Panenetheism is the claim that God and the cosmos are intimately inter-related, with the cosmos being in God and God being in the cosmos. What does this exactly mean? The aim of this paper is to address this question by sheding light on four possible models of God-world-inter-relatedness. Being critical of those models, which understand maximal immanence in a literal, spatial sense, the paper argues in favor of a model, which cashes out immanence in terms of divine activity. God is, (...) where God acts. Since God acts upon all of creation everywhere and anytime, God is omnipresent to it at all times. Thus, the proposal is to read the ‘en’ in ‘panetheism’ in an ‘agential sense’: God is in the cosmos by creating and sustaining it and the cosmos is in God by constantly being within the sphere of divine activity. (shrink)
In this paper I aim at explaining how analytic philosophical theology developed into a thriving field of research. In doing so, I place analytic philosophical theology into a larger intellectually narrative that is deeply influenced by the philosophy of Enlightenment. This larger framework shows that analytic philosophical theology aims at providing answers to concerns raised by a philosophical tradition that shaped fundamentally the making of our modern Western secular world.
We take it for granted that a person persists over time: when we make plans, we assume that we will carry them out; when we punish someone for a crime, we assume that she is the same person as the one who committed it. Metaphysical questions underlying these assumptions point towards an area of deep existential and philosophical interest. In this volume, leading metaphysicians discuss key questions about personal identity, including 'What are we?', 'How do we persist?', and 'Which conditions (...) guarantee our identity over time?' They discuss whether personal identity is 'complex', whereby it is analyzable in terms of simpler relations such as physical or psychological features, or whether it is 'simple', namely something that cannot be analyzed in terms of more fundamental relations. Their essays offer an innovative discussion of this topic and will be of interest to a wide readership in metaphysics. (shrink)
Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible (...) moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake. (shrink)
In this paper we explicate the notion of a miracle and highlight a suitable ontological framework for it. Our proposal draws on insights from Aquinas’s discussion of miracles and from the modern ontology of powers. We argue that each substance possesses a characteristic set of natural powers and dispositions which are operative or become manifest in the right circumstances. In a miracle divine intervention activates the fundamental disposition inherent in each creature to be responsive to God’s call. Thus, a miracle (...) brings something about which a substance’s set of natural powers and dispositions could not bring about by itself. (shrink)
What happens to us when we die? According to Christian faith, we will rise again bodily from the dead. This claim raises a series of philosophical and theological conundrums: Is it rational to hope for life after death in bodily form? Will it truly be “we” who are raised again or will it be post-mortem duplicates of us? How can personal identity be secured? What is God's role in resurrection and everlasting life? In response to these conundrums, this volume presents (...) joint work of leading philosophers and theologians on life after death. So this volume is an impressive demonstration of interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophy and theology. Various models are offered which depict what resurrection into an incorruptible post-mortem body might look like. (shrink)
This article argues that the causal theory of action cannot explain conscious human action adequately. Interpreting actions as bodily movements caused by (mental) states internal to the agent does not do justice to the particular role of the agent herself as ‘performing’ or ‘bringing about’ the action in the light of specific reasons. The only thing one can say about actions being distinct from other bodily movements such as automatic physiological processes or reflexes will employ again the concept of action (...) resp. of the agent doing something consciously. Therefore the thesis is defended that the concept of conscious action resp. human agency is a basic concept referring to the basic capacity of human persons to perform actions consciously. This capacity cannot be reduced to other phenomena within the agent such as mental states and causal mechanisms regulating and guiding human behaviour. If this view of human agency is correct, it sets a limit to attempts of naturalising the human person. (shrink)
Wer der Frage nachgeht, was jemand tut, der geht – wenigstens implizit – auch der Frage nach, wer da etwas tut. Handlungen schreiben wir normalerweise Personen zu. Handeln zu können ist eine derjenigen Eigenschaften, die Personen auszeichnet. Die Analyse menschlichen Handelns geht mit der Frage einher, was menschliche Personen sind. Folgender Beitrag befasst sich mit dem Verhältnis von Handlung und Person innerhalb der kausalen Theorie des Handelns. Durch eine eingehende Analyse dieses weitverbreiteten Ansatzes zur Erklärung und Deutung menschlichen Handelns sollen (...) Implikationen für den Begriff des Handelnden herausgearbeitet werden. (shrink)
This article is a contribution to what we might call „commonsense-ontology“. The aim is to defend the commonsensical distinction between living beings and artefacts on the basis of ontological arguments. The distinction between living beings and artefacts is increasingly difficult to draw because of new developments in biotechnology. For developing criteria of an acceptable distinction I defend the existence of artefacts first. Subsequently I discuss three criteria how we might sensibly distinguish between living beings and artefacts. These criteria are metabolism, (...) active powers and the capacity to develop. In this context I rely on the ontological distinction between unity and whole. (shrink)
Die intensive Auseinandersetzung mit Dispositionen und Kausalkräften innerhalb der analytischen Ontologie hat wesentlich dazu beigetragen, in der Handlungstheorie offener und ungenierter von den Kausalkräften des Handelnden („agent causal powers“) bzw. der Agenskausalität (AK) zu sprechen. In diesem Beitrag gehe ich auf diese Entwicklung ein, indem ich aktuelle Ansätze agenskausaler libertarischer Willensfreiheit (ALW) diskutiere. Zuerst stelle ich kurz die Konkurrenztheorie von ALW dar, welche libertarische Willensfreiheit im Rahmen ereigniskausaler Ansätze (ELW) zu entfalten versucht. Dann skizziere ich zwei Haupteinwände, welche Vertreter von (...) ALW gegenüber ELW einbringen, nämlich den Zufallseinwand („problem of luck“) und das Problem des verschwindenden Handelnden („problem of the disappearing agent“). Im Anschluss daran argumentiere ich dafür, dass Agenskausalität den Kontrolleinwand nur dann beheben kann, wenn sie nicht als rein kausales, sondern zusätzlich auch als ein rationales Vermögen bestimmt wird. Ich schließe mit einigen Überlegungen, inwiefern eine Metaphysik der Kausalkräfte positiv zur Fortführung dieser Diskussion beitragen kann, und wo die Grenzen eines solchen metaphysischen Ansatzes zu zeichnen sind. (shrink)
This book is the first systematic treatment of the strengths and limitations of personal and a-personal conceptions of the divine. It features contributions from Jewish, Islamic, Chinese, Indian and naturalistic backgrounds in addition to those working within a decidedly Christian framework. This book discusses whether the concept of God in classical theism is coherent at all and whether the traditional understanding of some of the divine attributes need to be modified. The contributors explore what the proposed spiritual and practical merits (...) and demerits of personal and a-personal conceptions of God might be. Additionally, their diverse perspectives reflect a broader trend within the analytic philosophy of religion to incorporate various non-Western religious traditions. Tackling these issues carefully is needed to do justice to the strengths and limitations of personal and a-personal accounts to the divine. The Divine Nature: Personal and A-Personal Perspectives will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. (shrink)
Das Handbuch dokumentiert die Bedeutung der analytischen Philosophie für den religionsphilosophischen und theologischen Diskurs erstmalig in kompakter Weise für den deutschsprachigen Raum. Ausgehend von der analytischen Methode, den Vorboten und den maßgeblichen Vertretern der analytischen Religionsphilosophie, wird der Blick auf die wichtigsten etablierten Diskurse, wie etwa die Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes, das Verhältnis Gott – Mensch und Gott – Welt, sowie auf aktuelle Debatten gelenkt. Dabei kommen sowohl der „Neue Atheismus“, die Attraktivität a-personaler Gottesbegriffe als auch der religiöse Pluralismus zur (...) Sprache. (shrink)
Analytic philosophy of religion has witnessed a significant increase in interest in the ontological presuppositions of the various theological doctrines. This special issue collects new essays on various divine attributes.
SummaryHolm Tetens develops in his book „Gott denken. Ein Versuch über rationale Theologie“ theoretical and practical arguments against a naturalistic and in favour of a theistic understanding of reality. In my paper I focus on Teten’s claim that we are rationally justified to hope for the truth of classical theism. I distinguish between rationally justified and unjustified forms of hope and argue that we are rationally justified to hope for the redemption of reality as promised by classical theism. However, this (...) hope has a weaker basis of justification than Tetens seems to assume because serious objections to classical theism ought to be taken into consideration as well. (shrink)
Many ethicists believe that moral statements can be true or false because there exist truthmakers for them. If these truth-makers are not conceived as natural but as moral facts „sui generis“ then we arrive at a position dubbed non-naturalistic moral realism (Non-NMR). This article tackles the question whether Non-NMR is persuasive. It is argued that metaphysics of supervenience and constitution between natural and moral facts will not suffice. Instead, Non-NMR should allow for moral standards or principles as abstract normative entities (...) in its ontology. These abstract normative entities are instantiated in our actions and thereby determine their moral quality. If we call an action „good“ or „bad“ we do not describe an action’s natural features but the moral standard realized in it. (shrink)
Alternative Gotteskonzepte gibt es viele. Im Grunde ist jedes Gotteskonzept eine Alternative für andere Gotteskonzepte. Die Frage nach alternativen Gotteskonzepten ist somit eine Frage der Perspektive. In der gegenwärtigen analytischen Religionsphilosophie werden unter dem Begriff ›alternative Gotteskonzepte‹ Gottesvorstellungen zusammengefasst, die sich implizit oder explizit von dem in der Diskussion vorherrschenden christlich inspirierten theistischen Gottesbegriff abheben. Die Ausgangsperspektive ist also der durch die westlich-christlich geprägte Tradition theistische Gottesbegriff, während Abweichungen davon als alternative Gottesbegriffe gelten.
Eleonore Stump’s intensive work on theodicy culminates in her opus magnum Wandering in Darkness. Her explicit thesis with regard to the evidential problem of evil is: From the background of a Christian worldview even terrible sufferings can be conceived as a necessary and indispensable part of a healing process through which God guides human beings from their postlapsarian sinful state towards their ultimate end, communion with God and fellow human beings. Stump pursues this aim by the use of biblical narratives (...) as a way of sharing interpersonal experiences between God and men. In this article I present the main steps of Stump’s argument. Then I discuss whether she is successful in her attempt to treat human suffering and the loss of one’s deepest desires as appropriately as she claims. Finally I outline the explanatory limits of this, and most probably, every theodicy by means of the concept of a worldview. (shrink)
Die Frage, was Religionsphilosophie eigentlich ist, ist eine Meta-Frage, da sie nach der spezifischen Eigenart religionsphilosophischer Reflexion fragt. Diese Frage ist schwierig zu beantworten, da Religionen äußerst komplexe Phänomene sind. Zum einen gibt es eine schier unendliche Vielfalt an unterschiedlichen existierenden Religionen und religiösen Praktiken.