making arithmetic a part of logic, but rather that of assigning to it an appropriate place in the architectonics of mathematics and knowledge, by immersing it in a theory of numbers of concepts and making truths about natural numbers, and/or knowledge of them transparent to reason without the medium of senses and intuition.

Worin unterscheidet sich eine idealistische Betrachtung der Natur von der uns gewohnten naturwissenschaftlichen 'Vermessung' derselben. Die Studie versucht vor allem diese Frage zu beantworten. Dabei greift der Autor auf Hegels programmatische Einleitung zu seiner Naturphilosophie zurück. Hegels objektiv-idealistischem Ansatz zufolge ist die Natur nicht bloß tote Materie, sondern durchdrungen von ideellen Strukturen. Dies klingt für moderne Ohren sicher erst einmal nach versteinerter Metaphysik. An dieser Stelle setzt die Untersuchung ein. Sie versucht zu zeigen, daß nicht nur die idealistische Naturphilosophie den (...) Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaft keineswegs widerspricht, sondern sie macht auch plausibel, daß diese aus einer nach Begründung fragenden philosophischen Sichtweise dem naturwissenschaftlichen Denken weit überlegen ist. Fragen wie 'Warum gibt es eine Natur?', 'Was ist die Natur überhaupt?', 'Warum ist die Natur gesetzmäßig?' und 'Was sind Naturgesetze' können hier sinnvoll bearbeitet werden. Der Autor, Marco Bormann M.A., studiert, lehrt und arbeitet im Fachbereich Philosophie an der Rheinisch Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule Aachen. (shrink)

Yuk Hui’s concept of cosmotechnics provides us with an excellent theoretical device to investigate the role of technology in relation to a culture’s self-understanding. This paper, in the first pla...

Celano’s notion of a “pre-convention” is grounded in the opposition between two types of normative behaviour: following a rule and conforming to a norm. The opposition plays a central role in Celano’s paper, and marks a crucial point in his intellectual trajectory. Nevertheless, it remains largely implicit. In this paper I try to make it fully explicit, giving a more precise, albeit sketchy, characterization of both kinds of normative behaviour. I also focus on the importance of distinguishing between them, express (...) some conjectures regarding Celano’s future research, and propose a critique. (shrink)

Embora a reflexão de Kant sobre a especificidade do juízo estético seja tomada pelos intérpretes de sua obra como não tendo o propósito de constituir uma nova possibilidade de pensar a arte e o fazer artístico, não se pode, todavia, negar sua contribuição, particularmente para o reconhecimento da estética como disciplina filosófica. Filósofos aparentemente tão diversos como Hegel, Schelling e Schopenhauer, bem como críticos de literatura e de arte, como os irmãos românticos August e Friedrich Schlegel são unânimes quando se (...) trata de identificar em Kant o primeiro ponto de partida para uma consideração verdadeiramente filosófica da arte. Neste artigo pretendo justamente lançar alguns apontamentos sobre esse lugar atribuído a Kant no horizonte da reflexão estética “sistemática”, que teve início com Baumgarten em 1750 e culminou com o sistema estético de Hegel na terceira década do século XIX. The place of Kant in the fundation of aesthetic as a philosophical disciplinePhilosophers so much different as Hegel, Schelling and Schopenhauer, as well as critics of literature and art, as the romantics brothers August and Friedrich Schlegel, are unanimous in identifying in Kant the starting point for a true philosophical appreciation of art. This paper analyzes the place attributed to Kant on the horizon of the "systematical" aesthetic reflexion, that begun with Baumgarten in 1750 and culminated in the aesthetic system of Hegel in the third decade of the 19 th century. (shrink)

Einstein’s “point-coincidence argument'” as a response to the “hole argument” is usually considered as an expression of “Leibniz equivalence,” a restatement of indiscernibility in the sense of Leibniz. Through a historical-critical analysis of Logical Empiricists' interpretation of General Relativity, the paper attempts to show that this labeling is misleading. Logical Empiricists tried explicitly to understand the point-coincidence argument as an indiscernibility argument of the Leibnizian kind, such as those formulated in the 19th century debate about geometry, by authors such as (...) Poincaré, Helmholtz or Hausdorff. However, they clearly failed to give a plausible account of General Relativity. Thus the point-coincidence/hole argument cannot be interpreted as Leibnizian indiscernibility argument, but must be considered as an indiscernibility argument of a new kind. Weyl's analysis of Leibniz's and Einstein's indiscernibility arguments is used to support this claim. (shrink)

L’analisi degli aspetti più innovativi del pensiero di Lawrence Lessig, e in particolare la messa in luce del rapporto fra diritto ed architettura nello spazio digitale, mostra la necessità per le società contemporanee di dotarsi di una “politica” del codice.

This Element aims to explore how the relation between societal organisation and legal orders – the question of materiality – has been investigated in philosophy of law. The starting point of the Element is that such relation has often been left invisible or thematised in poor and reductive terms. After having explained the main reasons behind this neglect, the Element provides an overview of the three main approaches to legal philosophy whose contributions, though not always effective, can still provide some (...) insights for a contemporary analysis of legal orders' materiality: materialism, legal institutionalism, and the new materialism. The last section of the Element suggests looking for a footing for the study of materiality in two fields: the metaphysics of relations and the political economy of legal orders. (shrink)