Sports are an excellent venue for demonstrating evolutionary principles to audiences not familiar with academic research. Team sports and sports fandom feature dynamics of in-group loyalty and intergroup competition, influenced by our evolved coalitional psychology. We predicted that reactions to expressions signaling mutual team/group allegiance would vary as a function of the territorial context. Reactions should become more prevalent, positive, and enthusiastic as one moves from the home territory to a contested area, and from a contested area to a rival’s (...) territory during active rival engagement. We also predicted that men would be more responsive than women based on sex differences in evolved coalitional psychology. The research team visited public places immediately prior to 2016–2017 collegiate football and basketball games. A male research confederate wore a sweatshirt displaying the logo of one of the competing university teams and vocalized the team’s most popular slogan when he saw a fan displaying similar logos. Observers followed 5 m behind, recording reactions and response positivity/enthusiasm. Reaction tone was most positive in the rival territory, least positive in the home territory, and intermediate in the periphery and contested territory. Rates of “no reaction” were lowest in the rival territory but were highest in the periphery. Men had higher reaction rates and more positive and enthusiastic reaction tones than women. Reactions generally followed predictions based on expected signal value. This project provides evidence that coalitional psychology influences dynamics related to university sports team rivalries and that context matters for expressions of alliance. (shrink)

The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard computational-representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with specific kinds of environments, and with (...) other people. Changes to any of the bodily, environmental, or intersubjective conditions elicit responses from the system as a whole. On this view, rather than representing or computing information, the brain is better conceived as participating in the action. (shrink)

In this paper, I elaborate the difference between the concept of infinity and the idea of infinity through Cantor's diagonalization proof to illuminate a passage in Kant's Critique of Judgment. Taking Lyotard's analysis of aesthetic judgments as the basis for my own project, I focus on the idea of a collapse of temporality required for objective cognition and its concomitant preclusion of cognitive subjectivity. Finally, after borrowing language from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, I show that even though there is not (...) a cognitive subject in judgments of the sublime, there is nevertheless a subjectivity that consciousness is tasked with, even if it never fulfills this task when it is confronted with a mathematically sublime object, and it is an subjectivity that would transcend time in order to know the object in-itself. (shrink)

The thermodynamic behavior is analyzed of a single classical charged particle in thermal equilibrium with classical electromagnetic thermal radiation, while electrostatically bound by a fixed charge distribution of opposite sign. A quasistatic displacement of this system in an applied electrostatic potential is investigated. Treating the system nonrelativistically, the change in internal energy, the work done, and the change in caloric entropy are all shown to be expressible in terms of averages involving the distribution of the position coordinates alone. A convenient (...) representation for the probability distribution is shown to be the ensemble average of the absolute square value of an expansion over the eigenstates of a Schrödinger-like equation, since the heat flow is shown to vanish for each hypothetical “state.” Subject to key assumptions highlighted here, the demand that the entropy be a function of state results in statistical averages in agreement with the form in quantum statistical mechanics. Examining the very low and very high temperature situations yields Planck's and Boltzmann's constants. The blackbody radiation spectrum is then deduced. From the viewpoint of the theory explored here, the method in quantum statistical mechanics of statistically counting the “states” at thermal equilibrium by using the energy eigenvalue structure, is simply a convenient counting scheme, rather than actually representing averages involving physically discrete energy states. (shrink)

Cross-term conservation relationships for electromagnetic energy, linear momentum, and angular momentum are derived and discussed here. When two or more sources of electromagnetic fields are present, these relationships connect the cross terms that appear in the traditional expressions for the electromagnetic (1) energy, (2) linear momentum, and (3) angular momentum, over to, respectively, (1) the sum of the rates of work, (2) the sum of the forces, and (3) the sum of the torques, that are due to the fields of (...) each charge or current source acting upon the other charge and current sources. These relationships, although not new, appear to be rarely recognized and used in the physics literature. As shown here, they can be extremely helpful for solving and gaining a deeper physical understanding into a rather diverse range of interesting problems in electrodynamics, including (1) aspects of Poynting's theorem when applied to charged point particles, (2) the detailed physical basis of electrostatic analysis, (3) understanding the connection between different techniques used in the past for solving Casimir force problems, and (4) reconciling the invalidity of Newton's third law in electrodynamics. (shrink)

In the past, a few researchers have presented arguments indicating that a statistical equilibrium state of classical charged particles necessarily demands the existence of a temperature-independent, incident classical electromagnetic random radiation. Indeed, when classical electromagnetic zero-point radiation is included in the analysis of problems with macroscopic boundaries, or in the analysis of charged particles in linear force fields, then good agreement with nature is obtained. In general, however, this agreement has not been found to hold for charged particles bound in (...) nonlinear force fields. The point is raised here that this disagreement arising for nonlinear force fields may be a premature conclusion on this classical theory for describing atomic systems, because past calculations have not directed strict attention to electromagnetic interactions between charges. This point is illustrated here by examining the classical hydrogen atom and showing that this problem has still not been adequately solved. (shrink)

In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma are absent (...) in the Herder Problem. Their absence does not ensure that players will achieve a welfare-enhancing, cooperative solution to the Herders Problem, but does create far more opportunity for players to alter the expected payoffs through cooperative arrangements. In a properly modeled Herder Problem—along the lines of an assurance game—defection would not always be the dominant strategy. Consequently, the Herder Problem is not in the nature of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. (shrink)

An analysis is carried out involving reversible thermodynamic operations on arbitrarily shaped small cavities in perfectly conducting material. These operations consist of quasistatic deformations and displacements of cavity walls and objects within the cavity. This analysis necessarily involves the consideration of Casimir-like forces. Typically, even for the simplest of geometrical structures, such calculations become quite complex, as they need to take into account changes in singular quantities. Much of this complexity is reduced significantly here by working directly with the change (...) in electromagnetic fields as a result of the deformation and displacement changes. A key result of this work is the derivation that for such cavity structures, classical electromagnetic zero-point radiation is the appropriate spectrum at a temperature of absolute zero to ensure that the reversible deformation operations obey both isothermal and adiabatic conditions. In addition, a generalized Wien displacement law is obtained from the demand that the change in entropy of the radiation in these arbitrarily shaped structures must be a state function of temperature and frequency. (shrink)

In this paper, I will attempt a defense of Hannah Arendt’s usage of the social/political distinction in her “Reflections on Little Rock,” demonstrating that not only is it tenable but also helpful. After distinguishing between her (in)famous distinction between the social and political spheres, I will use the notions of “power,” which is compatible with political freedom, and “force,” which is not, to analyze the strategy of governmentally enforced integration. What I hope to show is that althoughschools are of the (...) utmost political importance, governmental force cannot solve social prejudice, and it cannot legitimately be used outside of the sphere of establishing and protecting legal equality. I will further elucidate Arendt’s illustrative passage on how an integration effort might politically engage problems of exclusion and inequality in schools without having to resort to force to solve social problems and without reducing politics to instrumental administration. (shrink)

In this essay I defend Heidegger’s critique of technology against possible criticisms that he may be an anti-humanist and a mystic. This essay will show that Heidegger’s critique of technology is helpful in thinking about ecological questions; and his contributions to such questions is relevant and not radically separated from some of the work of other philosophers today including Karen Warren and Marilyn Frye.

Decaying wood, while an abundant and stable resource, presents considerable nutritional challenges due to its structural rigidity, chemical recalcitrance, and low nitrogen content. Despite these challenges, certain insect lineages have successfully evolved saproxylophagy (consuming and deriving sustenance from decaying wood), impacting nutrient recycling in ecosystems and carbon sequestration dynamics. This study explores the uneven phylogenetic distribution of saproxylophagy across insects and delves into the evolutionary origins of this trait in disparate insect orders. Employing a comprehensive analysis of gut microbiome data, (...) from both saproxylophagous insects and their non‐saproxylophagous relatives, including new data from unexplored wood‐feeding insects, this Hypothesis paper discusses the broader phylogenetic context and potential adaptations necessary for this dietary specialization. The study proposes the “Detritivore‐First Hypothesis,” suggesting an evolutionary pathway to saproxylophagy through detritivory, and highlights the critical role of symbiotic gut microbiomes in the digestion of decaying wood. (shrink)

From the early modern period to well into the eighteenth century, cattle plagues, murrains, or what were called “great cattle mortalities” were often analogized to bubonic plague; felling animals in devastating numbers, these catastrophes likewise afflicted living creatures on a grand scale. Three Enlightenment cattle pandemics (1709–1720, 1742–1760, and 1768–1786) propelled governments across Europe to enact harsh regulatory measures, including widespread slaughters, quarantines, and major disruptions of trade. This article examines works by Theophilus Lobb, Richard Bradley, Nathaniel Hodges, and (...) class='Hi'>Daniel Defoe, among other writers and physicians, who responded differently to the ways in which human and animal health were biophysically and imaginatively linked. (shrink)

From the early modern period to well into the eighteenth century, cattle plagues, murrains, or what were called “great cattle mortalities” were often analogized to bubonic plague; felling animals in devastating numbers, these catastrophes likewise afflicted living creatures on a grand scale. Three Enlightenment cattle pandemics (1709–1720, 1742–1760, and 1768–1786) propelled governments across Europe to enact harsh regulatory measures, including widespread slaughters, quarantines, and major disruptions of trade. This article examines works by Theophilus Lobb, Richard Bradley, Nathaniel Hodges, and (...) class='Hi'>Daniel Defoe, among other writers and physicians, who responded differently to the ways in which human and animal health were biophysically and imaginatively linked. (shrink)

This collection of essays argues that any valid theory of the modern should—indeed must—reckon with the medieval. Offering a much-needed correction to theorists such as Hans Blumenberg, who in his _Legitimacy of the Modern Age_ describes the “modern age” as a complete departure from the Middle Ages, these essays forcefully show that thinkers from Adorno to Žižek have repeatedly drawn from medieval sources to theorize modernity. To forget the medieval, or to discount its continued effect on contemporary thought, is to (...) neglect the responsibilities of periodization. In _The Legitimacy of the Middle Ages_, modernists and medievalists, as well as scholars specializing in eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century comparative literature, offer a new history of theory and philosophy through essays on secularization and periodization, Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism, Heidegger’s scholasticism, and Adorno’s nominalist aesthetics. One essay illustrates the workings of medieval mysticism in the writing of Freud’s most famous patient, Daniel Paul Schreber, author of _Memoirs of My Nervous Illness_. Another looks at Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s _Empire_, a theoretical synthesis whose conscientious medievalism was the subject of much polemic in the post-9/11 era, a time in which premodernity itself was perceived as a threat to western values. The collection concludes with an afterword by Fredric Jameson, a theorist of postmodernism who has engaged with the medieval throughout his career. _Contributors_: Charles D. Blanton, Andrew Cole, Kathleen Davis, Michael Hardt, Bruce Holsinger, Fredric Jameson, Ethan Knapp, Erin Labbie, Jed Rasula, D. Vance Smith, Michael Uebel. (shrink)

Des origines à la fin du cinquième siècle. Les Présocratiques -- La période classique. Socrate ; Platon ; Aristote et l'école péripatéticienne -- Les philosophies hellénistiques. La critique de la religion populaire à l'âge hellénistique et la philosophie épicurienne de la religion ; La religion des Stoïciens.

In this review essay Kevin Murray and Dan Liston examine three texts in what this symposium has deemed the recent resurgence in neo-Marxist accounts of schooling: David Blacker's The Falling Rate of Learning and the Neoliberal Endgame, Mike Cole's Marxism and Educational Theory, and John Marsh's Class Dismissed. Murray and Liston argue that Blacker, Cole, and Marsh provide a much-needed structural delineation of schooling in capitalist society. All three works have substantial merit and are in need of minor (...) adjustments. Blacker's vision is telling and chilling but may need some fine-tuning; Cole's defense of Marxism is commendable but tends toward the disembodied abstract; and Marsh's text capably highlights educationists' blinders but seems to miss elements of a critical structural account. While recognizing real limitations on transformative education under capitalism, Murray and Liston nevertheless elaborate a variation of the radical humanist project. It is their skeletal attempt at an educationally and morally defensible reparative theory. (shrink)

The Current Legal Problems lecture series and annual volume was established around sixty years ago at the Faculty of Laws, University College London and has long been recognized as a major reference point for legal scholarship. The continuing strength of Current Legal Problems is its representation of a broad range of legal scholarship opinion, theory, methodology, and subject matter, with an emphasis upon contemporary developments of law. Contributions to the 61st volume in the series include an analysis of war as (...) crime by Professor Gerry Simpson, an assessment of the problems in building a realistic climate change regime by Professor Daniel Cole, and an exploration of the problems of character evidence by Dr Mike Redmayne. (shrink)

Précis for a book symposium, with contributions from Meg Wallace, Louis deRosset, and Chris Tillman and Joshua Spencer.

So you want to publish some philosophy—preferably, good philosophy in a nice journal. -/- How do you do it?

David Lewis’s arguments against magical ersatzism are notoriously puzzling. Untangling different strands in those arguments is useful for bringing out what he thought was wrong with not just one style of theory about possible worlds, but with much of the contemporary metaphysics of abstract objects. After setting out what I take Lewis’s arguments to be and how best to resist them, I consider the application of those arguments to general theories of properties and relations. The constraints Lewis motivates turn out (...) to yield an argument for concretism about possible individuals that is quite different from the better-known Lewisian arguments for that position. The discussion also touches on the puzzling question of whether things are the way they are because of the properties they have, or are the properties and relations the way they are because of the things that have them. (shrink)

After 50 years of debate, the ethics of aggregation has reached a curious stalemate, with both sides arguing that only their theory treats people as equals. I argue that, on the issue of equality, both sides are wrong. From the premise that “each counts for one,” we cannot derive the conclusion that “more count for more”—or its negation. The familiar arguments from equality to aggregation presuppose more than equality: the Kamm/Scanlon “Balancing Argument” rests on what social choice theorists call “(Positive) (...) Responsiveness,” Kamm’s “Aggregation Argument” assumes that “equal” lives are fungible, and Hsieh et al. have it that spreading goods broadly best approximates equality. In each case, the crucial premise is not equality itself but a further idea that Taurek, I argue, can safely reject. I conclude with a conjecture: there is no theory-neutral argument that settles the question of whether the numbers count. (shrink)

There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a (...) clash between justifying and requiring reasons. (shrink)

This essay explores the mutual reinforcements between socioeconomic precarity and right-wing populism, and then envisions a politics that contests Trumpism through workers’ organizations that create alternatives to predominant patterns of subject formation through work. I first revisit my recent critique of precarity, which initiates a new method of critical theory informed by Paulo Freire’s political pedagogy of popular education. Reading migrant day laborers’ commentaries on their work experiences alongside critical accounts of today’s general work culture, this “critical-popular” procedure yields a (...) conception of precarity with two defining characteristics. First, precarity is socially bivalent: it singles out specific groups for especially harsh treatment even as it pervades society. Second, precarity constitutes subjects through contradictory experiences of time in everyday work-life, exacerbated by insoluble dilemmas of moral responsibility. Antonio Vásquez-Arroyo’s conception of “political literacy” and Bridget Anderson’s notion of “migrantizing the citizen,” in turn, help us understand how precaritization blocks workers from developing the critical dispositions toward time needed for democratic citizenship. This analysis then makes it possible to elucidate, in dialogue with Daniel Martinez-HoSang and Joseph Lowndes, how precaritized worker-citizenship facilitates the cross-class and multiracial appeal of Trumpism’s white supremacist discourse of national economic decline and resurgence, while normalizing the temporal affects of shock and violence characteristic of Trumpism, as theorized by Lia Haro and Romand Coles. Day laborers’ worker centers, I argue, refunction precaritized time, regenerate political literacy, and migrantize the citizen. A large-scale alternative to right-wing populism thus could emerge if the worker center network were expanded throughout the economy. (shrink)

There has recently been a focus on the question of statue removalism. This concerns what to do with public history statues that honour or otherwise celebrate ethically bad historical figures. The specific wrongs of these statues have been understood in terms of derogatory speech, inapt honours, or supporting bad ideologies. In this paper I understand these bad public history statues as history, and identify a distinctive class of public history-specific wrongs. Specifically, public history plays an important identity-shaping role, and bad (...) public history can commit specifically ontic injustice. Understanding bad public history in terms of ontic injustice helps understand not just to address bad public history statues, but also understand the value of public history more broadly. (shrink)

This paper seeks to carve out a distinctive category of conspiracy theorist, and to explore the process of becoming a conspiracy theorist of this sort. Those on whom I focus claim their beliefs trace back to simply trusting their senses and experiences in a commonsensical way, citing what they take to be authoritative firsthand evidence or observations. Certain flat Earthers, anti-vaxxers, and UFO conspiracy theorists, for example, describe their beliefs and evidence this way. I first distinguish these conspiracy theorists by (...) contrasting them with another group that has recently received a lot of attention from the media, philosophers, and academics more broadly. I then dig more deeply into the nature of these conspiracy theorists’ epistemic self-understanding, in order to give an account of the process by which one becomes such a conspiracy theorist. I conclude with some takeaways and implications: first, I explore the implications of my account for whether these conspiracy theorists’ beliefs are rational; then, I argue that my account has practical takeaways about counteracting beliefs in misinformation, since strategies appropriate to this kind of conspiracy theorist may not be the same ones that are appropriate for other kinds. (shrink)

A normative reason for a person to? is a consideration which favours?ing. A motivating reason is a reason for which or on the basis of which a person?s. This paper explores a connection between normative and motivating reasons. More specifically, it explores the idea that there are second-order normative reasons to? for or on the basis of certain first-order normative reasons. In this paper, I challenge the view that there are second-order reasons so understood. I then show that prominent views (...) in contemporary epistemology are committed to the existence of second-order reasons, specifically, views about the epistemic norms governing practical reasoning and about the role of higher-order evidence. If there are no second-order reasons, those views are mistaken. (shrink)

What is a normative reason for acting? In this paper, I introduce and defend a novel answer to this question. The starting-point is the view that reasons are right-makers. By exploring difficulties facing it, I arrive at an alternative, according to which reasons are evidence of respects in which it is right to perform an act, for example, that it keeps a promise. This is similar to the proposal that reasons for a person to act are evidence that she ought (...) to do so; however, as I explain, it differs from that proposal in two significant ways. As a result, I argue, the evidence-based account of reasons I advance shares the advantages of its predecessor while avoiding many of the difficulties facing it. (shrink)

Public health responses to the Covid‐19 pandemic included various measures to mitigate the spread of the virus. Among these, the most restrictive was a broad category referred to as “lockdowns.” We argue that the reasoning offered in favor of extended lockdowns—those lasting several months or longer—did not adequately account for a host of countervailing considerations, including the impact on mental illness, education, employment, and marginalized communities as well as health, educational, and economic inequities. Furthermore, justifications offered for extended lockdowns set (...) aside a basic tenet of public health ethics: restrictions on liberty and autonomy should be the least intrusive means of achieving the desired end. Since it is now clear that extended lockdowns cause severe harm to many vulnerable populations, the burden of proof is on those who would advocate for them, and there must be a much higher bar to implement an extended lockdown, with high‐quality evidence that the benefit would substantially exceed its harm. (shrink)

What is the connection between valid inference and true conditionals? Many conditional logics require that when A is a logical consequence of B, "if B then A" is true. Taking counterlogical conditionals seriously leads to systems that permit counterexamples to that general rule. However, this leaves those of us who endorse non-trivial accounts of counterpossible conditionals to explain what the connection between conditionals and consequence is. The explanation of the connection also answers a common line of objection to non-trivial counterpossibles, (...) which is based on a transition from valid arguments to the corresponding conditionals. It also contributes to the wider project of illuminating the connections between contexts of utterance, on the one hand, and the truth-conditions of conditionals uttered in those contexts, on the other. (shrink)

This paper responds to commentaries by Kaiserman and Magidor, and Hawthorne. The case of the infinite clowns can teach us several things.

A large body of research in political science claims that the way in which democratic citizens think about politics is motivationally biased by partisanship. Numerous critics argue that the evidence for this claim is better explained by theories in which party allegiances influence political cognition without motivating citizens to embrace biased beliefs. This article has three aims. First, I clarify this criticism, explain why common responses to it are unsuccessful, and argue that to make progress on this debate we need (...) a more developed theory of the connections between group attachments and motivated reasoning. Second, I develop such a theory. Drawing on research on coalitional psychology and the social functions of beliefs, I argue that partisanship unconsciously biases cognition by generating motivations to advocate for party interests, which transform individuals into partisan press secretaries. Finally, I argue that this theory offers a superior explanation of a wide range of relevant findings than purely non-motivational theories of political cognition. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A trivalent theory of indicative conditionals automatically enforces Stalnaker's thesis – the equation between probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities. This result holds because the trivalent semantics requires, for principled reasons, a modification of the ratio definition of conditional probability in order to accommodate the possibility of undefinedness. I explain how this modification is motivated and how it allows the trivalent semantics to avoid a number of well-known triviality results, in the process clarifying why these results hold for many (...) bivalent theories. In short, the slew of triviality results published in the last 40-odd years need not be viewed as an argument against Stalnaker's thesis: it can be construed instead as an argument for abandoning the bivalent requirement that indicative conditionals somehow be assigned a truth-value in worlds in which their antecedents are false. (shrink)

Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the (...) mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide. (shrink)

According to principles of modal security, evidence undermines a belief only when it calls into question certain purportedly important modal connections between one’s beliefs and the truth (e.g., safety or sensitivity). Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras have advanced such principles with the aim of blocking evolutionary moral debunking arguments. We examine a variety of different principles of modal security, showing that some of these are too strong, failing to accommodate clear cases of undermining, while others are too weak, failing to (...) do their advertised work of blocking evolutionary moral debunking arguments. If there is a security principle that slips between the horns of this dilemma—one that is both viable and debunker-blocking—it remains to be formulated. (shrink)

Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we’d believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren’t irrational people who are incapable of rationally processing evidence. I argue that existing accounts of conspiracist belief formation don’t fully address this puzzle. Then, drawing on both philosophical and empirical considerations, I propose a new explanation that appeals to the (...) role of the imagination in conspiracist belief formation. I argue that conspiracists first become imaginatively absorbed in conspiracist narratives, where this helps to explain how they process their evidence. From there, we can better understand why they find this evidence so compelling, as well as the psychological role it plays in their belief forming processes. This account also has practical implications for combatting the spread of online conspiracy theories. (shrink)