The present study fills a void in research on passion by examining for the first time the role of passion in physiological responses. The aim of the study was to investigate the role of passion, and the mediating role of cognitive appraisals, in the psychological and physiological responses to a stressful situation related to one’s passion. Students, who were passionate for their studies, completed the Passion Scale for their studies and the Cognitive Appraisal Scale. Then, they engaged in an education (...) task under stressful conditions, and a subsequent unrelated leisure task under no-stress. Physiological reactivity was measured throughout the entire session and their perceptions of situational vitality and positive and negative emotions were assessed directly after the education task. Results showed that harmonious passion positively predicted challenge appraisals that, in turn, were positively related to positive emotions, vitality, and positive cardiovascular adaptation while engaging in the stressful education task, but less so with the leisure task. On the other hand, obsessive passion positively predicted threat appraisals. In turn, threat appraisals were positively related to negative emotions, negatively associated with vitality, and not related to cardiovascular reactivity. The present findings suggest that HP creates the onset of an adaptive psychological and physiological response whereas the response is less adaptive with OP. (shrink)

This book is a small handbook designed to give Institutional Review Board (IRB) members the information they need to protect the rights and welfare of research subjects in a way that is both effective and efficient. The chapters of this book are short and to the point. Topic-specific chapters list the criteria IRB members should use to determine how to vote on specific kinds of studies and offer practical advice on what IRB members should do before and during full-committee meetings.

Hans-Georg Gadamer is widely recognized as the leading exponent of philosophical hermeneutics. The essays in this collection examine Gadamer's biography, the core of hermeneutical theory, and the significance of his work for ethics, aesthetics, the social sciences, and theology. There is full consideration of Gadamer's appropriation of Hegel, Heidegger and the Greeks, as well as his relation to modernity, critical theory and poststructuralism.

The risk of stroke for a child with SCD is many times greater than that of a healthy child without SCD or heart disease. There is a technique that allows the identification of the children with SCD who have high risk even within this relatively high-risk group. And there is a highly effective preventive treatment. While this would on the surface appear to be a straightforward medical decision, it is not. One must weigh the benefits of preventing permanent brain damage (...) against the risks of infection from transfused blood, iron overload, which is the result of the frequent transfusions, and rare transfusion reactions. (shrink)

Sickle cell anemia is a disease characterized by abnormal hemoglobin structure. There is a mutation in the beta-globin gene that changes the sixth amino acid from glutamic acid to valine causing the mutated hemoglobin to polymerize reversibly when deoxygenated to form a gelatinous network of fibrous polymers that stiffen and distort the red blood cell membrane. This leads to episodes of microvascular vasoocclusion and premature RBC destruction leading to hemolytic anemia. For reasons that are unclear, some children develop a large (...) artery vasculopathy involving the intracranial arteries supplying the brain.The risk of stroke for a child with SCD is many times greater than that of a healthy child without SCD or heart disease. There is a technique that allows the identification of the children with SCD who have high risk even within this relatively high-risk group. And there is a highly effective preventive treatment. (shrink)

In late September 1838, Darwin read Malthus's Essay on Population, which left him with “a theory by which to work.”115 Yet he waited some twenty years to publish his discovery in the Origin of Species. Those interested in the fine grain of Darwin's development have been curious about this delay. One recent explanation has his hand stayed by fear of reaction to the materialist implications of linking man with animals. “Darwin sensed,” according to Howard Gruber, “that some would object to (...) seeing rudiments of human mentality in animals, while others would recoil at the idea of remnants of animality in man.”116 With this link closed, Darwin hung the materialist chain around his own neck, where it rested most uncomfortably. Stephen Gould, supporting Gruber's argument, finds evidence for this reconstruction in Darwin's M and N notebooks, whichinclude many statements showing that he espoused but feared to expose something he perceived as far more heretical than evolution itself: philosophical materialism-the postulate that matter is the stuff of all existence and that all mental and spiritual phenomena are its by-products. No notion could be more upsetting to the deepest traditions of Western thought than the statement that mind-however complex and powerful-is simply a product of brain.117The proferred hypothesis suggests, then, that Darwin was acutely sensible of the social consequences of equating men with animals and therefore mind with brian, and that he thus shied from publically revealing his views until the intellectual climate became more tolerant.The history I have examined makes this hypothesis implausible. Even if Darwin warily explored the implications of his emerging theory in his notebooks, his subsequent study of Fleming, Wells, Brougham, and Kirby should have quieted any trepidation. If these natural theologians did not flinch at seeing human reason prefigured in the mind of a worm, should Darwin have? Moreover, he recognized in his M notebook that the thesis of evolutionary continuity between men and animals did not require an explicit avowal of his conviction that brain was the agent of thought.118 And in any case, his materialism was of a rather benign sort; at least he so expressed it in an annotation in Abercrombie's Inquiries concerning the Intellectual Powers (1838): “By materialism I mean, merely the intimate connection of thought with form of brain — like kind of attraction with nature of element.”119 This belief would have held little terror for British intellectuals, who were quite familiar — some even comfortable-with Locke's anti-Cartesian argument that there was nothing contradictory in supposing God could make matter to think.120 Finally, even if the intellectual atmosphere of early nineteenth-century Britain were inhospitable to Darwin's brand of materialism, there is little reason to believe he breathed a different air at mid-century while preparing his manuscript.That Darwin should not have feared suspicions of materialism, of course, does not mean that he did not. But I think there were other, more persistent sources of anxiety that kept him from rushing to publish: namely, the several conceptual obstacles he had to overcome if his theory of evolution by natural selection were to be made scientifically acceptable. Prominent among these were the problems surrounding his changing notions of instinct.The inertia of his older ideas about instinct at first made it hard for Darwin to gauge how far the theory of natural selection might be applied to behavior. By the early 1840s he finally felt ready to meet the challenge of the natural theologians by providing a naturalistic explanation for the wonderful instincts of animals. In his “Essays” of 1842 and 1844 one sort of instinct is, however, not considered-that of neuter insects. Yet Darwin seems to have appreciated the difficulties such instincts entailed at least by 1843, when he read Kirby and Spence. He simply required time to work out a solution to a problem he initially perceived as “fatal to my whole theory.” Even while writing the “Species Book” in the summer of 1857, he was still juggling several possible solutions compatible with natural selection. It was only a short time before he actually turned to work on the Origin of Species that he appears to have settled on a single explanation for the difficulties posed by the instincts of worker bees and ants. The force of his theory of community selection snapped the last critical support of the creationist hypothesis and, conveniently enough, also fractured the generalized Lamarckian account of the evolution of behavior. These results were worth waiting for. (shrink)

The sciences of ethology and sociobiology have as premisses that certain dispositions and behavioural patterns have evolved with species and, therefore, that the acts of individual animals and men must be viewed in light of innate determinates. These ideas are much older than the now burgeoning disciplines of the biology of behaviour. Their elements were fused in the early constructions of evolutionary theory, and they became integral parts of the developing conception. Historians, however, have usually neglected close examination of the (...) role behaviour has played in the rise of evolutionary thought. (shrink)

WITHIN the current discussion of political theory one of the most prominent voices remains that of Hannah Arendt. Her principal work, The Human Condition, attempts to revive a classical Aristotelian view of human action and politics. Recently we have been posthumously provided with her provocative reconstruction of Kant's political philosophy. Her concern with Kant is none other than to urge Kant as the basis for a revival of an appropriate political theory. Because I am largely sympathetic with what Arendt would (...) have an adequate political theory provide, I contest the appropriateness of Kant for such a purpose. I do not reject Kant out of hand, as for example Alasdair MacIntyre recently did in After Virtue. Nor do I accept, as will be apparent below, his rather standard criticisms of Kant. Yet Arendt gives us the wrong reasons to turn to Kant. (shrink)

Aquinas’s Disputed Questions on Truth (De veritate) are perhaps his most sustained examination of the implication that being is fundamentally and intrinsically intelligible and desirable, i.e., that “true” and “good” are transcendental terms convertible with “being.” I argue that the primary implication that Aquinas draws from this principle is that material creatures are not only intrinsically true and good, but that, in being so, they mediate a personal reality insofar as material creatures mediate the ideas and desires of a divine, (...) creative mind and will to created minds and wills, for an infinite and perfect mind must be the transcendent ground or cause of the transcendental properties of being. So, just as creatures are inherently true and good, the created world is inherently inter-personal: all creatures, insofar as they exist, are inherently oriented towards communicating the mind and will of their Creator—not in actuality, but in potentiality, for the world becomes actually inter-personal only to the degree that the truth of its Creator is known by faith. This is so because the virtue of faith orients our minds and wills to Christ as the ground of the interpersonal nature of the world; but it also actualizes and perfects our intellects and wills by revealing that the mystery of the transcendent ground of truth and goodness is analogous to the mystery of the incarnate person. (shrink)

Reason and revelation in the Middle Ages -- What is decisive about Averroes's decisive treatise? -- Is revelation really necessary? Revelation and the intellect in Averroes and Al-Ghazali -- Law, covenant, and intellect in Moses Maimonides's guide of the perplexed -- Natura as Creatura: Aquinas on nature as implicit revelation -- Why does the unity of the intellect become such a burning issue in medieval thought? Aquinas on human knowing as incarnate knowing -- Aquinas on revelation as incarnate divine intellect (...) -- The rationality of revelation in three traditions. (shrink)

August Boeckh, in his Encyclopedia and Methodology of the Philological Sciences provides an account of the methodology of philology (or what otherwise might be called methodological hermeneutics) that is the culmination of the development of the science of philology in the nineteenth century. Boeckh importantly defines philology in relation to philosophy and to history. Philosophy is the knowledge of the truth, gnosis, while philology is the knowledge of what has been known, anagnosis. Boeckh's hermeneutics provide the background for much of (...) the theory and practice of the twentieth and twentieth‐first centuries. Those who have looked for method in hermeneutics have looked to Boeckh. Those, like Hans‐Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, who have been critical of the methodologism and scientism in nineteenth‐century hermeneutics, have often considered Boeckh a leading example of these features which they would overcome. (shrink)

Authority, in its origin is a political concept, has largely maintained its political character in its most common and prominent usage. Etymologically “authority” is Latin: auctoritas. Perhaps the single most influential and important analysis of authority in the modern context has been provided by Max Weber who identifies Autorität with Herrschaft, domination (or, more traditionally and literally, lordship) and Herrschaft with Macht (power). Weber's account of Herrschaft provides for three kinds: traditional, legal‐rational, and charismatic. Weber's account has been taken up (...) and sometimes slightly modified in sociology, political theory, philosophy, and literature in almost every language. Gadamer's rehabilitation of authority is closely tied to his attempt to similarly rehabilitate prejudice and tradition. These three concepts are closely related. The concept of the mens auctoris (the mind of the author) as the ultimate principle of interpretation of final authority goes back at least to the Renaissance, if not long before. (shrink)

With the publication of two books and a series of articles in the late 1960s and 1970s, E. D. Hirsch Jr. established himself as a major voice in the debates about interpretation and literary criticism. Against the mainstream, he proposed and defended an “objectivist” hermeneutics. His voice has remained alive in the debates as the proponent of objectivity in interpretation. As the title of his major book on hermeneutics, Validity in Interpretation (1976), suggests, Hirsch's primary concern is the validation of (...) an interpretation. According to Hirsch, validation is one of two sides of the interpretive process. The first step of any interpretation is guessing at its meaning. Hirsch's genial guess was Schleiermacher's divination. In the course of his discussion of genre, to clarify his view of interpretation, Hirsch mentions Emilio Betti's classification of three types of interpretation: re‐cognitive (historical and literary), presentational (dramatic and musical), and normative (legal and religious). (shrink)

IN 1926 IN THE RELATIVE ISOLATION of his hut in the Black Forest Martin Heidegger completed writing the first portion of his influential Being and Time. In the same year at Kenyon College, Ohio, John Dewey delivered a public set of lectures that became The Public and Its Problems. Both were published the following year in 1927. These two books are obviously quite different in topic, style, occasion, and language. Being and Time is a systematic work of fundamental ontology, while (...) The Public and Its Problems is a topical set of lectures in political theory. If we are to look for the basis of a political theory in Heidegger's work, however, we must notice the central negative significance of the concept of "the public" in his account of our everyday life. While Heidegger attacks the dictatorship of the public in contemporary affairs, Dewey in his lectures seeks to revivify the public on behalf of democracy in response to Walter Lippman's decrying its eclipse. (shrink)