General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen’s idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given (...) of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies’ test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett’s notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable. (shrink)

Philosophers debate about which logical system, if any, is the One True Logic. This involves a disagreement concerning the sufficient conditions that may single out the correct logic among various candidates. This paper discusses whether there are necessary conditions for the correct logic; that is, I discuss whether there are features such that if a logic is correct, then it has those features, although having them might not be sufficient to single out the correct logic. Traditional rationalist arguments suggest that (...) the necessary conditions of thought are necessary and sufficient conditions singling out the correct logical and mathematical theories. In the contemporary debate, Chalmers advocates a view along this line. Jago, analogously, suggests that the necessary conditions for thought—or, as he calls them, our basic epistemic expectations—single out a family of logical and mathematical theories. Warren and Williamson, on the other hand, argue that there are no necessary conditions of thought. I argue that there are necessary conditions for thought, and these are necessary but not sufficient conditions to be the correct logic; indeed, these are features that all logics—correct or incorrect—share. No view we can understand is ruled out by the necessary conditions for thought, but we cannot understand quite any view. Human linguistic and conceptual abilities are genetically constrained, and these constraints are our best guide to the boundaries of logic. Arguing for this, I tackle two dogmas of modern rationalism: namely, the view that the biological constraints of human cognition have no bearing on the boundaries of the epistemic space, and the view that the boundaries of thought coincide with the boundaries of language. (shrink)

In a series of papers, 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his hylomorphic theory of embodiments. In this article, we supply a formal semantics for this theory that is adequate to the principles laid down for it in. In Section 1, we lay out the theory of embodiments as Fine presents it. In Section 2, we argue on Cantorian grounds that the theory needs to be stabilized, and sketch some ways forward, discussing various choice points (...) in modeling the view. In Section 3, we develop a formal semantics for the theory of embodiments by constructing embodiments in stages and restricting the domain of the second-order quantifiers. In Section 4 we give a few illustrative examples to show how the models deliver Finean hylomorphic consequences. In Section 5, we prove that Fine’s principles are sound with respect to this semantics. In Section 6 we present some inexpressibility results concerning Fine’s various notions of parthood and show that in our formal semantics these notions are all expressible using a single mereological primitive. In Section 7, we prove several mereological results stemming from the model theory, showing that the mereology is surprisingly robust. In Section 8, we draw some philosophical lessons from the formal semantics, and in particular respond to Koslicki’s main objection to Fine’s theory. In the appendix we present proofs of the inexpressibility results of Section 6. (shrink)

Serious actualism is the prima facie plausible thesis that things couldn’t have been related while being nothing. The thesis plays an important role in a number of arguments in metaphysics, e.g., in Plantinga’s argument for the claim that propositions do not ontologically depend on the things that they are about and in Williamson’s argument for the claim that he, Williamson, is necessarily something. Salmon has put forward that which is, arguably, the most pressing challenge to serious actualists. Salmon’s objection is (...) based on a scenario intended to elicit the judgment that merely possible entities may nonetheless be actually referred to, and so may actually have properties. It is shown that predicativism, the thesis that names are true of their bearers, provides the resources for replying to Salmon’s objection. In addition, an argument for serious actualism based on Stephanou, 219–250 2007) is offered. Finally, it is shown that once serious actualism is conjoined with some minimal assumptions, it implies property necessitism, the thesis that necessarily all properties are necessarily something, as well as a strong comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic according to which for every condition there necessarily is the property of being a thing satisfying that condition. (shrink)

On the classical understanding, an agent is fully excused for an action if and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to (...) closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é apontar cinco aspectos do pensamento nietzschiano que podem ser relevantes para os debates da filosofia da ciência em torno da natureza e representação do conhecimento científico. Para tanto, é realizada uma revisão de literatura com o objetivo de selecionar trechos de obras nietzschianas como O nascimento da tragédia, Genealogia da moral, A gaia ciência e outras que permitam interpretar Nietzsche como um filósofo da ciência preocupado com a construção do conhecimento cientifico sobre a realidade física. (...) Como resultado é possível identificar uma proposta epistemológica na perspectiva nietzschiana, cuja representação objetiva do mundo deve apontar para uma estética da vida. -/- The purpose of this article is to point out five aspects of Nietzschean thought that may be relevant to debates in the philosophy of science around the nature and representation of scientific knowledge. To this end, a literature review is carried out with the aim of selecting excerpts from Nietzschean works such as The Birth of Tragedy, Genealogy of Morals, The Gay Science and others that allow us to interpret Nietzsche as a philosopher of science concerned with the construction of scientific knowledge about the physical reality. As a result, it is possible to identify an epistemological proposal in the Nietzschean perspective, whose objective representation of the world should point to an aesthetics of life. (shrink)

Necessitism, Contingentism, and Theory Equivalence is a dissertation on issues in higher-order modal metaphysics. Consider a modal higher-order language with identity in which the universal quantifier is interpreted as expressing universal quantification and the necessity operator is interpreted as expressing metaphysical necessity. The main question addressed in the dissertation concerns the correct theory formulated in this language. A different question that also takes centre stage in the dissertation is what it takes for theories to be equivalent.The whole dissertation consists of (...) an extended argument in defence of the truth of two seemingly inconsistent higher-order modal theories, specifically: 1.Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a theory based on Plantinga’s [1] modal metaphysics that is committed to, among other things, the contingent being of some individuals and the necessary being of all possible higher-order entities;2.Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a theory advocated by Williamson [3] which is committed to, among other things, the necessary being of every possible individual as well as of every possible higher-order entity.Part of the case for these theories’ joint truth relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: Thorough Serious Actualism, the thesis that no things could have been related while being nothing, and Higher-Order Necessitism, the thesis that necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories. The defence of Higher-Order Necessitism constitutes a powerful challenge to Stalnaker’s [2] Thorough Contingentism, a theory committed to, among other things, the view that there could have been some individuals as well as some entities of any higher-order that could have been nothing.In the dissertation it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are in fact equivalent, even if they appear to be jointly inconsistent. The case for this claim relies on the Synonymy account, a novel account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to this account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same commitments and conception of logical space.By way of defending the Synonymy account’s adequacy, the account is applied to the debate between noneists, proponents of the view that some things do not exist, and Quineans, proponents of the view that to exist just is to be some thing. The Synonymy account is shown to afford a more nuanced and better understanding of that debate by revealing that what noneists and Quineans are really disagreeing about is what expressive resources are available to appropriately describe the world.By coupling a metatheoretical result with tools from the philosophy of language, it is argued that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are synonymous theories, and so, by the lights of the Synonymy account, equivalent. Given the defence of their extant commitments made in the dissertation, it is concluded that Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are both correct. A corollary of this result is that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is, in an important sense, merely verbal. For if two theories are equivalent, then they “require the same of the world for their truth.”Thus, the results of the dissertation reveal that if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, then one will not go wrong. Notwithstanding, one will still go wrong if one speaks as a Plantingan while advocating Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, or as a Williamsonian while advocating Plantingan Moderate Contingentism.On the basis of a conception of the individual constants and predicates of second-order modal languages as strongly Millian, i.e., as having actually existing entities as their semantic values, in the appendix are presented second-order modal logics consistent with Stalnaker’s Thorough Contingentism. Furthermore, it is shown there that these logics are strong enough for applications of higher-order modal logic in mathematics, a result that constitutes a reply to an argument to the contrary by Williamson [3]. Finally, these logics are proven to be complete relative to particular “thoroughly contingentist” classes of models. (shrink)

The history of philosophy risks a self-opacity whereby we overestimate or underestimate our proximity to prior modes of thinking. This risk is relevant to assessing Hegel’s appropriation by McDowell and Priest. McDowell enlists Hegel for a quietist answer to the problem with assuming that concepts and reality belong to different orders, viz., how concepts are answerable to the world. If we accept Hegel’s absolute idealist view that the conceptual is boundless, this problem allegedly dissolves. Priest enlists Hegel for a dialetheist (...) answer to the problem with assuming that truth and falsity are mutually exclusive, viz., how certain sentences are both true and false. If we accept Hegel’s dialectical view that certain contradictions are necessary, this problem allegedly dissolves. For both McDowell and Priest, we find a true friend in Hegel. I argue that McDowell’s and Priest’s appropriations of Hegel overestimate Hegel’s affinity with quietism and dialetheism. McDowell reads Hegel as a quietist who silences metaphysical claims and the skeptical questions they raise against commonsense, but neglects Hegel’s adaptation of ancient skepticism against commonsense. Priest reads Hegel as a dialetheist who subordinates formal logic to dialectical logic by affirming the truth of certain contradictions, but neglects Hegel’s commitment to resolving contradictions for the sake of truth qua whole. I diagnose their misreadings in terms of what Hegel regards as the three moments of logic and argue that while McDowell jumps to its third moment, Priest stalls at its second moment. According to Hegel’s Encyclopedia Logic, logic has three “moments”: the abstractive moment of the understanding, which “stops short” at fixed categories; the negative moment of dialectic, which discovers the “genuine nature” of the categories, viz., that each “passes over, of itself, into its opposite”; and the positive moment of speculation, which grasps the “unity” of categories through the “dissolution” of their inner opposition. Hegel warns that if these moments are “kept separate from each other […] they are not considered in their truth”. I suggest that quietist and dialetheist readings of Hegel fail to consider truthfully the unified moments of his logic. In his quietist critique of metaphysics, McDowell enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of concept and reality. But McDowell helps himself directly to the third moment of logic, where the unity of the categories, and hence the boundlessness of the conceptual, would be fully articulated. Since he arrives at the third moment prematurely, ignoring its prior moments, he obscures its truth (§1). In his dialetheist critique of formal logic, Priest enlists Hegel to dissolve the problem with assuming the duality of truth and falsity. But Priest restricts himself gratuitously to the second moment of logic, where contradictions within the categories are not yet resolved. Since he stalls at the second moment, severed from its final moment, he obscures its truth (§2). I argue we can extricate Hegel from quietist and dialetheist misreadings only if we grasp the truth of the three moments of logic. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é demonstrar, a partir do pensamento de Marx, como o lucro comercial e a renda fundiária – dois componentes do mais-valor que, juntamente com o salário, correspondem aos rendimentos da fórmula trinitária – pressupõem a exploração do trabalho ou o intercâmbio desigual que mantém o processo de acumulação capitalista. As remunerações do comerciante e do proprietário fundiário, muito embora apareçam na superfície da economia moderna dissociadas do seu fundamento real, como se fossem autônomas e sem qualquer (...) nexo com a espoliação que garante a autovalorização do capital, representam apenas quotas do trabalho excedente obtido na esfera da produção. (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage, Bruno Deschênes met en parallèle la pensée musicale européenne et la pensée esthétique japonaise, une rencontre philosophique par laquelle il propose par transpropriation comment cette pensée venant d'Asie permettrait aux mélomanes d'approfondir leur appréciation de toute musique quelle qu'elle soit. Il présente divers aspects de l'esthétique japonaise qui sont ignorés, à tout le moins jugés périphériques, dans la pensée européenne et qui, pourtant, sont inhérents à l'écoute de toute musique. Ouvrage écrit au départ du point de (...) vue du musicien, l'auteur met en contexte le rôle de l'interprète dans son rapport à un auditeur qui est à la recherche d'un sentiment esthétique vécu dans l'instant même d'une écoute tributaire de l'exécution musicale. L'écoute musicale est, selon lui, une relation visant une expérience esthétique commune. L'auditeur va à la rencontre d'une musique et du musicien, alors que ce dernier va à la rencontre de cette même musique pour l'enchantement de ses admirateurs. Tous deux convoitent un sentiment esthétique vécu mutuellement le temps d'une rencontre que l'auteur qualifie de musicale."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Cet article se demande si un dialogue entre la civilisation chinoise et Leo Strauss est possible et à quelles conditions. Il décrit le contexte d’introduction de Strauss en Chine, en se concentrant sur Liu Xiaofeng, l’un des straussiens les plus influents de la Chine contemporaine. L’analyse de son interprétation de la critique straussienne de la modernité occidentale fait ressortir deux distorsions fondamentales : là où Strauss considérait l’« enseignement tyrannique » comme quelque chose de théorique, Liu en fait un plan (...) d’action politique ; au lieu de reconnaître la modernité des bases idéologiques de l’État fondé par Mao Zedong, il les interprète au crible de la tradition. Cette double déformation contredit l’intention de Strauss en tant que philosophe zététique et socratique. (shrink)

In 1957, Francis Crick outlined a startling vision of life in which the great diversity of forms and shapes of macromolecules was encoded in the one-dimensional sequence of nucleic acids. This paper situates Crick's new vision in the debates of the 1950s about protein synthesis and gene action. After exploring the reception of Crick's ideas, it shows how they differed radically from a different model of protein synthesis which enjoyed wide currency in that decade. In this alternative model, advocated by (...) Linus Pauling and other luminaries, three-dimensional templates directed the folding of proteins. Even though it was always considered somewhat speculative, this theory was supported by a number of empirical results originating in different experimental systems. It was eventually replaced by a model in which the forms and shapes of macromolecules resulted solely from their amino acid sequence, dramatically simplifying the problem of protein synthesis which Crick was attempting to solve in 1957. (shrink)

The book outlines the historical development of Public Law and the state from ancient times to the modern day, offering an account of relevant events in parallel with a general historical background, establishing and explaining the relationships between political, religious, and economic events.

The objective of this work is to present Ludwig Wittgenstein's perspective on the impossibility of the existence of philosophical problems, to then reflect on the implications of such a perspective based on Popper's thought. For that, Wittgenstein's perspective, as exposed in his work Tractatus logico-philosophicus, is contrasted with Karl Popper's perspective presented in “The nature of philosophical problems and their scientific roots” (in Conjectures and refutations). The example of the problem faced by Kant in his work Critique of pure reason (...) will also be considered for the analysis of Wittgenstein's argument. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are pseudo-problems because they have no solution. However, despite admitting the existence of pseudo-problems, Popper argues that factual, logical, or hybrid problems, under certain circumstances, can be philosophical. Thus, the aim is to contrast these two perspectives in order to emphasize how not all philosophical problems are pseudo-problems. (shrink)

The most common first- and second-order modal logics either have as theorems every instance of the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae and of their second-order analogues, or else fail to capture the actual truth of every theorem of classical first- and second-order logic. In this paper we characterise and motivate sound and complete first- and second-order modal logics that successfully capture the actual truth of every theorem of classical first- and second-order logic and yet do not possess controversial instances of (...) the Barcan and Converse Barcan formulae as theorems, nor of their second-order analogues. What makes possible these results is an understanding of the individual constants and predicates of the target languages as strongly Millian expressions, where a strongly Millian expression is one that has an actually existing entity as its semantic value. For this reason these logics are called ‘strongly Millian’. It is shown that the strength of the strongly Millian second-order modal logics here characterised afford the means to resist an argument by Timothy Williamson for the truth of the claim that necessarily, every property necessarily exists. (shrink)

Le but de cet ouvrage est d'éclairer la façon dont Rousseau fait de la philosophie. Il s'organise autour des notions de dispositions, de sensibilité, et de relations sous lesquelles Rousseau pense le devenir humain de la nature. Leur rôle transversal et cardinal dans sa philosophie permet d'en appréhender l'unité.

Warum und wie genau darf zu Hause oder auf einer Theaterbühne anders gehandelt werden, als im Büro; wie verändert sich die Bedeutung von Worten, je nachdem wo, von wem und wie sie gesagt werden? Warum und mit welchen Mitteln versuchen wir, höflich zu sein, und inwiefern sind wir von unangemessenem Verhalten anderer bedroht? Welches Weltwissen benötigen Beobachter, um beurteilen zu können, wann Verhalten als angemessen oder unangemessen einzustufen ist? Im vorliegenden Band untersuchen die Beitragenden das Phänomen sozialer Angemessenheit unter anderem (...) aus philosophischer, sozialpsychologischer, soziologischer, kulturtheoretischer, linguistischer und anthropologischer Perspektive. Dabei werden insbesondere Bedingungen und Auswirkungen, Merkmale sowie Wandlungs- und Entstehungsprozesse sozialer Angemessenheit thematisiert. Die Herausgebenden Jacqueline Bellon M.A. promoviert an der TU Darmstadt und arbeitet als Philosophin, Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaftlerin. Dr. Bruno Gransche ist Philosoph am Institut für Technikzukünfte (ITZ) des Karlsruher Instituts für Technologie (KIT). Sebastian Nähr-Wagener M.A. ist wiss. Mitarbeiter am Institut für Technikzukünfte (ITZ) des Karlsruher Instituts für Technologie (KIT). (shrink)

A diversidade do pensamento filosófico sobre as transformações modernas e contemporâneas que cercam a produção artística desdobra-se nos quinze textos que compõem o livro, os quais abordam os mais variados gêneros: cinema, poesia, escultura, pintura e fotografia. Além disso, os textos dialogam ora com autores consagrados - de Winckelmann e Schelling a Benjamin e Rancière -, ora com os próprios artistas - de Glauber Rocha a Joseph Kosuth - e ora com contextos socioculturais mais amplos - desde o capitalismo estético (...) até a estética dos gêneros. Os principais problemas filosóficos que balizam a história da estética e se mantém no cerne dos debates modernos e contemporâneos atravessam esta coletânea: temas tradicionais como a educação do gosto, o conceito de beleza, o princípio da imitação da natureza e a relação entre aparência e verdade são atualizados com acuidade. Temas fundamentais do século XX como a autonomia da arte, o papel da arte na invenção de um povo, a liberdade e a experiência estética, a perda da materialidade das obras de arte e a função da crítica de arte também recebem atenção cuidadosa. Temas que dialogam diretamente com a situação atual das artes são igualmente contemplados, como a subsunção da arte pelo consumo, o possível caráter transgressor e revolucionário do gesto artístico e o papel das imagens na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

BackgroundCancer diagnosis and treatment represent a real upheaval both for the patient and for his or her life partner. Adjustment to cancer has been widely studied at the individual level, however, there is little in the literature about the experiences of the couple as an entity. This is especially true with regard to a population facing advanced cancer. This systematic review aimed to make an inventory of 1) the current knowledge relating to the experience of the patient-partner dyad when confronted (...) with advanced cancer, and 2) the psychosocial interventions specifically centered on this dyad.MethodThis review was conducted using the Cochrane methodology. The eligibility criteria for the literature review were: one of the members of the dyad being treated for advanced cancer, dyad composed of the patient and his/her life partner. Databases from PubMed, PsycArticle, PsycInfo, Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection and Scopus were investigated. A thematic content analysis on the basis of admitted articles made it possible to respond to each of our research objectives.ResultsThree hundred eighty-nine citations were found. Twenty were admitted to the systematic review of the literature. It highlighted the following experiences of the advanced cancer patient-life partner dyad: uncertainty about the future, disjointed time, intrusion into the couple's intimacy, attachment style and caregiving within the couple, couple's adjustment to cancer symptomatology, the couple's supportive care needs, role changes, nature of communication within the couple, anticipation of the coming death, and the meanings and beliefs around death. This review also describes the range of couple therapies used in the context of advanced cancer: emotionally focused-couple therapy, existential therapy, art therapy, support therapy and couple communication and intimacy promotion. These therapies seem to have individual beneficial effects for both the patient and his or her life partner as well as improving marital functioning.ConclusionsThese results clearly highlight that consideration of the couple and communication within the couple during care are fundamental to dyadic adjustment to advanced cancer. Further studies are needed to better understand the couple's experience in order to adapt the management of the couple facing advanced cancer. (shrink)

Mit Beiträgen zahlreicher Fachwissenschaftler.

The metaverse is the extension of this virtual world in which our avatars and other holograms will socialize. Should we speak of incarnation when it is virtual beings that represent us rather than physical bodies?

As coleções paleontológicas representam uma herança natural e cultural, que deve ser salvaguardada em acervos institucionais. Dentre elas, destaca-se a Coleção de Paleovertebrados do Departamento de Geologia e Paleontologia do Museu Nacional (DGP-MN), que sofreu uma considerável perda, em decorrência do incêndio sofrido por este museu em 2018. Uma forma de recuperar as informações históricas e científicas desta coleção está em seu registro iconográfico. Nesse contexto, o presente trabalho inventaria e ilustra o acervo, que ficou conhecido no Departamento de Geologia (...) e Paleontologia do Museu Nacional como “Coleção Cope”. Trata-se de uma centena de vertebrados fósseis que foram enviados, sob a forma de empréstimo, ao paleontólogo norte-americano Edward Drinker Cope (1840-1897), no final do século XIX, para identificação e descrição. Grande parte desta coleção foi obtida durante a construção da Estrada de Ferro da Bahia ao São Francisco, inaugurada em 1860. A implementação e consequente ampliação da rede ferroviária no Brasil, no final do século XIX, trouxe não só crescimento econômico, como possibilitou a formação de muitas coleções paleontológicas, uma vez que os cortes abertos nos terrenos para a construção das estradas de ferro revelaram o registro fossilífero, como é o caso da “Coleção Cope”. Se esta não mais existe fisicamente, ao menos a listagem e o registro iconográfico aqui apresentados poderão revalidá-la para a paleontologia brasileira. (shrink)

A mechanistic study of consciousness need not be confined to human complexity. Other animals also display key behaviors and responses that have long been intimately tied to the measure of consciousness in humans. Among them are some very well-defined and measurable endpoints: selective attention, sleep and general anesthesia. That these three variables associated with changes in consciousness might exist even in a fruit-fly does not necessarily imply that a fly is “conscious”, but it does suggest that some of the problems (...) central to the field of consciousness studies could be investigated in a model organism such as Drosophila melanogaster. Demonstrating suppression of unattended stimuli, which is central to attention studies in humans, is now possible in Drosophila by measuring neural correlates of visual selection. By combining such studies with an eventual understanding of suppression in other arousal states in the fly, such as sleep and general anesthesia, we might be unraveling mechanisms relevant to consciousness as well. BioEssays 27:321–330, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This research qualitatively investigated four treatments for addiction in Brazil that use ibogaine as the main tool in the process. Ibogaine is a substance derived from an African plant, Tabernanthe iboga, traditionally used in its region of origin and which leads to intense sensations during its acute effects and also different experiences of oneself and the surrounding world in the period after its use. It’s considered a non‐typical psychedelic. We visited the clinics and interviewed professionals and patients of these places. (...) In this article, we focus on how ibogaine is used for addiction and depression treatment and how its effect is understood. There is variation in patient screening and preparation, how the ibogaine is determined, and the care practices proposed after the treatment. These variations seem to be influenced by the context where ibogaine is inserted and their practices. We identified three different contexts that influence ibogaine use in Brazil: the market of addiction treatment clinics, the Brazilian urban religious use of ayahuasca, and the medical context of ibogaine use developed by Howard Lotsof. (shrink)

En los últimos años se ha propuesto una importante cantidad de métodos estadísticos demográficos. La gran mayoría han sido desarrollados con la finalidad de pronosticar las componentes demográficas y/o medidas derivadas a partir de la suposición de un modelo subyacente. El presente trabajo pretende realizar un ejercicio comparativo integral a través de la estimación y pronóstico de la fecundidad a partir de tres propuestas —métodos clásicos de pronóstico, tales como los modelos ARIMA y los suavizados exponenciales, modelos para datos funcionales (...) (MDF) y modelos jerárquicos bayesianos (MJB)—, como un primer paso hacia el estudio de las proyecciones de población derivadas de cada una de ellas, empleando datos de la Argentina. El ejercicio tiene como horizonte final la estimación de la mortalidad y la fecundidad a través de los tres métodos mencionados para luego integrarlos en proyecciones de población. (shrink)

[1] Ihr System und ihr Verhältnis zur Logistik. 4. Aufl.--2. Definitionstheorie und Kalkülwechsel.

Em The Empirical Stance, van Fraassen propõe o voluntarismo de posturas epistêmicas: é racional tudo o que é racionalmente permitido, e apenas a incoerência é racionalmente proibida. O voluntarismo de posturas é uma concepção permissiva de racionalidade, que permite a um agente escolher qual postura epistêmica adotar, onde uma postura epistêmica é entendida como um feixe de atitudes avaliativas (e.g. admirar, priorizar) acerca de como formar conhecimento. A vantagem proclamada pelo voluntarismo é a sua capacidade para explicar a racionalidade de (...) revoluções científicas: a aceitação de novos paradigmas não decorre do seguimento de regras metodológicas fixas, mas expressa uma escolha de aderir a um novo sistema de valores e posturas epistêmicas. Defendo que o voluntarismo enfrenta um dilema entre duas situações insatisfatórias: ou assume o conservadorismo epistêmico (i.e. que nossas crenças atuais possuem justificação prima facie) e torna-se incapaz de explicar a racionalidade das revoluções científicas; ou rejeita o conservadorismo epistêmico, e torna-se incapaz de criticar sistemas cognitivos alternativos, por mais absurdos que sejam (desde que coerentes). De um modo ou de outro, o voluntarismo oferece uma epistemologia incompleta para cumprir as finalidades postuladas por van Fraasen. (shrink)