L’article vise à montrer les difficultés théoriques que soulève l’interprétation de Leibniz proposée par Jon Elster. L’analogie entre l’entrepreneur capitaliste et le Dieu leibnizien, pour séduisante qu’elle soit, apparaît fragile sinon superficielle. La conclusion évoque la nécessité de réintroduire le point de vue du « consommateur » pour définir l’ optimum à atteindre, en esquissant un parallèle entre la théorie de l’équilibre général et la théodicée.

¿Qué es lo que hace, según Leibniz, que se pueda decir que nuestro mundo es el mejor posible? Varias interpretaciones, no siempre posibles de conciliar, se han propuesto. Sería el mejor porque en ese mundo las criaturas razonables obtendrían la mayor felicidad, o por cuanto realizaría la mayor cantidad de ser y realidad a nivel total, o incluso porque sería el que asocia las leyes más simples con los fenómenos más ricos y variados. El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar (...) que lo mejor ha de comprenderse en el sentido del método de Formis optimis, es decir, como lo que remite, en un genero dado, a la forma más determinada, la cual es a la vez única y la más racional. Así, la perfección del mundo no resulta de que concentraría la mayor cantidad de esencia y bien, sino de que constituye el orden más inteligible, donde cada cosa, sin ser forzosamente la más perfecta en sí misma, contribuye no obstante a la armonía universal, a saber, a la unidad de una multiplicidad que cumple mejor los fines divinos. For Leibniz, what makes our world be the best? Several interpretations not always compatible have been proposed. It would be the best, insofar as it would maximize the happiness of reasonable creatures, or insofar as it would achieve the largest quantity of being and reality as a whole, or insofar as it would combine the simplest laws with the richest and most varied phenomena. The aim of this paper is to show that the best is to be understood in the sense of the method de Formis optimis, as what refers, for a given sort of things, to the most determined form, which is both unique and the most rational one. Thus, the perfection of the world does not result from its containing the largest quantity of essence and of good, but from its forming the most intelligible order, in which every single thing, without being necessarily the best in itself, nevertheless contributes to the universal harmony, that is to the unity of a manifold fulfilling the divine ends in the best possible way. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a natureza do cosmopolitismo leibniziano e os fundamentos sobre os quais ele repousa. Procura-se resolver a aparente contradição entre, por um lado, a defesa de um cosmopolitismo científico e teológico-moral e, por outro, um certo “realismo” político, orientado pelo conhecimento preciso das relações internacionais, com a consideração dos interesses particulares dos Estados e a preocupação de preservar o “equilíbrio da Europa”. O artigo busca mostrar como esse cosmopolitismo não implica uma rejeição, por princípio, da (...) guerra nem a adesão ao projeto do abade de Saint-Pierre de instaurar uma paz perpétua. (shrink)

Paul Rateau traces the genesis and development of G.W. Leibniz's treatment of the problem of evil, from his earliest writings through the Essays on Theodicy (1710). By investigating Leibniz's early thinking about what evil is and where it comes from, Rateau reveals the deeply original nature of Leibniz's later work and the challenges it raises. Rateau explores the ways in which the Theodicy's theoretical project, which integrates numerous disciplines and various argumentative strategies, informs and is influenced (...) by two more practical aims-justifying the end of denominational divisions between Catholics and Protestants, and inculcating "true piety" in believers. By paying equal attention to both Leibniz's intellectual and personal development, Rateau offers a holistic view of Leibniz's most profound and sophisticated work of philosophy. Rateau shows how the young Leibniz moves from suggesting that the author of evil is God himself to later defending an original theory of necessitarianism (in The Confession of a Philosopher), which makes God the first link in the chain of beings that constitute the world, but which ultimately denies God's responsibility for sin. By examining Leibniz's theoretical development after 1673, he demonstrates how Leibniz comes to a revised framework that forms the basis for the project of theodicy. After having examined the defensive and the doctrinal aspects of the Theodicy, Rateau shows how human freedom can be reconciled with divine freedom in Leibniz's system. Newly translated from the original French edition, Rateau's book offers a novel and important new interpretation of Leibniz and will appeal to scholars both of Leibniz and of early modern thought generally. (shrink)

By making monads the “basic particulars” of his “system”, Leibniz offers a competing and rival metaphysics to that defended by Strawson in Individuals. The aim of the paper by Paul Rateau “Strawson and its Critique of Monads” is to show that the criticisms raised by the British philosopher in Chapter IV of his book, are based on two questionable interpretations: the assimilation of the complete notion of an individual substance to an exhaustive description in general terms, and the (...) reduction of a monad to pure consciousness. The aim is also to reply to the criticism that Leibniz introduced extra-logical considerations into his treatment of the question of individuation. (shrink)

Dans la « Drôle de pensée touchant une nouvelle sorte de représentations », rédigée à Paris en septembre 1675, Leibniz envisage de transformer la capitale française en un grand musée des savoirs, des arts et des métiers. Il rêve d’en faire un gigantesque lieu d’exposition des connaissances et des inventions, un laboratoire d’expérimentations, où seraient également donnés spectacles, jeux et divertissements. Le texte a été écrit à la suite de la représentation d’une machine servant à marcher sur l’eau, à laquelle (...) a assisté le philosophe. En identifiant cette machine à une lanquerre, l’article propose de réinterpréter le contenu et le but du projet esquissé dans la « Drôle de pensée ». (shrink)

En commençant les Essais de Théodicée par un Discours de la conformité de la foi avec la raison, Leibniz montrait que l'enjeu fondamental de sa confrontation avec Bayle était l'unité de la vérité. Pour produire un discours rationnel sur Dieu, ses attributs, sa providence, il était indispensable de répondre à celui qui disqualifiait par avance tout essai de justification de Dieu par la raison, en affirmant son impuissance radicale à établir des vérités solides et son divorce d'avec la foi. L'opposition (...) entre les deux auteurs est révélatrice de deux conceptions distinctes de la raison, de la nature du mystère religieux et de la connaissance que nous pouvons en avoir. Deux interprétations du « triomphe de la foi » apparaissent : l'une qui fait de la soumission à la parole révélée l'acte « raisonnable » du chrétien conséquent, l'autre qui n'y voit que le succès de la raison elle-même, triomphant des « apparences ». By starting the Essays of Theodicy with a Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason,, Leibniz showed that the fundamental issue of his confrontation with Bayle was the unity of truth. To produce a rational discourse on God, His attributes, and His providence, it was essential to respond to him rejected in advance through any attempt to prove God reason, affirming reason's radical inability to establish solid truths and its divorce from faith. The opposition between the two authors reveals two distinct conceptions of reason, of the nature of religious mystery and of the knowledge that we may have of all this. Two interpretations of the « triumph of faith » become apparent: for one, submission to the revealed word is the « reasonable » act of the consistent Christian, whereas for the other there is nothing to be seen but the success of reason itself -victorious over all « appearances ». (shrink)

Leibniz admet la thèse de la création continuée. Le but de cet article est de montrer les raisons pour lesquelles, à ses yeux, les tentatives de Descartes et de Weigel pour s’en servir comme preuve de l’existence de Dieu ont échoué et ce qui, dans sa propre métaphysique, empêche l’élaboration d’une démonstration pleinement satisfaisante sur son fondement. Il n’est pas sûr en effet que Leibniz soit parvenu à concilier parfaitement la nécessité de la dépendance permanente des créatures à l’égard de (...) leur créateur – qui requiert son action continuelle – et l’exigence de l’autonomie causale des substances finies. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é explicar o sentido da tese do melhor dos mundos possíveis. Para Leibniz, o melhor deve ser compreendido no sentido do método de Formis optimis, isto é, como o que reenvia, em um gênero dado, à forma a mais determinada. Essa última é a um só tempo única e a mais racional. Assim, a perfeição do mundo não resulta do fato de que ele concentraria a maior quantidade de essência ou de bem (perfeição quantitativa), mas (...) do fato de que ele constitui a ordem a mais inteligível, na qual cada coisa, sem ser necessariamente a mais perfeita em si mesma, contribui, no entanto, com a harmonia universal, ou seja, a unidade de uma multiplicidade que preenche da melhor maneira possível os fins divinos (perfeição qualitativa).Abstract:The aim of this paper is to explain the significance of Leibniz's thesis of the best possible world. For Leibniz, the best is to be understood in the sense of the method de Formis optimis, as what refers, for a given sort of things, to the most determined form, which is both unique and the most rational one. Thus, the perfection of the world does not result from its containing the largest quantity of essence and of good (quantitative perfection), but from its forming the most intelligible order, in which every single thing, without being necessarily the best in itself, nevertheless contributes to the universal harmony, that is to the unity of a manifold fulfilling the divine ends in the best possible way (qualitative perfection). (shrink)

L'affirmation de l'existence du meilleur des mondes possibles est l'une des thèses leibniziennes les plus connues et sans doute l'une des plus mal comprises. Cet ouvrage en explique le sens, montre sur quels fondements théoriques elle repose et envisage ses implications sur les plans métaphysique et moral.

Résumé Qu’est-ce qui fait, selon Leibniz, que notre monde peut être dit le meilleur possible? Plusieurs interprétations, qu’il n’est pas toujours possible de concilier, ont été proposées. Il serait le meilleur, parce qu’en lui les créatures raisonnables obtiendraient le plus de félicité, parce qu’il réaliserait la plus grande quantité d’être et de réalité au total, ou encore parce qu’il serait celui qui associe les lois les plus simples avec les phénomènes les plus riches et les plus variés. L’objet de cet (...) article est de montrer que le meilleur est à comprendre au sens de la méthode de Formis optimis, c’est-à-dire comme ce qui renvoie, dans un genre donné, à la forme la plus déterminée. Celle-ci est à la fois unique et la plus rationnelle. Ainsi, la perfection du monde ne vient pas de ce qu’il concentrerait la plus grande quantité d’essence et de bien (perfection quantitative), mais de ce qu’il constitue l’ordre le plus intelligible, où chaque chose, sans être forcément la plus parfaite en elle-même, contribue pourtant à l’harmonie universelle, cette unité d’une multiplicité qui remplit au mieux les fins divines (perfection qualitative ). (shrink)

Les textes reunis dans ce volume visent a combler une importante lacune : l'absence d'etude d'ampleur consacree specifiquement aux relations entre Pierre Bayle et Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, permettant d'evaluer l'influence qu'ils ont exercee l'un sur l'autre, par leurs ecrits et leurs echanges, directs et indirects.Le but est de confronter ces deux philosophes majeurs du XVIIe siecle, en cherchant a depasser l'opposition reductrice entre scepticisme d'un cote et rationalisme dogmatique de l'autre. L'etude de leurs rapports montre les differentes etapes et la (...) fecondite de leurs echanges : d'abord autour de la critique de la physique de Descartes, ensuite a propos du « systeme de l'harmonie preetablie » defendu par Leibniz mais critique par Bayle dans son Dictionnaire historique et critique, enfin au sujet du rapport entre foi et raison, du probleme du mal et de la justification de Dieu. (shrink)

Central to this volume are two philosophical powerhouses of the early modern period: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Pierre Bayle. Born in, respectively, 1646 and 1647, both made for an astonishing career in a variety of scholarly disciplines and reached, if not equal, then certainly comparable fame in the course of their lives. Nowadays, Bayle's reputation is eclipsed by that of Leibniz, who is the focus of yearly conferences and libraries of scholarship, while Bayle had to await the later twentieth century (...) to be rediscovered. He has since been at the center of a quickly expanding body of scholarship, which continues to be sharply divided over the vexed question how to interpret his religious stance.This imbalance... (shrink)

L'affirmation de l'existence du meilleur des mondes possibles est l'une des thèses leibniziennes les plus connues et sans doute l'une des plus mal comprises. Cet ouvrage en explique le sens, montre sur quels fondements théoriques elle repose et envisage ses implications sur les plans métaphysique et moral. The affirmation of the existence of the best of all possible worlds is one of Leibniz's best known and doubtless least understood theses. This work explains what it means, shows what theoretical foundations it (...) rests on, and considers its implications on the metaphysical and moral level. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

Paul Thom's book presents Kilwardby's science of logic as a body of demonstrative knowledge about inferences and their validity, about the semantics of non-modal and modal propositions, and about the logic of genus and species. This science is thoroughly intensional. It grounds the logic of inference on "that in virtue of which" the inference holds. It bases the truth conditions of propositions on relations between conceptual entities. It explains the logic of genus and species through the notion of essence. (...) Thom interprets this science as a formal logic of intensions with its own proof theory and semantics. This comprehensive reconstruction of Kilwardby's logic shows the medieval master to be one of the most interesting logicians of the thirteenth century. (shrink)

De milieuproblematiek staat pas sinds kort op de agenda als een fenomeen dat de mensheid bedreigt. Toch blijkt het negentiende-eeuwse gedachtegoed van Karl Marx verrassende inzichten te bieden om deze actuele problemen te duiden. Marx laat zien dat het menselijk ingrijpen in de natuur leidt tot zelfvervreemding: de mens ondermijnt zijn bestaan als een wezen dat zelf deel uitmaakt van de natuur. Deze zelfvervreemding cumuleert in de kapitalistische samenleving. Marx lezend zien we dat de milieuproblematiek geen historische vergissing is, maar (...) fundamenteel samenhangt met de mens als redelijk wezen. Onze beheersingsrede heeft geleid tot de vervreemding van de natuur. Toch geeft dezelfde rede die de mens de vrijheid biedt zich boven het ecologische evenwicht te verheffen, hem de mogelijkheid zich te verzoenen met de natuur. Marx verwijst naar dit dubbele gezicht van de rede als hij stelt dat het 'rijk van de vrijheid' in de schoot van het kapitalisme wordt geboren. In dit boek onderzoekt Paul Cobben welke aanzetten de huidige samenleving biedt om vorm te geven aan de verzoening met de natuur. Paul Cobben is emeritus hoogleraar geschiedenis van de moderne filosofie aan Tilburg University. Momenteel is hij gastonderzoeker aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam en redacteur van de serie 'Critical Studies in German Idealism'. Van zijn hand verscheen o.a. 'Value in Capitalist Society. Rethinking Marx's Criticism of Capitalism' (2015)."-- Publisher information. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

The Renaissance was a period of great intellectual change and innovation as philosophers rediscovered the philosophy of classical antiquity and passed it on to the modern age. Renaissance philosophy is distinct both from the medieval scholasticism, based on revelation and authority, and from philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who transformed it into new philosophical systems. Despite the importance of the Renaissance to the development of philosophy over time, it has remained largely understudied by historians of philosophy and professional (...) philosophers. This anthology aims to correct this by providing scholars and students of philosophy with representative translations of the most important philosophers of the Renaissance. Its purpose is to help readers appreciate philosophy in the Renaissance and its importance in the history of philosophy. The anthology includes translations from philosophers from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and it ranges from works on moral and political philosophy, to metaphysics, epistemology, and natural philosophy, thereby providing historians and students of philosophy with a sense for the nature, breadth, and complexity of philosophy in the Renaissance. Each translation is accompanied by an introduction by a historian of Renaissance philosophy, as well as select secondary sources, in order to encourage further study. (shrink)

In this work, Paul Bartha proposes a normative theory of analogical arguments and raises questions and proposes answers regarding the criteria for evaluating analogical arguments, the philosophical justification for analogical reasoning, and the place of scientific analogies in the context of theoretical confirmation.

The present collection brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers.

By Parallel Reasoning is the first comprehensive philosophical examination of analogical reasoning in more than forty years designed to formulate and justify standards for the critical evaluation of analogical arguments. It proposes a normative theory with special focus on the use of analogies in mathematics and science. In recent decades, research on analogy has been dominated by computational theories whose objective has been to model analogical reasoning as a psychological process. These theories have devoted little attention to normative questions. In (...) this book Bartha proposes that a good analogical argument must articulate a clear relationship that is capable of generalization. This idea leads to a set of distinct models for the critical analysis of prominent forms of analogical argument. The same core principle makes it possible to relate analogical reasoning to norms and values of scientific practice. Reasoning by analogy is justified because it strikes an optimal balance between conservative values, such as simplicity and coherence, and progressive values, such as fruitfulness and theoretical unification. Analogical arguments are also justified by appeal to symmetry--like cases are to be treated alike. In elaborating the connection between analogy and these broad epistemic principles, By Parallel Reasoning offers a novel contribution to explaining how analogies can play an important role in the confirmation of scientific hypotheses. (shrink)

Paul Abela presents a powerful, experience-sensitive form of realism about the relation between mind and world, based on an innovative interpretation of Kant. Abela breaks with tradition in taking seriously Kant's claim that his Transcendental Idealism yields a form of empirical realism, and giving a realist analysis of major themes of the Critique of Pure Reason. Abela's blending of Kantian scholarship with contemporary epistemology offers a new way of resolving philosophical debates about realism.

Immanuel Kant claims that transcendental idealism yields a form of realism at the empirical level. Polite silence might best describe the reception this assertion has garnered among even sympathetic interpreters. This book challenges that prejudice, offering a controversial presentation and rehabilitation of Kant's empirical realism that places his realist credentials at the centre of the account of representation he offers in the Critique of Pure Reason. This interpretation ranges over the major themes contained in the Analytic of Principles and relevant (...) portions of the Dialectic. Kant's analysis of the conditions necessary for determinate representation is shown to involve a realist understanding of the relation of mind and world. The realist character of Kant's account of empirical truth, and his commitment to the unity of nature, are defended against competing empiricist, pragmatist, and methodological readings. This title links Kant studies to contemporary philosophical debates, and will appeal to scholars and students of Kant, as well as epistemologists, metaphysicians, and philosophers of science interested in a powerful, experience-sensitive, form of realism. (shrink)

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented 'crisis in the foundations of mathematics', featuring a world-famous paradox, a challenge to 'classical' mathematics from a world-famous mathematician, a new foundational school, and the profound incompleteness results of Kurt Gödel. In the same period, the cross-fertilization of mathematics and philosophy resulted in a new sort of 'mathematical philosophy', associated most notably with Bertrand Russell, W. V. Quine, and Gödel himself, and which remains at the focus of Anglo-Saxon philosophical discussion. The present collection (...) brings together in a convenient form the seminal articles in the philosophy of mathematics by these and other major thinkers. It is a substantially revised version of the edition first published in 1964 and includes a revised bibliography. The volume will be welcomed as a major work of reference at this level in the field. (shrink)