Ambiguous terms are applicable to different kinds of things, but so are general terms, since a general kind may include various species. Thus a bank may be the side of a river or a certain kind of financial institution, and an animal may be a dog or a cat. Similarly, an ambiguous sentence is true in different kinds of situations, and so is a general sentence in that different specific situations may make the same general sentence true. Thus the sentence, (...) The bank collapsed yesterday,’ can be true of different varieties of banks, and the sentence, The animal is untrained,’ can be true of different varieties of animals. These similarities of ambiguity and generality have led many linguists and philosophers to confuse the two. Basic to this confusion is a failure to notice a difference in the scopes of disjunctions involved in ambiguity and generality. (shrink)

Ambiguous terms are applicable to different kinds of things, but so are general terms, since a general kind may include various species. Thus a bank may be the side of a river or a certain kind of financial institution, and an animal may be a dog or a cat. Similarly, an ambiguous sentence is true in different kinds of situations, and so is a general sentence in that different specific situations may make the same general sentence true. Thus the sentence, (...) The bank collapsed yesterday,’ can be true of different varieties of banks, and the sentence, The animal is untrained,’ can be true of different varieties of animals. These similarities of ambiguity and generality have led many linguists and philosophers to confuse the two. Basic to this confusion is a failure to notice a difference in the scopes of disjunctions involved in ambiguity and generality. (shrink)

Abduction is reasoning which produces explanatory hypotheses. Models are one basis for such reasoning, and language use can function as a model. I treat children’s early use of mental verbs as a model for dealing with a problem from developmental psychology, namely, how children’s early non-referential use of mental verbs might give children an early grasp of the mental realm. The present paper asks what practical knowledge of mental actions accompanies children’s competent use of mental verbs. I begin with examples (...) of non-referential verb uses and some theories from Diessel and Tomasello as bases for discussion. I argue that in using mental verbs non-referentially children understand several kinds of relations which people have to situations. Children learn how to use mental verbs to request someone to search for a situation in the past or in the physical surroundings; they learn to express hopes so as to affect their future; they learn to vouch strongly or weakly for the existence of a situation. In all of these cases it appears that the children’s main focus is on interactions with people, in which one person’s mental action in relation to a situation described in a COMP-clause is intended to have an effect on the other person. Children do not understand the nature or mechanisms of any of these mental actions, but instead focus on practical matters: how to use the verbs to perform certain actions in relation to other people and various situations. It appears that in these early uses children do not view mind as at all separate from the interactional and physical world. (shrink)

Published in 1909, this title contains a series of lectures on "The Outlines of Christian Ethics" addressed to candidates for the ministry.

If some aspects of human behavior are too murky to see into, others are too close and transparent to examine; one that has eluded both scientists and philosophers is how speakers of natural languages make words and expressions refer to specific objects in the world. Marshalling his expertise in philosophy, computers, and system science (State U. of.

The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of "respectability" accorded to conventional war. In this radical and cogent argument for pacifism, Robert Holmes asserts that all war--not (...) just nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world. Addressing a wide audience of informed and concerned readers, he raises dramatic questions about the concepts of "political realism" and nuclear deterrence, makes a number of persuasive suggestions for nonviolent alternatives to war, and presents a rich panorama of thinking about war from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr and Herman Kahn. Holmes's positions are compellingly presented and will provoke discussion both among convinced pacifists and among those whom he calls "militarists." "Militarists," we realize after reading this book, include the majority of us who live a friendly and peaceful personal life while supporting a system which, if Holmes is correct, guarantees war and risks eventual human extinction. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Arnold Zwicky and Jerrold Sadock object to my test for distinguishing ambiguity from generality by offering a counterexample and general criticisms about the use of intuitions in the test. Though I disagree with their criticisms, their paper has helped me to become aware of the unclarity of my earlier paper in regard to generality.

The paper discusses how abduction relates tochildren's early acquisition of words, and has three sections: (a) a brief description of Peirce's notion of abduction; (b) a developmentof a hypothesis for the content-related symbolic functioning of words; and (c)arguments that children's knowledge of such functioning involves two kinds of abduction. In (b), children's knowledge of the content-related symbolic functioning of words is argued to consist in practical knowledge ofhow to use words to direct attention to kindsof things. To acquire such knowledge, (...) a childmust form a practical causal hypothesis aboutthe kind of thing to which a word directs attention. I argue that forming such ahypothesis involves abduction. On the basis of empirical work of several developmentalists, I also argue that children use abduction notmerely in forming practical hypotheses for the functioning of their earliest words, but also in forming theoretical hypotheses about core(as contrasted perceptual and functional)features of natural and artificial kinds. (shrink)

In a world riven with conflict, violence and war, this book proposes a philosophical defense of pacifism. It argues that there is a moral presumption against war and unless that presumption is defeated, war is unjustified. Leading philosopher of non-violence Robert Holmes contends that neither just war theory nor the rationales for recent wars defeat that presumption, hence that war in the modern world is morally unjustified. A detailed, comprehensive and elegantly argued text which guides both students and scholars (...) through the main debates clearly but without oversimplifying the complexities of the issues or historical examples. (shrink)

Philosophical ethics comprises metaethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. These have characteristically received analytic treatment by twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. But there has been disagreement over their interrelationship to one another and the relationship of analytical ethics to substantive morality – the making of moral judgments. I contend that the expertise philosophers have in either theoretical or applied ethics does not equip them to make sounder moral judgments on the problems of bioethics than nonphilosophers. One cannot "apply" theories like Kantianism or (...) consequentialism to get solutions to practical moral problems unless one knows which theory is correct, and that is a metaethical question over which there is no consensus. On the other hand, to presume to be able to reach solutions through neutral analysis of problems is unavoidably to beg controversial theoretical issues in the process. Thus, while analytical ethics can play an important clarificatory role in bioethics, it can neither provide, nor substitute for, moral wisdom. Keywords: abortion, applied ethics, bioethics, metaethics, normative ethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Cautioning in advance that summary treatment of any aspect of Dewey's thought, much less one as far-reaching in compass as his ethics, must of necessity be omissive, I shall in the following develop what I believe to be the most plausible rendering of his ethical philosophy. In so doing I will confine myself principally to explicating his stand vis-à-vis contemporary metaethical positions, though I will expand upon this in the later sections and introduce some of his normative, or substantive, views (...) as well. In the final section I will outline a theory of morality as a whole which, though nowhere explicitly defended by Dewey, is consonant with the various theses he does defend. The burden of my argument, however, will be to show, first, that he is not holding the sort of position usually characterized as ethical naturalism, and secondly, that the position he does hold marks a significant departure from all three of the conventional metaethical positions, intuitionism, naturalism, and noncognitivism. Metaphorically he stands at the third point of a triangle, the other two points of which are naturalism and emotivism, for he adapts salient features of each of these positions to an orientation which fits the framework of his view of the nature of ethics, science and philosophy in general. Let us begin by assessing the chief arguments in support of a naturalistic interpretation, as these will provide a point of departure for clarifying his considered view. (shrink)

A problem of paramount importance to understanding John Dewey’s ethics is to clarify his conception of judgment and his distinction between judgments and propositions. Depending upon how one interprets him on this matter, different answers suggest themselves to some of the most basic questions underlying his ethical theory, particularly those dealing with the relationship between science and ethics, the relationship between practical judgments and descriptive statements, and the differentiae of moral and scientific judgments within the genus practical judgment. Oversimplified answers (...) are usually given to these, the stock interpretation being that he believes that ethics is reducible to science, that practical judgments are descriptive and hence that moral judgments are essentially scientific in nature. Although he undeniably says much to invite such an interpretation, it nonetheless fails to do justice to his considered view, and a probe of his account of the nature of judgments and propositions reveals that he views the whole relationship of moral to scientific judgments, hence of ethics to science, in a different light than is generally supposed. In consequence, much of his ethics needs reappraisal, particularly as having relevance to topics in the forefront of contemporary British and American ethical thought. (shrink)

The following sketches a constellation of views constituting the implicit philosophy of violence that one finds in much of the Western world. While I believe that much of this philosophy is deeply flawed, I shall, in a sense, be setting forth the case for violence because any hope of a nonviolent and peaceful world order must begin with a deeper understanding of violence and its attractiveness. After exploring various arguments for violence, I conclude that once we probe beneath the surface, (...) it is clear that most of those who deplore violence do not oppose all violence, only that of which they disapprove, and that social manipulation backed by violence in the end seems to most people to be justified. (shrink)