The articles in this theme issue seek to understand the evolutionary bases of social learning and the consequences of cultural transmission for the evolution of human behaviour. In this introductory article, we provide a summary of these articles and a personal view of some promising lines of development suggested by the work summarized here.

Henry, his parents, and his dog Mudge take a vacation out West, where they enjoy tumbleweeds, desert animals, souvenirs, and the wide open spaces.

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Knowles, D. The historical context of the philosophical work of St. Thomas Aquinas.--Logic and metaphysics: Geach, P. Form and existence. McCabe, H. Categories. Ross, J. F. Analogy as a rule of meaning for religious language. Geach, P. Nominalism.--Natural theology: Brown, P. St. Thomas' doctrine of necessary being. Salamucha, J. The proof ex motu for the existence of God. Brown, P. Infinite causal regression. Deck, J. N. St. Thomas Aquinas and the language of total dependence. Kenny, A. (...) Divine foreknowledge and human freedom.--Philosophy of mind: Kenny, A. Intellect and imagination in Aquinas. McCabe, H. The immortality of the soul. Sheehan, P. Aquinas on intentionality.--Moral philosophy: Donagan, A. The scholastic theory of moral law in the modern world. Grisez, G. G. The first principle of practical reason. (shrink)

The historical context of the philosophical work of St. Thomas Aquinas, by D. Knowles.--Form and existence, by P. Geach.--Categories, by H. McCabe.--Analogy as a rule of meaning for religious language, by J. F. Ross.--Nominalism, by P. Geach.--St. Thomas' doctrine of necessary being, by P. Brown.--The proof ex motu for the existence of God; logical analysis of St. Thomas' arguments, by J. Salamucha.--Infinite causal regression, by P. Brown.--St. Thomas Aquinas and the language of total dependence, by J. (...) N. Deck.--Divine foreknowledge and human freedom, by A. Kenny.--Intellect and imagination in Aquinas, by A. Kenny.--The immortality of the soul, by H. McCabe.--Aquinas on intentionality, by P. Sheehan.--The scholastic theory of moral law in the modern world, by A. Donagan.--The first principle of practical reason, by G. G. Grisez. (shrink)

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This paper explores the issue of when human life begins, giving special attention to the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s position is contrasted with the position defended by many Catholics today. After considering the evidence and a variety of arguments, the paper suggests that the individuated human being begins to exist at roughly fourteen days after the moment of conception.

Anthony Kenny offers a critical examination of Thomas Aquinas's influential account of being, arguing that it suffers from systematic confusion. Because of the centrality of the doctrine, this has implications for other parts of Aquinas's philosophical system. Kenny's clear and incisive study dispels the confusion and offers philosophers and theologians a guide through the labyrinth of Aquinas's ontology.

This book shows how the mature writings of Thomas Aquinas though written in the thirteenth century have much to offer the human mind and the relationship between intellect and will, body and soul.

The historical context of the philosophical work of St. Thomas Aquinas, by D. Knowles.--Form and existence, by P. Geach.--Categories, by H. McCabe.--Analogy as a rule of meaning for religious language, by J. F. Ross.--Nominalism, by P. Geach.--St. Thomas' doctrine of necessary being, by P. Brown.--The proof ex motu for the existence of God; logical analysis of St. Thomas' arguments, by J. Salamucha.--Infinite causal regression, by P. Brown.--St. Thomas Aquinas and the language of total dependence, by J. (...) N. Deck.--Divine foreknowledge and human freedom, by A. Kenny.--Intellect and imagination in Aquinas, by A. Kenny.--The immortality of the soul, by H. McCabe.--Aquinas on intentionality, by P. Sheehan.--The scholastic theory of moral law in the modern world, by A. Donagan.--The first principle of practical reason, by G. G. Grisez. (shrink)

This book shows how the mature writings of Thomas Aquinas though written in the thirteenth century have much to offer the human mind and the relationship between intellect and will, body and soul.

This paper explores the issue of when human life begins, giving special attention to the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas’s position is contrasted with the position defended by many Catholics today. After considering the evidence and a variety of arguments, the paper suggests that the individuated human being begins to exist at roughly fourteen days after the moment of conception.

This illustrated edition of Sir Anthony Kenny's acclaimed survey of Western philosophy offers the most concise and compelling story of the complete development of philosophy available. Spanning 2,500 years of thought, An Illustrated Brief History of Western Philosophy provides essential coverage of the most influential philosophers of the Western world, among them Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Berkeley, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Darwin, Freud, Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. Replete with over 60 (...) illustrations - ranging from Dufresnoy's The Death of Socrates, through to the title page of Thomas More's Utopia, portraits of Hobbes and Rousseau, photographs of Charles Darwin and Bertrand Russell, Freud's own sketch of the Ego and the Id, and Wittgenstein's Austrian military identity card - this lucid and masterful work is ideal for anyone with an interest in Western thought. (shrink)

Sir Anthony Kenny here continues his fascinating account of the history of philosophy, focusing on the thousand-year-long medieval period. This is the second volume of a four-book set in which Kenny will unfold a magisterial new history of Western philosophy, the first major single-author history of philosophy to appear in decades. In this volume, Kenny takes us on a fascinating tour through more than a millennium of thought from 400 AD onwards, charting the story of philosophy from (...) the founders of Christian and Islamic thought through to the Renaissance. The Middle Ages saw a great flourishing of philosophy, and the intellectual endeavor of the era reaches its climax in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, with the systems of the great schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. With Kenny as guide, we see these major philosophers through the eyes of a man who has spent a lifetime contemplating their work. Thus we do not simply get an overview of philosophy, but also a penetrating and insightful critique of it. Kenny offers an illuminating account of various thinkers and schools of thought, from Augustine to Maimonides and from Grosseteste to Pomponazzi. And he offers much insight into medieval thinking about logic and language, knowledge, physics, metaphysics, the mind, the soul, and God. Vividly written, but serious and deep enough to offer a genuine understanding of the great philosophers, Kenny's lucid and stimulating history will become the definitive work for anyone interested in the people and ideas that shaped the course of Western thought. (shrink)

Concepts of creation -- Life after Etna : Empedocles in prose and poetry -- Virtue and the good in Plato and Aristotle -- Aristotle's criteria for happiness -- Practical truth in Aristotle -- Aristotle's categories in the Latin fathers -- Essence and existence : Aquinas and Islamic philosophy -- Aquinas on the beginning of individual human life -- Thomas and thomism -- Aquinas in America -- Philosophy states only what everyone admits -- Cognitive scientism -- The Wittgenstein editions -- (...) Knowledge, belief, and faith -- The unity of knowledge and the diversity of Beli. (shrink)

Sir Anthony Kenny continues his magisterial new history of Western philosophy with a fascinating guide through more than a millennium of thought from 400 AD onwards, charting the story of philosophy from the founders of Christian and Islamic thought through to the Renaissance. The middle ages saw a great flourishing of philosophy, and the intellectual endeavour of the era reaches its climax in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, with the systems of the great schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas (...) and John Duns Scotus. Specially written for a broad popular readership, but serious and deep enough to offer a genuine understanding of the great philosophers, Kenny's lucid and stimulating history will become the definitive work for anyone interested in the people and ideas that shaped the course of Western thought. (shrink)

Sir Anthony Kenny continues his magisterial new history of Western philosophy with a fascinating guide through more than a millennium of thought from 400 AD onwards, charting the story of philosophy from the founders of Christian and Islamic thought through to the Renaissance. The middle ages saw a great flourishing of philosophy, and the intellectual endeavour of the era reaches its climax in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, with the systems of the great schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas (...) and John Duns Scotus. (shrink)

Stippen in de verte. Wat zijn dat? Het zijn kanoeten. Onderweg naar Mauritanië, maar nu op zoek naar eten op het wad. Nieuwe vragen: waarom naar Mauritanië? Waar komen ze vandaan? Wat zoeken ze in de modder? Als er één wetenschap is die meer vragen stelt dan beantwoordt, dan is het wel de biologie. Elke nieuwe ontdekking maakt het leven onbekender, complexer en fascinerender. Hoe meer kennis, hoe meer vragen. Voor onze kenniseconomie zijn de antwoorden uit biologische kennis vaak als (...) een knik in een tuinslang. En dat wordt alleen maar erger van al die nieuwe vragen. Kun je nog een plan uitvoeren als je niet weet wat het aanricht? Dit boek is een ontdekkingsreis door de complexiteit van de natuur. Een lange tocht die begint bij trekvogels, van de geulen en platen van onze eigen Waddenzee naar de tropische wadvlaktes in West-Afrika. In die wildernis vinden we nieuwe kennis, en dus nieuwe, betere vragen. Het gaat over onze verwondering over de natuur - inclusief de natuur van de mens - die we dankzij noest wetenschappelijk werk steeds beter leren begrijpen. Over het fabeltje van de genen die eigenschappen coderen. Over de evolutie van schoonheid en liefde. De dynamiek van seksisme en racisme. Over de gevaren van landbouw met oogkleppen, van efficiënte visserij, en van windmolens als zogenaamde oplossing. Over de waarde van een individu, over de waarde van een ecosysteem. (shrink)

A discussion of a view proposed by Anthony Kenny, that inferences from factual statements to evaluative or normative statements, are in fact as unproblematic as the commonly accepted inferences inferences in the reverse direction,i. i. i from evaluative or normative statements to factual ones, The paper draws attention to some difficulties inherent in Kenny's view.

Thomas Aquinas was first and foremost a Christian theologian. Yet he was also one of the greatest philosophers of the Middle Ages. Drawing on classical authors, and incorporating ideas from Jewish and Arab sources, he came to offer a rounded and lasting account of the origin of the universe and of the things to be found within it, especially human beings.

[Anthony Kenny: Thomas on the Human Spirit].

Anthony Kenny criticized the Five Ways, by Thomas Aquinas, in a widespread and influential book. About the First Way, among other critiques, Kenny considers that Thomas Aquinas failed to prove that “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another”. As this principle is central for the argument developed by Aquinas on the “first mover, put in movement by no other”, the First Way is insufficient and grounded on a mistake. In this article, Aristotle’s and (...) Aquinas’s works are analysed to expose that their arguments about movement are sound and persuasive. On the contrary, Kenny’s criticism is not consistent and is misled by bad interpretation of texts and concepts. Oderberg and Weisheipl agree with Aquinas and Aristotle, and their papers reinforce the conclusions of this article, favourable to the Medieval philosopher and against Kenny. (shrink)

The thesis developed and defended in this paper is that is it false that all knowledge is founded on experience. Much of our knowledge (or alleged knowledge), it is argued, is based on testimony. Still, many philosophers have either not dealt with testimony at all, or treated it very unkindly. One of the reasons for this is that those philosophers (such as Descartes and Locke) work with a concept of knowledge according to which knowledge is certain, indubitable, and/or self-evident. And (...) if knowledge is what these philosophers say it is, then there is no such thing as knowledge based on testimony indeed. Thomas Reid is introduced as holding that we do have testimonial knowledge and that therefore Descartes' and Locke's concept of knowledge is untenable. Reid furthermore holds that human beings are endowed with a disposition to accept or believe what otherstell us („the principle of credulity”). The working of this principle is refined through all kinds of experience. What Reid says or shows is how this disposition in fact operates. Many epistemologists, however, have higher aspirations and look for reasons or arguments that can justify our factual acceptance of testimony. The inductive argument Hume offers, it is argued, is unconvincing. There is even reason to think that the principle of credulity can never be justified by adducing reasons. This does not imply, however, that acceptance of testimony is unjustified. Whether or not it is depends, among other things, on the concept of justification one uses. On an internalist concept of justification (as Locke's or Hume's) this disposition may never be justified. But on an externalist conception it may. This may be disappointing, given some widely held philosophical aspirations, but at the same time it is, as Alston has said, a lesson in intellectual humility. (shrink)

The thesis developed and defended in this paper is that is it false that all knowledge is founded on experience. Much of our knowledge (or alleged knowledge), it is argued, is based on testimony. Still, many philosophers have either not dealt with testimony at all, or treated it very unkindly. One of the reasons for this is that those philosophers (such as Descartes and Locke) work with a concept of knowledge according to which knowledge is certain, indubitable, and/or self-evident. And (...) if knowledge is what these philosophers say it is, then there is no such thing as knowledge based on testimony indeed. Thomas Reid is introduced as holding that we do have testimonial knowledge and that therefore Descartes’ and Locke’s concept of knowledge is untenable. Reid furthermore holds that human beings are endowed with a disposition to accept or believe what otherstell us („the principle of credulity”). The working of this principle is refined through all kinds of experience. What Reid says or shows is how this disposition in fact operates. Many epistemologists, however, have higher aspirations and look for reasons or arguments that can justify our factual acceptance of testimony. The inductive argument Hume offers, it is argued, is unconvincing. There is even reason to think that the principle of credulity can never be justified by adducing reasons. This does not imply, however, that acceptance of testimony is unjustified. Whether or not it is depends, among other things, on the concept of justification one uses. On an internalist concept of justification (as Locke’s or Hume’s) this disposition may never be justified. But on an externalist conception it may. This may be disappointing, given some widely held philosophical aspirations, but at the same time it is, as Alston has said, a lesson in intellectual humility. (shrink)

This popular selection of Wittgenstein’s key writings has now been updated to include new material relevant to recent debates about the philosopher. Follows the evolution of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus through to the Philosophical Investigations. Excerpts are arranged by topic and introduce readers to all the central concerns of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Now includes a new chapter on ‘Sense, Nonsense and Philosophy’ incorporating material relevant to recent debates about Wittgenstein.

We introduce a family of rules for adjusting one's credences in response to learning the credences of others. These rules have a number of desirable features. 1. They yield the posterior credences that would result from updating by standard Bayesian conditionalization on one's peers' reported credences if one's likelihood function takes a particular simple form. 2. In the simplest form, they are symmetric among the agents in the group. 3. They map neatly onto the familiar Condorcet voting results. 4. They (...) preserve shared agreement about independence in a wide range of cases. 5. They commute with conditionalization and with multiple peer updates. Importantly, these rules have a surprising property that we call synergy - peer testimony of credences can provide mutually supporting evidence raising an individual's credence higher than any peer's initial prior report. At first, this may seem to be a strike against them. We argue, however, that synergy is actually a desirable feature and the failure of other updating rules to yield synergy is a strike against them. (shrink)

Naive versions of decision theory take probabilities and utilities as primitive and use expected value to give norms on rational decision. However, standard decision theory takes rational preference as primitive and uses it to construct probability and utility. This paper shows how to justify a version of the naive theory, by taking dominance as the most basic normatively required preference relation, and then extending it by various conditions under which agents should be indifferent between acts. The resulting theory can make (...) all the decisions of classical expected utility theory, plus more in cases where expected utilities are infinite or undefined. Although the theory requires similarly strong assumptions to classical expected utility theory, versions of the theory can be developed with slightly weaker assumptions, without having to prove a new representation theorem for the weaker theory. This alternate foundation is particularly useful if probability is prior to preference, as suggested by the recent program to base probabilism on accuracy and alethic considerations rather than pragmatic ones. (shrink)

First published in 1973, Sir Anthony Kenny’s classic introduction to Wittgenstein was widely praised for offering a lucid and historically informed account of the philosopher’s core concerns. Kenny's study is also remarkable for demonstrating the continuity between Wittgenstein’s early and late writings. Focusing on Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind and language, Kenny closely examines the works of the middle years. He exposes apparent conflicts and then goes on to reconcile them, providing a persuasive argument for the unity of (...) Wittgenstein’s thought. This revised edition includes an extensive new introduction in which Kenny outlines developments in Wittgenstein scholarship since the book was first published and assesses Wittgenstein’s influence in the latter part of the twentieth century. (shrink)

What is mind? This book attempts to give a philosophical answer to that question in language accessible to the layperson, but with a rigor acceptable to the specialist. Published on the centenary of the birth of Wittgenstein and the 40th anniversary of the publication of Gilbert Ryle 's classic The Concept of Mind, this work testifies to the influence of those thinkers on Kenny's own work in the philosophy of mind, and assembles Kenny's ideas on philosophical psychology into (...) a systematic whole. (shrink)

English summary: Wittgensteins questioning of the modern conception of the mind and thought, as it appeared with Descartes, and as it continues in cognitive science, provides an interesting avenue of approach to Thomas Aquinas. The present volume offers an innovative analysis of Wittgensteins work, as inspired by such British philosophers as Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Anthony Kenny. French description: Par sa mise en question d'une conception moderne de l'esprit et de la pensee - apparue avec Descartes, dominante (...) dans la phenomenologie et toujours presente dans les sciences cognitives - Wittgenstein a assure une voie d'acces a la philosophie de Thomas d'Aquin, au moins a sa conception de la pensee et de l'esprit. C'est en allant de Wittgenstein vers l'Aquinate que des philosophes britanniques, comme Peter Geach, Elizabeth Anscombe, Anthony Kenny, ont developpe une lecture du Docteur angelique et de l'auteur des Recherches philosophiques. Mais pourquoi et comment une interpretation de Wittgenstein peut-elle etre une invitation a la lecture de la Somme theologique? Ce livre se propose de le montrer. (shrink)

Cross-situational learning is a mechanism for learning the meaning of words across multiple exposures, despite exposure-by-exposure uncertainty as to the word's true meaning. We present experimental evidence showing that humans learn words effectively using cross-situational learning, even at high levels of referential uncertainty. Both overall success rates and the time taken to learn words are affected by the degree of referential uncertainty, with greater referential uncertainty leading to less reliable, slower learning. Words are also learned less successfully and more slowly (...) if they are presented interleaved with occurrences of other words, although this effect is relatively weak. We present additional analyses of participants’ trial-by-trial behavior showing that participants make use of various cross-situational learning strategies, depending on the difficulty of the word-learning task. When referential uncertainty is low, participants generally apply a rigorous eliminative approach to cross-situational learning. When referential uncertainty is high, or exposures to different words are interleaved, participants apply a frequentist approximation to this eliminative approach. We further suggest that these two ways of exploiting cross-situational information reside on a continuum of learning strategies, underpinned by a single simple associative learning mechanism. (shrink)

This dissertation focuses on the philosophical psychology of a little-studied author, Dominic of Flanders, as elaborated upon in a work that has received no attention in the scholarly literature thus far—viz., his Expositio super libros de anima. No modern editions of Dominic’s works exist. Born in the County of Flanders during the first half of the fifteenth century, Dominic was first educated at the University of Paris, but then made his intellectual home in Italy, where he entered the Dominican Order, (...) teaching at the studia of his order, as well as at the University of Florence. This study attempts to place Dominic within the broader context of Aristotelianism to which he belongs, recognizing his place within the school of Thomism that was thriving in Italy at the time, especially in Bologna. We have provided an account of his life and works, exhaustively examining available bibliographical literature, and have situated the composition of his Expositio during his period of Bologna following his entrance into the Order. In particular, we have studied the third book of his Expositio, which takes up the philosophical topics related to cognition and intellectual understanding. We have given attention to the themes of the cognition or knowledge of particulars, as well as the theory of abstraction, which is required for universal understanding. Beyond the fact that the theory of the internal senses is taken up at the outset of Dominic’s third book, it is our contention that a treatment of the internal senses is necessary for a proper understanding of particular knowledge. Dominic is firmly rooted in the Aristotelian tradition, and so for him there is no intellectual cognition without phantasms. Further, the role of the agent intellect is both to abstract from phantasms, as well as to turn back towards phantasms. In this study, we have shown the Flemish master’s reliance upon the thought and writings of Thomas Aquinas; we also have uncovered a silent source of Dominic’s Expositio—viz., the De anima commentary of John Versoris. Versoris’ commentary has been equally unstudied in the relevant scholarly literature. This Versoris had been Dominic’s teacher at Paris. The results of this research also include an edition of Latin text of the third book of Dominic’s Expositio super libros de anima. This edition is based on the four surviving manuscripts of the work, as well as three selected early modern editions ; this edition is presented in the dissertation as an appendix. (shrink)

Bayesians standardly claim that there is rational pressure for agents’ credences to cohere across time because they face bad (epistemic or practical) consequences if they fail to diachronically cohere. But as David Christensen has pointed out, groups of individual agents also face bad consequences if they fail to interpersonally cohere, and there is no general rational pressure for one agent's credences to cohere with another’s. So it seems that standard Bayesian arguments may prove too much. Here, we agree with Christensen (...) that there is no general rational pressure to diachronically cohere, but we argue that there are particular cases in which there is rational pressure to diachronically cohere, as well as particular cases in which interpersonal probabilistic coherence is rationally required. More generally, we suggest that Bayesian arguments for coherence apply whenever a collection (of agents or time slices) has a shared dimension of value and an ability to coordinate their actions in a range of cases relevant to that value. Typically, this shared value and ability to coordinate is very strong across the time slices of one human being, and very weak across different human beings, but there are special cases where these can switch—i.e., some groups of humans will have as much reason for their beliefs to cohere across a particular range of cases as the time slices of one human usually do, but some time slices of a human will have as much freedom to differ in their beliefs from the others as the members of a group usually do. (shrink)