"Throughout history, some books have changed the world. They have transformed the way we see ourselves - and each other. They have inspired debate, dissent, war and revolution. They have enlightened, outraged, provoked and comforted. They have enriched lives - and destroyed them. Now Penguin brings you the works of the great thinkers, pioneers, radicals and visionaries whose ideas shook civilization and helped make us who we are. Plato's retelling of the discourses between Socrates and his friends on such subjects (...) as love and desire, truth and illusion, spiritual transcendence and the qualities of a good ruler, profoundly affected the ways in which we view human relationships, society and leadership - and shaped the whole tradition of Western philosophy."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Christopher Gill provides a new translation and commentary on the first half of Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, and a full introduction to this unique and remarkable work: a reflective diary or notebook by a Roman emperor, whose content is based on Stoic philosophy but presented in a highly distinctive way.

Christopher Gill offers a new analysis of what is innovative in Hellenistic--especially Stoic and Epicurean--philosophical thinking about selfhood and personality. His wide-ranging discussion of Stoic and Epicurean ideas is illustrated by a more detailed examination of the Stoic theory of the passions and a new account of the history of this theory. His study also tackles issues about the historical study of selfhood and the relationship between philosophy and literature, especially the presentation of the collapse of character in (...) Plutrarch's Lives, Senecan tragedy, and Virgil's Aeneid. As all Greek and Latin is translated, this book presents original ideas about ancient concepts of personality to a wide range of readers. (shrink)

Stoics and Epicureans, while holding that all human beings are constitutively capable of achieving a fully coherent state of character, also maintain that failure to realize this capacity results in a radically un-structured and incoherent state of personality. This chapter examines the Stoic theory of the passions and explores the relationship between this theory and their view that human beings function as psychological wholes. It shows how an intense debate emerged in Hellenistic-Roman thought between Stoic and Platonic-Aristotelian ways of conceiving (...) emotions. It shows how this controversy underlies the critical presentation of the Stoic theory by Plutarch and Galen, and how it leads Galen to give a misleading account of the ideas about passions held by the Stoic thinkers Chrysippus and Posidonius. (shrink)

In Hellenistic-Roman debate about psychology, thinkers such as Plutarch and Galen saw themselves as maintaining Platonic ideas about psychology that the Stoics rejected. This chapter suggests that the relationship between Plato and these Hellenistic and Roman thinkers is more complex than initially appears. It suggests that both sides in the debate may have been influenced by key features of Platonic psychology. This suggestion is illustrated by accounts of competing ways of reading two important Platonic treatments of psychology: in the Timaeus (...) and the Republic. The account of Galen’s reading is based on Galen’s own statements; the reconstruction of Chrysippus’ reading is more speculative. These competing readings are used to show how Platonic material could be seen as lending support both to part-based and to holistic ideas about embodied psychology and psychological functions. (shrink)

This chapter charts links between the Stoic and Epicurean conception of self that is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, and their ideas about ethical development. Human beings, while seen as psychophysical and psychological wholes, are also seen as constitutively capable of achieving a fully structured and coherent ethical character. This set of ideas is illustrated especially by reference to the Stoic theory of development as ‘appropriation’. The Stoic theory is seen as embodying a holistic approach both to human psychology (...) and to ideals of ethical character. Stoic and Epicurean ideas about development are also linked with their use of the ‘whole-person’ model of causation and with ‘rich naturalism’, that is, the systematic integration of logic, ethics, and physics. Stoic-Epicurean thinking about development is contrasted with the Platonic-Aristotelian approach, especially as found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus. (shrink)

This chapter challenges the rather common view that Hellenistic-Roman thought shows a shift towards a more subjective and individualistic conception of self. It argues that this period expresses an ‘objective-participant’ conception, like that of Classical Greece. The account of self-knowledge in Plato’s Alcibiades is offered as an illustration of Classical Greek objective-participant thinking about the self. The chapter contests the idea, maintained by some scholars, that we find a shift towards a more subjective conception of self in the Stoic theory (...) of development as appropriation or in Epictetus’ Stoic teachings on practical ethics. It also questions the idea that we can find in ancient thought generally certain themes associated in modern thought with subjective conceptions of selfhood, especially that of the uniquely ‘first-personal’ viewpoint; this point is illustrated by reference to Cyrenaic and Sceptical thought about impressions. (shrink)

This chapter explores the potential relevance to the interpretation of later Greek and Roman literature of the competing Hellenistic-Roman patterns of thought about the development of character discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The presentation of collapse of ethical character in Plutarch’s Lives is taken as illustrating the Platonic-Aristotelian pattern of thinking. The depiction of psychological conflict and disintegration in Seneca’s Medea and Phaedra is seen as illustrating the contrasting Stoic pattern. Tracing philosophical influence on Virgil’s Aeneid is acknowledged to (...) be more difficult and complex. In the presentation of inner conflict and passions in Dido and Aeneas, there are grounds for seeing the influence of both Platonic-Aristotelian and Stoic-Epicurean patterns. But the latter pattern is presented as ultimately more important for making sense of the distinctive features of Virgil’s portrayal. (shrink)

This chapter identifies the combination of radical ethical claims and psychological holism as a second distinctive feature of Stoic and Epicurean thought about the self. The main ethical claims are that all human beings can achieve happiness by rational reflection and virtue, that happiness involves time-independent perfection of character, and that only the wise are fully coherent ethically and psychologically. The chapter suggests that Stoic and Epicurean ethical ideals were both influenced by Socrates but in quite different ways. It argues (...) that Stoics and Epicureans combine these radical ethical claims with a holistic conception of psychology. This can be contrasted with the Platonic-Aristotelian division of the personality into distinct parts, such as reason and emotion or desire. It also discusses some examples of ‘quasi-dualism’ in Stoicism and Epicureanism, in which seemingly dualistic psychological language is employed for ethical purposes. (shrink)

This chapter identifies, as a key innovative feature of Hellenistic thought about personality, the idea of the person as a psychophysical unit or whole in Stoicism and Epicureanism. It contrasts this idea with the core-centred or part-based view of the personality sometimes found in Plato and Aristotle, while highlighting certain strands in Platonic or Aristotelian thought that may have helped to shape Stoic and Epicurean thought about personality. Psychophysical holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism is illustrated by reference to their views (...) about the physical nature of the psyche and the development of human beings as embodied psychological wholes. Connections are also traced with some puzzles about identity in Stoic and Epicurean thought. (shrink)

This is a major study of conceptions of selfhood and personality in Homer and Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. The focus is on the norms of personality in Greek psychology and ethics. Gill argues that the key to understanding Greek thought of this type is to counteract the subjective and individualistic aspects of our own thinking about the person. He defines an "objective-participant" conception of personality, symbolized by the idea of the person as an interlocutor in a series of psychological (...) and ethical dialogues. (shrink)

This book offers a sustained examination of the core Stoic ethical claims and their significance for modern moral theory. The first part considers the Stoic ideas of happiness as the life according to nature and virtue as expertise in leading a happy life and explores the senses of ‘nature’ (both human and universal) relevant for ethics. It also explains the distinction in value between virtue and ‘indifferents’ and analyses virtuous practical deliberation as selection between ‘indifferents’ directed at leading a happy (...) human life. The second part studies Stoic thinking on ethical development (in their terms, learning to live naturally). It brings out the close interconnections between making progress in ethical understanding, in forming and deepening social relationships, and in emotional responses. The third part discusses how Stoic ethics, as interpreted here, can contribute to contemporary moral theory, especially virtue ethics. It suggests that Stoic thinking on the virtue-happiness relationship offers a cogent alternative to Aristotle, currently the main ancient prototype for virtue ethical theory. It explores ways in which Stoic ideas on human and universal nature can contribute to modern ethical debates, notably on how to respond effectively to the pressing challenge of climate breakdown. It also highlights the potential value of Stoic thinking on development and guidance for modern virtue ethics as well as discussing the powerful impact Stoicism has already had in contemporary ‘life-guidance’. (shrink)

This collection of essays explores analogous issues in classical and modern philosophy that relate to the concepts of person and human being. A primary focus is whether there are such analogous issues, and whether we can find in ancient philosophy a notion that is comparable to "person" as understood in modern philosophy. Essays on modern philosophy reappraise the validity of the notion of person, while essays on classical philosophy take up the related questions of what being "human" entails in ancient (...) ethics and psychology, and whether we should regard ourselves as, essentially, human or rational beings. (shrink)

It is often claimed that in the ancient world character was believed to be something fixed, given at birth and immutable during life. This belief is said to underlie the portrayal of individuals in ancient historiography and biography, particularly in the early Roman Empire; and tc constitute the chief point of difference in psychological assumptions between ancient and modern biography. In this article, I wish to examine the truth of these claims, with particular reference to Plutarch and Tacitus.

The scene at the end of the Phaedo, in which Plato describes how Socrates dies by poisoning from hemlock, is moving and impressive. It gives us the sense of witnessing directly an actual event, accurately and vividly described, the death of the historical Socrates. There are, however, certain curious features in the scene, and in the effects of the hemlock on Socrates, as Plato presents them. In the Phaedo hemlock has only one primary effect: it produces first heaviness and then (...) numbness in the body. (shrink)

The scene at the end of the Phaedo, in which Plato describes how Socrates dies by poisoning from hemlock, is moving and impressive. It gives us the sense of witnessing directly an actual event, accurately and vividly described, the death of the historical Socrates. There are, however, certain curious features in the scene, and in the effects of the hemlock on Socrates, as Plato presents them. In the Phaedo hemlock has only one primary effect: it produces first heaviness and then (...) numbness in the body. (shrink)

Reciprocity has been seen as an important notion for anthropologists studying economic and social relations, and this volume examines it in connection with Greek culture from Homer to the Hellenistic period.

This is a study of the psychological ideas of Galen (AD 129-c.210, the most important medical writer in antiquity) and Stoicism (a major philosophical theory in ...

Why did Plato put his philosophical arguments into dialogues, rather than presenting them in a plain and readily understandable fashion? A group of distinguished scholars here offer answers to this question by studying the relation between form and argument in his late dialogues. These penetrating studies show that the literary structure of the dialogues is of vital importance in the ongoing interpretation of Plato.

It is often claimed that in the ancient world character was believed to be something fixed, given at birth and immutable during life. This belief is said to underlie the portrayal of individuals in ancient historiography and biography, particularly in the early Roman Empire; and tc constitute the chief point of difference in psychological assumptions between ancient and modern biography. In this article, I wish to examine the truth of these claims, with particular reference to Plutarch and Tacitus.

This volume of new essays by an international group of scholars examines the response of Hans-Georg Gadamer to Plato, especially to the Philebus. The book studies Gadamer's interpretative approach to the dialogues and unwritten doctrines of Plato. It also shows how, for Gadamer, reading Plato was intimately interconnected with formulating his own philosophical views. The volume also brings out how Gadamer influenced Donald Davidson in his reading of Plato and his philosophical thought. The volume thus explores a fascinating case-study of (...) the creative reception of Plato by two major twentieth-century philosophers, Gadamer and Davidson, while also clarifying Gadamer's relationship to Heidegger. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Plato, especially on the Philebus, and also to scholars of twentieth-century thought. (shrink)

This chapter discusses distinctive features of Stoic ethical thought and their potential contribution to modern moral theory, especially virtue ethics. These features include Stoic ideas on the virtue-happiness relationship, theory of value, ethics and nature, ethical development and relationships to other people. The main claim is that, on these topics, Stoicism can contribute to modern virtue ethics more effectively than Aristotle, despite Aristotle’s well-known role as a stimulus for modern virtue ethics.

Jasper Griffin, in his recent book on Homer, has suggested that modern critics would do well to pay more attention to the localized insights and the general critical framework of the ancient Greek commentators. In a previous article, ‘Homeric Pathos and Objectivity’, he claimed to show, by careful study of those passages in which the scholiasts found λεος, οκτος or πάθος, that ‘the ancient scholars were right to regard pathos as one of the most important elements in the Iliad’. also (...) think this is a potentially fruitful and underdeveloped approach to the criticism of Homer and other ancient authors; and that the term pathos, together with ēthos, with which it is often coupled or contrasted, is one of the most suggestive, though also confusing, of ancient critical terms. I want to begin the story further back in time than the scholia, in the treatises on rhetoric and poetics from which the scholiasts’ critical vocabulary was largely derived. I propose to survey the use of ēthos and pathos as contrasted terms in these treatises from Aristotle to Longinus, in the hope that such a survey will not only clarify the various meanings and associations attached to these terms but will also throw a more general light on ancient critical presuppositions. Both Aristotle and Longinus used the ethos/pathos distinction to contrast the Odyssey and theIliad; and a clearer understanding of the significance they gave to these words may help us to appraise the critical usefulness of their comments. (shrink)

Jasper Griffin, in his recent book on Homer, has suggested that modern critics would do well to pay more attention to the localized insights and the general critical framework of the ancient Greek commentators. In a previous article, ‘Homeric Pathos and Objectivity’, he claimed to show, by careful study of those passages in which the scholiasts found λεος, οκτος or πάθος, that ‘the ancient scholars were right to regard pathos as one of the most important elements in the Iliad’. also (...) think this is a potentially fruitful and underdeveloped approach to the criticism of Homer and other ancient authors; and that the term pathos, together with ēthos, with which it is often coupled or contrasted, is one of the most suggestive, though also confusing, of ancient critical terms. I want to begin the story further back in time than the scholia, in the treatises on rhetoric and poetics from which the scholiasts’ critical vocabulary was largely derived. I propose to survey the use of ēthos and pathos as contrasted terms in these treatises from Aristotle to Longinus, in the hope that such a survey will not only clarify the various meanings and associations attached to these terms but will also throw a more general light on ancient critical presuppositions. Both Aristotle and Longinus used the ethos/pathos distinction to contrast the Odyssey and theIliad; and a clearer understanding of the significance they gave to these words may help us to appraise the critical usefulness of their comments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 554-555 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas White. Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics.New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. xv + 369. Cloth, $55.00. This is a thoughtful book on an interesting subject by a well-known scholar of ancient ethical philosophy. However, the organization and mode of exposition is, in some ways, rather odd; and this rather muffles the (...) potential depth and impact.White challenges (what he presents as) a widespread current view about Greek ethical philosophy. This is that Greek philosophy does not contain the same kinds of moral conflict that we find in modern thought: namely, between the claims of the individual and the state, and between doing your duty, or what is best for others, and pursuing your own happiness. White, by contrast, believes that those conflicts do figure—as substantive, problematic issues—in Greek thought, and that they are conceived in a way that is broadly similar to modern thought, despite some other salient differences. Further, White maintains that the general denial of conflict in Greek thought has its roots in certain eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectual tendencies. A crucial factor was the Hegelian picture of Classical Greek thought as free from the conflicts between individual and state, and between happiness and duty that are central in modern thought and are articulated especially by Kant. White sees the Hegelian view as influential on late nineteenth-century readings of Greek philosophy by thinkers such as Sidgwick, on more recent anti-Kantian thinkers such as Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Williams, as well as on much current scholarship on Greek philosophy.White confronts what he sees as a mistaken tendency partly by charting its historical roots and partly by offering a competing (or at least "ground-clearing" [xiii]) reading of key relevant features of Greek ethics. Two crucial topics are Plato's presentation of the demand that the fully trained philosopher-rulers go back into the cave to direct the state rather than philosophizing, as they would prefer (Republic 219-21) and Aristotle's selection [End Page 554] of the philosophical life, rather than the ethical life of practical action, as the highest form of human happiness (Nicomachean Ethics10.7-8). White argues, first, that these are recognized as substantive and difficult issues by the two Greek thinkers and, second, that the way in which the issues are conceived is (roughly) in terms of the modern-style contrast between doing your communal duty and pursuing your personal happiness. The "eudaimonistic" (happiness-centered) outlook often seen as typical of Greek philosophy does not mean that these issues are therefore defused or resolved. Hellenistic (Epicurean and Stoic) philosophy does offer a unified ethical outlook, but not in a way that matches the Hegelian pattern. The influential Hegelian reading of Greek ethics is shown up as mistaken and the door is opened for interpretations which recognize and analyse these issues in more accurate terms.White's central claims are challenging, important and, in principle at least, plausible. How effectively is the case made? As indicated earlier, the organization of the book does not seem to me to support the argument as well as it could. The discussion of Plato and Aristotle, which forms the core of White's thesis, is preceded by an extended preparation, extending to nearly half of the book. This examines, in meticulous detail, the background in modern intellectual history to the tendency that White attacks. It also explores in general terms conceptual issues (about deliberative conflict, the role of imperatives and the city-state as a source of normativity) that bear on his claims about Greek thought. When White finally gets to detailed discussion of philosophical texts, he does not—surprisingly—try to show in specific ways how current leading scholarly interpretations are informed by the Hegelian pattern he has so elaborately described. His confrontation with the modern version of this pattern is generalized, with references to scholarly readings largely confined to footnotes. The thrust of his interpretative discussion is negative, ruling out the harmonizing, Hegelian... (shrink)