Epistemic transparency tells us that, if an agent S knows a given proposition p , then S knows that she knows that p . This idea is usually encoded in the so-called KK principle of epistemic logic. The paper develops an argument in favor of a moderate version of KK , which I dub quasi-transparency , as a normative rather than a descriptive principle. In the second Section I put forward the suggestion that epistemic transparency is not a demand of (...) ideal rationality, but of ideal epistemic responsibility, and hence that ideally responsible agents verify transparency principles of some sort; I also contend that their satisfaction should not be tied to an internalist epistemology. The central argument in favor of transparency is then addressed in Sections 3 to 8, through the development of a formal system. I show that, in a well-behaved formal setting, a moderate version of transparency is imposed upon us as a result of a number of independent decisions on the structure of higher-order probabilities, as long as we request that our probability and knowledge attributions cohere with each other. Thus I give a rationale to build a model for a hierarchy of languages with different levels of knowledge and probability operators; we obtain an analogous to KK for successive knowledge operators without actually demanding transitivity. The formal argument reinforces the philosophical intuition that epistemic transparency is an important desideratum we should not be too ready to dismiss. (shrink)

Some propositions are structurally unknowable for certain agents. Let me call them ‘Moorean propositions’. The structural unknowability of Moorean propositions is normally taken to pave the way towards proving a familiar paradox from epistemic logic—the so-called ‘Knowability Paradox’, or ‘Fitch’s Paradox’—which purports to show that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are in fact known. The present paper explores how to translate Moorean statements into a probabilistic language. A successful translation should enable us to derive a version of (...) Fitch’s Paradox in a probabilistic setting. I offer a suitable schematic form for probabilistic Moorean propositions, as well as a concomitant proof of a probabilistic Knowability Paradox. Moreover, I argue that traditional candidates to play the role of probabilistic Moorean propositions will not do. In particular, we can show that violations of the so-called ‘Reflection Principle’ in probability need not yield structurally unknowable propositions. Among other things, this should lead us to question whether violating the Reflection Principle actually amounts to a clear case of epistemic irrationality, as it is often assumed. This result challenges the importance of the principle as a tool to assess both synchronic and diachronic rationality—a topic which is largely independent of Fitch’s Paradox—from a somewhat unexpected source. (shrink)

I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance , which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I discuss (...) how agents can rationally shift their credal probability functions so as to consciously modify some of their contextual acceptances; the present account also allows us to represent how the very set of contexts evolves. Voluntary credal shifts, in turn, might provoke changes in the agent’s beliefs, but I show that this is actually a side effect of performing multiple adjustments in the total lot of the agent’s acceptance sets. In this way we obtain a model that preserves many pre-theoretical intuitions about what counts as adequate rationality constraints on our actual practices—and hence about what counts as an adequate, normative epistemological perspective. (shrink)

The paper suggests a way of modeling belief changes within the tradition of formal belief revision theories. The present model extends the scope of traditional proposals, such as AGM, so as to take care of “structural belief changes” – a type of radical shifts that is best illustrated with, but not limited to, instances of scientific discovery; we obtain AGM expansions and contractions as limiting cases. The representation strategy relies on a non-standard use of a semantic machinery. More precisely, the (...) model seeks to correlate knowledge states with interpretations of a given formal language L, in such a way that the epistemic state of an agent at a given time gives rise to a picture of how things could be, if there weren’t anything else to know. Interpretations of L proceed along supervaluational ideas; hence, the model as a whole can be seen as a particular application of supervaluational semantics to epistemic matters. (shrink)

In a recent paper Samir Okasha has suggested an application of Arrow’s impossibility theorem to theory choice. When epistemic virtues are interpreted as ‘voters’ in charge of ranking competing theories, and there are more than two theories at stake, the final ordering is bound to coincide with the one proposed by one of the voters, provided a number of seemingly reasonable conditions are in place. In a similar spirit, Jacob Stegenga has shown that Arrow’s theorem applies to the amalgamation of (...) evidence; the ‘voters’ here are the different sources of evidence. As with Okasha’s proposal, it is not clear how to avoid Arrow’s pessimistic conclusion.In this paper we develop a novel argument that purports to show that, in typical examples, Arrow’s result does not obtain when dealing with evidence amalgamation. The reason is that we cannot escape the well-known Duhem problem: the evidence actually confirms complex conjunctions that include various auxiliary hypotheses. We argue that confirmational holism induces us to restrict the domain of a reasonable amalgamation function, thus violating one of Arrow’s conditions. The upshot is that we are now able to see the Duhem problem under a different, positive light – namely, as a phenomenon that makes the aggregation of the evidence possible in the first place, when there are at least three options on the table. (shrink)

According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not (...) always perceived as a necessary condition for true knowledge attribution, according to our pre-theoretical usage of standard epistemic terms. This is not to say that justification is never seen as an important requirement; sometimes it certainly is. Still, the full-fledged, traditional position on epistemic justification needs to be seriously qualified. Ultimately, I will contend that this result lends support to a rival epistemological standpoint — what we might dub a Moderate Peircean stance on epistemic matters. (shrink)

Este trabajo examina el concepto de conocimiento grupal. Por un lado, se observa que a menudo nos vemos compelidos a atribuir a los agentes grupales actitudes epistémicas que difieren de las de sus miembros individuales; por otro lado, también notamos que los agentes idealmente responsables están sometidos a una “presión deflacionaria” para anclar tales actitudes en individuos concretos. En vistas de ello, argumento que los grupos epistémicamente esponsables deben concebirse como entidades dinámicas; de anera correlativa, el conocimiento grupal puede definirse (...) en érminos de una familia de posibles rutas entre el onocimiento distribuido y el conocimiento común del grupo. Muestro ntonces que las Lógicas de Anuncios Públicos pueden usarse en este contexto como herramientas adecuadas para monitorear la satisfacción de requerimientos normativos por parte de individuos epistémicamente responsables. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Porchat Pereira and the Neo‐Pyrrhonian School Knowledge and Skepticism: The Legacy of Ezequiel de Olaso Luis Villoro and the Beginnings of Systematic Studies in Analytic Epistemology Current Analytic Epistemology in Latin America Acknowledgments References Further Reading.

I explore a game-theoretic analysis of social interactions in which each agent’s well-being depends crucially on the well-being of another agent. As a result of this, payoffs are interdependent and cannot be fixed, and hence the overall assessment of strategies becomes ungrounded. A paradigmatic example of this general phenomenon occurs when both players are ‘reflective altruists’, in a sense to be explained. I argue that ungroundedness cannot be captured by standard games with incomplete information, but that it requires the concept (...) of an underspecified game; underspecified games have radically underdetermined matrices. Players locked in ungroundedness will be assumed to engage simultaneously in an implicit second-order game in which they try to coordinate their first-order matrices. If they fail to coordinate, their first-order interaction cannot be recast as a game in the first place. (shrink)

En este trabajo argumento a favor de la idea de que una explicación científica es una respuesta a una pregunta, aunque no necesariamente a una pregunta-por-qué. Esto no quiere decir que las preguntas-por-qué no sean elementos fundamentales de toda investigación científica: su importancia radica en que son capaces de organizar y sistematizar un conjunto dado de creencias. Para justificar esta afirmación, comienzo por identificar tres estadios básicos en los cuales pueden surgir preguntas-por-qué, y luego procedo a caracterizar su estructura. Muestro (...) finalmente cómo usar este análisis para elucidar la noción de poder de unificación de hipótesis rivales. Entiendo que esta última noción, a su vez, constituye uno de los criterios que debemos considerar a la hora de evaluar cuál de dichas hipótesis rivales es la mejor explicación disponible, comparativamente hablando. In this paper I take scientific explanations to be answers to questions, though not necessarily to why-questions. This, however, is not meant to imply that why-questions are not fundamental in their own peculiar way. As I understand it, why-questions are crucial elements in any research process because they are able to organize and systematize an agent's belief set. In order to justify my claim I start by identifying three basic stages in which whyquestions can arise, and then I proceed to characterize their structure. I also show how to use this analysis to elucidate the notion of comparative unification power of rival hypotheses. The notion of comparative unification power, in turn, can be thought of as one of the criteria that we should take into account at the time of assessing which of such rival hypotheses is the best explanation available, comparatively speaking. (shrink)

En este trabajo se ofrece un comentario al artículo de Miguel Ángel Fernández sobre el veritismo y el valor del entendimiento publicado en Diánoia 65. En primer lugar, se observa que el veritismo descansa en una definición de valor epistémico que amenaza con trivializar toda la discusión. Luego se procede a examinar los argumentos de Fernández con cierto detalle. In this paper I comment on M.Á. Fernández's paper on veritism and the value of understanding. I begin by observing that veritism (...) relies on a definition of epistemic value that threatens to trivialize the discussion. Then I proceed to examine Fernandez's arguments with some detail. (shrink)

In this paper I present a model of rational belief change, and I show how to use it to obtain a better insight into the debate about the nature of pneumococcal transformation, genes and DNA that took place in the forties, as a result of Oswald T. Avery’s work. The model offers a particular elaboration of the concept of inference to the best explanation, along decision theoretic lines. Within this framework, I distinguish different senses in which Avery’s team can be (...) said to have proceeded with caution, thus throwing some light upon a persistent source of disagreement among researchers in the history of genetics. In addition, I explain why we are entitled to say that rival parties such as physicist Maclyn McCarty and biochemist Alfred Mirsky were epistemically rational, in spite of the fact that they reached different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence. (shrink)

RESEÑAS. Margarita M. Valdés y Miguel Ángel Fernández (compiladores), Normas, virtudes y valores epistémicos. Ensayos de epistemología contemporánea, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, México, 2011, 550 pp.

The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of the confusion surrounding it. While the prospects for a Darwinian metaethics appear to be improving, some underlying epistemological issues remain unclear. We will focus on the so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) which, when applied in metaethics, are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs so as to undermine their epistemic justification. The point is that an epistemic disanalogy (...) can be identified in the debate on EDAs between moral beliefs and other kinds of beliefs, insofar as only the former are regarded as vulnerable to EDAs. First, we will analyze some significant debunking positions in metaethics in order to show that they do not provide adequate justification for such an epistemic disanalogy. Then, we will assess whether they can avoid the accusation of being epistemically incoherent by adopting the same evolutionary account for all kinds of beliefs. In other words, once it is argued that Darwinism has a corrosive impact on metaethics, what if its universal acid cannot be contained? (shrink)

The work examines the influence of the relationship that football players have with significant others on their psychological wellbeing (PWB), adopting a psychosocial perspective. According to this perspective, PWB can be considered a basic condition for an effective talent development and holistic growth of young athletes. Current literature on talent development in sport has been analyzed to support the theoretical hypothesis of psychosocial perspective. Thus, it has been tested empirically through a Structural Equation Model. Analysis reveals a strong and positive (...) influence of some dimensions of the relationships with significant others on the psychological wellbeing, specifically team effort, coach closeness and parental learning climate. Following ANOVA shows that élite players perceive significantly better relationships than sub-élite and amateurs and have significantly higher levels of PWB. Those results provide a first evidence for the importance of relationships within and outside sport for an effective talent development, since they positively influence players’ PWB, that is higher in higher competitive level players. It emerges the necessity to further investigate different aspects of psychological wellbeing and to deepen the knowledge about the meaning of relationship in developmental athletes according to a psychosocial approach. (shrink)

The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic has strongly affected oncology patients. Many screening and treatment programs have been postponed or canceled, and such patients also experience fear of increased risk of exposure to the virus. In many cases, locus of control, coping flexibility, and perception of a supportive environment, specifically family resilience, can allow for positive emotional outcomes for individuals managing complex health conditions like cancer. This study aims to determine if family resilience, coping flexibility, and locus of control can mitigate (...) the negative affect caused by the pandemic and enhance positive affect in breast cancer patients. One hundred and fifty-four female patients with breast cancer completed the Walsh’s Family Resilience Questionnaire, the Perceived Ability to Cope With Trauma Scale, the Positive-Negative Affect Schedule, and the Mini Locus of Control Scale. Family resilience and internality of locus of control contribute significantly to positive affective responses. Family resilience is responsible for mitigating the negative affect perceived during the pandemic and is enhanced by external locus of control. Evidence suggests that clinical psychologists should develop and propose programs to support oncology patients’ family resilience, coping flexibility, and internal locus of control, allowing for decreased stress and improved adaptability for effectively managing cancer treatment during the pandemic. (shrink)

The paper explores the interplay among moral progress, evolution and moral realism. Although it is nearly uncontroversial to note that morality makes progress of one sort or another, it is far from uncontroversial to define what constitutes moral progress. In a minimal sense, moral progress occurs when a subsequent state of affairs is better than a preceding one. Moral realists conceive “it is better than” as something like “it more adequately reflects moral facts”; therefore, on a realist view, moral progress (...) can be associated with accumulations of moral knowledge. From an evolutionary perspective, on the contrary, since there cannot be something like moral knowledge, one might conclude there cannot even be such a thing as moral progress. More precisely, evolutionism urges us to ask whether we can acknowledge the existence of moral progress without being committed to moral realism. A promising strategy, I will argue, is to develop an account of moral progress based on moral understanding rather than moral knowledge. On this view, moral progress follows increases in moral understanding rather than accumulations of moral knowledge. Whether an understanding-based account of moral progress is feasible and what its implications for the notion itself of moral progress are, will be discussed. (shrink)

Self-regulation of learning is a key psychological factor that supports young athletes aiming to reach the elite level by promoting their involvement in deliberate practice. We contributed to the validation of the Italian version of the Bartulovic et al. Self-Regulation of Learning – Self-Report Scale for Sport Practice by testing its factorial structure, reliability, and measurement invariance among elite and non-elite football players, involving 415 male professional, semi-professional, and amateur youth academy players. The original six-factor structure did not fit the (...) data well and a five-factor solution was a better fit. This five-factor solution was measurement invariant across groups of elite and non-elite athletes. We found that elite athletes scored significantly higher than non-elite ones in each SRL subprocess. Implications for future validation studies and for the use of this tool are discussed. (shrink)

The so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. When applied to morality, such arguments are intended to undermine moral realism. In this paper I will discuss Andreas Mogensen’s recent effort to secure moral realism against EDAs. Mogensen attempts to undermine the challenge provided by EDAs in metaethics through the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. The problem with this move is that the proximate/ultimate distinction is misconceived. (...) If ultimate and proximate causes are properly understood to be complementary, such distinction cannot affect EDAs in metaethics. Therefore, I will argue, Mogensen’s argument fails and moral realism is still in danger. (shrink)

En este artículo buscamos indagar el sentido y alcance de unos términos que se entrelazan en las acciones y modos de relacionarnos en un medio, no sólo existencial, sino social. Centraremos el enfoque a partir de la lectura de algunos textos de Merleau-Ponty para presentar así su peculiar modo de abordar ciertos temas desde una perspectiva fenomenológica situada. Palabras clave: corporalidad; interioridad; exterioridad; conciencia; fenomenología. The Corporality of the Self and the Interiority of the Other, in Merlau-Ponty’s philosophyIn this paper (...) we inquire into the sense and scope of terms which are intertwined in the actions and ways in which we relate to one another, in a medium which is not only existential, but social as well. We shall focus on the reading of some texts of Merleau-Ponty, in order to show his peculiar way of addressing certain topics from a situated phenomenological perspective. Keywords: Corporality; Interiority; Exteriority; Conscience; Phenomenology. (shrink)

The two dominant theories relating to animal cruelty are critically reviewed. These are (1) the violence graduation hypothesis and (2) the deviance generalization hypothesis. The outcomes indicate very high consistency with the broader antisocial behavior and aggression literature, which is large and very robust. This strongly supports the validity of the animal cruelty theory proposals. Proposals that animal cruelty is one of the earliest indicators of externalizing disorders and that it is a marker of development along a more severe trajectory (...) of antisocial and aggressive behaviors are supported. The implications of these conclusions are discussed. (shrink)

Research shows that animal cruelty shares many of the aetiologial pathways and risk factors that have been shown for other aggressive behaviors. The shared aetiology not only aids understanding of the co-occurrence that has been documented between animal cruelty and other aggressive and antisocial crimes, it also highlights the dangers over and above those to animals that are lurking where animal cruelty offenders remain unidentified and their crimes remain unsanctioned. This article reviews current understandings about the development of antisocial behaviors, (...) including human aggression, and animal cruelty behaviors. Available research leads one to ask, when individuals have been found to be guilty of animal cruelty, what other aggressive behaviors might they be guilty of? For young children, one must ask, are they victims of child abuse, are they living in circumstances of domestic violence, and/or what is the aggression or violence that they may have been witness to? Animal cruelty, and most aggressive behaviors from the later childhood years onward, are indicators of non-normative development. Early detection of such behaviors can provide a valuable opportunity to engage in preventative intervention for young people or for appropriate sanctions to be applied for adults. Such interventions would be beneficial for all, humans and animals alike. (shrink)

This article focuses on the animal cruelty, health, psychological and social consequences, as well as environmental consequences of an animal-based diet. Animals are intensively bred and raised in factory farms in the most inhumane ways. By far, the greatest numbers of animals reared and killed by humans every year is for human consumption. The numbers are estimated to be greater than 56 billion animals globally. The cruelty involved in the intensive farming of animals is the most widespread form of cruelty (...) imposed by humans on other species. This has significant implications for who we are as a species. Moreover, the belief that humans need to consume animal products to maintain good health has been seriously questioned over the past few decades. It is also a lifestyle choice that is responsible for significant damage to the environment. In contrast, a strong evidence base exists to show that a plant-based diet is health promoting and sustainable. Thus, by cultivating a culture of compassion toward nonhuman animals, current and future generations will benefit through better physical and psychological health and through markedly reduced damage to the planet and all of its inhabitants. (shrink)

This paper presents the collective reflection of a temporary community of inquiry (COI) created during an international workshop at the 20th biennial ICPIC conference--“Philosophy In And Beyond the Classroom: P4wc Across Cultural, Social, and Political Differences”-- and the suggestions emerging from that event. The workshop, entitled “Pedagojazz—improvising and inquiring, community interplay”, was conducted via Zoom, but participants were both online and present in person. The topic focused on the pedagojazz perspective, and the short activities proposed were aimed at involving the (...) (temporary) COI in a collective discussion about how it would be possible to transform a community of inquiry into an inquiring-jazzing community. Three premises were introduced as common background on which to develop our reflections: the pedagojazz perspective; the connection between pedagojazz idioms and the different roles of the facilitator in P4wC; and the idea that jazz, and collective improvisation in particular, can inform COI development. The principles and practices of pedagojazz and collective improvisation are presented in detail here. During the workshop, Zoom chat and the Wooclap site were used to involve all participants and to gather their contributions and suggestions. A word cloud and three tables were produced and are presented here. Interesting themes, questions and perspectives emerged that can help us reflect in a more complex way on the education of P4wC facilitators across cultural, social and political differences. (shrink)

Risk management is a well-known method to face technological challenges through a win–win combination of protective and proactive approaches, fostering the collaboration of operators, researchers, regulators, and industries for the exploitation of new markets. In the field of autonomous and unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to risk analysis, the generation of ground risk maps, and ground risk assessment by estimating the fatality rate. The paper aims to expand this approach with a tool (...) for managing data protection risks raised by drones through the design of flight maps. The tool should allow UAS operators choosing the best air corridor for their drones based on the so-called privacy by design principle pursuant to Article 25 of the EU data protection regulation, the GDPR. Among the manifold applications of this approach, the design of fly zones for drones can be tailored for public authorities in the phase of authorization of new operations, much as for national Data Protection authorities that have to control the lawfulness of personal data processing by UAS operations. The overall aim is to present the first win–win approach to data protection issues, aerospace engineering challenges, and risk management methods for the threats posed by this technology. (shrink)

Risk management is a well-known method to face technological challenges through a win–win combination of protective and proactive approaches, fostering the collaboration of operators, researchers, regulators, and industries for the exploitation of new markets. In the field of autonomous and unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to risk analysis, the generation of ground risk maps, and ground risk assessment by estimating the fatality rate. The paper aims to expand this approach with a tool (...) for managing data protection risks raised by drones through the design of flight maps. The tool should allow UAS operators choosing the best air corridor for their drones based on the so-called privacy by design principle pursuant to Article 25 of the EU data protection regulation, the GDPR. Among the manifold applications of this approach, the design of fly zones for drones can be tailored for public authorities in the phase of authorization of new operations, much as for national Data Protection authorities that have to control the lawfulness of personal data processing by UAS operations. The overall aim is to present the first win–win approach to data protection issues, aerospace engineering challenges, and risk management methods for the threats posed by this technology. (shrink)

Risk management is a well-known method to face technological challenges through a win–win combination of protective and proactive approaches, fostering the collaboration of operators, researchers, regulators, and industries for the exploitation of new markets. In the field of autonomous and unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, a considerable amount of work has been devoted to risk analysis, the generation of ground risk maps, and ground risk assessment by estimating the fatality rate. The paper aims to expand this approach with a tool (...) for managing data protection risks raised by drones through the design of flight maps. The tool should allow UAS operators choosing the best air corridor for their drones based on the so-called privacy by design principle pursuant to Article 25 of the EU data protection regulation, the GDPR. Among the manifold applications of this approach, the design of fly zones for drones can be tailored for public authorities in the phase of authorization of new operations, much as for national Data Protection authorities that have to control the lawfulness of personal data processing by UAS operations. The overall aim is to present the first win–win approach to data protection issues, aerospace engineering challenges, and risk management methods for the threats posed by this technology. (shrink)

Le but de cet article est de contribuer au débat sur la relation entre les pratiques prédictives et l’orthodoxie religieuse, telle qu’elle est exposée dans le Liber introductorius de Michel Scot. Au cœur de ce travail se trouve l’étude de la discussion de l’interprétation des signes inhabituels et des événements inattendus par Michel Scot, à la fois dans le Liber quatuor distinctionum et le Liber particularis. L’analyse de nouvelles preuves textuelles, jusque là passées inaperçues, permettra par ailleurs la réévaluation de (...) la réception de Michel Scot en tant qu’autorité dans le domaine des pratiques prédictives. (shrink)