In his monumental edition of Callimachus, R. Pfeiffer has questioned the authenticity of three epigrams. More than fifty years ago U. v. Wilamowitz- Moellendorff had rejected Ep. 33 and Ep. 36 4; but Pfeiffer seems to be the first critic to exclude Ep. 63 from the collection of Callimachus' epigrams. Although he sets forth his objections in a long footnote, none of the reviewers has so far discussed this point.

In his recently published Propertiana, Mr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey has given what I believe to be the correct interpretation of the first two lines. He maintains that sacra has no direct connexion with poetry, that it may be virtually synonymous with Manes or possibly signify the rites paid to the dead, or that it can be taken in the sense of their physical relics, the ashes in the urn. He reminds us that nemus is more than a ‘poetic grove’; (...) it must be a ‘consecrated grove’. (shrink)

In his monumental edition of Callimachus, R. Pfeiffer has questioned the authenticity of three epigrams. More than fifty years ago U. v. Wilamowitz- Moellendorff had rejected Ep. 33 and Ep. 36 4; but Pfeiffer seems to be the first critic to exclude Ep. 63 from the collection of Callimachus' epigrams. Although he sets forth his objections in a long footnote, none of the reviewers has so far discussed this point.

In his recently published Propertiana, Mr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey has given what I believe to be the correct interpretation of the first two lines. He maintains that sacra has no direct connexion with poetry, that it may be virtually synonymous with Manes or possibly signify the rites paid to the dead, or that it can be taken in the sense of their physical relics, the ashes in the urn. He reminds us that nemus is more than a ‘poetic grove’; (...) it must be a ‘consecrated grove’. (shrink)

Luck egalitarians maintain that inequalities are always unjust when they are due to luck, but are not always unjust when they are due to choices for which the parties are responsible. In this paper, I argue that the two halves of this formula do not fit neatly together, and that we arrive at one version of luck egalitarianism if we begin with the notion of luck and interpret responsible choice in terms of its absence, but a (...) very different version if we begin with the notion of responsible choice and interpret luck in terms of its absence. I argue, further, that the difference between the two versions is significant because many real-world inequalities fall precisely in the gap between them, and that attempts to adjudicate between them lead quickly to hard questions about the relation between equality and responsibility. (shrink)

This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation. Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in achieving any more specific (...) goals. He argues, also, that the state's obligation to promote this interest supports a principled version of the view that what matters about resources, opportunity, and other secondary goods is only that each person have enough. The book opens up a variety of new questions, and offers a distinctive new perspective for scholars of political theory and political philosophy, and for those interested in distributive justice and luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Divine Sign Conversion to Wisdom Unremarkable Premise Further Reading.

It is widely thought to be unfair to hold people responsible, or to blame or punish them, for wrongful acts or omissions that are beyond their control. Because this principle is often taken to support incompatibilism, and because it has led many to deny the possibility of moral luck, we might expect its normative underpinnings to have been carefully scrutinized. However, surprisingly, they have not. In the current paper, I will try to fill this gap by first reconstructing, and (...) then criticizing, what I take to be the principle’s most compelling rationale. Because I will argue that that rationale is irretrievably flawed, the thrust of my discussion will be to raise doubts both about the principle itself and about the philosophical theses that it is said to support. (shrink)

Aristotle argues that provided we have moderate luck, we can attain eudaimonia through our own effort. He claims that it is crucial to attaining eudaimonia that we aim at an overall target in our lives to which all our actions are directed. He also claims that the proper target of a eudaimon human life is virtuous activity, which is a result of effort not chance. He criticises Theognis for saying that the most pleasant thing is to chance on love, (...) arguing instead that virtuous activity is the most pleasant thing. I argue that although Aristotle’s view is insightful and carefully worked out, he fails to show that Theognis is wrong. Effort is not necessarily the path to human eudaimonia and important things we attain by chance seem to have an irreplacable value. (shrink)

A standard account of creativity is that it is a process in which the form of a thing or event is altered—restructured or reinterpreted—in a way that changes fundamentally that thing’s or event’s meaning, its nature or function, its intrinsic or instrumental value. What is created in this manner, however, is only a variation of the initial form. Such processes are creative in a weak sense; the strong sense requires that the old form be replaced by a quite different one, (...) as in reconstructions or metaphors. But creative substitution is not haphazard, not a matter of insight, genius, luck, or divine assistance. It utilizes the generative rules governing a formal structure to make or discover new forms that are transformations, not variations, of the original form. These procedures are teachable and not mysterious, although the possible transforms of the structure are never predictable. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Inquiring Mind I have been singularly fortunate in my friends, both colleagues and students. I have been also fortunate in having been able to participate in events outside the academic field. My training in one of the arts, my classical education, my drifting about from one graduate school to another, my persistent refusal to confine my studies to any narrow field, an ability to pick up languages without much difficulty, a willingness to relax and let chance take (...) care of me, have all contributed to making my career peculiarly agreeable. The greatest stroke of luck was my being called to the Johns Hop kins University where I have passed over half my life. As far as I can judge, it is unique in the latitude which it gives its faculties, in the informality of its organization, in its assumption that the professors are scholars and not bookkeepers. There may be other institutions in which this is also true, but I have not taught in them. It has always been a pleasure to acknowledge my debt to my university and I do so once more, even though it be the last occasion. I am happy to join to its name that of the Institute for Advanced Study whose guest I was in the autumn term of 1956. The Director and Faculty of the Institute have done everything possible to make writing this book easy. If it does not justify their hospitality, that is surely not their fault. Finally no Carus Lecturer can adequately express his thanks to the children of Paul Carus, whose generosity founded the lectureship. I can only say that the liberal spirit of their father still lives in them. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Hegels Naturphilosophie, früher als der schwächste Teil des enzyklopädischen Systems betrachtet, erlebt in der gegenwärtigen Rezeption eine Renaissance. Die Herausgabe der erhaltenen Vorlesungsnachschriften spielt dabei eine fundamentale Rolle, weil sie eine zuverlässige Textgrundlage für Einzelstudien bereitstellt und es erlaubt, die historische Entwicklung der Hegelschen Reflexion über Natur und Naturwissenschaften zu rekonstruieren. Die vorliegende Edition der von Boris von Uexküll in Auftrag gegebenen Nachschrift der Vorlesung von 1821/22 füllt die Lücke zwischen den bereits edierten Vorlesungsnachschriften von 1819/20 und von 1823/24. Sie (...) wirft neues Licht auf ein relativ frühes und doch bereits ausgereiftes Stadium der enzyklopädischen Naturphilosophie Hegels. Zahlreiche historische Anmerkungen erleichtern das Verständnis des schwierigen, aber an grundlegenden Einsichten reichen Textes. (shrink)

History is in the midst of experiencing a "moral turn." This shift has resulted from the culture wars, challenges to objectivity and truth, and various world crises. Understanding moral issues through historical narratives requires a dialogue between historians and philosophers. Philosophers need to appreciate historians' attention to circumstance and context, while historians need to be familiar with philosophical concepts such as moral luck and virtue ethics. Rather than simply rendering judgments, history in a moral mode demonstrates the complexity behind (...) agency, character, empathy, and moral decisions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In and Out of MeGeorge Graham (bio)An important role in many recent philosophical analyses of personal well-being and psychological health has been played by a principle I call the "the principle of responsible innerness." This principle states that a person is psychologically healthy and well only if she or he acts in critical situations on preferences and desires that are responsibly in her or him rather than being merely (...) in her or him. Various analyses have been proposed of what it means for a desire or preference to be responsibly in a person—namely, that he or she identify with it or that the desire or preference be part of his or her wholehearted or decisive identity as a person. Harry Frankfurt (1988) has formulated a version of the principle in his accounts of personal caring and freedom of will. Charles Taylor (1976) has deployed a version of the principle in his account of self-assessment and personal redefinition. In this issue of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Mark Rego with deference to Frankfurt suggests how a responsible innerness principle (Rego does not name the principle as such, of course, because the neologism is my own) might be deployed in a therapeutic setting. In this brief commentary I explore an obvious commitment of the principle, namely that there is a difference between the responsible psychological inside of a person and both the mere (nonresponsible) inside and the outside. In connection with the presupposition I include some comments on Rego's thoughtful and suggestive paper.Individuating MeWhat individuates a person? What makes a person one person or individual as opposed to another person or individual?One hypothesis is that an individual person is individuated by their being a particular living human animal (see Olson 2003; Van Inwagen 1990). Mark Rego (the name) refers to one particular living human animal. George Graham (the name) refers to another. In my case an animalist (someone who holds that an individual human person is a particular living human animal) would say that I am nothing other than the six-foot tall living human animal whose photograph you would take if you were to take a picture of me writing this brief commentary. I am not an immaterial substance nor am I a composite made out of any such substance and this animal body (or some part of it). I am, instead, a biological being, made of biological parts—the organs, cells, and so forth of which living human animals are made.Although one might worry about just how animals themselves are individuated, it is not too hard to appreciate what philosophers (like Eric Olson and others) who favor animalism must be attracted to. The attraction of animalism is this: individuation requires limits or boundaries and, for animalism, whatever is in the animal as a proper part of its being alive therein is in the person, whereas whatever is outside of the animal therein is outside of the person. So, if I am a particular living human animal, and if something is in or out of me, this means it is inside or [End Page 323] outside, respectively, my living body. Various neurons are in me; the heavenly stars are out of me. Various information processes are in me; the athletic dispositions of the Boston Red Sox are out of me.Suppose animalism is true. Suppose I am nothing other than this particular six-foot tall living human animal. Suppose also that I have a mental health problem. Suppose I am a pathological gambler. Suppose, in addition, that I am under the care of a therapist. With her help I have learned various facts about my addiction: that it thrives on a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement, that it is strengthened by my quasi-prayerful invocations of a mythic figure I call "Lady Luck," and that it relieves albeit severely imprudently assorted stresses and strains in my professional career. Alas, though, such lessons notwithstanding, I gamble. I am in the grips of an addiction. My therapist tells me that I should avoid self-deception and acknowledge or own up to the fact that I am addicted. She claims, too, that I should disown or... (shrink)

Die intensive Auseinandersetzung mit Dispositionen und Kausalkräften innerhalb der analytischen Ontologie hat wesentlich dazu beigetragen, in der Handlungstheorie offener und ungenierter von den Kausalkräften des Handelnden („agent causal powers“) bzw. der Agenskausalität (AK) zu sprechen. In diesem Beitrag gehe ich auf diese Entwicklung ein, indem ich aktuelle Ansätze agenskausaler libertarischer Willensfreiheit (ALW) diskutiere. Zuerst stelle ich kurz die Konkurrenztheorie von ALW dar, welche libertarische Willensfreiheit im Rahmen ereigniskausaler Ansätze (ELW) zu entfalten versucht. Dann skizziere ich zwei Haupteinwände, welche Vertreter von (...) ALW gegenüber ELW einbringen, nämlich den Zufallseinwand („problem of luck“) und das Problem des verschwindenden Handelnden („problem of the disappearing agent“). Im Anschluss daran argumentiere ich dafür, dass Agenskausalität den Kontrolleinwand nur dann beheben kann, wenn sie nicht als rein kausales, sondern zusätzlich auch als ein rationales Vermögen bestimmt wird. Ich schließe mit einigen Überlegungen, inwiefern eine Metaphysik der Kausalkräfte positiv zur Fortführung dieser Diskussion beitragen kann, und wo die Grenzen eines solchen metaphysischen Ansatzes zu zeichnen sind. (shrink)

First published in 1903, this volume revolutionized philosophy and forever altered the direction of ethical studies. A philosopher’s philosopher, G. E. Moore was the idol of the Bloomsbury group, and Lytton Strachey declared that Principia Ethica marked the rebirth of the Age of Reason. This work clarifies some of moral philosophy’s most common confusions and redefines the science’s terminology. Six chapters explore: the subject matter of ethics, naturalistic ethics, hedonism, metaphysical ethics, ethics in relation to conduct, and the ideal. Moore's (...) simplicity of style and precise use of everyday language exercised an enormous influence on the development of analytic philosophy, and they contribute to the continuing resonance of his compelling arguments. (shrink)

Natural resources, especially land, play an important role in many economic problems society faces today, including the climate crisis, housing shortages and severe inequality. Yet, land has been either entirely neglected or seriously misunderstood by contemporary theorists of distributive justice. I aim to correct that in this paper. In his theory of original acquisition, Locke did not carefully distinguish between the value of natural resources and the value that we add by laboring upon them. This oversight led him to the (...) mistaken conclusion that labor mixing gives the laborer an entitlement to both the improvement and the resource. I explain how Locke's false belief that the proviso was satisfied in his time was the fundamental cause of this error. -/- Instead, we should think, following Henry George, that the community is entitled to the economic value of natural resources, because the community created the value of resources, not the individual improver. I discuss an argument from George's "Progress and Poverty" that selfownership is actually inconsistent with (rather than the ground for, as Locke thought) private appropriation of natural resources. I present George's argument that private appropriation of natural resources is akin to forced labor, which is remarkably similar to Nozick's infamous argument that taxation is akin to forced labor. -/- I then develop my own view of original acquisition, inspired by George. The selfownership of improvers gives them an entitlement to improvements that they generate. But the self-ownership of everyone else precludes an entitlement to natural resources value. Natural resource rents should not be enjoyed only by those who improve the resource, but rather, by all community members in proportion to the share of demand for natural resources they are responsible for. In the last section, I consider and refute an objection from the luck egalitarian claiming that natural talents are relevantly similar to land. (shrink)

v. 1. Tucker's life and writings -- v. 2. Essays on various subjects of taste, morals, and national policy -- v. 3. A voyage to the moon -- v. 4. Essays, moral and metaphysical.

A brilliant and comprehensive history of the creation of the modern Western mind. Soul Machine takes us back to the origins of modernity, a time when a crisis in religious authority and the scientific revolution led to searching questions about the nature of human inner life. This is the story of how a new concept—the mind—emerged as a potential solution, one that was part soul and part machine, but fully neither. In this groundbreaking work, award-winning historian George Makari shows how (...) writers, philosophers, physicians, and anatomists worked to construct notions of the mind as not an ethereal thing, but a natural one. From the ascent of Oliver Cromwell to the fall of Napoleon, seminal thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Diderot, and Kant worked alongside often-forgotten brain specialists, physiologists, and alienists in the hopes of mapping the inner world. Conducted in a cauldron of political turmoil, these frequently shocking, always embattled efforts would give rise to psychiatry, mind sciences such as phrenology, and radically new visions of the self. Further, they would be crucial to the establishment of secular ethics and political liberalism. Boldly original, wide-ranging, and brilliantly synthetic, Soul Machine gives us a masterful, new account of the making of the modern Western mind. (shrink)

Throughout The Blessed and Boundless God, he proves his doctrine by demonstrating God's incomparableness in His being, attributes, works, and words. Swinnock is a pastor-theologian who views theology as the means by which we grow in acquaintance with God and, consequently, in godliness.

In this book the author argues that knowledge is the outcome of an activity of judging, which is constrained by reasons (reflexive).