Emotional truth: Emotional accuracy: Adam Morton

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):265–275 (2002)
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Abstract

This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.

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Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

True emotions.Mikko Salmela - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):382-405.
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