Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.

Life is a self-maintaining process based on metabolism. Something is said to be alive when it exhibits organization and is actively involved in its own continued existence through carrying out metabolic processes. A life is a spatio-temporally restricted event, which continues while the life processes are occurring in a particular chunk of matter (or, arguably, when they are temporally suspended, but can be restarted at any moment), even though there is continuous replacement of parts. Life is organized in discrete packages, (...) particular cells and multicellular organisms with differing degrees of individuality. Biological species, too, have been shown to be individuals, and not classes, as these collections of organisms are spatio-temporally localized, restricted, continuous, and somewhat cohesive entities, with a definite beginning and end. Assuming that all life on Earth has a common origin, all living organisms, cells, and tissues descending from this origin exhibit continuity of the life processes at the cellular level, as well as many of the features that define the individual character of species: spatio-temporal localization and restriction, continuity, historicity, and cohesiveness. Therefore, life on Earth is an ontological individual. Independent origins of life will have produced other such individuals. These provisionally called ‘life-individuals’ constitute a category of organization of life which has seldom been recognized. The discovery of at least one independent life-individual would go a long way toward the project of the universality of biology. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to three commentaries on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. In response to Alcoff, I primarily defend my conception of how an individual hearer might develop virtues of epistemic justice. I do this partly by drawing on empirical social psychological evidence supporting the possibility of reflective self-regulation for prejudice in our judgements. I also emphasize the fact that individual virtue is only part of the solution – structural mechanisms also have an essential role (...) in combating epistemic injustice. My response to Goldberg principally concerns my perceptual account of the epistemology of testimony, which I defend as being both well-motivated and best categorized as a species of non-inferentialism. I also explain its relation to the reductionism/non-reductionism contrast, and defend my resistance to casting it as any kind of default view. In response to Hookway, I contrast discriminatory with distributive forms of epistemic injustice, and defend the basic taxonomy I present in the book, which casts testimonial and hermeneutical injustice as the two fundamental discriminatory forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

Previous research suggests that all-inclusive superordinate categories, such as “citizens of the world” and “humans,” may represent different socio-psychological realities. Yet it remains unclear whether the use of different categories may account for different psychological processes and attitudinal or behavioral outcomes. Two studies extended previous research by comparing how these categories are cognitively represented, and their impact on intergroup helping from host communities toward migrants. In a correlational study, 168 nationals from 25 countries perceived the group of migrants as more (...) prototypical of the superordinate category “citizens of the world” than their national group, whereas no differences in prototypicality occurred for the category “humans.” Identification with “citizens of the world” was positively associated with a disposition to oppose helping migrants and to offer dependency-oriented help. However, identification with “humans” was positively associated with helping in general, and with offering dependency- and autonomy-oriented help; and negatively associated with opposition to helping. The experimental study manipulated the salience of “citizens of the world” vs. “humans” vs. control category, among 224 nationals from 36 countries. Results showed that the salience of “humans” triggered higher entitativity and essentialist perceptions, and dual-identity representations. No differences due to salience were found for representations of relative ingroup prototypicality or helping responses. Overall, these findings suggest that the interchangeable use of different labels is problematic, considering these might activate different representations, and thus, are likely to lead, in some circumstances, to different attitudinal or behavioral outcomes. (shrink)

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form (...) of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi-political worry about blame is raised. (shrink)

Bernard Williams is a sceptic about the objectivity of moral value, embracing instead a qualified moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. His attitude to blame too is in part sceptical. I will argue that the relativism of distance is unconvincing, even incoherent; but also that it is detachable from the rest of Williams's moral philosophy. I will then go on to propose an entirely localized thesis I call the relativism of blame, which says that when an agent's moral shortcomings by our (...) lights are a matter of their living according to the moral thinking of their day, judgements of blame are out of order. Finally, I will propose a form of moral judgement we may sometimes quite properly direct towards historically distant agents when blame is inappropriate—moral-epistemic disappointment. Together these two proposals may help release us from the grip of the idea that moral appraisal always involves the potential applicability of blame, and so from a key source of the relativist idea that moral appraisal is inappropriate over distance. (shrink)

Some plausibly necessary a posteriori theoretical claims include ‘water is H 2 O’, ‘gold is the element with atomic number 79’, and ‘cats are animals’. In this paper I challenge the necessity of the third claim. I argue that there are possible worlds in which cats exist, but are not animals. Under any of the species concepts currently accepted in biology, organisms do not belong essentially to their species. This is equally true of their ancestors. In phylogenetic systematics, monophyletic clades (...) such as the animal kingdom are composed of an ancestral stem species and all of its descendants. If the stem species had not existed, neither would the clade. Thus it could have been the case that all the organisms which actually belong to the animal kingdom might have existed yet not have been animals. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question ‘what is an organism?’. Extant theories of organismality only provide a partial answer because they do not include an account of composition on which an ontology of living entities can be based. Here we develop a new account of what organisms are, based on a naturalistic answer to the special composition question, the bound state view. We argue that physical structure, including the existence of a boundary, is essential for life, and that, therefore, organisms are (...) a particular kind of composite physical object – living objects. The bound state account of composition explains how composite physical objects exist in the world, and the property ‘life’ distinguishes the subset of those objects which are organisms. Our view obviates the need for disjunctive accounts of composition for living and non-living entities, placing ‘organism’ within the context of a broader scientific ontology, while at the same time providing a clear criterion of organismality that can be used in adjudicating problematic cases of biological individuality. (shrink)

O objetivo deste estudo é identificar como a adoção aparece nas histórias de vida de indivíduos adotados e como eles normalizam suas experiências relacionadas à adoção. Focaliza-se a re-historiação do “eu” na narrativa e considera-se que o seu final é determinado por quem constrói a narrativa, não por eventos relatados cronologicamente. Os dados provêm das narrativas de dois indivíduos adotados, transcritas segundo convenções utilizadas na Análise da Conversa Etnometodológica, nas quais se destaca a presença dos eventos relacionados à adoção na (...) re-historiação dos pesquisados e na constituição de seus “eus” parciais, considerando também as características rítmicas e outras propriedades da fala em interação. Foi possível constatar que o final da história influencia na maneira como a narrativa é construída e como as experiências de adoção aparecem nas narrativas, com maior ou menor grau de normalização a elas atribuído. (shrink)

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

Gilberto Monteiro foi médico municipal da freguesia de Carnaxide de 1921 a 1961, Chefe dos Serviços Clínicos da extinta fábrica dos Fermentos Holandeses (F.P.F.H.), sediada na Cruz Quebrada, de 1934 a 1962 e, durante a II Guerrra Mundial, exerceu no Hospital Militar de Belém, na qualidade de tenente médico miliciano. Amante do desporto e desportista, G. Monteiro foi um dos fundadores do Sport Algés e Dafundo (SAD), instituição onde, enquanto membro da sua primeira Comissão Cultural, criou a Biblioteca, organizou conferências, (...) exposições e concertos e outras actividades culturais que ali atrairam figuras de relevo como Aquilino Ribeiro, Viana da Mota, Hernâni Cidade e Norton de Matos, entre outros. Se nas suas crónicas escritas para “O Fermento” deparamos com o G. Monteiro, historiador inconformado, que denuncia os constantes atentados à integridade histórica e patrimonial, no Esboço Histórico do Hospital Militar (1945) convivemos com um testemunho de vertical e desassombrada coragem cívica, denunciadora dos males de que padecia a medicina contemporânea. Finalmente, acompanhamos o esforço e as diligências que, numa linha de justiça, educação e melhoria da qualidade de vida das pessoas, G. Monteiro desenvolveu, em pleno Estado Novo, a fim de instituir na fábrica (FPFH) uma assistência médico-social moderna. (shrink)

There are two kinds of forgiveness that appear as radically different from one another: one presents forgiveness as essentially earned through remorseful apology; the other presents it as fundamentally non-earned—a gift. The first, which I label Moral Justice Forgiveness, adopts a stance of moral demand and conditionality; the second, which I label Gifted Forgiveness, adopts a stance of non-demand and un-conditionality. Each is real; yet how can two such different responses to wrongdoing be of one and the same kind? This (...) paper explains how, by showing that the basic role each plays in moral-social life is the same; and that one is conceptually and therefore historically prior to the other. The result is pluralism, with each kind of forgiveness represented as distinctive in both its psychology and its normativity; and yet an ordered pluralism—with Moral Justice Forgiveness revealed as the root kind, and Gifted Forgiveness a culturally contingent iteration. (shrink)

Animalism is prima facie the most plausible view about what we are; it aligns better with science and common sense, and is metaphysically more parsimonious. Thought experiments involving the brain, however, tend to elicit intuitions contrary to animalism. In this paper, I examine two classical thought experiments from the literature, brain transplant and cerebrum transplant, and a new one, cerebrum regeneration. I argue that they are theoretically possible, but that a scientifically informed account of what would actually happen shows that (...) in none of the cases would the person be separated from the animal. Our intuitions in these cases, when adequately informed by neuroscience, do not conflict with animalism – rather, they suggest a correction of the animalist position: the persisting animal should be at least minimally sentient. Sentience animalism is a new formulation of the animalist account of personal identity that allows us to reconcile facts about our biological persistence conditions with the intuition that human persistence should involve some kind of psychological continuity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPrevious research has revealed a stable preference for words with inward consonantal-articulation patterns, over outward-words. Following the oral approach-avoidance account suggesting that the in–out effect is due to the resemblance between consonantal-articulations patterns and ingestion/expectoration, recent findings have shown that when judging inward-outward names for objects with particular oral functions, valence did not modulate the effect while the oral function did. To replicate and examine further the role of edibility and valence in shaping the in–out effect, we asked participants to (...) rate inward and outward names for edible and non-edible products while controlling for valence. Results revealed that the motor-to-affect link was only observed for edible products, regardless of valence. (shrink)

The United Nations World Tourism Organization has acknowledged 2020 as the worst year in tourism history due to the worldwide pandemic COVID-19. Destinations, tourists, local communities, stakeholders, and residents, and their daily activities were affected. Thus, wellbeing and resilience are two crucial variables to help the industry and the people recover. This research aims to analyze early positive approaches and attitudes to respond to the negative impact of COVID-19 in tourism everyday activities that have at its core wellbeing and resilience, (...) the two main variables of the Positive Psychology field of studies. A systematic literature review was conducted, following PRISMA guidelines to achieve this aim. The research was done using the Online Knowledge Library and all the available databases. The research led to 32 articles that were screened using the inclusion and exclusion criteria. A total of 18 scientific articles met all criteria. Overall, results show that a positive and resilient approach to deal with the adverse outcomes of the pandemic is a concern for stakeholders and the future of the organizations in the tourism and hospitality sector, as is tourists’ wellbeing. However, less research has been done on wellbeing and a clear lack of research regarding residents’ wellbeing and resilience is evident. A deeper study of wellbeing and resilience in tourism is needed, and actual practices and interventions to ensure that all tourism actors have the resources to overcome the pandemic and restart the industry’s daily lives feeling well and safe. (shrink)

We gain information from collective, often institutional bodies all the time—from the publications of committees, news teams, or research groups, from web sites such as Wikipedia, and so on—but do these bodies ever function as genuine group testifiers as opposed to mere group sources of information? In putting the question this way I invoke a distinction made, if briefly, by Edward Craig, which I believe to be of deep significance in thinking about the distinctiveness of the speech act of testimony. (...) The distinction is that between somebody’s functioning as a ‘good informant’ and their functioning merely as a ‘source of information’. The difference between these has, as he remarks, a crucial ethical aspect: What I have in mind is the special flavour of situations in which human beings treat each other as subjects with a common purpose, rather than as objects from which services, in this case true belief, can be extracted. In this paper I shall try to bring out the distinctive nature of the role of good informant in a way that helps to clarify what is at stake in asking whether there can be group testimony in the sense of genuinely collective testimony—that is to say, where the group testifier is a collective and not merely a sum of individuals testifying in one or another form of aggregated chorus. (shrink)

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. (...) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]. (shrink)

Interpreting Bernard Williams’s ethical philosophy is not easy. His style is deceptively conversational; apparently direct, yet argumentatively inexplicit and allusive. He is moreover committed to evading ready-made philosophical “-isms.” All this reinforces the already distinct impression that the structure of his philosophy is a web of interrelated commitments where none has unique priority. Against this impression, however, I will venture that the contours of his philosophy become clearest if one considers that there is a single, unchanging root conviction from which (...) his ethical philosophy grows. Despite the perpetual motion of his philosophical thought—its erudition, originality, range, and unceasing forward momentum—still, I contend, there is something unchanging at the heart of it. I will show this by reference to three signature theses: internal reasons, the relativism of distance, and the porous borders of philosophy and history. I will argue that the root conviction of which these are the fruits is the conviction that the constraints of universal rationality seriously underdetermine how one should live. This, I believe, is the vision of the human ethical condition that constitutes the largely inexplicit yet utterly fundamental presupposition beneath Williams’s ethical philosophy taken as a whole. I label the object of this root conviction ethical freedom, and thus portray Williams as a philosopher of ethical freedom. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is (...) likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed. (shrink)

[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the (...) powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed. (shrink)

BackgroundWomen survivors of breast cancer treatments face significant challenges around initiation or maintenance of physical activity as they transit to recovery. Embracing their needs and preferences is important to increase adherence. This study aimed to explore the perspectives of Portuguese women survivors of breast cancer regarding regular performance of PA and individual choices and strategies that should be considered in designing effective interventions.MethodsThe individual semi-structured interviews were analyzed through thematic analysis, following an inductive process, seeking to identify the barriers, facilitators, (...) and particular influencing circumstances associated with regular PA.ResultsFour themes and several contextual, emotional, physical, and social factors were identified as determinants of regular PA. Guilt, women’s duties, and altruism to help close relatives were identified as emotional and cultural factors that are less-found in the existing literature. PA showed influence both from health professionals’ counseling and from knowledge and beliefs held by these women.ConclusionWhile confirming the already-known impact of breast cancer diagnosis and treatments on PA, which redefine participants’ availability to be active, the findings highlight beliefs and specific emotional factors that should be considered when planning culturally sensitive interventions. (shrink)

This paper aims, on the one hand, to determine the valid span of the diagram of unequal hours and, on the other, to find a mathematical expression for the error. It is found that the diagram is valid for the two days of the equinoxes and for the times when the sun is on the horizon or on the meridian. This subject has previously been treated by Delambre in 1819 and Drecker in 1925, but not comprehensively.

José Ortega y Gasset deu em Lisboa, em 1944, um curso universitário intitulado La razón histórica. Não obstante ter ficado incompleto, após interrupção por doença do autor, ele é talvez um dos mais importantes vestígios da sua estada em Portugal, durante a última etapa do seu longo exílio. Em edição da Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, Margarida I. Almeida Amoedo disponibiliza agora a tradução desse curso, enquadrando-o no contexto próximo da obra orteguiana.