During the 1920s and 1930s the testing of blood groups for large numbers of people became a very common practice. Although much of this was to ensure compatibility for blood transfusion, over 1,000 articles were published with results of tests on over 1.3 million people to answer more theoretical, scientific questions. The motivation for much of this research was the possible link between the well established hereditary blood types and other possible inherited traits. Because the existence of the blood groups (...) was a rather sudden discovery, the record of this publication offers an excellent case study of the diffusion of new scientific knowledge. Differences in the beginning of blood group research from country to country reveal some important influences of social setting on the spread and application of the new discoveries. (shrink)

Recognition that biological systems are stabilized far from equilibrium by self-organizing, informed, autocatalytic cycles and structures that dissipate unusable energy and matter has led to recent attempts to reformulate evolutionary theory. We hold that such insights are consistent with the broad development of the Darwinian Tradition and with the concept of natural selection. Biological systems are selected that re not only more efficient than competitors but also enhance the integrity of the web of energetic relations in which they are embedded. (...) But the expansion of the informational phase space, upon which selection acts, is also guaranteed by the properties of open informational-energetic systems. This provides a directionality and irreversibility to evolutionary processes that are not reflected in current theory.For this thermodynamically-based program to progress, we believe that biological information should not be treated in isolation from energy flows, and that the ecological perspective must be given descriptive and explanatory primacy. Levels of the ecological hierarchy are relational parts of ecological systems in which there are stable, informed patterns of energy flow and entropic dissipation. Isomorphies between developmental patterns and ecological succession are revealing because they suggest that much of the encoded metabolic information in biological systems is internalized ecological information. The geneological hierarchy, to the extent that its information content reflects internalized ecological information, can therefore be redescribed as an ecological hierarchy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 303 philosophical, artistic) forms as a vivid protest "from within." If, on the contemporary scene, religion wants to actualize itself and the Church "to answer the question implied in man's very existence" (p. 49), then theology has to use the material of an "existential analysis" of the various cultural realms, confronting this material "with the answer implied in the Christian message" (p. 49). Part II gives so (...) to say instances of such a theological appreciation of cultural expressions. Successively passed in review are: religious "language" (signs and symbols), artistic "style," existential philosophy, psychoanalysis, science, morality, and education. Though each essay is illuminating, those on Existential Philosophy: its historical meaning (1944) and The Theological Significance o/Existentialism and Psychoanalysis (1955) may be called brilliant. Part III contains comparisons of theological thought in Germany and America (in which the author gives some personal reminiscences), and of religion in America and Russia, together with An Evaluation o/Martin Buber (1948). The book concludes with Part IV: Communicating the Christian Message: a Question to Christian Ministers and Teachers (1952), which appears to be relevant to Christians in general. It may be said that it has been a privilege for America to have received among the intellectual refugees of the "catastrophe" of 1933 this powerful German thinker, just as it must have bcen a privilege for Dr. Tillich to be able to elaborate his thought in a country where it received such great response in thoughtful circles. One recognizes behind this thinking the essential continental problems of the relation between philosophy of religion and theology, between religion and culture, between personal existence and industrial society: questions becoming American problems as well. In all his work, the role of religion is positively appreciated, and an appeal is made to a religious "courage to be," reminding man in his estranged life situation of his essential nature and his final destiny. It is not with the deus est esse, neither the certitudo ex se ipsis, nor the ultimate concern, nor the unconditional, that we should like to voice here some questions with regard to the author's views. Rather it is with two seemingly minor questions. Accepting his circumscription of religion as "the dimension of depth," we would be interested to see if within or beside a Theology o] culture, a Theology o] religion would also be possible, having as its subject religious expressions under and outside the authority of the Gospel. A second question arises from the author's statement: "Self is good, self-affirmation is good, self-acceptance is good, but selfishness is bad because it prevents both self-affirmation and self-acceptance" (p. 145). Although this phrase may have its particular context in Moralisms and Morality (1955), I personally wonder if the deflated Self does not risk becoming the essential prison of industrial society, in which, unfortunately, there is no Nirwana.... JACQUES WAA_RDENB URG University o[ California, Los Angeles BOOK NOTES John A. Mourant, ed., Introduction to the Philosophy oI Saint Augustine. Selected Readings and Commentaries. University Park, Pa., Pennsylvania State University Press [1964]. Pp. ix + 366. $7.50. This is an excellent introduction to the philosophy of Augustine as well as to the general Romanizing of the Platonic tradition. Professor Mourant's thirty pages of Introduction (supplemented appropriately by the great "Prayer" in which the Saint explains the world to his Creator), the bibliographical references, and the critical comments, all provide a concise exposition of the varioua ways in which Augustine attempted to organize his faith into a system of thought. The selections from the treatises, sermons, and letters are well arranged and contain several new translations into English by competent scholars. Both the editor's exposition and Augustine's own efforts to face the basic issues created by the meeting of diverse systems of doctrine and language enable the student to become aware of the amazing range of Christian philosophy created by a man who was both a busy bishop and an inquisitive truth-seeker. The reader can follow Augustine himself in dealing with his problems, instead of being confronted with the literature and context of modernization or of apologetics. 304 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Since this volume is evidently and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Book Reviews St. Auc~stine and Being: A Me$aphyM,cal Essay. By James F. Anderson. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.Pp. viii [i] + 76. Guilders 9.90.) Contemporary students of medieval philosophy, especially those influenced by the writings of Gilson, usually view Augustine as primarily an essentialist in metaphysics, while Aquinas is viewed as some sort of existentialist. This is taken to mean that, whereas Augustine seems to identify being with essence (...) or wha~ a thing is, Aquinas distinguishes between what a thing is and its act of existence. The major contribution of Aquinas to later philosophy is often depicted as this distinction between essence and existence. Perhaps the major interest and value of Professor Anderson's essay is that it contests this currently predominant opinion of the essentialist character of Augustinian metaphysics and calls for a re-evaluation of the supposedly revohi~ionary character of the Thomistic concentration upon the act of existence. It is quite evident that Augustine broke with Plotinus when he asserted that the first principle of all things was God, being itself (ipsum esse), rather than the One, which transcends being. The controversy arises over Augustine's view of the nature of being (esse). For Gilson the notion of being remained for Augustine Neoplatonic, while for Anderson Augustine introduced an existential aspect to the notion of being lacking in Neoplatonic thought. Citing the same texts for support Gilson maintains that Augustine interprets the name of God given in Exodus as "I am he who never changes," while Anderson maintains that Augustine interprets Exodus as asserting that God is being, in the sense of existence, itself. The major point of disagreement between Gilson and Anderson is not whether Augustine regarded being as pre~ dominant, but how Augustine interpreted the notion of being. In some texts Augustine maintsSns that being and immutability mean the same thing, in others he argues that a thing truly is 'because it is immutable, and in yet others he argues that a thing is immutable because it truly is. The first opinion seems to be the one frequently favored as an interpretation of Augustine by Gilson. The second is usually regarded as Neoplatonic. The third is the opinion which Professor Anderson argues was most accurately Augustine's. According to Professor Anderson the first two opinions reflect for Augustine a merely factual connection between being and immutability, whereas the third reflects a metaphysical entailment. I should like to mention three points in Professor Anderson's discussion which seem to me weak. Firstly, as Augustine remarks that being is the name for unchangeableness we cannot take this as asserting a merely factual relationship. Secondly, to say that 'being' and 'immutability ~mean the same thing to Augustine or that being and immutability are identical to him does not necessitate, as Professor Andersen claims, denying the primacy of being. If 'being' and 'immutability' mean the same thing, then it is very peculiar to ask which is primary. If it is remarked that 'triangleI means the same thing as 'three sided figure', what sense does it make to ask which notion is primary? I suspect that Professor Anderson's contention makes sense only if one believes that there is a difference in the meanings of 'being' and 'immutability ', but whether or not there was such a difference for Augustine is precisely the point at issue. Professor Anderson asserts that it would be a "metaphysical inconsistency" to claim that God is both being and immutability, but it is not clear why such a claim would be inconsistent if the two terms in fact mean the same thing (p. 30). Thirdly, if, as is in fact the case, Augustine's remarks on the relationship between immutability and being are inconsistent perhaps we should accept the possibility that Augustine himself never came to a clear view on this matter rather than attempt to surmise what Augustine "must have meant." Of course, such inconsistency in Augustine's writings would tend to support the thesis of Gilson that Augustine has difficulties reconciling his theology and metaphysics. Moreover, the analogy Professor Anderson suggests between the Augustinian mutability-immutability contrast and the Thomistic potency-act contrast could only be a very rough one... (shrink)

Monitoring the environment for visual events while performing a concurrent task requires adjustment of visual processing priorities. By use of Bundesen's (1990) Theory of Visual Attention (TVA), we investigated how monitoring for an object-based brief event affected distinct components of visual attention in a concurrent task. The perceptual salience of the event was varied. Monitoring reduced the processing speed in the concurrent task, and the reduction was stronger when the event was less salient. The monitoring task neither affected the temporal (...) threshold of conscious perception nor the storage capacity of visual short-term memory nor the efficiency of top-down controlled attentional selection. (shrink)