Capturing the conspiracist’s imagination

Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3353-3381 (2023)
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Abstract

Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we’d believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren’t irrational people who are incapable of rationally processing evidence. I argue that existing accounts of conspiracist belief formation don’t fully address this puzzle. Then, drawing on both philosophical and empirical considerations, I propose a new explanation that appeals to the role of the imagination in conspiracist belief formation. I argue that conspiracists first become imaginatively absorbed in conspiracist narratives, where this helps to explain how they process their evidence. From there, we can better understand why they find this evidence so compelling, as well as the psychological role it plays in their belief forming processes. This account also has practical implications for combatting the spread of online conspiracy theories.

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Daniel Munro
York University

Citations of this work

Heterodox conspiracy theories and evidence-based theories of error.Rico Hauswald - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
Do your own research!Neil Levy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-19.
The seductions of clarity.C. Thi Nguyen - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:227-255.
Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.

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