This is a collection of the most important writings of Oxford philosopher H.H. Price on the topics of psychical research and survival of death, collected from a wide variety of sources unavailable to most interested readers. Included are discussions of telepathy, clairvoyance, telekinesis, precognition, hauntings and apparitions, the impact of psychical research on western philosophy and science, and what afterlife is probably like. Few twentieth century English-speaking philosophers have written much on these topics. Of those who did so and (...) whose writings have not been collected and published in a single source, H.H. Price was the most important. (shrink)

Henry Habberley Price, who published as H. H. Price, was born in 1899. From 1935 to 1959 he was Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford University. Price was a major figure in his lifetime well-known especially for the “clarity and elegance of style”, which, according to Martha Kneale (1996: xix), make his works readable in spite of changing fashions in philosophy. Many people’s acquaintance nowadays with Price’s philosophical work derives from his being a target in (...) Austin’s (1962) famous attack on the sense-datum theory. This restricted acquaintance with his output is one reason that Price has been ignored in recent philosophy. -/- Mainstream philosophy neglected him after the Second World War, perhaps partly because, when articulating his ideas, he mainly engaged with philosophers of the past, such as Locke and Hume. His thought was, however, valued by fellow philosophers such as Broad, Moore, Ayer, and generations of his students at Oxford, including Sellars, Armstrong, and Anscombe. -/- Although Price is seen mainly as a philosopher of perception, only two of his six books are about perception and he had a major influence, also publishing many articles, on a variety of topics, including some we cannot focus on here, e.g., our evidence of other minds (1938; 1930b: 195) and psychical research (1940c; 1953b; 1972; 1995; an interest he claims to share with Neo-Platonists [1968a: 447]). We can only provide a sketch of his rich contributions. After briefly sketching his life (§1), we discuss his philosophy’s general features (§2), contributions to the studies of perception (§3), properties (§5.1), recognition (§5), belief (§6), religious belief (§6.8), his revival and serious study of Hume (§4), and some remarkable anticipations (§7). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 149 On the other hand, "a history which were only a lofty generalisation would go astray in pure speculation and would deduce its content from principles without making sure that the bulk of facts produced in reality could find its proper place within its frame" (ibid.). Hence, between the anecdotic and fantastic, history asserts its own exigencies, which are authenticity and intelligibility expressed in a true system (...) of human evolution. In the last chapter of Part I, Callot makes interesting observations concerning the problem of prevision or prediction in history. He mentions two types, the long4erm and the shortterm type, which he calls the type of prediction on the basis of history of philosophy, and the type of prediction on a sociological basis, respectively (p. 216). As is well known, Hegel developed his dialectical method in a constructive critique of Kant's doctrine of antinomies. In his Encyclopgdie, he observes that Kant's discovery of the inevitability of antinomies is "one of the most important and profound developments in modern philosophy." This association of ideas invites certainly to a further constructive critique and should be discussed in a book whose main subject is the antinomies in history. Furthermore, Marx's contribution to the development of dialectic and, in particular, his doctrine of "contradictions " as presented in Capital is far too important to be passed over in silence. The connection between Marxian dialectic and the Correspondence principle in physics (Bohr), to which Callot seems to refer on page 264, is so obvious that it should not be neglected in a book which otherwise bears testimony of erudition and intrepidity. I quite agree with Fernand Braudel that the author owes us another volume where the thinking of Marx and his historiographical descendants up to Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique is closely scrutinized. By taking such a step, Callot would probably create a still more suitable basis for the discussion of the problems of history of philosophy and science, of which he, in Part II of the book, gives an instructive and lengthy report. JOHANNES WI~-HANSEN University of Copenhagen BOOK NOTES New Editions Pierre Bayle, Oeuvres diverses, I. Avec une introduction par Elisabeth Labrousse. Hildesheim, C~eorge Olms, Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964. xx -{- 760 pp. Subscription price per volume, DM 118. (Individual volumes, DM 148.) In view of the revival of interest in Pierre Bayle's thought and influence, it is fortunate that this excellent photoreproduction edition of his Oeuvres diverses, which have been so difficult to obtain, will now again be available. The four volumes, published first in 1727, bring together all of Bayle's works other than the Dictionnaire historique et critique, plus many of his letters. The present photoreproduetion edition will include all the works except the letters, since a new edition, including a very large number of those not in the Oeuvres diverses is now being prepared by a group of scholars under the direction of Madame Labrousse for the International Archives of the History of Ideas series. The first volume consists of the issues of the Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres during Bayle's editorship, from its inception in 1684, until Bayle withdrew because of illness in 1687. Madame Labrousse, in her fine Introduction, discusses the history of this journalistic venture, and its importance in European intellectual history. The flight of so many French refugees to the Netherlands made it possible to set up a journal in Holland, written in French, that would review works in theology, philosophy, natural science, mathematics, history, etc. The capital, the publisher, the printers, the author and most of the readers were all refugees from Louis XIu persecutions. Bayle, while teaching philosophy at the ]~cole illustre of Rotterdam and writing some of his famous works, like the Ce que c'est la France toute catholique and Commentaire philosophique, undertook to review what was going on in the Republic of Letters. His objectivity, erudition, wit, and critical ability made the effort a success, and led to the series of other efforts, such as Jean Le Clerc's Bibliotheque choisie, and Henri Basnage de Beauval's Histoire des ouvrages des Sgavans. Bayle discussed the issues of the day--the... (shrink)

Interdisciplinary work is intractable because the search for knowledge in different fields entails different interests, and thereby different values too; and the different possibilities of knowledge about different subjects also lead to different epistemologies. Thus differ ences among practitioners of the various disciplines are pervasive and aptly described as cultural ones, and interdisciplinary work requires transcending unconscious habits of thought. The more those unconscious habits are explicated and the more we under stand how the disparate characteristics of the various intellectual (...) cultures are related to the necessarily different interests, values, and epistemologies, the more feasible becomes the goal of transcending thought habits. Two sorts of interdisciplinary effort seem to have been successful: specific, delimited problems have been solved by teams in what is actually multidisciplinary rather than interdisciplinary work, and new disciplines have sprung up at the intersections of existing ones. STS fits neither of those patterns. Can it nevertheless be viable? (shrink)

A major challenge for The Cancer Genome Atlas (TCGA) Project is solving the high level of genetic and epigenetic heterogeneity of cancer. For the majority of solid tumors, evolution patterns are stochastic and the end products are unpredictable, in contrast to the relatively predictable stepwise patterns classically described in many hematological cancers. Further, it is genome aberrations, rather than gene mutations, that are the dominant factor in generating abnormal levels of system heterogeneity in cancers. These features of cancer could significantly (...) reduce the impact of the sequencing approach, as it is only when mutated genes are the main cause of cancer that directly sequencing them is justified. Many biological factors (genetic and epigenetic variations, metabolic processes) and environmental influences can increase the probability of cancer formation, depending on the given circumstances. The common link between these factors is the stochastic genome variations that provide the driving force behind the cancer evolutionary process within multiple levels of a biological system. This analysis suggests that cancer is a disease of probability and the most‐challenging issue to the TCGA project, as well as the development of general strategies for fighting cancer, lie at the conceptual level. BioEssays 29:783–794, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This book discusses the ways in which science, the touchstone of reliable knowledge in modern society, changed dramatically in the second half of the 20th century, becoming less trustworthy through excessive competitiveness and conflicts of interest.

Modern biology has been heavily influenced by the gene‐centric concept. Paradoxically, this very concept – on which bioresearch is based – is challenged by the success of gene‐based research in terms of explaining evolutionary theory. To overcome this major roadblock, it is essential to establish new theories, to not only solve the key puzzles presented by the gene‐centric concept, but also to provide a conceptual framework that allows the field to grow. This paper discusses a number of paradoxes and illustrates (...) how they can be addressed by the genome‐centric concept in order to further resynthesize evolutionary theory. In particular, methodological breakthroughs that analyze genome evolution are discussed. The multiple interactions among different levels of a complex system provide the key to understanding the relationship between self‐organization and natural selection. Darwinian natural selection applies to the biological level due to its unique genetic and heterogeneous features, but does not simply or directly apply to either the lower non‐living level or higher intellectual society level. At the complex bio‐system level, the genome context (the entire package of genes and their genomic physical relationship or genomic topology), not the individual genes, defines the system and serves as the principle selection platform for evolution. (shrink)

Fluorescent in situ hybridization technology is one of the most exciting and versatile research tools to be developed in recent years. It has enabled research to progress at a phenomenal rate in diverse areas of basic research as well as in clinical medicine. Fluorescent in situ hybridization has applications in physical mapping, the study of nuclear architecture and chromatin packaging, and the investigation of fundamental principles of biology such as DNA replication, RNA processing, gene amplification, gene integration and chromatin elimination. (...) This review highlights some of these areas and provides source material for the reader who seeks more information on a specific field. (shrink)

In recent philosophy of mathematics avariety of writers have presented ``structuralist''views and arguments. There are, however, a number ofsubstantive differences in what their proponents take``structuralism'' to be. In this paper we make explicitthese differences, as well as some underlyingsimilarities and common roots. We thus identifysystematically and in detail, several main variants ofstructuralism, including some not often recognized assuch. As a result the relations between thesevariants, and between the respective problems theyface, become manifest. Throughout our focus is onsemantic and metaphysical issues, (...) including what is orcould be meant by ``structure'' in this connection. (shrink)

Epistemologists have not usually had much to say about believing ‘in’, though ever since Plato's time they have been interested in believing ‘that’. Students of religion, on the other hand, have been greatly concerned with belief ‘in’, and many of them, I think, would maintain that it is something quite different from belief ‘that’. Surely belief ‘in’ is an attitude to a person, whether human or divine, while belief ‘that’ is just an attitude to a proposition? Could any difference be (...) more obvious than this? And if we over-look it, shall we not be led into a quite mistaken analysis of religious belief, at any rate if it is religious belief of the theistic sort? On this view belief ‘in’ is not a propositional attitude at all. (shrink)