This paper discusses the concept of information formulated by Michael (Michał) Heller. Heller—a philosopher, theoretical physicist, cosmologist, and theologian—provided a complex image of information and its role in nature, which is rarely found in studies of information. Heller posited that the laws of nature may be interpreted as information, or as providing information, presenting this as a complementary view to scientific structuralism (not discussed in this paper). According to Heller, the informational content of a structure in nature is inversely proportional (...) to that structure’s degree of freedom. The more constrained or complex a structure is, and the less likely it is to exist, the more information it contains. In Heller’s view, the concept of information in Shannon’s Theory of Communication (ToC) is inadequate for expressing the notion of information beyond a numerical measure of a signal structure. Information in Heller’s research closely aligns with the concepts of Jacquette’s and Perzanowski’s combinatorial ontology (concepts not discussed in this paper) and the general theory of information (GTI) of Mark Burgin, although Heller did not explicitly make these connections. (shrink)

In philosophy, it is always refreshing to introduce unconventional ideas. It requires a certain audacity from the author; he or she may face the wall of silence or be shunned by academia, both treatments being undesirable. However, these are more rewarding than gathering laurels for beating the dead philosophical cats like Humes, Leibnitzs, Wittgensteins, Whiteheads, and others, a practice that for many philosophers is their life's opus. Bartłomiej Skowron’s book _Part and Whole: Towards Topo-Ontology_, published by Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej (...) in 2021, certainly does not fall into this category. Skowron undertakes a discovery trip into an unknown land in his book, exploring new philosophical territories. (shrink)

There are many ontologies of the world or of specific phenomena such as time, matter, space, and quantum mechanics1. However, ontologies of information are rather rare. One of the reasons behind this is that information is most frequently associated with communication and computing, and not with ‘the furniture of the world’. But what would be the nature of an ontology of information? For it to be of significant import it should be amenable to formalization in a logico-grammatical formalism. A candidate (...) ontology satisfying such a requirement can be found in some of the ideas of K. Turek, presented in this paper. Turek outlines the ontology of information conceived of as a part of nature, and provides the ‘missing link’ to the Z axiomatic set theory, offering a proposal for developing a formal ontology of information both in its philosophical and logicogrammatical representations. (shrink)

The concept of information can be viewed from two perspectives, namely epistemic and ontological. In the epistemic view, information is associated with meaning, semantics, and knowledge, while in the ontological view, it is understood as structures and forms of objects. Information is most often perceived as epistemic information, yet a closer look at epistemic information reveals that this concept does not account for ontological information. This paper poses the following question: Should we select epistemic or ontological information as our primary (...) concept of information, or should we acknowledge that both kinds of information are required for a full comprehension? The discussion here is supported by references to modern research in physics, computing, cosmology, and information sciences. (shrink)

There are many ontologies of the world or of specific phenomena such as time, matter, space, and quantum mechanics1. However, ontologies of information are rather rare. One of the reasons behind this is that information is most frequently associated with communication and computing, and not with ‘the furniture of the world’. But what would be the nature of an ontology of information? For it to be of significant import it should be amenable to formalization in a logico-grammatical formalism. A candidate (...) ontology satisfying such a requirement can be found in some of the ideas of K. Turek, presented in this paper. Turek outlines the ontology of information conceived of as a part of nature, and provides the ‘missing link’ to the Z axiomatic set theory, offering a proposal for developing a formal ontology of information both in its philosophical and logicogrammatical representations. (shrink)

We argue that the Internet is, and is acting as, an EA because it shapes our belief systems, our worldviews. We explain key concepts for this discussion and provide illustrative examples to support our claims. Furthermore, we explain why recognising the Internet as an EA is important for Internet users and society in general. We discuss several ways in which the Internet influences the choices, beliefs, and attitudes of its users, and we compare this effect with those of psychological conditioning (...) and brainwashing techniques. Finally, we present examples where the Internet’s epistemic agency acts at scale, affecting large portions of society rather than individuals. (shrink)

Looking into the future is always a risky endeavour, but one way to anticipate the possible future shape of AI-driven societies is to examine the visionary works of some sci-fi writers. Not all sci-fi works have such visionary quality, of course, but some of Stanisław Lem’s works certainly do. We refer here to Lem’s works that explore the frontiers of science and technology and those that describe imaginary societies of robots. We therefore examine Lem’s prose, with a focus on the (...) Cyberiad stories, to see what challenges our future technological societies may face when they entrust their lives to AI technology. For example, what questions should we ask, and what questions do we forget to ask, when developing AI systems and allowing these systems to control our lives. The technologically honed minds of our current technocrats are perhaps too limited to guide us into this future, because AI-based technology is relatively unchartered territory, as any new, complex technology is by nature. Lem’s visions of future societies oriented around AI and robotics portray AI technology in a deeper and more nuanced way than the current technological visions offered by our leading technological prophets. Based on Lem’s visions, what is to come may not turn out to be an AI-driven nirvana. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the meta-ontology of AI systems with human-level intelligence, with us denoting such AI systems as AI E. Meta-ontology in philosophy is a discourse centered on ontology, ontological commitment, and the truth condition of ontological theories. We therefore discuss how meta-ontology is conceptualized for AI E systems. We posit that the meta-ontology of AI E systems is not concerned with computational representations of reality in the form of structures, data constructs, or computational concepts, while the ontological (...) commitment of AI E systems is directed toward what exists in the outside world. Furthermore, the truth condition of the ontology (which is meta-ontological assumption) of AI E systems does not require consistency with closed conceptual schema or ontological theories but rather with reality, or in other words, “what is the world” (Smith, 2019, p.57). In addition, the truth condition of AI E systems is verified through operational success rather than by coherence with theories. This work builds on ontological postulates about AI systems that were formulated by Brian Cantwell Smith (2019). (shrink)

Physical information is a property of nature. How does physical information persist over time? Does it do so as an object, process, or event, which are things considered in the current persistence theories? Physical information is none of these, however, this implies that persistence theories cannot explain the persistence of information. We therefore study the persistence of snowflakes, ephemeral natural structures, to better understand the persistence of natural things, such as physical information. The transitory nature of snowflakes suggests that physical (...) information persists as nature’s latent order, therefore, it is associated with natural structures, but it is not identical to them. This interpretation preserves the properties attributed to physical information, particularly its foundational character. The concept of physical information as latent order accords with Burgin’s General Theory of Information (GTI), which is currently the most comprehensive conceptualization of information that has been proposed. (shrink)

Presented here is a review of the book by Michael Wooldridge The Road to Conscious Machines: The Story of AI. The book was published in 2021 by Pelican Publishing Company. The book presents a philosophical exploration of the AI-related quest to understand the essence of our minds, ethics, and consciousness. Nonetheless, the book is unconventional as it focuses on failures of past AI programs rather than on AI success stories. The author also indicates the possible pathways to develop new, more (...) efficient AI paradigms. The short technical section at the end of the book offers more in-depth information on topics like Prolog, Bayesian, and deep neural networks. (shrink)

Book review: Contemporary Polish Ontology. Skowron, B., Philosophical Analysis, 82. Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2020. pp.320.

This special edition of Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce or ZFN) focuses on concepts of information and computing. On reading this issue, you may be surprised by the absence of traditional perspectives and themes that one would usually expect from such collections, but this apparent oversight is deliberate. The eight papers collected in this special edition of ZFN bring together perspectives that aim to inspire readers rather than confirm concepts that have already been researched. The main motivation (...) behind this collection is a desire to explore the philosophical dimensions of computing and information sciences. Thus, for anyone looking for new ideas related to the philosophy of computing and information and wondering what is on the horizon, this special edition of ZFN may be the place to start. (shrink)

James Lovelock, who is famous for the Gaia hypothesis, has written a new book called Novacene: The Coming Age of Hyperintelligence. It is an extended argument about an impending new epoch on Earth called Novacene in which biological life as we know it will evolve into lifeforms based on cyber technology built from non-biological materials. Novacene may be seen as a development of the ideas presented in Lovelock’s earlier book A Rough Guide to The Future. In Novacene, the Earth will (...) be populated by cyborgs, which are self-replicating and self-improving mechanical systems that will eventually dominate and rule the Earth. These cyborgs will possess intelligence and knowledge beyond our understanding. (shrink)

Social robotics are autonomous robots or Artificial Moral Agents (AMA), that will interact respect and embody human ethical values. However, the conceptual and practical problems of building such systems have not yet been resolved, playing a role of significant challenge for computational modeling. It seems that the lack of success in constructing robots, ceteris paribus, is due to the conceptual and algorithmic limitations of the current design of ethical robots. This paper proposes a new approach for developing ethical capacities in (...) robotic systems, one based on the concept of Aristotelian phronesis. Phronesis in principle reflexes closer human ethics than the ethical paradigms we employ today in ethical robotics. This paper describes the essential features of phronesis and proposes a high-level architecture for implementing phronetic principles in autonomous robots. Phronetic robotics is in its early stages of conceptualization, so many of the presented ideas are speculative and require further research.2. (shrink)

Book review of: M. Heller, _Przestrzenie Wszechświata_. Od geometrii do kosmologii, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2017, ss. 284.

Book review of: M. Heller, Przestrzenie Wszechświata. Od geometrii do kosmologii, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2017, ss. 284.

Zajmował się informatyką i telekomunikacją przez 30 lat. Obecnie koncentruje się na filozofii informatyki i w ramach pracy doktorskiej z filozofii na zagadnieniu istoty informacji. Doktorat uzyskał na Uniwersytecie w Londynie na podstawie dysertacji o przestrzennych algorytmach genetycznych. Opublikował kilka książek na temat sztucznej inteligencji, telekomunikacji i filozofii Tao.

Stuart Richie’s book discusses social, political, and cultural influences on science. In a series of well documented cases Richie shows how many of top scientific journals publish poorly executed studies with dubious conclusions. Such publications distort a public image of science as an unbiased search for truth. The roots of such practices, Richie traces to the way science enterprise is done in academia and in private research centers, where only positive and “expected” results are valued. While according to Richie there (...) is a small chance to cure scientific practices from these ills, science itself is and remains the search for truth, even if our social moors make it so much harder. (shrink)

Book review: Homo Deus. A Brief History of Tomorrow. Yuval Noah Harari. Vintage, UK. 2017. p. 512.

Book review: Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The evolution of mind, Penguin Random House, UK 2017, pp. 467.

Stanisław Lem is mostly known as a sci-fi writer and not widely perceived as a visionary of the cyber age, despite the fact that he foresaw the future of information technology better than most scientific experts. Indeed, his visions of future information-based societies have proved to be remarkably accurate. Lem’s stories fuse together elements of fantasy, philosophy, and science, but what we can really learn from them is the nature of humanity, technology, and philosophy, as well as the values of (...) technological prophecies. Moreover, Lem gave birth to, without naming it as such, the concept of philosophy in technology, which is a perspective on technology and philosophy that explores the deep implicit philosophical foundations of technology and humanity. (shrink)

In this review, we present the philosophical blog “Cafe Aleph”, which was founded by Witold Marciszewski in collaboration with Paweł Stacewicz. The blog contains numerous expert entries on issues from the border of philosophy, science and technology. “Cafe Aleph” is an area for developing, popularizing and discussing the idea of philosophy of computing.

As one may have noticed, the title of this paper is somewhat provocative. We found Roman Krzanowski’s (2020a,b,c; 2022) proposed approach to the problem of information very intriguing. Our aim here is to highlight some advantages when it comes to answering some fundamental questions in the philosophy of physics and metaphysics, as well as the philosophy of information and computer science. This issue is of great importance, so we propose that the introduction of some subtle distinctions between ontological (...) and epistemological information can be regarded as being analogous to G.F.R. Ellis’s analyses of the passage of time in his concept of the Crystallizing Block Universe (Ellis and Goswami, 2012). This analogy could be useful when further studying the relations between different types of information. We also suggest some subjects for further study, ones where Krzanowski’s proposal could serve as a very solid foundation for examining traditional metaphysical issues by combining classical philosophical doctrines with the new approach. (shrink)

Machine ethics and robot rights are quickly becoming hot topics in artificial intelligence and robotics communities. We will argue that attempts to attribute moral agency and assign rights to all intelligent machines are misguided, whether applied to infrahuman or superhuman AIs, as are proposals to limit the negative effects of AIs by constraining their behavior. As an alternative, we propose a new science of safety engineering for intelligent artificial agents based on maximizing for what humans value. In particular, we challenge (...) the scientific community to develop intelligent systems that have human-friendly values that they provably retain, even under recursive self-improvement. (shrink)

Models are of central importance in many scientific contexts. The centrality of models such as inflationary models in cosmology, general-circulation models of the global climate, the double-helix model of DNA, evolutionary models in biology, agent-based models in the social sciences, and general-equilibrium models of markets in their respective domains is a case in point (the Other Internet Resources section at the end of this entry contains links to online resources that discuss these models). Scientists spend significant amounts of time building, (...) testing, comparing, and revising models, and much journal space is dedicated to interpreting and discussing the implications of models. In short, models are one of the principal instruments of modern science. (shrink)

Scientific discourse is rife with passages that appear to be ordinary descriptions of systems of interest in a particular discipline. Equally, the pages of textbooks and journals are filled with discussions of the properties and the behavior of those systems. Students of mechanics investigate at length the dynamical properties of a system consisting of two or three spinning spheres with homogenous mass distributions gravitationally interacting only with each other. Population biologists study the evolution of one species procreating at a constant (...) rate in an isolated ecosystem. And when studying the exchange of goods, economists consider a situation in which there are only two goods, two perfectly rational agents, no restrictions on available information, no transaction costs, no money, and dealings are done immediately. Their surface structure notwithstanding, no competent scientist would mistake descriptions of such systems as descriptions of an actual system: we know very well that there are no such systems. These descriptions are descriptions of a model-system, and scientists use model-systems to represent parts or aspects of the world they are interested in. Following common practice, I refer to those parts or aspects as target-systems. What are we to make of this? Is discourse about such models merely a picturesque and ultimately dispensable façon de parler? This was the view of some early twentieth century philosophers. Duhem (1906) famously guarded against confusing model building with scientific theorizing and argued that model building has no real place in science, beyond a minor heuristic role. The aim of science was, instead, to construct theories, with theories understood as classificatory or representative structures systematically presented and formulated in precise symbolic.. (shrink)

It is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. It is also generally accepted that most models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent its target system? I begin by introducing three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semantic view (...) of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides us with adequate answers to these questions. After having argued in some detail that it does not, I conclude by pointing out in what direction a tenable account of scientific representation might be sought. (shrink)

Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number (...) 2. (shrink)

Science provides us with representations of atoms, elementary particles, polymers, populations, genetic trees, economies, rational decisions, aeroplanes, earthquakes, forest fires, irrigation systems, and the world’s climate. It's through these representations that we learn about the world. This entry explores various different accounts of scientific representation, with a particular focus on how scientific models represent their target systems. As philosophers of science are increasingly acknowledging the importance, if not the primacy, of scientific models as representational units of science, it's important to (...) stress that how they represent plays a fundamental role in how we are to answer other questions in the philosophy of science. This entry begins by disentangling ‘the’ problem of scientific representation, before critically evaluating the current options available in the literature. (shrink)

Williams’s famous argument against immortality rests on the idea that immortality cannot be desirable, at least for human beings, and his contention has spawned a cottage industry of responses. As I will intend to show, the arguments over his view rest on both a difference of temperament and a difference in the sense of desire being used. The former concerns a difference in whether one takes a forward-looking or a backward-looking perspective on personal identity; the latter a distinction between our (...) normal desire to continue living and the kind of desire implied in desiring immortality. Showing that there is some sense of identity and desire that support Williams’s conclusion goes some way toward providing support for his argument, if not a full-fledged defense of it. (shrink)

This is an extensive review of recent work on the foundations of statistical mechanics.

This long-awaited translation of Das literarische Kunstwerk makes available for the first time in English Roman Ingarden's influential study. Though it is inter-disciplinary in scope, situated as it is on the borderlines of ontology and logic, philosophy of literature and theory of language, Ingarden's work has a deliberately narrow focus: the literary work, its structure and mode of existence. The Literary Work of Art establishes the groundwork for a philosophy of literature, i.e., an ontology in terms of which the (...) basic general structure of all literary works can be determined. This "essential anatomy" makes basic tools and concepts available for rigorous and subtle aesthetic analysis. (shrink)

Обґрунтовано стратегію високочастотної біржової торгівлі (high-frequency trading) акціями. Для цього досліджено особливості та обмеження біржової високочастотної торгівлі, визначено верхню межу прибутку агресивного «шкідливого» високочастотного трейдера, обґрунтовано оптимальну частоту стратегії біржової високочастотної торгівлі акціями, розглянуто емпіричне підтвердження прогнозованості біржових курсів акцій на надкоротких горизонтах інвестування.

Understanding scientific modelling can be divided into two sub-projects: analysing what model-systems are, and understanding how they are used to represent something beyond themselves. The first is a prerequisite for the second: we can only start analysing how representation works once we understand the intrinsic character of the vehicle that does the representing. Coming to terms with this issue is the project of the first half of this chapter. My central contention is that models are akin to places and characters (...) of literary fictions, and that therefore theories of fiction play an essential role in explaining the nature of model-systems. This sets the agenda. Section 2 provides a statement of this view, which I label the fiction view of model-systems, and argues for its prima facie plausibility. Section 3 presents a defence of this view against its main rival, the structuralist conception of models. In Section 4 I develop an account of model-systems as imagined objects on the basis of the so-called pretence theory of fiction. This theory needs to be discussed in great detail for two reasons. First, developing an acceptable account of imagined objects is mandatory to make the fiction view acceptable, and I will show that the pretence theory has the resources to achieve this goal. Second, the term ‘representation’ is ambiguous; in fact, there are two very different relations that are commonly called ‘representation’ and a conflation between the two is the root of some of the problems that beset scientific representation. Pretence theory provides us with the conceptual resources to articulate these two different forms of representation, which I call p-representation and t-representation respectively. Putting these elements together provides us with a coherent overall picture of scientific modelling, which I develop in Section 5. (shrink)

On the face of it ‘deterministic chance’ is an oxymoron: either an event is chancy or deterministic, but not both. Nevertheless, the world is rife with events that seem to be exactly that: chancy and deterministic at once. Simple gambling devices like coins and dice are cases in point. On the one hand they are governed by deterministic laws – the laws of classical mechanics – and hence given the initial condition of, say, a coin toss it is determined whether (...) it will land heads or tails.2 On the other hand, we commonly assign probabilities to the different outcomes a coin toss, and doing so has proven successful in guiding our actions. The same dilemma also emerges in less mundane contexts. Classical statistical mechanics (which is still an important part of modern physics) assigns probabilities to the occurrence of certain events – for instance to the spreading of a gas that is originally confined to the left half of a container – but at the same time assumes that the relevant systems are deterministic. How can this apparent conflict be resolved? (shrink)

The received wisdom in statistical mechanics is that isolated systems, when left to themselves, approach equilibrium. But under what circumstances does an equilibrium state exist and an approach to equilibrium take place? In this paper we address these questions from the vantage point of the long-run fraction of time definition of Boltzmannian equilibrium that we developed in two recent papers. After a short summary of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics and our definition of equilibrium, we state an existence theorem which provides general (...) criteria for the existence of an equilibrium state. We first illustrate how the theorem works with a toy example, which allows us to illustrate the various elements of the theorem in a simple setting. After a look at the ergodic programme, we discuss equilibria in a number of different gas systems: the ideal gas, the dilute gas, the Kac gas, the stadium gas, the mushroom gas and the multi-mushroom gas. In the conclusion we briefly summarise the main points and highlight open questions. (shrink)

Gases reach equilibrium when left to themselves. Why do they behave in this way? The canonical answer to this question, originally proffered by Boltzmann, is that the systems have to be ergodic. This answer has been criticised on different grounds and is now widely regarded as flawed. In this paper we argue that some of the main arguments against Boltzmann's answer, in particular, arguments based on the KAM-theorem and the Markus-Meyer theorem, are beside the point. We then argue that something (...) close to Boltzmann's original proposal is true for gases: gases behave thermodynamic-like if they are epsilon-ergodic, i.e., ergodic on the entire accessible phase space except for a small region of measure epsilon. This answer is promising because there are good reasons to believe that relevant systems in statistical mechanics are epsilon-ergodic. (shrink)

Entropy is ubiquitous in physics, and it plays important roles in numerous other disciplines ranging from logic and statistics to biology and economics. However, a closer look reveals a complicated picture: entropy is defined differently in different contexts, and even within the same domain different notions of entropy are at work. Some of these are defined in terms of probabilities, others are not. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of some of the most important notions (...) of entropy and to clarify the relations between them, After setting the stage by introducing the thermodynamic entropy, we discuss notions of entropy in information theory, statistical mechanics, dynamical systems theory and fractal geometry. (shrink)

The present book is an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics. It asks philosophical questions concerning fundamental concepts, constructions and methods - this is done from the standpoint of mathematical research and teaching. It looks for answers both in mathematics and in the philosophy of mathematics from their beginnings till today. The reference point of the considerations is the introducing of the reals in the 19th century that marked an epochal turn in the foundations of mathematics. In the book problems (...) connected with the concept of a number, with the infinity, the continuum and the infinitely small, with the applicability of mathematics as well as with sets, logic, provability and truth and with the axiomatic approach to mathematics are considered. In Chapter 6 the meaning of infinitesimals to mathematics and to the elements of analysis is presented. The authors of the present book are mathematicians. Their aim is to introduce mathematicians and teachers of mathematics as well as students into the philosophy of mathematics. The book is suitable also for professional philosophers as well as for students of philosophy, just because it approaches philosophy from the side of mathematics. The knowledge of mathematics needed to understand the text is elementary. Reports on historical conceptions. Thinking about today‘s mathematical doing and thinking. Recent developments. Based on the third, revised German edition. For mathematicians - students, teachers, researchers and lecturers - and readersinterested in mathematics and philosophy. Contents On the way to the reals On the history of the philosophy of mathematics On fundamental questions of the philosophy of mathematics Sets and set theories Axiomatic approach and logic Thinking and calculating infinitesimally – First nonstandard steps Retrospection. (shrink)

Models occupy a central role in the scientific endeavour. Among the many purposes they serve, representation is of great importance. Many models are representations of something else; they stand for, depict, or imitate a selected part of the external world (often referred to as target system, parent system, original, or prototype). Well-known examples include the model of the solar system, the billiard ball model of a gas, the Bohr model of the atom, the Gaussian-chain model of a polymer, the MIT (...) bag model of quark confinement, the Lorenz model of the atmosphere, the Lotka-Volterra model of the predator-prey interaction, or the hydraulic model of an economy, to mention just a few. All these models represent their target systems (or selected parts of them) in one way or another. (shrink)