Monod, J. La science, valeur suprême de l'homme.--Caveing, M. Le projet rationnel des sciences contemporaines.--Halbwachs, F. Sur les problèmes de la causalité physique.--Roger, J. Conditions intellectuelles de l'apparition du transformisme.--Gohau, G. Méthode ou système chez Cuvier.--Desanti, J. Les idéalités mathématiques.--Caveing, M. Laicisation de la parole et l'exigence rationnelle.--Mouloud, N. La science du langage et les problèmes philosophiques des sens.--Godelier, M. Marxisme, anthropologie et religion.--Dan, C. Empirisme et réalisme de Marx à Piaget.

In biology proteins are uniquely important. They are not to be classed with polysaccharides, for example, which by comparison play a very minor role. Their nearest rivals are the nucleic acids....The main function of proteins is to act as enzymes....In the protein molecule Nature has devised a unique instrument in which an underlying simplicity is used to express great subtlety and versatility; it is impossible to see molecular biology in proper perspective until this peculiar combination of virtues has been clearly (...) grasped. (shrink)

Jacques Monod (1971) argued that certain molecular processes rely critically on the property of chemical arbitrariness, which he claimed allows those processes to “transcend the laws of chemistry”. It seems natural, as some philosophers have done, to interpret this in modal terms: a biological relationship is chemically arbitrary if it is possible, within the constraints of chemical “law”, for that relationship to have been otherwise than it is. But while modality is certainly important for understanding chemical arbitrariness, understanding its (...) biological role also requires an account of the concrete causal-functional features that distinguish arbitrary from non-arbitrary phenomena. In this paper I elaborate on this under-emphasised aspect by offering a general account of these features: arbitrary relations are instantiated by mechanisms that involve molecular adapters, which causally couple two properties or processes which would otherwise be uncorrelated. Additionally, adapters work by acting as intermediate rather than cooperating causes. (shrink)

In his 1970s work Chance and Necessity, Jacques Monod provided an explanatory framework not only for the biological evolution of species, but, as has become recently apparent, for the evolutionary development of cancers. That is, contemporary oncological research has demonstrated that cancer is an evolutionary disease that develops according to the same dynamics of chance and necessity at work in all evolutionary phenomena. And just as various challenges are raised for religious thought by the operations of chance and necessity (...) within biological evolution, so this particular theological question is raised by the findings of contemporary cancer science: Where is love, divine and human, within the evolutionary chance and necessity operative in all dimensions of cancer? In this article, we contribute to the dialogue in science and religion by offering the following responses to this question: the thought of Arthur Peacocke to claim that divine love may be understood to be at work in, with, and under our very efforts to make theological meaning of the chance and necessity that inform the evolution of cancers; and Charles Sanders Peirce's evolutionary philosophy to make this claim: that the work of scientific communities of inquiry to understand and to find better ways to cope with the disease of cancer is itself the work of divine love amid the chance and necessity of cancer. (shrink)

In 1970, Jacque Monod, a Nobel Laureate and a founding father of molecular biology, wrote a short celebrated book entitled Chance and Necessity.

Diauxie is at the origin of research that led Jacques Monod, François Jacob, and André Lwoff to win the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1965 for their description of the first genetic regulatory model. Diauxie is a term coined by Jacques Monod in 1941 in his doctoral dissertation that refers to microbial growth in two phases. In this article, we first examine Monod’s thesis to demonstrate how and why Monod interpreted diauxie as a phenomenon (...) of enzyme inhibition or suppression of adaptive enzymes. We also briefly investigate prior enzyme suppression studies, before Monod’s work, which indicate that he is the first person to observe diauxic growth. Second, we analyse Monod’s post-thesis publications throughout his scientific career, revealing that diauxic inhibition was a significant part of Monod’s scientific activities and greatly fascinated Monod until the end of his life. Paradoxically, Monod’s work and interest on diauxic inhibition are still neglected in historical recounts, focused mostly on Monod’s enzymatic adaptation studies. Indeed, we uncovered a statement by Monod’s colleague, Lwoff, who transformed a quotation from Monod by replacing the word phenomenon with enzymatic adaptation, which we believe has influenced historians. Finally, we offer hypotheses to explain why Lwoff altered Monod’s statement. (shrink)

Dans Les aventures de la dialectique, Merleau-Ponty s’appuie sur Weber pour se défaire du marxisme et juger la réalité du communisme. Mais le parcours qu’il effectue est complexe et sinueux, comme le montre notamment le chapitre sur Lukács : la volonté de Merleau-Ponty de rétablir une critique sans restriction et la netteté de sa rupture politique avec le communisme font contraste avec sa difficulté à rompre avec la dialectique.In Les Aventures de la dialectique, Merleau-Ponty uses Weber to break with Marxism (...) and to judge the reality of communism. But he follows a complex and sinuous path, as shown in the chapter about Lukacs : Merleau-Ponty’s will to restaure a free criticism and the clearness of his political rupture with communism contrast with his difficulty in renouncing dialectic. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage a pour but de répondre au "devoir qui s'impose, aujourd'hui plus que jamais, aux hommes de sciences de penser leur discipline dans l'ensemble de la culture moderne pour l'enrichir non seulement de connaissances techniquement importantes, mais aussi des idées venues de leur science qu'ils peuvent croire humainement signifiantes. L'ingénuité même d'un regard neuf (celui de la science l'est toujours) peut parfois éclairer d'un jour nouveau d'anciens problèmes...".

Change and necessity is a statement of Darwinian natural selection as a process driven by chance necessity, devoid of purpose or intent.

Cet ouvrage, un grand classique désormais, son auteur l'a écrit pour répondre au "devoir qui s'impose, aujourd'hui plus que jamais, aux hommes de science de penser leur discipline dans l'ensemble de la culture moderne pour l'enrichir non seulement de connaissances techniquement importantes, mais aussi des idées venues de leur science qu'ils peuvent croire humainement signifiantes. L ingénuité même d'un regard neuf (celui de la science l'est toujours) peut parfois éclairer d'un jour nouveau d'anciens problèmes...".

Foucault a souligné l’importance, pour la philosophie française du xx e siècle, des Méditations cartésiennes de Husserl, prononcées à la Sorbonne en 1929. Contrairement à Husserl, Foucault n’a pas réactivé le geste cartésien de l’auto-méditation et de la refondation du savoir philosophique sur des bases sûres. Mais il n’a cessé de revenir sur les Méditations métaphysiques de Descartes comme moment décisif pour l’apparition du sujet moderne – d’abord dans la fameuse lecture du « Mais quoi! ce sont des fous » (...) dans l’ Histoire de la folie. Mais Foucault ne s’en est pas tenu à cette interprétation, discutée par Derrida, qui reliait la construction du sujet rationnel à l’exclusion des fous. On trouve dans L’Herméneutique du sujet une nouvelle approche des Méditations métaphysiques, cette fois démarquée de Heidegger, qui les restitue dans l’histoire des « techniques de soi » et situe la rupture décisive au plan même de la dissociation entre technique spirituelle, accès à la connaissance et transformation éthique de soi. Cet article suit ainsi « la méditation cartésienne de Foucault » en mettant en lumière le constant débat sous-jacent avec les lectures de Descartes produites par la phénoménologie et la déconstruction de la métaphysique. (shrink)

This collection addresses a post-WWII shift in the hierarchy of scientific explanations, where the highest goal moves from reductionism towards some ...

In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form (...) of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory. (shrink)

It is a common experience that we talk to some animals, especially those with which we share our human lives, such as dogs or cats. From this communication, should one conclude that these animals participate in intersubjectivity? Though Husserl’s phenomenology has a “Cartesian” tendency, in his late reflections on the variations of “normal” consciousness and the “normal” body, he suggests that there are degrees of subjectivity, following a more “Leibnizian” path. Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas have also developed this thesis of (...) a “sympathy” with animals beyond the limits of the human species. (shrink)

Contingency is the presence of non-actualized possibility in the world. Fatalism is a view of reality on which there is no contingency. Since it is contingency that permits agency, there has traditionally been much interest in contingency. This interest has long been embarrassed by the contention that simple and plausible assumptions about the world lead to fatalism. I begin with an Aristotelian argument as presented by Richard Taylor. Appreciation of this argument has been stultified by a question pertaining to the (...) source of necessity and possibility and a closely related one regarding the nature of metaphysics itself. Answering these questions reveals the crucial issue here, to wit, necessity and possibility in a temporal world. This issue is investigated through an important later criticism of Taylor by David Foster Wallace. Wallace’s critique is significant because it brings to the fore the pivotal notion for understanding contingency in a temporal world, that of synchronic possibility, the idea that incompatible states of affairs are possible at a single moment. This notion provides the basis of distinguishing two systematic accounts of truth, modality and time: two metaphysics of contingency. On one account, Taylor’s Aristotelian argument is straightforwardly valid and compelling; on the other, it is fallacious. In closing, I present reasons why the former account, supporting the Aristotelian views of time and truth, is correct and make some comments to ameliorate this conclusion. (shrink)

It is a common experience that we talk to some animals, especially those with which we share our human lives, such as dogs or cats. From this communication, should one conclude that these animals participate in intersubjectivity? Though Husserl’s phenomenology has a “Cartesian” tendency, in his late reflections on the variations of “normal” consciousness and the “normal” body, he suggests that there are degrees of subjectivity, following a more “Leibnizian” path. Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas have also developed this thesis of (...) a “sympathy” with animals beyond the limits of the human species. (shrink)

The X-ray and bulk densities of PdIn alloys have been determined at ambient temperature on samples annealed at 1273 and 1373 K and quenched in water-ice mixtures. From these measurements the vacancy concentrations in this intermetallic phase have been obtained as a function of In concentration at these two temperatures. In addition, a generalized thermodynamic model is presented which considers the existence of antisite and vacancy defects on both sublattices without any dilute solution approximations. This model uses three energy parameters, (...) whose values have been obtained for PdIn using the measured vacancy concentrations and the chemical potentials of In. This model is able to describe all the available vacancy data and is suitable for calculating these values at compositions and temperatures when such data are not available. In addition, the model permits the calculation of the concentrations of the minority point defects. It is shown that dilute-solution approximations, which have invariably been used in this kind of modelling, are unsatisfactory. The present results and their analysis confirm that PdIn is a near-triple-defect type of intermetallic and not a near-Schottky type, as has been claimed recently. (shrink)

Dans cette étude du grand livre que Schmitt a consacré à l’histoire du droit international, Le Nomos de la terre, on tente de reconstituer la logique d’une pensée qui, partie de l’idée d’un lien essentiel entre le droit et la « limite », aboutit à une critique de la résurgence moderne de la « guerre juste » comme « guerre pour l’humanité ». Si l’actualité et la sagacité de certaines analyses restent frappantes, on rappelle aussi ici ce que fut « (...) l’envers de la critique », soit l’accompagnement théorique que Schmitt a fourni à la politique du « grand espace » nazi et son rejet ultérieur de la notion de « crime contre l’humanité », où peuvent se lire les effets d’un « antihumanisme » radical.This paper is a study of Schmitt’s book The Nomos of the Earth. We try to investigate the historical background and the political consequences of Schmitt’s genealogy and criticism of the humanitarian « just war ».Schmitts Verständnis des « Nomos » begründet seine Polemik gegen die destabilisierenden Folgen des Universalismus und gegen den « Krieg für Menschheit ». Heute findet diese Kritik eine neue Aktualität. Aber sowohl mit seiner Rechtfertigung der « Grossraum »-Politik als auch mit seiner Verwerfung des Begriffs des « Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit », hat Schmitt die gefährlichsten Konsequenzen aus seinem juristischen « Antihumanismus » gezogen. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de reconstruire la réflexion de Hans Blumenberg sur le mythe en dégageant les ‘principes’ directeurs du mythe tels que Blumenberg les conçoit et en rattachant chacun de ces principes à un mythe considéré alors comme paradigmatique. Il s’agit moins de reprendre la théorie schellingienne selon laquelle le mythe «s’auto-explique» que de montrer la fécondité de l’hypothèse de Blumenberg, celle d’un «travail du mythe» qui se prolonge dans les tentatives mêmes d’explication du sens de la pensée mythique. (...) Ce dépassement en acte de l’opposition logos/mythos confirme l’importance anthropologique du mythe comme technique de mise à distance de l’angoisse et rupture avec ‘l’absolutisme de la réalité’. Mais la réhabilitation théorique du mythe ne saurait déboucher sur un nouveau mythe politique: si le ‘travail du mythe’ de Blumenberg, n’est pas dénué d’effets politiques, comme d’ailleurs celui de Lévi-Strauss, ces effets ne peuvent être qu’indirects, suivant la valorisation du détour qui caractérise toute l’œuvre de Blumenberg. (shrink)

Dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, les principaux aspects de la définition et de la compréhension « aristotélicienne » de la métaphore ont été mis en question: théorie de la substitution, téléologie de l’univocité, subordination de la métaphore à la connaissance, et jusqu’à la centralité même conférée à la métaphore aux dépens d’autres figures (métonymie, synecdoque, catachrèse...). Dans cet article, nous tentons de résumer et de discuter les points essentiels de cette contestation multiforme, en nous attachant particulièrement à la (...) déconstruction derridienne de la métaphore « dans le texte philosophique » et à la synthèse, par Ricoeur, de la « nouvelle » théorie de la métaphore. (shrink)

Cet article suit l’articulation, dans la pensée de Blumenberg, entre le concept de métaphore absolue et l’idée qu’il n’y a « pas de fin » au mythe, mais seulement des stratégies diverses pour tenter de le « porter à sa fin ». On a là les deux faces d’une théorie de l’inconceptualisable comme ce qui nourrit la pensée conceptuelle elle-même. Un exemple privilégié de ce rapport complexe entre métaphore, mythe et concept pourrait être fourni par l’analyse infinie de la Caverne (...) de Platon mais aussi par les métaphoriques de la lumière et de l’aveuglement, telles qu’elles continuent de sous-tendre la vision du dévoilement de la vérité et de ses effets chez Freud ou Heidegger. (shrink)