In a famous paper of 1931, Gödel proved that any formalization of elementary Arithmetic is incomplete, in the sense that it contains statements which are neither provable nor disprovable. Some two years before this, Presburger proved that a mutilated system of Arithmetic, employing only addition but not multiplication, is complete. This essay is partly an exposition of a system such as Presburger's, and partly an attempt to gain insight into the source of the incompleteness of Arithmetic, by linking Presburger's result (...) with Gödel's. Chapter 1, p. 1. (shrink)

In 1943 one of the authors of this paper set out a case for the view that the sixth book of Polybius' Histories contained two layers, written at different times, and indicating a change in the historian's assessment of the achievements and merits of the Roman hegemony. The arguments there put forward met with some acceptance; but the recent burst of interest in the problems of the sixth book has shown that unanimity is still remote. Among scholars writing since 1943, (...) one, G. B. Cardona, is a ‘separatist’ who accepts the views of De Sanctis; another, W. Theiler, believes that three ‘layers’ of composition can be detected and isolated; three, E. Mioni, H. Erbse, and H. Ryffel, are ‘Unitarians’, but vary in the date they assign to the composition of the Histories; and K. Ziegler in his R.E. article on Polybius argues for composition in the sixties followed by a revision and publication before 146. (shrink)

This paper expands the notion of finite nondeterminism by allowing also cofinite nondeterminism. We characterise a class of programs and a class of predicates, such that each predicate is either finite or cofinite, and programs, when viewed as predicate transformers, preserve this distinction. So as not to be too closely tied to the specifics of any semantic approach, we require our relational model of programs to be translatable also into a predicate transformer model, as well as a Hoare-logical model, by (...) considerations of duality. This make for a well-behaved class of programs and predicates, albeit fairly restricted. One advantage of this approach is that we need not equate either nontermination or non-finite nondeterminism with chaos. (shrink)

Certain proximities between two distinguished but very dissimilar contemporaries, Quintilian and Tacitus, may be stated. Contemporary they were, though the former, born probably a little before A.D. 40, was older by about twenty years. Both were from outside Rome, Quintilian certainly of provincial, Spanish, origin, Tacitus very probably from one of the Galliae, yet both exemplars of Romanitas.

Certain proximities between two distinguished but very dissimilar contemporaries, Quintilian and Tacitus, may be stated. Contemporary they were, though the former, born probably a little before A.D. 40, was older by about twenty years. Both were from outside Rome, Quintilian certainly of provincial, Spanish, origin, Tacitus very probably from one of the Galliae, yet both exemplars of Romanitas.

In 1943 one of the authors of this paper set out a case for the view that the sixth book of Polybius' Histories contained two layers, written at different times, and indicating a change in the historian's assessment of the achievements and merits of the Roman hegemony. The arguments there put forward met with some acceptance; but the recent burst of interest in the problems of the sixth book has shown that unanimity is still remote. Among scholars writing since 1943, (...) one, G. B. Cardona, is a ‘separatist’ who accepts the views of De Sanctis; another, W. Theiler, believes that three ‘layers’ of composition can be detected and isolated; three, E. Mioni, H. Erbse, and H. Ryffel, are ‘Unitarians’, but vary in the date they assign to the composition of the Histories; and K. Ziegler in his R.E. article on Polybius argues for composition in the sixties followed by a revision and publication before 146. (shrink)

Based on Russell's archives and developments in psychodynamic theory, Brink (English and psychiatry, McMaster University) presents a new perspective on his contributions in forming late 20th c. liberal awareness. Paperback edition ($12.50) not seen. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

De redactie van Philosophia Reformata heeft aan prof. Brümmer, dr. Sarot en ondergetekende gevraagd te reageren op hetgeen prof. Geertsema in twee bijdragen aan dit nummer over de zogenoemde ‘Utrechtse school’ in de wijsgerige theologie te berde brengt. Aangezien het minder gebruikelijk is om als auteurs c.q. redacteuren te reageren op een boekrecensie, gaan onze duplieken vooral in op het zelfstandige artikel dat Geertsema wijdt aan de theologie van Brümmer. Toch willen we graag ook beknopt reageren op de recensie, die (...) immers de vorm gekregen heeft van een tamelijk uitvoerige ‘kritische studie’, en daarmee toch eigenlijk ook van een min of meer zelfstandige bijdrage. (shrink)

The evolutionary stages by which man has progressed from organic determination to self-determination forms the subject of this "myth-historicus." We now stand on the brink of a new age, the author maintains, in which it is no longer necessary to devote our energies to the discovery of further "labor-saving devices" but in which the good life for the sake of which we saved labor will be and is already our proper business.--C. M.

We may be at the brink of a Kuhnian paradigm shift when it comes to the categorical classification system of mental disorders. Reviewing more than 30 years of critical literature on the categorical classification of personality disorders, Kueger, Hopwood, Wright, and Markon conclude that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is "fundamentally broken". Just before, the director of the National Institute of Mental Health declared that the institute will no longer support research that is based on DSM (...) categories.The critique on the categorical system of mental disorders consists of several arguments that are briefly mentioned as they have been... (shrink)

I begin by quoting from two valuable recent works on Horace. Professor Brink in his Horace on Poetry writes: ‘The centre of the short piece lies in lines 21—34. Readers, among them critics and poets, had denied one aspect of the Odes which was surely above criticism—the striking originality of these poems. Horace's defence turns on the question of originality’ and ‘Epistle 19 is unique in that it alone among the literary satires and letters reiterates Horace's claim to be (...) the Latin fidicen’ . And Dr. McGann in his Studies in Horace's First Book of Epistles : ‘In Ep. 19... as in the literary satires, Horace is a practising poet or at least a very recently practising one, engaged in defending himself against hostile criticism’ and ‘As the only epistle concerned exclusively with literary matters, the nineteenth stands apart’. (shrink)

The conference explored an extraordinary diversity of aging strategies in organisms ranging from short‐lived species to “immortal” animals and plants. Research on the biological processes of aging is at the brink of a revolution with respect to our understanding of its underlying mechanisms as well as our ability to prevent and cure a wide variety of age‐related pathologies.

relative to the actual world) of a propositional theory are defined. A theory is ‘closer to the truth’ the logically stronger its positive content and the logically weaker its negative content. This proposal delivers the same verisimilar preordering of theories that has been defined by Brink and Heidema as a ‘power ordering’. The preordering may be collapsed to a partial ordering and then embedded into a complete distributive lattice. The preordering may also be refined to a partial ordering by (...) employing the ‘convex content’ and the ‘non-convex content’ of each theory. Philosophical implications and historical relations are discussed. (shrink)

At the intersection of meta-ethics and philosophy of science, Nicholas Sturgeon’s “Moral Explanation” ([1985] 1988), Richard Boyd’s “How to be a Moral Realist” (1988), and David Brink’s Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (1989) inaugurated a sustained argument for the claim that moral kinds like right action and virtuous agent are scientifically investigable natural kinds. The corresponding position is called “non-reductive ethical naturalism,” or “NEN.” Ethical nonnaturalists, by contrast, argue that moral kinds are genuine and objective, but not (...) natural. This dissertation is largely a challenge to non-reductive ethical naturalism from the viewpoint of ethical nonnaturalism. An introduction, four fairly independent chapters, and a conclusion comprise this dissertation. The introduction (chapter one) situates and summarizes the arguments in the four chapters that immediately follow, and the concluding chapter (chapter six) describes future work related to the arguments in this dissertation. I now turn to chapters two through five. In chapter two, I shore up what I believe are weakness in Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection to reductive ethical naturalism and then present a challenge to the NEN theorist, which, I argue, the NEN theorist must but ultimately cannot meet. The challenge is to sketch an empirical experiment whereby we can adjudicate between competing moral hypotheses. I explain in terms of experimental design and evaluation why the challenge cannot be met. Chapters three and four focus on the semantics and reference relations of kind terms. In chapter three, I defend the Causal Externalist (CE) theory of semantics and reference against an objection distilled from two articles by Åsa Marie Wikforss. The objection is that CE implies a paradox, escape from which forces the CE theorist upon the horns of a dilemma. I show how the CE theorist can avoid the dilemma by allowing that the intensions of some artificial-kind terms (e.g., ‘jade’) are not given by descriptions associated with the terms. One consequence of this move, however, is that it casts doubt upon the coherence of the claim that moral-kind terms (e.g., ‘morally required action’) are natural-kind terms. In chapter four, I defend Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons’s Moral-Twin Earth argument from three critical responses put forward in recent paper by David Merli. NEN theorists claim that CE can account for the semantics and reference of moral-kind terms. As per Horgan and Timmons (H&T), however, our responses to the Moral-Twin Earth thought experiment give us reason to doubt the NEN theorists’ claim. Against H&T’s argument, however, Merli presents three independent, critical responses, and in this chapter I defend H&T’s argument in a way that is friendly to the ethical nonnaturalist. One upshot is, I contend, that the ethical nonnaturalist can and indeed should co-opt H&T’s argument for his own use. In chapter five, I return to kinds themselves, specifically those in biology. I first point out that ethical nonnaturalism appeals to a metaphysical thesis about nonnatural value, which need not be limited to the moral domain. Then, I argue that biological naturalism alone cannot give a satisfying realist account of biological kinds like HEART and NEURON. Finally, I show that by conjoining the concept of Cummins functions as recently defended by Paul Davies, a thesis about nonnatural value, and Ned Block’s Disney Principle regarding structural properties, the nonnaturalist, unlike the naturalist, can offer a satisfying realist account of biological kinds. (shrink)

According to Michael Smith, in his book The Moral Problem, the following internalist claim is true: ‘‘If an agent judges it right to do something in certain circumstances, then the agent is either motivated to do that thing in the circumstances or is practically irrational.’’ He calls this claim the ‘‘practicality requirement on moral judgment,’’ and in his book tries to defend it against the amoralist challenge presented by David Brink. Brink famously argues against internalism on the grounds (...) that it ‘‘makes the amoralist conceptually impossible.’’ Amoralists are people who genuinely make moral judgments, remain unmoved with respect to their motivation, and yet do not suffer the relevant kinds of practical irrationality. They may judge, say, that it is right to donate one's old clothes to the Red Cross, but they not only fail to do so when the time comes, they are not motivated at all to do so when the time comes. Defenders of the practicality requirement, in contrast, claim that it is a ‘‘conceptual truth’’ that ‘‘agents who make moral judgments are motivated accordingly, at least absent weakness of will and the like.’’ Brink thinks amoralists are possible, and that since internalists deny the possibility, we should reject internalism in favor of externalism, which makes the moral motivation of judgers a matter of a contingent fact about them. -/- Smith's argument in The Moral Problem in defending the practicality requirement, then, is in essence to show that ‘‘it is impossible for there to be any amoralists.’’ In the argument to be considered here, he argues that externalists cannot offer an acceptable explanation for why the moral motivation of good people reliably follow their moral judgments. But we will see that Smith's defense of the practicality requirement loses its appeal once we see that it turns on an ambiguity in his use of the expression ‘‘good people.’’ Furthermore, easy examples show that, contrary what Smith says, people whose motivations reliably follow their moral judgments sometimes care only derivatively about that which they judge. Smith's later presentations of his argument also fail, for externalists need not offer a single explanation of the moral motivation of all whose motivation reliably follow their moral judgments. (shrink)

The authors present a case study involving truth telling responsibilities in the setting of nonepileptic seizures. Specifically, over the course of several suspected nonepileptic seizures, a patient’s seizures stopped after he received a saline flush meant to precede the administration of anti-seizure medication. The patient and his surrogate believed he had received the medication each time, and the team wondered whether they should disclose the truth. Some worried that disclosure would reinforce the suspected psychogenic behavior, exacerbating the patient’s condition. In (...) this way, the case study presents a twist on the traditional truth telling archetype. While most truth telling cases center on navigating cultural differences or worries about emotional harm, this case presented concerns about medical harm in the form of exacerbating the patient’s condition. The authors describe the complex patient-family-team dynamic that preceded this ethical dilemma, describe the case, analyze the ethical issue, and describe the outcome. (shrink)

Postcolonial science studies entails ostensibly contradictory critical and empirical commitments. Science studies scholars influenced by Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers embrace forms of realist, radical empiricism, while postcolonial studies scholars influenced by Jacques Derrida trace the limits of the knowable. This essay takes their common use of the term cosmopolitics as an unexpected point of departure for reconciling Derrida’s program with Stengers’s and Latour’s. I read Derrida’s critique of hospitality and Stengers’s and Latour’s ontological politics as necessary complements for conceiving (...) a care-oriented subalternist cosmopolitics, a process of composing common worlds that remains attentive to the limits of representation. (shrink)