Ever since the proposal of Giovanni Reale, it has been useful to distinguish three “paradigms,” or models of “normal science,” in Thomas Kuhn’s sense, in the history of Platonic scholarship, each of which are relatively distinct from the others in their historical succession: the Neoplatonic model which persisted into modern times; the “Romantic” model which replaced it and whose foundations were formulated around 1800 by Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher, and which was until recently the guiding model for history, philology (...) and philosophy; and lastly the model that takes both the literary and indirect Platonic traditions, integrates them, uses them to supplement one another, and so in part preserves and in part modifies the second model by a perspectival “paradigm shift”. The new research program justified itself in view of the surplus of anomalies left by the old program, which had to leave certain central portions of the tradition unexplained or else forcefully reinterpret them. Meanwhile, the new program promised to progressively work off the explanatory deficit. The new program was also able to emerge as an alternative because the explanatory abilities of the old program had visibly declined into a state of stagnation and exhaustion. That program had not achieved the hoped-for explanatory goals: neither the extraction of the philosophical content of Platonic dialogues by an analysis of form, nor the evaluation of the relative chronology of the dialogues for the inner development of their philosophical thought. (shrink)

The concept of hermeneutical experience is conceived analogously to that of aesthetic, religious or empirical experience. The unique nature of hermeneutical experience is the comprehension of the meaning of artificial signs or sign-systems, such as art, literature, laws, institutions, actions, etc. It may be questioned how far and to what extent hermeneutical experience is second-hand experience, i.e., secondary to primary experience expressed in signs, or, following a well-known formula of Boeckh, a ‘recognition of what has been recognized before’.

It will be useful to connect the following survey with Giovanni Reale’s important book on Plato, because it reflects forcefully and lucidly the current state of Platonic scholarship. According to Reale, the three historical models of Plato—the Neoplatonic, the Romantic and the currently emerging one—are all paradigms or “disciplinary matrices” in the sense of Thomas Kuhn’s work on scientific theories. This view is fundamentally correct. Reale has adduced sufficient evidence to support it, and Kuhn himself is said to regard favorably (...) the application of his theory to Plato. In the succession of the three paradigms, we may further see a development in which the new view of Plato, which I shall sketch here, assumes the role of a synthesis of the Neoplatonic thesis and its Romantic antithesis in the work of Schleiermacher and Schlegel. Avoiding equally the extremes of too much and too little, the new view neither succumbs to the unhistorical adaptation and systematic transformation of Plato, as does Neoplatonism, nor does it abbreviate his philosophy to the extant literary corpus, as do the Romantics. It takes instead a mediate, historically scrupulous and balanced position between the allegorical interpretation, which prevailed into the eighteenth century, and the subsequently dominant literary interpretation by combining the doxographic tradition, which has its origin in Plato’s oral teaching, with the dialogues and the epistles. This view is careful to include and preserve all the tenable elements of the Romantic paradigm, as, for instance, the correct elements of Schleiermacher’s theory of the dialogue-form. The relation of the new paradigm to the older ones may thus be seen as the correction of the latter and their integration as partial theorems into a more comprehensive general theory. (shrink)