Analyzing Mediumistic Mentation - Alvarado Proposal for Short List of Best Papers in Parapsychology - Levin Kauffman Stokes.

Can thought arise out of matter? Can self, soul, consciousness, “I” arise out of mere matter? If it cannot, then how can you or I be here? I Am a Strange Loop argues that the key to understanding selves and consciousness is the “strange loop”—a special kind of abstract feedback loop inhabiting our brains. The most central and complex symbol in your brain is the one called “I.” The “I” is the nexus in our brain, one of many symbols seeming (...) to have free will and to have gained the paradoxical ability to push particles around, rather than the reverse. How can a mysterious abstraction be real—or is our “I” merely a convenient fiction? Does an “I” exert genuine power over the particles in our brain, or is it helplessly pushed around by the laws of physics? These are the mysteries tackled in I Am a Strange Loop, Douglas Hofstadter's first book-length journey into philosophy since Gödel, Escher, Bach. Compulsively readable and endlessly thought-provoking, this is a moving and profound inquiry into the nature of mind. (shrink)

In this article, I make the case for the continued relevance of Plato’s Timaeus. I begin by sketching Allan Bloom’s picture of the natural sciences today in The Closing of the American Mind, according to which the natural sciences are, objectionably, increasingly specialized and have ejected humans qua humans from their purview. I argue that Plato’s Timaeus, despite the falsity of virtually all of its scientific claims, provides a model for how we can pursue scientific questions in a comprehensive way (...) that stresses their connections to other disciplines, including the humanities, and that puts humanity qua humanity back in the picture. I then argue that being led by Plato’s philosophy to return humanity conceptually to the natural world can improve our thinking regarding climate change and other important environmental crises. (shrink)

Chapter INTRODUCTION Charles Sanders Peirce is quickly becoming the dominant figure in the history of American philosophy. The breadth and depth of his work ...

I provide a comprehensive metaphysics of causation based on the idea that fundamentally things are governed by the laws of physics, and that derivatively difference-making can be assessed in terms of what fundamental laws of physics imply for hypothesized events. Highlights include a general philosophical methodology, the fundamental/derivative distinction, and my mature account of causal asymmetry.

The American thinker Charles Sanders Peirce, best known as the founder of pragmatism, has been influential not only in the pragmatic tradition but more recently in the philosophy of science and the study of semiotics, or sign theory. Strands of System provides an accessible overview of Peirce's systematic philosophy for those who are beginning to explore his thinking and its import for more recent trends in philosophy.

The partial ordering of Medvedev reducibility restricted to the family of Π0 1 classes is shown to be dense. For two disjoint computably enumerable sets, the class of separating sets is an important example of a Π0 1 class, which we call a ``c.e. separating class''. We show that there are no non-trivial meets for c.e. separating classes, but that the density theorem holds in the sublattice generated by the c.e. separating classes.

Abstract.The partial ordering of Medvedev reducibility restricted to the family of Π01 classes is shown to be dense. For two disjoint computably enumerable sets, the class of separating sets is an important example of a Π01 class, which we call a ``c.e. separating class''. We show that there are no non-trivial meets for c.e. separating classes, but that the density theorem holds in the sublattice generated by the c.e. separating classes.

Cenzer, D., R. Downey, C. Jockusch and R.A. Shore, Countable thin Π01 classes, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 59 79–139. A Π01 class P {0, 1}ω is thin if every Π01 subclass of P is the intersection of P with some clopen set. Countable thin Π01 classes are constructed having arbitrary recursive Cantor- Bendixson rank. A thin Π01 class P is constructed with a unique nonisolated point A and furthermore A is of degree 0’. It is shown that no (...) set of degree ≥0” can be a member of any thin Π01 class. An r.e. degree d is constructed such that no set of degree d can be a member of any thin Π01 class. It is also shown that between any two distinct comparable r.e. degrees, there is a degree that contains a set which is of rank one in some thin Π01 class. It is shown that no maximal set can have rank one in any Π01 class, while there exist maximal sets of rank 2. The connection between Π01 classes, propositional theories and recursive Boolean algebras is explored, producing several corollaries to the results on Π01 classes. For example, call a recursive Boolean algebra thin if it has no proper nonprincipal recursive ideals. Then no thin recursive Boolean algebra can have a maximal ideal of degree ≥0”. (shrink)

This paper is a continuation of the authors' work , where the main problem considered was whether a given recursive structure is recursively isomorphic to a polynomial-time structure. In that paper, a recursive Abelian group was constructed which is not recursively isomorphic to any polynomial-time Abelian group. We now show that if every element of a recursive Abelian group has finite order, then the group is recursively isomorphic to a polynomial-time group. Furthermore, if the orders are bounded, then the group (...) is recursively isomorphic to a polynomial-time group with universe A being the set of tally representations of natural numbers Tal = s{;1s};* or the set of binary representations of the natural numbers Bin. We also construct a recursive Abelian group with all elements of finite order but which has elements of arbitrary large finite order which is not isomorphic to any polynomial-time group with universe Tal or Bin. Similar results are obtained for structures , where f is a permutation on the set A. (shrink)

An explanation of our seeming inability to influence the past.

A brief exploration of the nature of, and motivations for, contemporary forms of metaethical quietism. Also outlines some of the prominent objections to such positions and discusses some of the limitations of these objections from the quietist's perspective.

The central problem considered in this paper is whether a given recursive structure is recursively isomorphic to a polynomial-time structure. Positive results are obtained for all relational structures, for all Boolean algebras and for the natural numbers with addition, multiplication and the unary function 2x. Counterexamples are constructed for recursive structures with one unary function and for Abelian groups and also for relational structures when the universe of the structure is fixed. Results are also given which distinguish primitive recursive structures, (...) exponential-time structures and structures with honest witnesses. (shrink)

We argue that (1) a purported example of an infinite inference we humans can actually perform admits a faithful, finitary description, and (2) infinite inference contravenes any view which does not grant our minds uncomputable powers. These arguments block the strategy, dating back to Carnap's Logical Syntax of Language, of using infinitary inference rules to secure the determinacy of arithmetical truth on conventionalist grounds.

I defend what may loosely be called an eliminativist account of causation by showing how several of the main features of causation, namely asymmetry, transitivity, and necessitation, arise from the combination of fundamental dynamical laws and a special constraint on the macroscopic structure of matter in the past. At the microscopic level, the causal features of necessitation and transitivity are grounded, but not the asymmetry. At the coarse-grained level of the macroscopic physics, the causal asymmetry is grounded, but not the (...) necessitation or transitivity. Thus, at no single level of description does the physics justify the conditions that are taken to be constitutive of causation. Nevertheless, if we mix our reasoning about the microscopic and macroscopic descriptions, the structure provided by the dynamics and special initial conditions can justify the folk concept of causation to a significant extent. I explain why our causal concept works so well even though at bottom it is comprised of a patchwork of principles that don't mesh well. (shrink)

In order to improve our understanding of the components that reflect functionally important processes during reward anticipation and consumption, we used principle components analyses (PCA) to separate and quantify averaged ERP data obtained from each stage of a modified monetary incentive delay (MID) task. Although a small number of recent ERP studies have reported that reward and loss cues potentiate ERPs during anticipation, action preparation, and consummatory stages of reward processing, these findings are inconsistent due to temporal and spatial overlap (...) between the relevant electrophysiological components. Our results show three components following cue presentation are sensitive to incentive cues (N1, P3a, P3b). In contrast to previous research, reward‐related enhancement occurred only in the P3b, with earlier components more sensitive to break‐even and loss cues. During feedback anticipation, we observed a lateralized centroparietal negativity that was sensitive to response hand but not cue type. We also show that use of PCA on ERPs reflecting reward consumption successfully separates the reward positivity from the independently modulated feedback‐P3. Last, we observe for the first time a new reward consumption component: a late negativity distributed over the left frontal pole. This component appears to be sensitive to response hand, especially in the context of monetary gain. These results illustrate that the time course and sensitivities of electrophysiological activity that follows incentive cues do not follow a simple heuristic in which reward incentive cues produce enhanced activity at all stages and substages. (shrink)

Several diagrams and tables from review articles during the Ox-Phos Controversy serve as an occasion to assess the nature of competition in models of theory choice in science. Many models follow "Super-Bowl" principles of polar, either-or, winner-take-all competition. A significant alternative highlighted by this episode, however, is the differentiation of domains. Incommensurability and the partial divergence of overlapping domains serve both as signals and context for shifting frameworks of competition. Appropriate strategies may thus help researchers diagnose the status of competition (...) and shape their research accordingly. (shrink)

A Π01 class is an effectively closed set of reals. We study properties of these classes determined by cardinality, measure and category as well as by the complexity of the members of a class P. Given an effective enumeration {Pe:e < ω} of the Π01 classes, the index set I for a certain property is the set of indices e such that Pe has the property. For example, the index set of binary Π01 classes of positive measure is Σ02 complete. (...) Various notions of boundedness are discussed and classified. For example, the index set of the recursively bounded classes is Σ03 complete and the index set of the recursively bounded classes which have infinitely many recursive members is Π04 complete. Consideration of the Cantor-Bendixson derivative leads to index sets in the transfinite levels of the hyperarithmetic hierarchy. (shrink)

In this engaging book, Douglas Anderson begins with the assumption that philosophy—the Greek love of wisdom—is alive and well in American culture. At the same time, professional philosophy remains relatively invisible. Anderson traverses American life to find places in the wider culture where professional philosophy in the distinctively American tradition can strike up a conversation. How might American philosophers talk to us about our religious experience, or political engagement, or literature—or even, popular music? Anderson’s second aim is to find (...) places where philosophy happens in nonprofessional guises—cultural places such as country music, rock’n roll, and Beat literature. He not only enlarges the tradition of American philosophers such as John Dewey and William James by examining lesser-known figures such as Henry Bugbee and Thomas Davidson, but finds the theme and ideas of American philosophy in some unexpected places, such as the music of Hank Williams, Tammy Wynette, and Bruce Springsteen, and the writingsof Jack Kerouac.The idea of “philosophy Americana” trades on the emergent genre of “music Americana,” rooted in traditional themes and styles yet engaging our present experiences. The music is “popular” but not thoroughly driven by economic considerations, and Anderson seeks out an analogous role for philosophical practice, where philosophy and popular culture are co-adventurers in the life of ideas. Philosophy Americana takes seriously Emerson’s quest for the extraordinary in the ordinary and James’s belief that popular philosophy can still be philosophy. (shrink)

We describe here an interdisciplinary lab science course for non-majors using the history of science as a curricular guide. Our experience with diverse instructors underscores the importance of the teachers and classroom dynamics, beyond the curriculum. Moreover, the institutional political context is central: are courses for non-majors valued and is support given to instructors to innovate? Two sample projects are profiled.

I highlight a category of experiment-what I am calling 'demonstrations'-that differs in justificatory mode and argumentative role from the more familiar 'crucial tests'. 'Tests' are constructed such that alternative results are equally and symmetrically informative; they help discriminate between alternative solutions within a problem-field, where questions are shared. 'Demonstrations' are notably asymmetrical (for example, "failures" are often not telling), yet they are effective, if not "crucial," in interparadigm dispute, to legitimate questions themselves. The Ox-Phos Controversy in bioenergetics serves as an (...) integral case study. (shrink)

This important book was the first serious work of philosophy to address the question: Do adults have a moral right to use drugs for recreational purposes? Many critics of the 'war on drugs' denounce law enforcement as counterproductive and ineffective. Douglas Husak argues that the 'war on drugs' violates the moral rights of adults who want to use drugs for pleasure, and that criminal laws against such use are incompatible with moral rights. This is not a polemical tract but (...) a scrupulously argued work of philosophy that takes full account of all available data concerning drug use in the United States today. The author is careful to describe the properties a recreational drug would have to possess before the state would be justified in prohibiting it. Since criminal laws against the use of recreational drugs are justified neither by the harm users cause to themselves nor by the harm users cause to each other, Professor Husak concludes that such laws are, in almost all cases, unjustified. (shrink)

This paper continues joint work of the authors with P. Clote, R. Soare and S. Wainer (Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 31 (1986), pp. 145--163). An element x of the Cantor space 2 ω is said have rank α in the closed set P if x is in $D^\alpha(P)\backslash D^{\alpha + 1}(P)$ , where D α is the iterated Cantor-Bendixson derivative. The rank of x is defined to be the least α such that x has rank α in (...) some Π 0 1 set. The main result of the five-author paper is that for any recursive ordinal λ + n (where λ is a limit and n is finite), there is a point with rank λ + n which is Turing equivalent to O (λ + 2n) . All ranked points constructed in that paper are Π 0 2 singletons. We now construct a ranked point which is not a Π 0 2 singleton. In the previous paper the points of high rank were also of high hyperarithmetic degree. We now construct ▵ 0 2 points with arbitrarily high rank. We also show that every nonrecursive RE point is Turing equivalent to an RE point of rank one and that every nonrecursive ▵ 0 2 point is Turing equivalent to a hyperimmune point of rank one. We relate Clote's notion of the height of a Π 0 1 singleton in the Baire space with the notion of rank. Finally, we show that every hyperimmune point x is Turing equivalent to a point which is not ranked. (shrink)

We develop a theory of LOGSPACE structures and apply it to construct a number of examples of Abelian Groups which have LOGSPACE presentations. We show that all computable torsion Abelian groups have LOGSPACE presentations and we show that the groups ${\mathbb {Z}, Z(p^{\infty})}$ , and the additive group of the rationals have LOGSPACE presentations over a standard universe such as the tally representation and the binary representation of the natural numbers. We also study the effective categoricity of such groups. For (...) example, we give conditions are given under which two isomorphic LOGSPACE structures will have a linear space isomorphism. (shrink)

Important examples of $\Pi^0_1$ classes of functions $f \in {}^\omega\omega$ are the classes of sets (elements of ω 2) which separate a given pair of disjoint r.e. sets: ${\mathsf S}_2(A_0, A_1) := \{f \in{}^\omega2 : (\forall i < 2)(\forall x \in A_i)f(x) \neq i\}$ . A wider class consists of the classes of functions f ∈ ω k which in a generalized sense separate a k-tuple of r.e. sets (not necessarily pairwise disjoint) for each k ∈ ω: ${\mathsf S}_k(A_0,\ldots,A_k-1) := (...) \{f \in {}^\omega k : (\forall i < k) (\forall x \in A_i) f(x) \neq i\}$ . We study the structure of the Medvedev degrees of such classes and show that the set of degrees realized depends strongly on both k and the extent to which the r.e. sets intersect. Let ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ denote the Medvedev degrees of those ${\mathsf S}_k(A_0,\ldots,A_{k-1})$ such that no m + 1 sets among A 0,...,A k-1 have a nonempty intersection. It is shown that each ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ is an upper semi-lattice but not a lattice. The degree of the set of k-ary diagonally nonrecursive functions $\mathsf{DNR}_k$ is the greatest element of ${\mathcal S}^1_k$ . If 2 ≤ l < k, then 0 M is the only degree in ${\mathcal S}^1_l$ which is below a member of ${\mathcal S}^1_k$ . Each ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ is densely ordered and has the splitting property and the same holds for the lattice ${\mathcal L}^m_k$ it generates. The elements of ${\mathcal S}^m_k$ are exactly the joins of elements of ${\mathcal S}^1_i$ for $\lceil{k \over m}\rceil \leq i \leq k$. (shrink)

This article examines peirce's technical use of metaphor. in doing so it looks at certain aspects of his semiotics and, in particular, his division of signs into icons, indexes, and symbols. the upshoot is that, for peirce, metaphor plays a central role in artistic thought while analogy is central to scientific thought.

Conceptual analyses can be subdivided into two classes, good and evil. Em- pirical analysis is the good kind, routinely practiced in the sciences. Orthodox analysis is the malevolent version that plagues philosophical discourse. In this paper, I will clarify the difference between them, provide some reasons to prefer good over evil, and illustrate their consequences for the metaphysics of causation. By conducting an empirical analysis of causation rather than an orthodox analysis, one can segregate the genuine metaphysical problems that need (...) to be addressed from the many pseudo-problems that have long dogged traditional accounts of causation. (shrink)

This investigation joins recent research on problems with ambiguity in two fields, argumentation and computing. In argumentation, there is a concern with fallacies arising from ambiguity, including equivocation and amphiboly. In computing, the development of agent communication languages is based on conversation policies that make it possible to have information exchanges on the internet, as well as other forms of dialogue like persuasion and negotiation, in which ambiguity is a problem. Because it is not possible to sharply differentiate between problems (...) arising from ambiguity and those arising from vagueness, obscurity and indeterminacy, some study of the latter is included. The semantic web is based on what are called ontologies, or systems of classification of concepts, shown to be useful tools for dealing with these problems. (shrink)

The problem of when a recursive graph has a recursive k-coloring has been extensively studied by Bean, Schmerl, Kierstead, Remmel, and others. In this paper, we study the polynomial time analogue of that problem. We develop a number of negative and positive results about colorings of polynomial time graphs. For example, we show that for any recursive graph G and for any k, there is a polynomial time graph G′ whose vertex set is {0,1}* such that there is an effective (...) degree preserving correspondence between the set of k-colorings of G and the set of k-colorings of G′ and hence there are many examples of k-colorable polynomial time graphs with no recursive k-colorings. Moreover, even though every connected 2-colorable recursive graph is recursively 2-colorable, there are connected 2-colorable polynomial time graphs which have no primitive recursive 2-coloring. We also give some sufficient conditions which will guarantee that a polynomial time graph has a polynomial time or exponential time coloring. (shrink)

We examine the effective categoricity of equivalence structures via Ershov's difference hierarchy. We explore various kinds of categoricity available by distinguishing three different notions of isomorphism available in this hierarchy. We prove several results relating our notions of categoricity to computable equivalence relations: for example, we show that, for such relations, computable categoricity is equivalent to our notion of weak ω-c.e. categoricity, and that $\Delta _2^0 $ -categoricity is equivalent to our notion of graph-ω-c.e. categoricity.

Wilson introduces us to nine of his favorite authors through their lives, key works, and legacies. In doing so, he shows what good writing looks like-- and helps you become a better reader.

Moral enhancements aim to morally improve a person, for example by increasing the frequency with which an individual does the right thing or acts from the right motives. Most of the applied ethics literature on moral enhancement focuses on moral bioenhancement – moral enhancement pursued through biomedical means – and considers examples such as the use of drugs to diminish aggression, suppress implicit racial biases, or amplify empathy. A number of authors have defended the voluntary pursuit of moral bioenhancement, or (...) the development of technologies that would enable it. They have highlighted the need for humans to morally improve themselves in order to address moral failures such as the oppression of women, the mistreatment of animals, and anthropogenic climate change. They have also emphasised the moral similarities between moral bioenhancement and more familiar forms of moral enhancement, such as that achieved through childhood education, introspective reflection, and engagement with literature. Critics of moral enhancement have argued that it may undermine our freedom to ‘fall’ (i.e. be immoral), and therefore our moral agency, or exacerbate the domination of individuals by political authorities. They have also questioned the potential for biomedical interventions to produce the deepest and most valuable forms of moral improvement, and have highlighted the risks that technologies for moral bioenhancement might misfire or be intentionally misused, thereby producing moral deterioration. Underlying some of these worries is the observation that there is little agreement on which psychological transformations would constitute moral improvements, and in which contexts. Defenders of moral enhancement have made various proposals for resolving or side-stepping these disagreements, but it remains unclear how far these proposals can take us beyond establishing consensus on the worst types of moral failure. (shrink)

Let A and B be subsets of the space 2 N of sets of natural numbers. A is said to be Wadge reducible to B if there is a continuous map Φ from 2 N into 2 N such that A = Φ -1 (B); A is said to be monotone reducible to B if in addition the map Φ is monotone, that is, $a \subset b$ implies $\Phi (a) \subset \Phi(b)$ . The set A is said to be monotone (...) if a ∈ A and $a \subset b$ imply b ∈ A. For monotone sets, it is shown that, as for Wadge reducibility, sets low in the arithmetical hierarchy are nicely ordered. The ▵ 0 1 sets are all reducible to the (Σ 0 1 but not ▵ 0 1 ) sets, which are in turn all reducible to the strictly ▵ 0 2 sets, which are all in turn reducible to the strictly Σ 0 2 sets. In addition, the nontrivial Σ 0 n sets all have the same degree for n ≤ 2. For Wadge reducibility, these results extend throughout the Borel hierarchy. In contrast, we give two natural strictly Π 0 2 monotone sets which have different monotone degrees. We show that every Σ 0 2 monotone set is actually Σ 0 2 positive. We also consider reducibility for subsets of the space of compact subsets of 2 N . This leads to the result that the finitely iterated Cantor-Bendixson derivative D n is a Borel map of class exactly 2n, which answers a question of Kuratowski. (shrink)

_Discusses philosophers Mencius and Aristotle as socio-ecological thinkers._ Mencius (385–303/302 BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 BCE) were contemporaries, but are often understood to represent opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum. Mencius is associated with the ecological, emergent, flowing, and connected; Artistotle with the rational, static, abstract, and binary. Douglas Robinson argues that in their conceptions of rhetoric, at least, Mencius and Aristotle are much more similar than different: both are powerfully socio-ecological, espousing and exploring collectivist thinking about the circulation of (...) energy and social value through groups. The agent performing the actions of _pistis_, “persuading-and-being-persuaded,” in Aristotle and _zhi_, “governing-and-being-governed,” in Mencius is, Robinson demonstrates, not so much the rhetor as an individual as it is the whole group. Robinson tracks this collectivistic thinking through a series of comparative considerations using a theory that draws impetus from Arne Naess’s “ecosophical” deep ecology and from work on rhetoric powered by affective ecologies, but with details of the theory drawn equally from Mencius and Aristotle. (shrink)