The young Canadian philosopher, George John Blewett, stood at the matrices of idealism at the turn of the century, and was so highly regarded that in 1910 he was invited by Boston University to succeed the eminent personalist, Borden Parker Bowne. Yet his name is virtually unknown. He studied in the classrooms of four idealists in the tradition of Wilhelm Wundt. Josiah Royce was one of his dissertation readers when he received his doctoral degree from Harvard University. He spent two (...) terms at Oxford under Edward Caird, and his two books were regarded at the time as first-rate contributions to the literature of idealism. My purpose in this paper is to introduce George Blewett as an important figure in the history of North American idealism, to set out briefly the range and major insights of his work, and to make public for the first time several pieces of private correspondence related to the Boston offer. (shrink)

The young Canadian philosopher, George John Blewett, stood at the matrices of idealism at the turn of the century, and was so highly regarded that in 1910 he was invited by Boston University to succeed the eminent personalist, Borden Parker Bowne. Yet his name is virtually unknown. He studied in the classrooms of four idealists in the tradition of Wilhelm Wundt. Josiah Royce was one of his dissertation readers when he received his doctoral degree from Harvard University. He spent two (...) terms at Oxford under Edward Caird, and his two books were regarded at the time as first-rate contributions to the literature of idealism. My purpose in this paper is to introduce George Blewett as an important figure in the history of North American idealism, to set out briefly the range and major insights of his work, and to make public for the first time several pieces of private correspondence related to the Boston offer. (shrink)

The author examines three fundamental concepts: existence, a priori knowledge, and value. These concepts have been recurrent concerns of western philosophy and also reveal important similarities and differences between the movements from which the author takes his departure.

R W K Paterson; Towards an Axiology of Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 91–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

R W K Paterson; Towards an Axiology of Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 91–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

The years between 1833 and 1945 fundamentally transformed science’s understanding of the body’s inner senses, revolutionizing fields like philosophy, the social sciences, and cognitive science. In How We Became Sensorimotor, Mark Paterson provides a systematic account of this transformative period, while also demonstrating its substantial implications for current explorations into phenomenology, embodied consciousness, the extended mind, and theories of the sensorimotor, the body, and embodiment. -/- Each chapter of How We Became Sensorimotor takes a particular sense and historicizes its (...) formation by means of recent scientific studies, case studies, or coverage in the media. Ranging among a diverse array of sensations, including balance, fatigue, pain, the “muscle sense,” and what Maurice Merleau-Ponty termed “motricity,” Paterson’s analysis moves outward from the familiar confines of the laboratory to those of the industrial world and even to wild animals and their habitats. He uncovers important stories, such as how forgotten pain measurement schemes transformed criminology, or how Penfield’s outmoded concepts of the sensory and motor homunculi of the brain still mar psychology textbooks. -/- Complete with original archival research featuring illustrations and correspondence, How We Became Sensorimotor shows how the shifting and sometimes contested historical background to our understandings of the senses are being extended even today. (shrink)

I discuss aspects of Freudian theory that have entered folk psychology.

The God of the Machine presents an original theory of history and a bold defense of individualism as the source of moral and political progress.

This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.

Experiments are actions, performed in order to gain information. Like other acts, there are virtues of performing them well. I discuss one virtue of experimentation, that of knowing how to trade its information-gaining potential against other goods.

I consider Glimcher's claim to have given an account of mental functioning that is at once neurological and decision-theoretical. I am skeptical, but remark on some good ideas of Glimcher's.

ABSTRACT R. P. Wolff has argued that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the distinguishing mark of every state, viz. supreme authority over all its citizens, and the primary obligation of rational beings, viz. to act autonomously by taking moral responsibility for all of their actions. Utilitarian and consent theories which seek to justify the state's claim to possess a monopoly of the rightful use of force are shown to fail and the concept of a ‘legitimate state’to be morally incoherent. (...) However, Wolff's version of individualist anarchism does not follow. Human beings are by no means equally rational or homogeneously autonomous. There are ‘states’which have a contingent and variable right to enforce obedience over an indefinitely large number of their ‘subjects’, although not over those who are autonomous because rational in high degree. (shrink)

I discuss Bermudez' minimalist approach to self-consciousness approvingly, connecting it with other positions in philosophy and trying to separate it from ideas about non-conceptual content.