Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (sup1):191-210 (1999)
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Abstract

[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the powerless, there is another species of oppression at work, one that has not been registered in mainstream epistemology: epistemic oppression. The word ‘structured’ may be read materially, so as to imply that social institutions and practices favour the powerful, or ontologically, so as to imply that the powerful somehow constitute the world. But for present purposes I am interested only in an epistemological reading, which implies that the powerful have some sort of unfair advantage in “structuring” our understandings of the social world. I will try to present an account of what this initially vague idea involves. I hope thereby to explain an exact sense in which the powerful can have a kind of epistemic advantage that means the powerless are epistemically oppressed.

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Miranda Fricker
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.
Recent Work in Standpoint Epistemology.Briana Toole - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):338-350.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

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The Construction of Social Reality.John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy 71 (276):313-315.
Are 'old wives' tales' justified.Vrinda Dalmiya & Linda Alcoff - 1993 - In Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter (eds.), Feminist Epistemologies. Routledge. pp. 217--244.
First published 1953.Ludvig Wittgenstein - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
Anti-Essentialism in Feminist Theory.Charlotte Witt - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (2):321-344.

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