Intuitionists and classical logicians use in common a large number of the logical axioms, even though they supposedly mean different things by the logical connectives and quantifiers — conquans for short. But Wittgenstein says The meaning of a word is its use in the language. We prove that in a definite sense the intuitionistic axioms do indeed characterize the logical conquans, both for the intuitionist and the classical logician.

The contributions to this special collection concern issues and problems discussed in or related to the work of Wesley C. Salmon. Salmon has long been noted for his important work in the philosophy of science, which has included research on the interpretation of probability, the nature of explanation, the character of reasoning, the justification of induction, the structure of space/time and the paradoxes of Zeno, to mention only some of the most prominent. During a time of increasing preoccupation with historical (...) and sociological approaches to under standing science (which characterize scientific developments as though they could be adequately analysed from the perspective of political movements, even mistaking the phenomena of conversion for the rational appraisal of scientific theories), Salmon has remained stead fastly devoted to isolating and justifying those normative standards distinguishing science from non-science - especially through the vindi cation of general principles of scientific procedure and the validation of specific examples of scientific theories - without which science itself cannot be (even remotely) adequately understood. In this respect, Salmon exemplifies and strengthens a splendid tradi tion whose most remarkable representatives include Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap and Carl G. Hempel, all of whom exerted a profound influence upon his own development. (shrink)

This collection of essays is the definitive version of a widely discussed debate over the origins of the New Theory of Reference. In new articles, written especially for this volume, Quentin Smith and Scott Soames, the original participants in the debate, elaborate their positions on who was responsible for the ideas that Saul Kripke presented in his Naming and Necessity. They are joined by John Burgess, who weighs in on the side of Soames, while Smith adds a further dimension in (...) discussing the contributions of philosophers such as Follesdal, Geach, Hintikka, and Plantinga. Also included are lengthy excerpts from Follesdal's 1961 Harvard dissertation and a careful examination by Sten Lindstrom of the respective contributions of Kripke and Stig Kanger to the development of modal semantics. The collection will be essential reading for anyone acquainted with these influential ideas. (shrink)

This article explores Presocratic epistemology, arguing that divine revelation is replaced as a warrant for knowledge with naturalistic accounts of how and what we humans can know; thus replacing earlier Greek pessimism about knowledge with a more optimistic outlook that allows for human discovery of the truth. A review of the relevant fragments and testimonia shows that Xenophanes, Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, and Parmenides—even Pythagoras and Empedocles—all moved some distance away from the older “god-oriented” view of knowledge toward a more secular and (...) optimistic outlook. But to get some sense of the dynamics at work in this transition this article begins, as virtually every account of early Greek thought must begin, with Homer and Hesiod. (shrink)

Tragic allusions to contemporary events are not, as a rule, taken on trust, but the Eumenides of Aeschylus provides three notable exceptions. The view that the Athenian-Argive alliance of 462 B.C. is reflected in Eum. 287–91, 667–73, anc^ 762–74 has won wide acceptance, although no systematic theory of the relation between the drama and the historical context has yet been advanced. If demonstration in detail has been wanting, the view seems to be supported by three general considerations. In the first (...) place, the emphasis put on the dramatic declaration of friendship exceeds the requirements of the plot: the acquittal of Orestes rather than his gesture of gratitude to Athens is the natural climax of this part of the drama, 1–777, and yet the gesture has been considered important enough to be heralded twice before it is actually made in 762–74. Secondly, Orestes' declaration is not limited in duration but binding on his successors in perpetuity; it seems, therefore, to have been deliberately formulated in order to react upon historical fact. Thirdly, in instituting the Council of the Areopagus and dwelling upon the importance of its constitutional function, Aeschylus seems to have gone out of his way to pass judgement of some sort on the recent reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles; the theory that he has also appreciated their foreign policy on the tragic stage is thus relieved of some of the obvious practical objections and made inherently more plausible. (shrink)

Myles Burnyeat maintains that Aristotelian epistêmê, in so far as it deals with explanations, is properly identified as understanding rather than as knowledge. Although Burnyeat is right in thinking that the cognitive achievement Aristotle typically has in mind is not justified true belief, Aristotelian epistêmê cannot be equated with understanding. On some occasions in Aristotle's writings (e.g. Apo 71a4), the term designates a particular science such as mathematics; on others (e.g. Apo 72b18-20), it designates the grasp of a first principle; (...) on others (e.g. Apo 94a20) it is a systematic grasp of fact and explanation that is properly termed understanding; and on still others (e.g. N. Ethics 1147a22) it is that combination of factual knowledge and competency in demonstration that qualifies as expertise or disciplinary mastery. (shrink)

In fragment B 18 (DK) Xenophanes asserts that ‘Not from the outset did the gods reveal all things to mortals’ but that ‘in time, as they seek, men discover better.’ The remark has been understood in different ways but is usually read as a rejection of the view of the gods as the givers of all good things and an expression of faith in the capacity of human beings to make progress through their own efforts. I argue that the ‘hymn (...) to progress’ reading of B 18 is unjustified by any other aspect of Xenophanes’ thought and at odds with his generally dour view of the intelligence and character of his fellow citizens. A detailed analysis of the fragment supports the view that Xenophanes is here rejecting belief in divine revelation through natural signs and affirming the value of historiê or inquiry in the form of travel and direct observation. (shrink)

An examination of footnotes, quotations, and name-lists shows that historians try to follow the reality rule - to tell about the past the most likely story that can be sustained by the relevant existing evidence. But this is modified by the maximum impact rule - stories must have evocative force, and the reader should actively confront the past. The maximum impact rule may require the historian to sacrifice some completeness and exactness for evocative impact; and there is no parallel to (...) this sacrifice in scientific explanations. History, as it is practiced, is a rule-bound discipline, with rules and a rhetoric different from those of scientific explanation. There is no need for historians to structure their explanations according to the pattern of the sciences. (shrink)

The fragment is preserved in two sources, Clement of Alexandria's Miscellanies, Strom. 5.14.112, which gives the order of words printed above, and Eusebius' Praep. Evang. 13.680c, in which the second line is given as. The latter reading was preferred by Bergk, but there seems at first little reason to prefer one order over the other. I shall return to this issue shortly.

The application of λκθος ànd its derivatives and the Latin terms ampullae and ampullari to the turgid or elevated style of poetry or oratory has provoked such a variety of explanations amongst modern and ancient commentators that it would be a tedious business to examine them all in detail. The ancient commentators on Horace, Ars Poetica, 11. 93–7 interdum tamen et vocem comoedia tollit, iratusque Chremes tumido delitigat ore; et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri Telephus et Peleus, cum pauper et (...) exsul uterque proicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba… were not even in agreement on the question of the precise correspondence of the two words, for while Porphyrion said that proicit ampullas was imitated directly from the ληκθειος Mοcomflex;σα of Callimachus, Pseudacron's note makes no reference to ληκθζειν at all, but merely connects the metaphor with the inflated appearance of the Roman ampulla. And though modern scholars do not question the fact that the two words do correspond in some degree, there has been a wide divergence of opinion on the derivation and meaning of the metaphor. Ritter and Wilkins, for example, held that the meaning ‘paint-pots’ was indicated by the conjunction of ληκθος with pingere in one of Cicero's letters to Atticus, and that in Horace, Epistles 1. 3. 12–14. (shrink)

Les rédacteurs du Code pénal, lorsqu'ils ont décrit l'élément matériel des crimes et des délits, ont pris grand soin de distinguer entre l'omission et la commission punissables, et les juges s'interdisent scrupuleusement de les confondre, même quand elles ont le même résultat dommageable. Pourtant, les personnes investies d'une autorité publique ou privée sont, par la jurisprudence, rendues responsables d'un grand nombre de délits commis sous leur autorité, par le seul motif qu'elles n'ont pas mis tout en oeuvre pour les empêcher. (...) Cet article explique l'origine historique de ce paradoxe. La responsabilité des décideurs était primitivement confinée à la matière des contraventions, conçues comme des violations de règles de police administrative, et sanctionnées de peines faibles précisément dites "de police". Les lois modernes ont peu à peu détruit la spécificité des contraventions et leur lien avec la police administrative. Le mode d'imputation jadis caractéristique des contraventions est passé dans la matière des délits et concerne tous ceux dont l'élément moral est fait d'une intention faiblement caractérisée ou d'une imprudence. (shrink)

Fragment B 18 of Xenophanes is widely regarded as an early expression of a faith in human progress. I believe, however, that we should reconsider this 'progressivist' interpretation. Not only does it lack a firm foothold in the language of Fr. 18, its optimism is out of keeping with virtually everything else Xenophanes is known to have said or thought on the topic of human intelligence. If we had no viable alternative to the 'hymn to progress' reading we might be (...) justified (on the basis of its similarities with later expressions of pride in human achievement) in regarding it as his singular and otherwise inexplicable surge of optimism. But since there is an alternative reading that can be firmly and systematically grounded in Xenophanes' own teachings, then we ought to prefer it over one which fits the fragment only inexactly and fails to correspond with other aspects of his teachings. -/- . (shrink)

In Posterior Analytics II 19 Aristotle likens the way in which sense perception gives rise to knowledge of the universal to the way in which one soldier’s ceasing his flight from the enemy leads other soldiers to do the same ‘heôs epi archên êlthen.’ Although the remark seems intended to characterize knowledge as the end result of an accumulative process, the concluding reference to ‘a starting point’ or archê has no clear meaning. I argue that the phrase can be plausibly (...) understood in light of Aristotle’s explanation of how a single calm thought can spread calm to other thoughts (Problems 917a29-33) and a single cloud can serve as a starting point (archê) for a revival of stormy weather (Problems 941a9-13). In addition, Aristotle elsewhere (e.g. Generation of Animals 788a13-16) speaks of the archê as the person or thing which initiates a process. Thus, when one soldier’s stopping causes another soldier to stop, this process can continue ‘until they come to the one who initiated the process.’ . (shrink)

Is there a place in scientific inquiry for guessing? Jonathan Cohen has recently argued that resorting to guesswork entails a loss of objectivity and regard for evidence which are essential to proper scientific investigation. I assess the merits of Cohen’s view first by taking as a test case Aristotle’s positive view of the role of guesswork (anchinoia) and conjecture (eustochia) in the search for the connections essential to the construction of scientific demonstrations. I then argue contra Cohen that one can (...) usefully employ guesswork while also employing reason; that it is possible to guess either intelligently or mindlessly; and consequently, that the use of guesswork need not represent a diminution in respect for the objectivity essential to scientific investigation. Although I would not claim that guesswork has a role to play in all scientific inquiry, there appear to be some datable instances of the useful and respectable scientific guess. (shrink)

Fragment B 1 of Parmenides describes a youth’s journey to the house of a goddess who enlightens him as to the nature of all things. The task of translating Parmenides’ Greek text is beset with many difficulties, most notably the phrase kata pant’ atê at B 1.3. There, the neuter accusative plural panta (‘all things’) combines with the feminine nominative singular atê (‘heaven sent blindness’) to render translation impossible. Some have proposed emending the text to read astê (‘down to all (...) cities’), understood in connection with the pathway of divine inspiration. Others reject the emendation in so far as the youth is said at B 1.27 to travel ‘far from the beaten path of men.’ I argue in defense of the reading kata pant’ a<s>tê in so far as references to pathways of inspiration and poetic journeys to the cities of men occur frequently in the poetry of Parmenides’ era. (shrink)

Reid’s philosophy is an attempt to describe the operations of the mind. The author is less concerned with objects than with the power or faculty by means of which the mind is furnished with objects. This faculty he calls conception or apprehension or understanding, and he is careful always to distinguish it from the power of judgment by means of which we come to possess belief or knowledge. Much of what is most distinctive in Reid’s philosophy is to be found (...) in his account of these two faculties and of the way in which they are related to each other. (shrink)

In an early poem, "Year's End", Jorge Luis Borges takes the turning of the year as an occasion to consider how "something in us" endures, despite the fact that we are products of "infinite random possibilities" and "droplets in the stream of Heraclitus": It is not the emblematic detail of replacing a two with a three, nor that barren metaphor that brings together a time that dies and another coming up nor yet the rounding out of some astronomical process that (...) stuns and undermines the altiplano1 of this night, and compels us to keep listening for those twelve irreparable tollings of a bell. The true cause is a vague, pervasive apprehension of Time's enigma; a certain awe before the miracle that in spite of... (shrink)