In der Neonatologie—wie auch in anderen Bereichen der Intensivmedizin—müssen Ärzte und Pflegende häufig die ethisch schwierige Entscheidung treffen, ob die Therapie eines schwer kranken Patienten intensiviert oder eingeschränkt werden soll. In der Literatur existieren verschiedene Instrumente zur Entscheidungsfindung, die, angewandt im Rahmen ethischer Konsile, die Nachvollziehbarkeit einer ausgesprochenen Empfehlung gewährleisten sollen. Zwei dieser verfügbaren Modelle („Schema zur ethischen Urteilsbildung nach dem Muster der aristotelischen Ethik“, Honnefelder 1994 und die „Nimwegener Methode für ethische Fallbesprechung“, Gordijn 1998) wurden anhand klinischer Fälle auf (...) ihre Anwendbarkeit in der Neonatologie hin untersucht. Unsere Studie zeigt, dass die Verwendung eines Entscheidungshilfeinstruments zwar grundsätzlich sinnvoll ist, deckt aber gleichzeitig den Konkretisierungsbedarf der oben genannten Modelle beim Einsatz in der Neonatologie auf. Der daraufhin entwickelte „Kölner Arbeitsbogen zur ethischen Entscheidungsfindung in der Neonatologie“ stellt ein auf die speziellen Bedürfnisse der Neonatologie ausgerichtetes Schema dar und könnte damit eine Lücke für den rasant expandierenden Bereich der Früh- und Neugeborenenmedizin schließen. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der Neonatologie—wie auch in anderen Bereichen der Intensivmedizin—müssen Ärzte und Pflegende häufig die ethisch schwierige Entscheidung treffen, ob die Therapie eines schwer kranken Patienten intensiviert oder eingeschränkt werden soll. In der Literatur existieren verschiedene Instrumente zur Entscheidungsfindung, die, angewandt im Rahmen ethischer Konsile, die Nachvollziehbarkeit einer ausgesprochenen Empfehlung gewährleisten sollen. Zwei dieser verfügbaren Modelle („Schema zur ethischen Urteilsbildung nach dem Muster der aristotelischen Ethik“, Honnefelder 1994 und die „Nimwegener Methode für ethische Fallbesprechung“, Gordijn 1998) wurden anhand klinischer Fälle auf (...) ihre Anwendbarkeit in der Neonatologie hin untersucht. Unsere Studie zeigt, dass die Verwendung eines Entscheidungshilfeinstruments zwar grundsätzlich sinnvoll ist, deckt aber gleichzeitig den Konkretisierungsbedarf der oben genannten Modelle beim Einsatz in der Neonatologie auf. Der daraufhin entwickelte „Kölner Arbeitsbogen zur ethischen Entscheidungsfindung in der Neonatologie“ stellt ein auf die speziellen Bedürfnisse der Neonatologie ausgerichtetes Schema dar und könnte damit eine Lücke für den rasant expandierenden Bereich der Früh- und Neugeborenenmedizin schließen. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der Neonatologie—wie auch in anderen Bereichen der Intensivmedizin—müssen Ärzte und Pflegende häufig die ethisch schwierige Entscheidung treffen, ob die Therapie eines schwer kranken Patienten intensiviert oder eingeschränkt werden soll. In der Literatur existieren verschiedene Instrumente zur Entscheidungsfindung, die, angewandt im Rahmen ethischer Konsile, die Nachvollziehbarkeit einer ausgesprochenen Empfehlung gewährleisten sollen. Zwei dieser verfügbaren Modelle („Schema zur ethischen Urteilsbildung nach dem Muster der aristotelischen Ethik“, Honnefelder 1994 und die „Nimwegener Methode für ethische Fallbesprechung“, Gordijn 1998) wurden anhand klinischer Fälle auf (...) ihre Anwendbarkeit in der Neonatologie hin untersucht. Unsere Studie zeigt, dass die Verwendung eines Entscheidungshilfeinstruments zwar grundsätzlich sinnvoll ist, deckt aber gleichzeitig den Konkretisierungsbedarf der oben genannten Modelle beim Einsatz in der Neonatologie auf. Der daraufhin entwickelte „Kölner Arbeitsbogen zur ethischen Entscheidungsfindung in der Neonatologie“ stellt ein auf die speziellen Bedürfnisse der Neonatologie ausgerichtetes Schema dar und könnte damit eine Lücke für den rasant expandierenden Bereich der Früh- und Neugeborenenmedizin schließen. (shrink)

A new cosmopolitan world order founded on peace-related diversity of human expressions is likely to strengthen the weaker individual. Such order remains nevertheless meritocratic because it would contribute to materialize enhanced equality between individuals belonging to human groups of different strengths with respect to access to power, wealth or popularity. Therefore, in comparison to existing orders, it would arguably create a better basis for freedom and solidarity as well as for peace between human groups, including states. The originality of this (...) theory rests on three pillars. First and foremost, it is built upon the diversity of human expressions in connection with peace as elements which arguably determine directly or indirectely the contents of all legal, social or moral norms. Secondly, it provides the foundation for a new cosmopolitan system promoting moderation against “groupism” that does not require any decision making by unanimity, majority or diktat, but can be implemented by any individual vis-à-vis any other individuals and human groups without any form of institution. Third, this theory relies on a consistency test between an imaginary situation under a veil of ignorance about group affiliations on the one hand and a situation referring to a specific historical reality on the other hand. The coherence test is conditioned by the fear of belonging to the weaker human groups which should procure a universal validity to it by relying on average risk aversion of human beings. The comparison between these two positions shall allow for a verification of consistency in relation to peacerelated human diversity when it comes to assessing existing legal, social and moral norms or to create and implement new ones. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Obschon Hadrians Reisen immer die Aufmerksamkeit der Forschung auf sich gezogen haben, machen neue Quellenfunde eine neue, gründliche Untersuchung der kaiserlichen Route, aber auch von Hadrians Absichten und Ziele nötig; auch die Reaktionen der Provinzialen erscheinen so in neuem Licht. Zunächst werden Kriterien für einen persönlichen Besuch des Kaisers in den Provinzen erarbeitet, um vor diesem Hintergrund neugefundene Inschriften und Münzen in den historischen Kontext einzuordnen. Im Folgenden wird die Route, die der kaiserliche Tross 131 von Ägypten über (...) Syrien und das westliche Kleinasien nach Nordgriechenland genommen hat, diskutiert; in diesem Zusammenhang ist die Gründung des Antinoos-Kultes ebenso von besonderer Bedeutung wie die Frage nach den Gründen von Hadrians Beliebtheit unter den Provinzialen. Obschon dieser Teil der Reise bisher als besonders schlecht dokumentiert galt, schließt sich nun die Lücke zwischen dem bekannten Besuch des Kaisers in Ägypten und seinem letzten Aufenthalt in Athen. (shrink)

Johannes de Sacroboscos (c. 1195–c. 1256) De sphaera, eine Einführung in die Kosmologie aus dem 13. Jahrhundert, war mit über 320 Drucken das am häufigsten edierte, kommentierte oder adaptierte astronomisch-kosmologische Handbuch der Frühen Neuzeit. Während die Rezeption und Verbreitung dieses Werkes im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert bereits vielfach untersucht wurden ist bisher übersehen worden, dass diese vermeintlich unproblematischen Sphaera-Textbücher auch vielfach Gegenstand der katholischen Zensur wurden, obwohl sie gerade eine Kosmologie enthielten, die Katholiken als Bollwerk gegen den aufkommenden Kopernikanismus betrachteten. (...) Vorliegender Aufsatz untersucht erstmals die Dynamik und Motive der zahlreichen präventiven und posthumen Zensuren der römischen und iberischen Index- und Zensurorgane mit Bezug auf diesen Kosmologietraktat. Von protestantischen Autoren verfasste Kommentare zur Sphaera waren zwar prinzipiell verdächtig, wurden aber selten pauschal verboten. Vielmehr wurden sie aufgrund ihres wissenschaftlichen Wertes meist genehmigt, nachdem geringfügige, theologiebezogene Expurgationen durchgeführt worden waren. Der Kommentar (1550) des katholischen Autors Mauro da Firenze (1493–1556) wurde hingegen wiederholt und prinzipiell verboten, weil er theologisch bedenkliche Gedanken enthielt. Die hier präsentierte Fallstudie soll zum einen die Wissensdynamik der frühneuzeitlichen Sphaera-Tradition aus einem neuen Blickwinkel beleuchten, und zwar dem der Buchzensur. Zum anderen gewährt ein buchbezogener Längsschnitt Einblicke in die Ideologie und Praktiken der katholischen Buchzensur, wodurch auch die bekanntermaßen problematische Beziehung von Wissen und Religion in der vormodernen Zeit im Lichte einer Konfessionalisierung der Wissenschaften erscheint. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungJohannes de Sacroboscos (c. 1195–c. 1256) De sphaera, eine Einführung in die Kosmologie aus dem 13. Jahrhundert, war mit über 320 Drucken das am häufigsten edierte, kommentierte oder adaptierte astronomisch-kosmologische Handbuch der Frühen Neuzeit. Während die Rezeption und Verbreitung dieses Werkes im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert bereits vielfach untersucht wurden ist bisher übersehen worden, dass diese vermeintlich unproblematischen Sphaera-Textbücher auch vielfach Gegenstand der katholischen Zensur wurden, obwohl sie gerade eine Kosmologie enthielten, die Katholiken als Bollwerk gegen den aufkommenden Kopernikanismus betrachteten. (...) Vorliegender Aufsatz untersucht erstmals die Dynamik und Motive der zahlreichen präventiven und posthumen Zensuren der römischen und iberischen Index- und Zensurorgane mit Bezug auf diesen Kosmologietraktat. Von protestantischen Autoren verfasste Kommentare zur Sphaera waren zwar prinzipiell verdächtig, wurden aber selten pauschal verboten. Vielmehr wurden sie aufgrund ihres wissenschaftlichen Wertes meist genehmigt, nachdem geringfügige, theologiebezogene Expurgationen durchgeführt worden waren. Der Kommentar (1550) des katholischen Autors Mauro da Firenze (1493–1556) wurde hingegen wiederholt und prinzipiell verboten, weil er theologisch bedenkliche Gedanken enthielt. Die hier präsentierte Fallstudie soll zum einen die Wissensdynamik der frühneuzeitlichen Sphaera-Tradition aus einem neuen Blickwinkel beleuchten, und zwar dem der Buchzensur. Zum anderen gewährt ein buchbezogener Längsschnitt Einblicke in die Ideologie und Praktiken der katholischen Buchzensur, wodurch auch die bekanntermaßen problematische Beziehung von Wissen und Religion in der vormodernen Zeit im Lichte einer Konfessionalisierung der Wissenschaften erscheint. (shrink)

Ausgehend von einer Verortung der Kategorie der ethischen Tugend im Feld der Tugenden überhaupt wird deren Struktur und ontologischer Status zunächst anhand von sieben grundlegenden Merkmalen näher bestimmt, um dann aus normativer Perspektive das für sie konstitutive Zusammenspiel von kognitiver, motivationaler und affektiver Dimension zu charakterisieren. Abschließend wird im Licht von drei konkurrierenden philosophischen Modellen der Frage nachgegangen, was es überhaupt erlaubt, einen bestimmten Charakterzug als Tugend zu bestimmen.

Werk und Wirkung. Die "Politik" ist die bedeutendste staatsphilosophische Schrift des Aristoteles; aus ihr bildete sich schon früh die abendländische Tradition politischen Denkens. Vom Hellenismus über Spätantike und Mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert die verschlungene Geschichte des politischen Aristotelismus ist bislang nur lückenhaft aufgearbeitet. Die in diesem Band versammelten Kapitel werfen ein neues Licht auf die komplexen Nachwirkungen der aristotelischen "Politik".

Wissenschaftler verschiedener Fachrichtungen (Theologen, Historiker, Padagogen, Literaturwissenschaftler und Musikwissenschaftler) haben sich 2017 mit der Frage befasst, wie weit Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) durch eine Interpretation seiner Position in Weimar als Superintendent besser verstanden werden konnte, arbeitend unter dem Bilde Luthers, sich diesem lebenslang verpflichtet fuhlend auch als Aufklarer. Kann man den "Theologen unter den Klassikern" aus dem Geflecht der Beziehungen zu Goethe, Schiller und Wieland losen, aus seinen Beziehungen zum Hof, zur Stadt, zur Schule in Weimar? Andererseits lebte er autonom (...) aus der Idee, das Erbe der Reformation fur eine neue Zeit umformen zu mussen. Aus diesen Fragestellungen fallt neues Licht auf die deutsche Geistesgeschichte, auf die Herder gerade als Protestant massgeblich eingewirkt hat. Mit Beitragen von:Martin Bollacher, Claas Cordemann, Corinna Dahlgrun, Stefanie Freyer, Stefan Gerber, Hans-Werner Hahn, Henry Hope, Martin Kessler, Roland M. Lehmann, Johannes von Lupke, Michael Maurer, Hans-Jurgen Schrader, Christopher Spehr, Michael Winkler. (shrink)

Difficult Atheism shows how contemporary French philosophy is rethinking the legacy of the death of God in ways that take the debate beyond the narrow confines of atheism into the much broader domain of post-theological thinking. Christopher Watkin argues that Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux each elaborate a distinctive approach to the post-theological, but that each approach still struggles to do justice to the death of God.

In this article Cristoph Wulf examines the basic concepts of pedagogy and educational science in the German-speaking world, looking at education and socialization from the perspective of educational anthropology. He makes evident that the complex German concept of Bildung, in particular, can only be fully understood by means of a historical and philosophical analysis.

Do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously? A number of philosophers have investigated this question by examining whether famous athletes are subject to special role model obligations (Wellman 2003; Feezel 2005; Spurgin 2012). In this paper we will take a different approach and give a positive response to this question by arguing for the position that sport and gaming celebrities are ‘ambassadors of the game’: moral agents whose vocations as rule-followers have unique implications for their non-lusory lives. According (...) to this idea, the actions of a game’s players and other stakeholders—especially the actions of its stars—directly affect the value of the game itself, a fact which generates additional moral reasons to behave in a virtuous manner. We will begin by explaining the three main positions one may take with respect to the question: moral exceptionalism, moral generalism, and moral exemplarism. We will argue that no convincing case for moral exemplarism has thus far been made, which gives us reason to look for new ways to defend this position. We then provide our own ‘ambassadors of the game’ account and argue that it gives us good reason to think that sport and game celebrities are subject to special obligations to act virtuously. (shrink)

This paper argues that we should replace the common classification of theories of welfare into the categories of hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories. The tripartite classification is objectionable because it is unduly narrow and it is confusing: it excludes theories of welfare that are worthy of discussion, and it obscures important distinctions. In its place, the paper proposes two independent classifications corresponding to a distinction emphasised by Roger Crisp: a four-category classification of enumerative theories (about which items constitute (...) welfare), and a four-category classification of explanatory theories (about why these items constitute welfare). (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the role of perspective in Hegel’s metaphysics, and in particular the role that multiple perspectives play within the ultimate structure in Hegel’s metaphysics, which Hegel calls ‘the idea [die Idee].’ My (somewhat anachronistic) way into this topic will be to inquire about Hegel’s stance on what Adrian Moore has called ‘absolute representations.’ I argue for the claim that perspective is maintained, even in the absolute idea, which generates the task of understanding the nature of that (...) perspective and its compatibility with absoluteness. I attempt to accomplish this task by asking what a logical perspective could be, and how it might be related to visual perspective. Then I inquire into the relation that perspectives have to each other, i.e., to the system of perspectives. I construe those relations in reciprocal and dynamic terms, so that absoluteness takes the form of a structured round of perspectives rather than a relation to reality “once and for all”. (shrink)

Authentizitat ist ein in unserem kulturellen Raum allgegenwartiges Phanomen. Doch wem oder was begegnen wir, wenn wir meinen, uns selbst verwirklichen oder alternativ einfach uns selbst treu sein zu mussen? Christoph Wiesinger zeigt, dass wir auf ein Selbst geworfen werden, das zwar als homogener Nukleus der Person projiziert werden kann, sich aber bei genauerem Hinsehen als komplexe sozial verinnerlichte Struktur entpuppt. Das Selbst ist keineswegs objektiv zu fassen, sondern unterliegt sozialen Genesen und wird durch soziale Adressierung unterschiedlich formiert. Das (...) Ereignis von Authentizitat gibt somit Anlass zur Reflexion der Differenz zwischen Erwartung und Erfahrung. Christoph Wiesinger legt die Strukturen des Phanomens der Authentizitat frei, zeigt die theologischen Implikationen auf und diskutiert die praktisch-theologischen Konsequenzen. (shrink)

This chapter surveys hybrid theories of well-being. It also discusses some criticisms, and suggests some new directions that philosophical discussion of hybrid theories might take.

Group-based reasons are reasons to play one’s part in some pattern of action that the members of some group could perform, because of the good features of the pattern. This paper discusses three broad conceptions of such reasons. According to the agency-first conception, there are no group-based reasons in cases where the relevant group is not or would not be itself an agent. According to the behaviour-first conception, what matters is that the other members of the group would play their (...) parts in the relevant pattern, not whether they would have the cooperative intentional states constitutive of group agency in doing so. This paper argues against these conceptions and in favour of the powers-first conception, according to which what matters is that the members of the group have practically relevant powers. (shrink)

What makes philosophy on the continent of Europe so different and exciting? And why does it have such a reputation for being 'difficult'? Continental philosophy was initiated amid the revolutionary ferment of the 18th century, philosophers such as Kant and Hegel confronting the extremism of the time with theories that challenged the very formation of individual and social consciousness. Covering the great philosophers of the modern and postmodern eras – from Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze right to up Agamben and (...) Žižek – and philosophical movements from German idealism to deconstruction and feminism – Christopher Kul-Want and Piero brilliantly elucidate some of the most thrilling and powerful ideas ever to have been discussed. (shrink)

What does social justice require in contemporary societies? What are the requirements of social democracy? Who and where are the individuals and groups that can carry forward agendas for progressive social transformation? What are we to make of the so-called new social movements of the last thirty years? Is identity politics compatible with egalitarianism? Can cultural misrecognition and economic maldistribution be fought simultaneously? What of the heritage of Western Marxism is alive and dead? And how is current critical social theory (...) to approach these and other questions? Much of the most productive work done in recent social theory has revolved around such issues, in particular, around those concerning the relationship between the politics of recognition and the politics of distribution. After the intense theoretical focus over the last fifteen years or so on the issues of recognition politics—multiculturalism, multi-nationalism, identity politics, group-differentiated rights, the accommodation of difference, and so on—some social theorists have worried that attention has been diverted from important issues of distributive equality—systematic impoverishment, increasing material inequality, ‘structural’ unemployment, the growth of oligarchic power, global economic segmentation, and so on. While some critics seem to have adopted a blunt ‘it’s the economy, stupid’ line of criticism,1 others have attempted to develop an overarching, integrative theoretical framework adequate to the diverse issues concerning both economic and cultural justice. For example, Axel Honneth proposes that a suitably developed and normatively robust theory of intersubjective recognition can adequately integrate an analysis of apparently diverse contemporary struggles: those for a just division of labor and hence, a fair distribution of resources and opportunities, as well as those for a culture free of identity-deforming disrespect and denigration. (shrink)

Die Kernthese der Paracelsischen Naturphilosophie, die Ahnlichkeit von Mensch und Welt, festgelegt in der Analogie von Mikro- und Makrokosmos, enthullt einen -Code-, der als konstitutives Moment samtliche Aussagen auf einer prakonzeptionellen Ebene organisiert, samtliche Teilbereiche in ihrer funktionalen Bedeutung fur das -Ganze- markiert und schliesslich im Sinne Foucaults zu einer -diskursiven Formation- werden lasst. Die auf diese Weise vorgefuhrte Erfahrungsform von Welt und Natur steht zu dem neuzeitlich-technischen Verfugungswissen in einer historischen Diskontinuitat.".

Bernard Freydberg’s recent work is a careful and compact study of David Hume’s signature texts: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), An Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals (1751), and “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757). Contrary to traditional epistemological readings that comfortably situate Hume as an empiricist naturalist, Freydberg argues that he is better understood as a profound thinker of imagination and Socratic ignorance. Hume’s figurative and Platonic argumentation varies in each text, but Freydberg makes a convincing case that his (...) theoretical, moral, and aesthetic philosophies share a proto-phenomenological center in the artistry of human nature and perception. (shrink)

This article proposes a way of understanding Kantianism, act-utilitarianism and some other important ethical theories according to which they are all versions of the same kind of theory, sharing a common structure. I argue that this is a profitable way to understand the theories discussed. It is charitable to the theories concerned; it emphasizes the common ground between them; it gives us insights into the differences between them; and it provides a method for generating new ethical theories worth studying. The (...) article briefly discusses the relationship between these ideas and some other recent proposals that emphasize the common ground between Kantianism and versions of consequentialism. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The paper argues for this conclusion by examining (...) uses of the idea of an extended unit of action in four theoretical contexts. It also explains why the idea of an extended unit of action need not involve magical thinking, and discusses possible replies to an objection based on a worry about recklessness. (shrink)

Are we witnessing progress or regress in the recent increasing popularity and electoral success of populist politicians and parties in consolidated democratic nations? ... Is the innovative use of popular referendum in Great Britain to settle fundamental constitutional questions a progressive or regressive innovation? ... Similarly, is the increasing use of constituent assemblies to change constitutions across the world evidence of progress in democratic constitutionalism, or, a worryingly regressive change back toward unmediated popular majoritarianism? ... This paper reflects on some (...) of the perils and promise of framing such questions with the conceptual couplet of progress and regress. It considers four compelling critiques of the use of ‘progress’ and its cognates in sociopolitical theory, as well as arguing that such concepts are nevertheless ineliminable for our normative theories. The paper concludes by suggesting that we can avoid the most serious problems by employing only conceptions of political progress and regress that are piecemeal, pragmatic, and processual. (shrink)

Our reception of Hegel’s theory of action faces a fundamental difficulty: on the one hand, that theory is quite clearly embedded in a social theory of modern life, but on the other hand most of the features of the society that gave that embedding its specific content have become almost inscrutably strange to us (e.g., the estates and the monarchy). Thus we find ourselves in the awkward position of stressing the theory’s sociality even as we scramble backwards to distance ourselves (...) from the particular social institutions that gave conceptualized form to such sociality in Hegel’s own opinion. My attempt in this article is to make our position less awkward by giving us at least one social-ontological leg to stand on. Specifically, I want to defend a principled and conceptual pluralism as forming the heart of Hegel’s theory of action. If this view can be made out, then we will have a social-ontological structure that might be filled out in different ways in Hegel’s time and our own while simultaneously giving real teeth to the notion that Hegel’s theory of action is essentially social. (shrink)

Theorists of public reason such as John Rawls often idealize constitutional courts as exemplars of public reason. This paper raises questions about the seduction and limits of analogies between theorists’ account of public reason and actual constitutional jurisprudence. Examining the work product of the United States Supreme Court, the paper argues that while it does engage in reason-giving to support its decisions—as the public reason strategy suggests— those reasons are (largely) legalistic and specifically juristic reasons—not the theorists’ idealized moral-political reasons (...) on matters of fundamental principle. But if constitutional courts do not engage on matters of fundamental principle, then a public reason strategy for assuaging democratic worries about judicial review would no longer be open: prominent liberal and deliberative democratic theorists could no longer point to the alleged superiority of constitutional courts to speak in the name of, and for, the people’s shared political principles. The paper extends beyond the U.S. case study by pointing to three institutional factors explaining the disanalogy between what some constitutional courts do and what public reason theories require them to do. It concludes with considerations about whether the public reason strategy might be more successfully applied to international courts. (shrink)

This paper connects two ideas. The first is that some common responses to ethical views are responses to their degrees of pragmatism, where a view’s degree of pragmatism is its sensitivity to ethically relevant changes in the actor’s circumstances. I claim that we feel the pull of opposing pro-pragmatic and antipragmatic intuitions in certain cases. This suggests a project, of searching for an ethical view capable of doing justice to these opposing intuitions in some way. The second central idea is (...) that a theory of pattern-based reasons looks more promising than the obvious alternatives to fulfil this role, amongst Teleological theories at least. Pattern-based reasons are reasons to perform some action because of the goodness or rightness of a larger pattern of action—such as a pattern that a group could perform or that the actor could perform over an extended period—of which the immediate action is a mere part. Existing theories of such reasons share two features that prevent them explaining the intuitions we wish to explain: they consider only one pattern at a time (they are monist), and they treat patterns as eligible only if the agents concerned are willing to realise them (they accept the Willingness Requirement). But we need not accept these doctrines. Moreover, a theory of patternbased reasons without them is able to explain the pro- and anti-pragmatic intuitions in an elegant way, and has other attractive features. (shrink)

In classical speculation on medical matters health is conceived of as a bodily statewhich is in accordance with Nature. It is a state of natural balance in the mixture (complexio) of the primary qualities of the human body. Although few of the details in theancient natural philosophy and the Galenic philosophy of health have survived, it is important to note that two of the ancient ideas still influence the thoughts: the idea ofa balance between opposing elements or forces, and, in (...) particular, the idea of a natural or normal state of the living organism. In the actual reflection there is a forceful attempt to formulate a conception of health and disease in terms of biological norms where the interpretation is unambiguous. According to this conception the biological norms are related to certain natural goals (e.g. survival). These goals are not attributed to the body for the outside, but belong to the internal constitution of the body. In this paper the author wants to present the essential tenets and main merits of such a theory, more precisely the bio-statistical theory of the American philosopher Christopher Boorse. In a second phase he points out a critical assessment of this perspective, mainly focussing on the claims of a value-free scientific approach and of neutrality. (shrink)

One of the most important elements of Hegel’s philosophical anthropology is his moral psychology. In particular, his understanding of the relation between motivations and reason plays a crucial intermediate role in connecting his anthropological meditations on the complete nature of the human being with his political theory of actualized freedom. Whereas recent important work on Hegel’s moral psychology has detected a Kantian distinction between natural desires and the rational perspective, the activity of practical reason actually takes place within motivations themselves (...) on Hegel’s view. The exercise of the free, rational will is best understood in terms of its role in shaping the experience of malleable, indeterminate motivations. Rather than stepping back, the free agent on Hegel’s account delves further into the motivation, acting on it in the dual sense of being guided by and transforming it. This is what it means for Hegel to conceive of agency as self-expression while maintaining the centrality of reason for Free Will. Hegel says that when we go further into the motivations in this way, we should stop speaking of motivation in terms of drives and instead begin speaking of character. (shrink)

In the Gorgias, Plato explores the relationship between statesmanship and rhetoric. Socrates argues that the true statesman uses the true rhetoric in the attempt to make others better through speeches. In the conversation with Gorgias, Socrates forces him to see the potentially disastrous consequences of teaching a kind of rhetoric that is morally neutral, which suggests the need for an uncompromisingly true or just rhetoric. In the exchange with Polus, Socrates attempts the just reformation of rhetoric into true rhetoric to (...) counter the unjust rhetoric of Polus. In his discussion with Callicles, Socrates uses the true rhetoric to try to moderate him, but his failure reveals the limits of true statesmanship. By examining these three exchanges, I shed light on a unique and neglected paradox of the Gorgias. As clearly as the dialogue articulates what constitutes a true statesman, it challenges his own practice. Socrates, as the true statesman possessing the true rhetoric, is powerless to achieve his goals. However, a potential way to expand the success of the true statesman can be seen by going back to the discourse between Socrates and Gorgias and forging an alliance between them. (shrink)

The increasing use of Artificial Intelligence for making decisions in public affairs has sparked a lively debate on the benefits and potential harms of self-learning technologies, ranging from the hopes of fully informed and objectively taken decisions to fear for the destruction of mankind. To prevent the negative outcomes and to achieve accountable systems, many have argued that we need to open up the “black box” of AI decision-making and make it more transparent. Whereas this debate has primarily focused on (...) how transparency can secure high-quality, fair, and reliable decisions, far less attention has been devoted to the role of transparency when it comes to how the general public come to perceive AI decision-making as legitimate and worthy of acceptance. Since relying on coercion is not only normatively problematic but also costly and highly inefficient, perceived legitimacy is fundamental to the democratic system. This paper discusses how transparency in and about AI decision-making can affect the public’s perception of the legitimacy of decisions and decision-makers and produce a framework for analyzing these questions. We argue that a limited form of transparency that focuses on providing justifications for decisions has the potential to provide sufficient ground for perceived legitimacy without producing the harms full transparency would bring. (shrink)

Details the role that giants have played in the history of humankind. _...style is breezy and accessible...a pleasant browse._ --BOOKLIST.

This chapter discusses the analysis of Joseph Raz on coercion, trust, and citizenship. The chapter starts with a number of brief comments on some of his observations regarding the doctrine of liberty and the preference for minimum government. The chapter also includes one of Raz's arguments that states that some people favour non-perfectionist forms of government out of a misunderstanding of the implications of perfectionism for liberty.

This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p. We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while untethering belief from assertion. The PtK‐norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other‐regarding, allowing asserters to act in the (...) best interests of their audience when psychological pressures would otherwise prevent them from communicating the knowable truth. (shrink)