Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016)

Authors
James Nguyen
School of Advanced Study, University of London
Abstract
Science provides us with representations of atoms, elementary particles, polymers, populations, genetic trees, economies, rational decisions, aeroplanes, earthquakes, forest fires, irrigation systems, and the world’s climate. It's through these representations that we learn about the world. This entry explores various different accounts of scientific representation, with a particular focus on how scientific models represent their target systems. As philosophers of science are increasingly acknowledging the importance, if not the primacy, of scientific models as representational units of science, it's important to stress that how they represent plays a fundamental role in how we are to answer other questions in the philosophy of science. This entry begins by disentangling ‘the’ problem of scientific representation, before critically evaluating the current options available in the literature.
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References found in this work BETA

How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rational Endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
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Why Surplus Structure Is Not Superfluous.Nguyen James, J. Teh Nicholas & Wells Laura - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):665-695.

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