Critic, poet and philosopher Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829) was a leading figure of German Romanticism. In the two years before his untimely death, he wrote three cycles of lectures intended as part of a larger project to lay the foundations of a new general philosophy. Two of these cycles, 'Philosophie des Lebens' (given in 1827, published 1828) and 'Philosophie des Sprache und des Wortes' (given in December 1828 and published posthumously), are reissued here in an 1847 English translation. The (...) first presents Schlegel's understanding of philosophy as independent of theology or politics, concerned with the 'inner spiritual life' of humankind. The second explores the nature of communication through language and art. Schlegel argues that full human consciousness cannot be restored by Enlightenment science, but only by divine revelation and redemption. He offers no ready-made solutions, but encourages his listeners to develop their own responses to these questions. (shrink)

1827 hielt Friedrich Schlegel seine Vorlesungen zur "Philosophie des Lebens". Damit beginnt sich der Diskurs der modernen Lebensphilosophie zu manifestieren. Doch diese diskurs-begründende Leistung Schlegels wurde bisher nicht gewürdigt. Deshalb hat Robert Josef Kozljanic hier nun erstmals die entscheidenden Vorlesungen Schlegels ausgewählt, betitelt und herausgegeben. In seinem nachfolgenden Text "Schlegel und die Lebensphilosophie des 21. Jahrhunderts - Eine Manifestation" zieht Kozljanic die Linie weiter. Er greift Schlegels Lebensphilosophie engagiert auf und öffnet sie in Richtung Zukunft. Damit fließen erstmals (...) neue Themen in den lebensphilosophischen Diskurs. Themen, die bisher auf dem Gebiet der Philosophiegeschichte übersehen oder abgedrängt wurden: die wichtige Rolle der Lebensphilosophinnen, die dialogisch-philosophische Grundhaltung, Philosophie als Lebenskunst und Leben-Liebes-Kunst, die Frage der Leibes-Lust-Kultivierung, die Funktion der Lebenserfahrungsvernunft und die Suche nach einem gesellschaftskritischen und zugleich empathisch-lebendigen Ich. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY. LECTURE X. On the Christian point of view in the Philosophy of History.— The origin of Christianity, considered in reference to the ...

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Volume: v. 1 General Books publication date: 2009 Original publication date: 1835 Original Publisher: Saunders and Otley Subjects: History History / General ...

Volume 2, part 1 "herausgegeben von Georg Braungart; begrèundet von Ernst Behler in Zusammenarbeit mit Frank Jolles;" volume 3 "begrèundet von Ernst Behler und Frank Jolles; herausgegeben von Claudia Becker.".

I consider Friedrich Schlegel as a philosopher, and argue that Schlegel’s philosophical views must be understood in relation to his emphasis on history and historical knowledge and his claim that philosophy must emerge from and in relation to life. Thus, in deep contrast to two influential interpretations of Schlegel--Hegel’s view of Schlegel’s philosophy as a poetic exaggeration of the Fichtean subject and the postmodern view of Schlegel as a deeply sceptical anti-idealist--I contend that Schlegel (...) sough to develop a historically-informed philosophy and maintained that it is only through concrete knowledge of political and social realities that we can understand the nature of morality and achieve moral progress. Furthermore, I argue that Schlegel did not entirely forgo the possibility of systematic knowledge, but developed a new conception of systematicity based on his understanding of living or organic beings. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed a rehabilitation of early German Romanticism in philosophy, including a renewed interest in Romantic ethics. Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) is acknowledged as a key figure in this movement. While significant work has been done on some aspects of his thought, his views on ethics have been surprisingly overlooked. This essay aims to redress this shortcoming in the literature by examining the core themes of Schlegel’s ethics during the early phase of his career (1793–1801). I argue (...) that Schlegel’s position stands out against both the dominant Kantianism of his era, as well as against some of fellow Romantics. I show how Schlegel anticipates contemporary philosophers such as Bernard Williams, Harry Frankfurt, John McDowell, and Stanley Cavell in both his criticisms of traditional moral theory and in his attempts to develop a positive position. (shrink)

In this paper I reconstruct Schlegel's idea that romantic poetry can re-enchant nature in a way that is uniquely compatible with modernity's epistemic and political values of criticism, self-criticism, and freedom. I trace several stages in Schlegel's early thinking concerning nature. First, he criticises modern culture for its analytic, reflective form of rationality which encourages a disenchanting view of nature. Second, he re-evaluates this modern form of rationality as making possible an ironic, romantic, poetry, which portrays natural phenomena (...) as mysterious indications of an underlying reality that transcends knowledge. Yet Schlegel relies here on a contrast between human freedom and natural necessity that reinstates a disenchanting view of nature as fully intelligible and predictable. Third, therefore, he reconceives nature as inherently creative and poetic, rethinking human creativity as consisting in participation in natural creative processes. He replaces his earlier "idealist" view that reality is in itself unknowable with the "idealist realist" view that reality is knowable as creative nature, yet, in its spontaneous creativity, still eludes full comprehension. I argue that Schlegel's third approach to the re-enchantment of nature is his most consistent and satisfactory, and is important for contemporary environmental philosophy in showing how re-enchantment is compatible with modernity. (shrink)

Fred Rush investigates the historical and conceptual structure of the development of a distinctive conception of irony in early- to mid-nineteenth century European philosophy. He explores the thought of Schlegel and Novalis, Hegel and Kierkegaard, and argues that the development of irony in this period offered an alternative to German idealism.

Ever since the proposal of Giovanni Reale, it has been useful to distinguish three “paradigms,” or models of “normal science,” in Thomas Kuhn’s sense, in the history of Platonic scholarship, each of which are relatively distinct from the others in their historical succession: the Neoplatonic model which persisted into modern times; the “Romantic” model which replaced it and whose foundations were formulated around 1800 by Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher, and which was until recently the guiding model for history, (...) philology and philosophy; and lastly the model that takes both the literary and indirect Platonic traditions, integrates them, uses them to supplement one another, and so in part preserves and in part modifies the second model by a perspectival “paradigm shift”. The new research program justified itself in view of the surplus of anomalies left by the old program, which had to leave certain central portions of the tradition unexplained or else forcefully reinterpret them. Meanwhile, the new program promised to progressively work off the explanatory deficit. The new program was also able to emerge as an alternative because the explanatory abilities of the old program had visibly declined into a state of stagnation and exhaustion. That program had not achieved the hoped-for explanatory goals: neither the extraction of the philosophical content of Platonic dialogues by an analysis of form, nor the evaluation of the relative chronology of the dialogues for the inner development of their philosophical thought. (shrink)

In this study I have presented Early-German Romanticism as a philosophical movement and Friedrich Schlegel as its major philsopher. The central philosophical problem which concerned this movement was the problem of philosophy's beginning. Schlegel's skeptical view led him to reject both Reinhold's foundationalism and Jacobi's irrationalism. This skeptical position distinguishes Early-German Romanticism from Fichte's idealism. ;Schlegel's rejection of Fichte's solution to the problem of philosophy's beginning led to a unique solution: the Wechselerweis. This involves the claim that (...) philosophy cannot begin with any single principle, but only with the interaction between at least two principles. This interactive model involves an ever-changing dialogue between the knowing subject and the world. For Schlegel, philosophy cannot be understood without an understanding of change. Therefore, history becomes a central part of the activity of philosophizing. According to Schlegel's view, philosophy never begins with a point of absolute certainty but always in the middle. (shrink)

_Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde and the Fragments _ was first published in 1971. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. For the last century and a half, Friedrich Schlegel has enjoyed a reputation for being the critical grey eminence behind the coming to power of the Romantic Movement. It was Schlegel, in his three series of aphoristic fragments _, who actually (...) first defined and employed the word "romantic" in the present sense; and it was he who in a chaotic, fragmentary, and often mysterious but forceful manner first proclaimed the doctrine that was to usher in the modern age in literature. He too was among the first to put his new program into practice in the shape of his unfinished _Lucinde_,a work variously denounced as pornography and heralded as a forerunner of modern novelistic experimentation, and probably the most famous novel to come out of German Romanticism. Both the _Fragments _and _Lucinde_,along with a brilliant _tour de force_, the "Essay on Incomprehensibility," are available now for the first time in a complete English translation in this volume, together with a brief scholarly introduction. This translation will enable non-German readers to examine at first hand the work of a man whom Rene Wellck has called "one of the greatest critics of history." At a time when the function of criticism is coming once again under close skeptical scrutiny, Friedrich Schlegel's unorthodox, unsystematic but seminal critical mind—all of literature, philosophy, art, and history were grist to his mill—should find many sympathetic readers. The book will be of particular interest to theorists of literature and fiction, comparative literature scholars, and historians of the intellectual history of Germany, and it is appropriate for course use in German and comparative literature classes. (shrink)

Friedrich Schlegel er kendt som en af grundlæggerne af den tidlige tyske romantik og som den, der gennem sin konversion forsøgte at springe ud af dennes "ironiens ironi" 1) i en katolsk konservatisme.

Desde la polémica mantenida entre Jacobi y Mendelssohn en 1785 sobre el supuesto spinozismo de Lessing, se ha considerado que sistema de razón , fatalismo y panteísmo (y con él el spinozismo como forma más perfecta) constituyen una tríada de conceptos inseparables, de ahí la afirmación clave de Schlegel en el Indierbuch : “der Pantheismus ist das System der reinen Vernunft” (KA VIII, 249; Cit. por Schelling en SW I/VII 339, n. a ; 117). De esta manera, Schelling no (...) deja de ser un “vástago” del Pantheismusstreit de Mendelssohn y Jacobi: una polémica cuyo fantasma, personificado por Schlegel, aparecerá entre las páginas del Freiheitsschrift. (shrink)

Though irony is a category familiar to rhetoric and literature, its philosophical forms are far less explored, and this is especially true with regards to its articulation in the work of Friedrich Schlegel. Schlegel’s engagement with irony is essential to the Romantic philosophical project, one that is fundamentally concerned with contradiction and posits itself as a challenge to and continuation of idealism. Through exploring his relation to the philosophies of Kant and Fichte, this essay demonstrates that Schlegel (...) can deploy irony as a method of taking up the philosophical paradigm of idealism without limiting himself to their systems. He can use Kant and Fichte against themselves, making sincere philosophical arguments through a brazen playfulness. Further, Schlegel’s concept of irony is shown to be a philosophical faculty that is concerned with the limits of philosophy in language. Irony is much more than a rhetorical device – it is a form that allows Schlegel to approach the limits of discursivity from within and so continually stage instances of philosophical contradiction, undermining systematicity. This centering of contradiction is one of Schlegel’s major contributions to the development of German philosophy, critical of those who precede him and spurning their presuppositions of univocal logic. The outworking of Schlegel’s philosophical concern with irony is unmistakably humorous, full of puns, jokes and witticisms, which nevertheless need to be taken seriously. This paper contends that irony is at the crux of Schlegel’s philosophical project, simultaneously the content and mode of his criticism, the source and justification of his humour, and one of Romanticism’s most significant conceptual developments. (shrink)

Schlegel’s irony, which is the main author along with Solger, of irony in German romanticism, becomes a reinterpretation of the figure of the ironic Plato’s Socrates . Nevertheless, his proposal of a pragmatic irony was rejected in a violent way by Hegel and Kierkegaard, that reread Socrates and his irony in a different sense of Schlegel. For these the proposal of the romantic author was a challenge to the society that would end up destroying it, but, from our (...) perspective such semantic reading of the schlegelian irony is very weak and, rather, the proposal of the German writer can be understood like a way of a constructive critic of the political community and we can learn much of Schlegel today.La ironía de Schlegel, máximo representante, junto con Solger, de la ironía en el romanticismo alemán supuso una reinterpretación de la figura del Sócrates irónico de Platón. Sin embargo, su propuesta de una ironía pragmática fue rechazada de manera violenta por Hegel y Kierkegaard, que releyeron a Sócrates y su ironía enfrentándola a la de Schlegel. Para estos la propuesta del autor romántico era un reto a la sociedad que acabaría destruyéndola, pero, desde nuestra perspectiva tal lectura semántica de la ironía schlegeliana no se sostiene y, más bien, la propuesta del escritor alemán puede entenderse como un modo de crítica constructiva de la comunidad política de la que todavía hoy podemos aprender mucho. (shrink)

This essay investigates what a nuanced and revisionary interpretation of Fichte’s Critical-idealist philosophy could reveal about its impact on the philosophic thought of Friedrich Schlegel. It argues that Schlegel sees the Wissenschaftslehre through the lens of the distinction Fichte famous draws between the “spirit” (Geist) and the “letter” (Buchstaben) of a philosophy. He considers the spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre to lie in its acute awareness of its own limitation as a work of art and its letter in the (...) deductive or demonstrative form it inevitably assumes upon being expounded. In the face of the discrepancy, Schlegel rejects the letter of the Wissenschaftslehre in favor of its spirit. (shrink)

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel developed an influential theory of irony that anticipated some of the central concerns of postmodernity. His most vocal contemporary critic, the philosopher Hegel, sought to demonstrate that Schlegel’s theory of irony tacitly relied on certain problematic aspects of Fichte’s philosophy. While Schlegel’s theory of irony has generated seemingly endless commentary in recent critical discourse, Hegel’s critique of Schlegelian irony has gone neglected. This essay’s primary aim is to defend (...) Hegel’s critique of Schlegel by isolating irony’s underlying Fichtean epistemology. Drawing on Søren Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony in the final section of this essay, I argue that Hegel’s critique of irony can motivate a dialectical hermeneutics that offers a powerful alternative both to Paul de Man’s poststructuralist hermeneutics and to recent cultural-studies-oriented criticism that tends to reduce literary texts to sociohistorical epiphenomena. (shrink)

The term “irony” has always found itself caught up in philosophical discourse, yet this term has only been elevated to the status of a philosophical concept relatively recently along the trajectory of the movement of philosophy. In fact, the philosophical centrality of irony can be traced to the Romantics at the turn of the 19th century and, in particular, to the writings of Friedrich Schlegel, even though the topic of “Socratic irony” has been discussed from Plato’s time on. This (...) is to say that, although it has long been a pondered over that philosophical points can be made ironically, i.e., socratically, the notion that philosophical discourse, philosophy itself, might be essentially informed by irony is a relatively recent proposal. (shrink)

Sowohl Friedrich Schlegel als auch Joseph Görres reagieren mit ihren Einlassungen auf die Idee des "Ewigen Friedens", wie sie vor allem durch Kant vorgetragen und um 1800 durch eine Vielzahl von Autoren im Angesicht einer stürmischen und kriegerischen Zeitenwende diskutiert wurden -/- With their statements, both Friedrich Schlegel and Joseph Görres react to the idea of "eternal peace", as it was primarily put forward by Kant and discussed by a large number of authors around 1800 in the face (...) of a stormy and warlike turning point in time -/- Своими высказываниями и Фридрих Шлегель, и Йозеф Гёррес реагируют на идею «вечного мира», как она была в первую очередь выдвинута Кантом и обсуждалась большим числом авторов около 1800 года перед лицом бурного и воинственного перелома во время -/- Con sus declaraciones, tanto Friedrich Schlegel como Joseph Görres reaccionan a la idea de “paz eterna”, tal y como fue planteada principalmente por Kant y discutida por un gran número de autores hacia 1800 ante un tormentoso y bélico punto de inflexión. a tiempo. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Schlegel states “... the photon clock when interpreted as a device for showing the Lorentz transformation of time does actually involve a violation of basic relativity principles.” His conclusion is false, and is based on an incorrect analysis of the photon clock in two reference frames with relative motion. The purpose of this note is to present a corrected analysis and show that such an analysis is consistent with basic relativity principles.

Schlegels Theorie des Verstehens nimmt Grundgedanken der modernen philosophischen Hermeneutik vorweg. Entwickelt hat Schlegel seine 'hermeneutische Kritik' im Anschluss an die Textkritik und Hermeneutik der damaligen Altertumswissenschaft (F. A. Wolf). Mit seiner 'hermeneutischen Kritik' werden der kunstlerische Schaffensprozess und der Existenzvollzug des Menschen sowie die positive Rolle des Nichtverstehens thematisiert - Aspekte, die nicht ohne Nachwirkung auf die postromantische Entwicklung der Hermeneutik geblieben sind.

La ironía de Schlegel, máximo representante, junto con Solger, de la ironía en el romanticismo alemán supuso una reinterpretación de la figura del Sócrates irónico de Platón. Sin embargo, su propuesta de una ironía pragmática fue rechazada de manera violenta por Hegel y Kierkegaard, que releyeron a Sócrates y su ironía enfrentándola a la de Schlegel. Para estos la propuesta del autor romántico era un reto a la sociedad que acabaría destruyéndola, pero, desde nuestra perspectiva tal lectura semántica (...) de la ironía schlegeliana no se sostiene y, más bien, la propuesta del escritor alemán puede entenderse como un modo de crítica constructiva de la comunidad política de la que todavía hoy podemos aprender mucho. (shrink)

This paper investigates the new form of writing—the fragmentary project—that Friedrich Schlegel developed in response to Kant’s systematic philosophy.The fragments, I argue, are not anti-systematic; rather, they elucidate the idea that philosophy, like the modern work of art, no longer represents the unity of a closed system but a unity beyond the system. The fragmentary project is an ambitious attempt to find a form of philosophical coherence beyond the compulsion of a system. In contrast to the traditional view which (...) regards the fragment as expressing relativistic, skeptic, and at bottom, anarchic sentiments, this account views the fragment as a figure of writing that does not represent but itself enacts the movement toward greater coherence and communication. (shrink)

Im 18. Jahrhundert verliert die Rhetorik ihre herausragende Stellung im Bildungssystem, ihre Kraft gegenüber der Philosophie und ihre Bedeutung für die Poesie. Und doch erweist sie sich als unverzichtbar. Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) setzt sich intensiv und kritisch mit der Rhetorik auseinander. Der erste Teil dieser Studie untersucht den romantischen Rhetorikbegriff. Erläutert wird Schlegels Kenntnis und Rezeption des Kanons: Rhetorik wird von Schlegel poetisiert, verliert an konkreter Absichtlichkeit. Aber diese Romantisierung bestätigt nicht die These, Rhetorik sei um 1800 untergegangen. (...) Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit werden - im Hinblick auf die Romantik - die Gegenläufigkeiten in der Rhetorikgeschichte und die jeweils zugrundeliegenden Rhetorikbegriffe dargestellt. (shrink)

_The origins of early German Romanticism and the philosophical contributions of the movement’s most important philosopher._.

ABSTRACT Nietzsche and Schlegel both write about practical topics with more than merely descriptive intent. Their intent is also practical insofar as it aims to alter the life of the reader, setting her a task: be thus! Each, however, also evinces skepticism about the propriety of such task setting. This skepticism is more general than the explicitly signaled audience partitioning in which each also engages: it is not that some readers will not be able to make use of the (...) text in the intended way, but that the task setting itself is misplaced. In this article I describe the character of the tasks that give rise to this skepticism, and argue that in both Schlegel's and Nietzsche's cases we get truer and more satisfying interpretations if we take them as disclaiming practical intent: though it is seductive to think we could attain the states they describe through our own effort, they systematically elude such pursuit. (shrink)

This essay investigates what a nuanced and revisionary interpretation of Fichte’s Critical-idealist philosophy could reveal about its impact on the philosophic thought of Friedrich Schlegel. It argues that Schlegel sees the Wissenschaftslehre through the lens of the distinction Fichte famous draws between the “spirit” (Geist) and the “letter” (Buchstaben) of a philosophy. He considers the spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre to lie in its acute awareness of its own limitation as a work of art and its letter in the (...) deductive or demonstrative form it inevitably assumes upon being expounded. In the face of the discrepancy, Schlegel rejects the letter of the Wissenschaftslehre in favor of its spirit. (shrink)